TEH AUN YANG (BERNIAGA SEBAGAI PEMILIK TUNGGAL DENGAN NAMA FOO YUAN FOOD COURT) 1. ) WAN CHOW SENG 2. ) YAP CHENG HEE 3. ) YAP KIM KEE & SONS SDN BHD

WA-12ANCC-145-11/2021 Kand. 33 03/09/2022 20:23:40 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN DAGANG) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: WA-12ANCC-145-11/2021 ANTARA TEH AUN YANG (No. K/P: 851022-07-5747) (berniaga sebagai pemilik tunggal dengan nama Foo Yuan Food Court) (No. Pendaftaran: 002992202-P) … PERAYU DAN 1. WAN CHOW SENG (No. K/P: 680304-10-6077) 2. YAP CHENG HEE (No. K/P: 491201-10-5183) 3. YAP KIM KEE & SONS SDN BHD (No. Syarikat : 9195-A) … RESPONDEN- RESPONDEN [DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO. WA-B52NCC-862-11/2019 ANTARA TEH AUN YANG (No. K/P: 851022-07-5747) (berniaga sebagai pemilik tunggal dengan nama Foo Yuan Food Court) (No Pendaftaran 002992202-P) ... PLAINTIF DAN 1. WAN CHOW SENG (NO K/P: 680304-10-6077) S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2. YAP CHENG HEE (NO K/P: 491201-10-5183) 3. YAP KIM KEE & SONS SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 9195-A) ... DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN] JUDGMENT [1] The was an appeal by the Appellant (Plaintiff in the Sessions Court) against the decision of the Sessions Court on 1.11.2021 allowing the 3rd Respondent’s (3rd Defendant in the Sessions Court) application (“3rd Respondent’s Striking Out Application”) to strike out the Appellant’s Amended Writ and Amended Statement of Claim, both dated 1.6.2021 pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19 (1)(a) and/or (b) and/or (c) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC”)(“this Appeal”). [2] At the outset, it must be pointed out that the Notice of Appeal in this Appeal is against all three Respondents (being the Defendants in the Sessions Court) when the Sessions Court only decided on the 3rd Respondent’s Striking Out Application which did not involve the 1st and 2nd Respondents. Therefore, the 1st and 2nd Respondents were wrongfully made respondents in this Appeal. [3] After hearing submissions from the parties, I dismissed this Appeal and upheld the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge. I set out below the reasons for my decision. A] SALIENT BACKGROUND FACTS [4] The 3rd Respondent is the registered owner of the vacant land held under No. Title H.S (D) 77399, PT 11120, Mukim Batu, Daerah Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan (“the said Land”). S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 2 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [5] On 1.7.2019, the 3rd Respondent entered into a Tenancy Agreement dated 1.7.2019 (“Main Tenancy Agreement”) with the 1st and 2nd Respondents in which the 3rd agreed to rent the said Land to the 1st and 2nd Respondents. [6] The material terms of the Main Tenancy Agreement are, inter alia, as follows: “1. The Landlord lets and the Tenant takes the Said Land for fixed term of three (3) years commencing from 01st August, 2019 and expiring on 31st July 2022 at a monthly rental of Ringgit Malaysia Six Thousand Only (RM6,000.00) payable in advance within the first seven (7) days of each calendar month and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter contained. 2. The Tenant hereby covenants with the Landlord as follows:- ………. (e) Not to assign sublet or part with possession of the Said Land of any part thereof without prior first obtaining the written consent of the Landlord, including constructing or installing any religions’ structure. (f) To use the Said Land solely and exclusively for the Tenant’s business only, that is to say, to be used as Multi-Purpose and legal business which not against the Malaysia Law only. ………. (h) To apply to the relevant authorized for any licences required to operate the Said Land and shall be responsible for all expenses incurred in procuring the maintaining such a license. (i) To comply with all law, bye-law, rules and regulations, if any imposed by the relevant authorities in respect of the Said Land and the operating of storage at the Said Land. ………. (n) To obtain the approval from the relevant authorities and the Landlord, before any temporary structure.” (own emphasis added) S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 3 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [7] By way of letter dated 7.7.2019, the 3rd Respondent gave his consent to the 1st and 2nd Respondents to allow them to sublet the said Land to the Appellant pursuant to Clause 2(e) of the Main Tenancy Agreement (“Consent Letter”). [8] The 1st and 2nd Respondents subsequently entered into a Sub- Tenancy Agreement dated 15.7.2019 (“Sub Tenancy Agreement”) where the 1st Respondent and the 2nd Respondent agreed to sublet the said Land to the Appellant. The 3rd Respondent is not a party to the said Sub-Tenancy Agreement. [9] The Appellant filed the present action in November 2019 originally against the 1st and 2nd Respondents only but then later applied to join the 3rd Respondent on 16.3.2021 (“Joinder Application”). Appellant’s Claim against the 1st and 2nd Respondents [10] The Appellant’s pleaded case against the 1st and 2nd Respondents is summarised as follows: i) The Appellant was interested in renting the said Land to run his food court business thereon. ii) The Appellant was informed that the said Land is owned by the 3rd Respondent and the 1st and 2nd Respondents had already obtained the Consent Letter to sublet the said Land. iii) The Appellant alleged that before the Sub-Tenancy Agreement was signed, the 1st and 2nd Respondents had given their guarantee that the 1st and 2nd Respondents have obtained, inter alia, the building licence from Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur (“DBKL”). iv) The Appellant further alleged that the 1st and 2nd Respondents represented to the Appellant, inter alia, that: a) The 1st and 2nd Respondents had purchased the structures on the said Land from the previous owner and are in the midst of obtaining, inter alia, the licence S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 4 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal certificates, development order and building plans from the previous owner and will give a copy to the Appellant to enable him to apply for the licence to operate a food court. b) The 1st and 2nd Respondents guaranteed that the licence certificates, development order and building plans truly exist. c) The 1st and 2nd Respondents guaranteed that the said Land was previously let and used as a food court and it would not be difficult to obtain the business licence from DBKL. (“1st and 2nd Respondents’ Alleged Representations”) v) After making the above representations, the 1st and 2nd Respondents urged the Appellant to sign the Sub-Tenancy Agreement. vi) The Plaintiff then executed the Sub-Tenancy Agreement based on the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Representations. vii) However, while in the process of obtaining the business license from the necessary bodies to run the food court business on the said Land, the Appellant discovered that a business licence cannot be obtain as the property is reserved for school use or “dirizabkan untuk sekolah” and cannot be use for any business or commercial purpose. [11] The Appellant’s pleaded cause of action against the 1st and 2nd Respondents are essentially based on: i) False or fraudulent representation; and ii) Fraud. Appellant’s Claim against the 3rd Respondent [12] As stated earlier, the 3rd Respondent was added as a party via the Appellant’s Joinder Application which was allowed by the Sessions S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 5 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Court on 1.4.2021 (“Joinder Order”). The Joinder Application was filed about 1 year and 4 months after the present action was filed. [13] Upon obtaining the Joinder Order which included an amendment application the Appellant amended its Statement of Claim to add the 3rd Respondent and the Appellant’s cause of action against him. The Appellant’s cause of action against the 3rd Respondent in his Amended Statement of Claim was for the alleged breach of the 3rd Respondents duty of care towards the Appellant under Tort. [14] The Appellant’s pleaded case against the 3rd Respondent are substantially contained in the following paragraphs of the Amended Statement of Claim: “39. Dalam pada itu, Plaintif juga percaya dan memplidkan bahawa Defendan Ketiga pada sekitar tahun 2014/2015 telah menyewakan tanah tersebut kepada penyewa yang dikenali sebagai One Two Six Eight Restaurant (“penyewa terdahulu”) di mana penyewa terdahulu juga menjalankan bisnes perniagaan medan selera dan/atau restoran makanan. 40. Pada sekitar tahun 2015/2016, pihak Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur telah menolak permohonan lesen perniagaan medan selera/restoran makanan penyewa terdahulu, atas sebab, antara lain bahawa permohonan tidak dapat dipertimbangkan kerana aktiviti perniagaan dijalankan di tanah rezab sekolah. Dalam hal ini, Defendan Ketiga adalah berpengetahuan penuh bahawa tanah tersebut tidak boleh digunakan untuk aktiviti perniagaan kerana telah direzabkan untuk sekolah. 41. Defendan Ketiga kemudiannya memasuki Perjanjian Sewa Defendan- Defendan tersebut dan seterusnya sebagai tuanpunya tanah dan/atau pemilik berdafatar tanah tersebut memberikan persetujuan dan/atau kebenaran dan/atau autoriti kepada Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua untuk meneruskan dengan Perjanjian Sewa tersebut di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua. 42. Pada setiap masa yang material, Defendan Ketiga mempunyai kewajipan dan tanggungjawab untuk memastikan bahawa tanah tersebut adalah tidak boleh dan/atau tidak harus digunakan untuk aktiviti perniagaan dan/atau untuk aktiviti komersial. Defendan Ketiga juga sebagai pemilik berdaftar tanah tersebut mempunyai kewajipan dan tanggungjawab pada setiap masa yang material untuk memastikan bahawa pengunaan tanah tersebut adalah tidak melanggari sebarang undang-undang. S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 6 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43. Maka, Plaintif memplidkan bahawa Defendan Ketiga sebagai pemilik berdaftar tanah tersebut mempunyai kewajipan dan tanggungjawab dibawah tort dan/atau undang-undang terhadap Plaintif sebagai penyewa tanah tersebut pada setiap masa yang material. Butir-butir kecuaian dan kewajipan dibawah tort dan undang-undang Defendan Ketiga adalah seperti berikut:- BUTIR-BUTIR DEFENDAN KETIGA a. Defendan Ketiga telah gagal, enggan, ingkar dan/atau cuai untuk memastikan bahawa tanah tersebut adalah tidak digunakan untuk aktiviti perniagaan dan/atau komersial; b. Defendan Ketiga telah gagal, enggan, ingkar dan/atau cuai untuk memastikan bahawa Struktur-struktur tersebut tidak didirikan di atas tanah tersebut pada setiap masa yang material; c. Defendan Ketiga telah gagal, enggan, ingkar dan/atau cuai untuk memastikan bahawa tanah tersebut tidak digunakan untuk tujuan dan/atau aktiviti-aktiviti selain daripada yang dimaktubkan oleh pihak berkuasa tempatan pada setiap masa yang material; d. Defendan Ketiga telah gagal, enggan, ingkar dan/atau cuai untuk memastikan bahawa Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua menggunakan tanah tersebut selaras dengan undang-undang dan/atau peraturan-peraturan yang ditetapkan oleh pihak berkuasa tempatan sebelum Perjanjian Sewa tersebut dimasuki di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua; e. Defendan Ketiga telah gagal, enggan, ingkar dan/atau cuai untuk memastikan tujuan pengunaan tanah tersebut oleh Plaintif sebelum memberikan persetujuan dan/atau kebenaran dan/atau autoriti kepada Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua untuk meneruskan dengan Perjanjian Sewa tersebut di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua; f. Defendan Ketiga telah gagal, enggan, ingkar dan/atau cuai untuk mendedahkan dan/atau memberikan informasi penuh kepada Plaintif mengenai keadaan sebenar tanah tersebut bahawa tanah tersebut tidak boleh digunakan untuk aktiviti perniagaan kerana telah direzabkan untuk sekolah sebelum memberikan persetujuan dan/atau kebenaran dan/atau autoriti kepada Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua untuk meneruskan dengan Perjanjian Sewa tersebut di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua; S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 7 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal g. Defendan Ketiga telah gagal, enggan, ingkar dan/atau cuai untuk mendedahkan dan/atau memberikan informasi penuh kepada Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua bahawa tanah tersebut tidak boleh digunakan untuk aktiviti perniagaan kerana telah direzabkan untuk sekolah sebelum memberikan persetujuan dan/atau kebenaran dan/atau autoriti kepada Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua untuk meneruskan dengan Perjanjian Sewa tersebut di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua; h. Defendan Ketiga telah gagal, enggan, ingkar dan/atau cuai untuk bertindak secara bona fide apabila memberikan persetujuan dan/atau kebenaran dan/atau autoriti kepada Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua untuk meneruskan dengan Perjanjian Sewa tersebut di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua tanpa memastikan tujuan pengunaan tanah tersebut oleh Plaintif; i. Defendan Ketiga telah gagal, enggan, ingkar dan/atau cuai untuk bertindak secara bona fide apabila memasuki Perjanjian Sewa Defendan-Defendan tersebut; j. Defendan Ketiga telah menyalahgunakan kuasanya dengan memberikan persetujuan dan/atau kebenaran dan/atau autoriti kepada Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua untuk meneruskan dengan Perjanjian Sewa tersebut di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua tanpa memastikan tujuan pegunaan tanah tersebut oleh Plaintif; k. Defendan Ketiga telah gagal, enggan, ingkar dan/atau cuai untuk melaksanakan ketelitian, kemahiran, dan usaha yang munasabah dalam memastikan tujuan pengunaan tanah tersebut oleh Plaintif sebelum memberikan persetujuan dan/atau kebenaran dan/atau autoriti kepada Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua untuk meneruskan dengan Perjanjian Sewa tersebut di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua; l. Defendan Ketiga telah gagal, enggan, ingkar dan/atau cuai untuk mendedahkan dan/atau memberikan informasi penuh kepada Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua bahawa tanah tersebut tidak boleh digunakan untuk aktiviti perniagaan kerana telah direzabkan untuk sekolah sebelum dan/atau selepas memasuki Perjanjian Sewa Defendan-Defendan tersebut; S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 8 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m. Defendan Ketiga telah gagal, enggan, ingkar dan/atau cuai untuk mengambil kira faktor-faktor material dalam membuat penilaian sama ada persetujuan dan/atau kebenaran dan/atau autoriti boleh dan/atau harus diberikan ataupun tidak kepada Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua untuk meneruskan dengan Perjanjian Sewa tersebut di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua. ………………… 46. Tambahan pula, Plaintif sesungguhnya memplidkan dengan lebih lanjut bahawa jikalau bukan kerana kecuaian-kecuaian dan/atau tindakan- tindakan Defendan Ketiga seperti yang diplidkan di perenggan 43 di atas, Plaintif juga tidak akan memasuki perjanjian sewa tersebut dan menjalankan kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian atas premis tersebut serta mengalami kerugian-kerugian tersebut. ………………… 49. Plaintif juga sesungguhnya memplidkan bahawa kecuaian-kecuaian dan/atau tindakan-tindakan Defendan Ketiga seperti yang dipilidkan di perenggan 43 telah membolehkan perjanjian sewa tersebut dan/atau Perjanjian Sewa Defendan-Defendan tersebut adalah tidak sah (“ void”) dan/atau kebolehtidaksahan (“Voidable”) yang mana ia merupakan tanggungjawab Defendan Ketiga untuk memberikan pampasan dan/atau gantirugi kepada Plaintif dengan secukupnya untuk membolehkan Plaintif kembali kepada posisi seolah-olah perjanjian sewa tersebut dan/atau Perjanjian Sewa Defendan-Defendan tersebut tidak pernah dimasuki dan/atau dijalankan. (own emphasis added) [15] The above paragraphs of the Amended Statement of Claim were included after the Joinder Application was allowed. [16] The crux of the Appellant’s claim against the 3rd Respondent is essentially that the 3rd Respondent (as the owner of the said Land) had a duty of care towards the Appellant to ensure that compliance of some of the terms of the Sub-Tenancy Agreement and the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Alleged Representations (between the 1st and 2nd Respondents and the Appellant), namely, the terms and representations that would enable the Appellant to run its food court business on the said Land as that is the purpose for which the Appellant had agreed to rent the same. S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 9 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Reliefs claimed by the Appellant against all the Respondents [17] The reliefs sought by the Appellant against the Respondents are essentially as follows: i) that the Sub-Tenancy Agreement is a voidable; ii) in the alternative, a declaration that the Sub-Tenancy Agreement is void; iii) a declaration that the Main Tenancy Agreement is void; iv) an order rescinding the Sub-Tenancy Agreement; v) an order rescinding the Main Tenancy Agreement; vi) an order for the security deposit amounting to RM24,000.00, rental that was paid by Appellant amounting to RM 15,500.00 and agent’s fee of RM3,000.00 be refunded by the 1st and 2nd Respondents or in the alternative for damages amounting to RM42,500.00; vii) an order for the Respondents to, jointly and severally, pay the Appellant for the costs and expenses for the electrical and wiring works, renovation and upgrading works, advertising and service, purchase of kitchen equipment/food court for the said Land in the sums of RM61,999.00, RM162,070.00, RM21,306.00 and RM107,273.90 respectively. viii) an order for the Respondents to, jointly and severally, pay the Appellant for the Appellant’s employees, ix) General damages, interests and costs. B] THE 3RD RESPONDENT’S STRIKING OUT APPLICATION AND THE GROUNDS IN SUPPORT [18] In 3rd Respondent’s Striking Out Application before the Sessions Court was based on Order 18 Rule 19 (1)(a) and/or (b) and/or (c) S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 10 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal and/or (d) ROC for the Amended Writ and Amended Statement of Claim against the 3rd Respondent to be struck out on the following grounds: i) The Appellant’s claim against the 3rd Respondent discloses no reasonable cause of action because the Appellant failed to demonstrate contractual and/or tortious relationship/nexus between the Appellant and the 3rd Respondent; ii) The Appellant’s claim against the 3rd Respondent is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious and it is obviously unsustainable; iii) The Appellant’s claim against the 3rd Respondent will prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; iv) The Appellant’s suit against the 3rd Respondent a is an abuse of the process of the Court; v) The Appellant has no locus standi to file this suit against the 3rd Respondent; and vi) The Appellant is estopped from filling this suit against the 3rd Respondent. [19] The 3rd Respondent’s main ground in support of the 3rd Respondent’s Striking Out Application is that there is essentially no nexus between the Appellant’s claim or cause of action and the 3rd Respondent. C] NO CONTRACTUAL OR TORTIOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APPELLANT AND THE 3RD RESPONDENT [20] After hearing submissions from both counsel for the Appellant and the 3rd Respondent, I found that there was no appealable error committed by the Sessions Court to warrant this Appeal to be allowed. My reasons are set out below. S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 11 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [21] I will begin with the chronology of proceedings stated earlier which shows that the Appellant did not originally intend to sue the 3rd Respondent and that his claim is actually against the 1st and 2nd Respondents. This is evident from the fact that the Appellant took about 1 year and 4 months to file the Joinder Application to join the 3rd Respondent as a party to this action. [22] The Appellant recognised that his claim and causes of action were against the 1st and 2nd Respondents. The Appellant only later considered to include the 3rd Respondent. [23] The Appellant is not a party to the Main Tenancy Agreement between the 3rd Respondent and 1st and 2nd Respondents and therefore the Appellant has no privity of contract in so far as the Main Tenancy Agreement is concerned. [24] The 3rd Respondent is not a party to the Sub-Tenancy Agreement between the 1st and 2nd Respondents and the Appellant and therefore the 3rd Respondent is not bound by the terms of the Sub- Tenancy Agreement. [25] Hence, there is no privity of contract or contractual relationship between the Appellant and the 3rd Respondent (Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v. Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75). [26] What the Appellant had essentially sought to do is to make the 3rd Respondent liable for the 1st and 2nd Respondents alleged failure to ensure that the Appellant was able to carry out his food court business on the said Land. In this regard the Appellant alleged that the approvals and licences from DBKL and the relevant bodies were prerequisites for the Appellant to enter into the Sub-Tenancy Agreement. [27] It is quite evident from the Amended Statement of Claim itself that the Appellant intends to hold the 3rd Respondent liable for the alleged breach of contract under the Sub-Tenancy Agreement and the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Alleged Representations which were made by the 1st and 2nd Respondents to the Appellant. S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 12 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [28] The Appellant’s pleads that the 3rd Respondent owes him a duty of care under Tort because: i) The 3rd Respondent is the owner of the said Land; ii) The 3rd Respondent is aware of the Sub-Tenancy Agreement; and iii) The 3rd Respondent had issued the Consent Letter. [29] Therefore, the main question here is whether the 3rd Respondent being a stranger to the Sub-Tenancy Agreement owed the Appellant a duty of care under the Tort of negligence. If there is no such duty of care then it is axiomatic that the Appellant has no cause of action against the 3rd Respondent. [30] The reason why the 3rd Respondent was made a party to this action can be seen from the following submission of learned counsel for the Appellant, some of which he considered necessary to repeat (paragraph 7 of the Appellant’s Reply Submissions (Enclosure 20)): “7. Appellant again humbly submits that since the Third Respondent is the owner of the property in dispute, the inclusion of the Third Defendant is necessary as declaratory relief is applied for in this suit where any order and/or judgement made by the court will have a direct impact on the rights and interests of Third Respondent and would potentially be affected by such declarations.” [31] The emphasis placed in parts of the above submissions are by learned counsel for the Appellant himself. [32] First and foremost, learned counsel for the Appellant has failed to provide a single case or authority to show that the Appellant’s cause of action against the 3rd Respondent founded on a tort of negligence fell within any established categories of negligence under the law of Tort. S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 13 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [33] Secondly, the 3rd Respondent is not a nominal defendant in the present action. The reliefs claimed by the Appellant against the 3rd Respondent are substantially the same as those claimed against the 1st and 2nd Respondents which reliefs include restitution or in other words intended to put the Appellant in his original position prior to occurrence of the alleged breach. [34] The Appellant sought to make the 3rd Respondent principally responsible for the alleged breach of contract by the 1st and 2nd Respondents as well as the breach of the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Alleged Representations. [35] With respect to learned counsel for the Appellant, there is no known or established cause of action under Tort for the Appellant’s claim against the 3rd Respondent. [36] In this regard, I must emphasise that the Appellant also sought to declare void and rescind the Main Tenancy Agreement in which he is not a party. This is totally devoid of merit. The Appellant, being a stranger to the Main Tenancy Agreement, has no right to declare it void or have it rescinded. [37] On this issue of the doctrine of privity of contract, the Federal Court in Badiaddin (supra) held as follows in reference to restitution under Section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950: “Under that section the party who is bound to restore any advantage received or to make compensation for such advantage should be construed as "any person" who is a party to the agreement and has received any advantage pursuant to the terms or conditions of the invalid contract, but not otherwise. To extend the meaning of "any person" in s. 66 to strangers to the agreement would be in violation of the elementary principle of contract.” ……….. “Kepong Prospecting is therefore authority for the proposition that the words "or any other person" appearing in s. 2(d) of the Contracts Act 1950 are not to be wide enough to exclude the doctrine of privity of contract. It follows, by parallel reasoning, that the identical words used by s. 66 do not include persons who are not parties to a contract under which a benefit passed. In my judgment, there is no justification, in principle or policy, to extend the terms S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 14 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal of the section by means of an interpretation that runs counter to settled jurisprudence. It follows that the only parties to a contract may claim or become liable to make, restitution under that section. Any other construction would produce an anomaly because, while only parties to a contract may sue upon it, yet, when the very same contract is discovered to be void, anyone, including persons who cannot enforce it may recover any benefit received by one of the parties thereto.” (own emphasis added) [38] I now return to the earlier issue that the Appellant’s cause of action does not fall within any established categories of negligence under the law of Tort. [39] Whilst the law recognises that there is some room for the establishment of new categories of negligence however there are limits to it and should be guided by traditional categorisation. This principle can be seen in, inter alia, the following passages from the English House of Lords in the well known case of Caparo Industries Plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605: “Whilst recognising, of course, the importance of the underlying general principles common to the whole field of negligence, I think the law has now moved in the direction of attaching greater significance to the more traditional categorisation of distinct and recognisable situations as guides to the existence, the scope and the limits of the varied duties of care which the law imposes. We must now, I think, recognise the wisdom of the words of Brennan J. in the High Court of Australia in Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman (1985) 60 A.L.R. 1, 43-44, where he said: “It is preferable, in my view, that the law should develop novel categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy with established categories, rather than by a massive extension of a prima facie duty of care restrained only by indefinable 'considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed.'" (own emphasis added) S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 15 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [40] The Court may strike out an action where the pleaded duty of care does not exist or is not based on any recognised or established categories of negligence. This was considered and decided in the case of Ku Pon & Ors v. Pemandangan Sinar Sdn Bhd & Ors [2004] 3 CLJ 46 where the High Court struck out the plaintiff’s statement of claim as there was no duty of care that existed based on any recognised categories of negligence and held as follows: “The issue of want of cause of action, whether I could conclude that the plaintiffs' claim fell within any legally recognized heads of claim for negligence, certainly had to be founded only on the facts pleaded in the statement of claim, which as said earlier must be presumed to be true at this early stage. To succeed, the plaintiffs must by legal necessity establish the existence of a duty of care towards them. Further, the plaintiffs must establish whether the alleged negligence pursuant to the publication had caused provable physical damages or losses, or economic losses arising from that physical damage or economic loss, which by necessity must fall within the scope of that duty of care. (own emphasis added) [41] The case of Ku Pon (supra) was referred with approval in the Court of Appeal case of The President of Majlis Perbandaran Tawau v. Amiruddin Rasake & Ors And Another Appeal [2017] 6 CLJ 519 and also in the Federal Court case of Tenaga Nasional Malaysia v. Batu Kemas Industri Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2018] 6 CLJ 683. [42] In reference to the case of Ku Pon (supra) the Court of Appeal in The President of Majlis Perbandaran Tawau (supra) held as follows: “[31] In striking out the claim, Suriyadi J (later FCJ) took the approach of first determining whether, on a given set of facts, a notional duty of care could be identified, failing which the matter ends. At p. 476 (CLJ); p. 476 (MLJ), His Lordship said: So, should I expand the scope to accommodate the plaintiffs' claim? To take that drastic step, I need to conclude whether, on the given set of S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 16 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal facts, a notional duty of care could be identified, failing which the matter ends. If I were to conclude otherwise, the next step naturally would be to determine whether a factual duty of care existed between the plaintiffs and the defendants at the hearing proper stage. Needless to say, whether the pleaded set of facts disclose the existence of notional duty of care, would very much depend on the foreseeability of damages to the plaintiffs, the relationship of proximity or neighbourhood notion, and that it is fair and reasonable to impose a duty of care. To reiterate only after these ingredients have been satisfied will a notional duty of care may (sic) arise. (emphasis added)” [43] Further, I am of the considered view that the 3rd Respondent does not owe a duty of care to the Appellant to prevent the alleged wrongdoing committed by the 1st and 2nd Respondents. By analogy the following principles laid down by the English House of Lords in Smith And Others Appellants And Littlewoods Organisation Ltd. Respondents Maloco Respondents [Consolidated Appeals] [1987] A.C. 241 are applicable: “But it must not be overlooked that a problem arises when the pursuer is seeking to hold the defender responsible for having failed to prevent a third party from causing damage to the pursuer or his property by the third party's own deliberate wrongdoing. In such a case, it is not possible to invoke a general duty of care; for it is well recognised that there is no general duty of care to prevent third parties from causing such damage. The point is expressed very clearly in Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd ed. (1985), when the authors state, at pp. 196-197: "The law might acknowledge a general principle that, whenever the harmful conduct of another is reasonably foreseeable, it is our duty to take precautions against it … But, up to now, no legal system has gone so far as this …" The same point is made in Fleming, The Law of Torts, 6th ed. (1983), where it is said, at p. 200: “there is certainly no general duty to protect others against theft or loss.” I wish to add that no such general duty exists even between those who are neighbours in the sense of being occupiers of adjoining premises. There is no general duty upon a householder that he should act as a watchdog, or that his house should act as a bastion, to protect his neighbour's house.” (own emphasis added) S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 17 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [44] As illustrated in Smith (supra), even in far lesser extreme cases the Courts have declined to hold that there is a duty of care to prevent wrongs committed by third parties. [45] To put it simply, there is no legal basis for the 3rd Respondent to be liable for the alleged wrongful acts of the 1st and 2nd Respondents. [46] It is also important for me to highlight that it is not stated anywhere in the Amended Statement of Claim or the Appellant’s Affidavit In Reply in response to the 3rd Respondent’s Striking Out Application of any communication, interaction or dealing directly between the Appellant and the 3rd Respondent. [47] Therefore, it is not wrong for learned counsel for the 3rd Respondent to argue that the Appellant has no locus standi to bring the action against the 3rd Respondent. Learned counsel for the 3rd Respondent referred to the High Court in Abdul Aziz Bin Lebai Milin & Ors v. Suruhanjaya Pengangkutan Awam Darat [2016] MLJU 1873 where it was held as follows: “[116] I found that the plaintiffs have no locus standi to bring the action against the defendant due to the failure of the plaintiffs to show a nexus between the plaintiffs and the defendant in the writ and the statement of claim. [117] This is because in addition to the failure to disclose material facts in the statement of claim, the plaintiffs’ averments have also failed to show that they have the requisite locus standi to bring the suit against the defendant by showing a nexus between the plaintiffs and the defendant, be it a contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant or the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiffs and whether the duty owed is a public duty for the cause of action for a breach of statutory duty or whether the duty owed is the duty of care for the cause of action in negligence. Thus, the failure of the plaintiffs to disclose any breach of contract by the defendant or breach of statutory duty or breach of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiffs renders the plaintiffs' suit as having no reasonable cause of action.” (own emphasis added) S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 18 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [48] The difference between Abdul Aziz (supra) and the present case on appeal is that in the present case the Appellant had pleaded that his cause of action against the 3rd Respondent is for negligence. However, there is no nexus between the Appellant’s claim and the 3rd Respondent and there is no established of duty of care owed by the 3rd Respondent to the Appellant as pleaded. [49] Even if the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Alleged Representations are true, the 3rd Respondent has nothing to do with them. Thus, the 3rd Respondent is not complicit in any wrongdoings by the 1st and 2nd Respondents, even if there were any. [50] In connection with this I must add that the Appellant’s pleaded case against the 3rd Respondent did not include the allegation of conspiracy between the 3rd Respondent and the 1st and 2nd Respondents or fraud as against the 3rd Respondent. [51] It does not stand to reason that just because the 3rd Respondent is the owner of the said Land, whatever was promised or represented by the 1st and 2nd Respondents to the Appellant, even if they were true, would bind the 3rd Respondent. [52] Even the Consent Letter was issued before the Sub-Tenancy Agreement was entered. The Appellant is not party to the Consent Letter as it was only between the 3rd Respondent and the 1st and 2nd Respondents. D] CONCLUSION [53] For the purpose of completeness, in his written submissions (Enclosures 14 and 20) learned counsel for the Appellant attempted to raise the issue of a “collateral contract” but this was never pleaded in the Amended Statement of Claim or even in the Appellant’s Affidavit In Reply though it would not have made any S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 19 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal difference if it was raised in the Appellant’s Affidavit In Reply as the defect in a pleading cannot be made good by way of affidavit evidence (United Malayan Banking Corp. Bhd. v. Palm & Vegetable Oils (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. [1983] 1 MLJ 206). [54] Therefore, learned counsel for the Appellant’s argument on a “collateral contract” must be disregarded (Ribaru Bina Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Bakti Kausar Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [2007] 1 CLJ 552). Additionally, and in any event, there were no pleaded facts to support such an allegation of a “collateral contract”. [55] Learned counsel for the Appellant had also raised a technical objection that the 3rd Respondent’s Striking Out Application should have been made via a misjoinder application under Order 15 Rule 6 (2)(a) ROC as the 3rd Respondent is trying to strike out a party. I rejected this argument on the basis that the 3rd Respondent’s Striking Out Application clearly prayed for the Amended Writ and Amended Statement of Claim to be struck out against the 3rd Respondent under Order 18 Rule 19(1) ROC, which provision entitles the 3rd Respondent to do so. [56] I found that this is a case where the Appellant’s claim against the 3rd Respondent is on the face of it is obviously unsustainable (Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 MLJ 1; Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd v. United Malaysian Banking Corp Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36). [57] Further, that the said claim is frivolous, vexatious (Middy Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Arensi-Marley (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 3 MLJ 511) or is otherwise an abuse of the process of Court. Thus, the Appellant’s claim against the 3rd Respondent is bound to fail (Raja Zainal Abidin Bin Raja Haji Tachik & 3 Ors. v. British- American Life & General Insurance Bhd. [1993] 3 CLJ 6). [58] Whilst, my reasons for dismissing this Appeal may differ somewhat from the grounds of the learned Sessions Court Judge for allowing the 3rd Respondent’s Striking Out Application, however, the conclusion arrived at is the same. S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 20 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [59] For the reasons stated above, I dismissed this Appeal and after hearing submissions on costs from all parties, granted costs of RM5,000.00 in favour of the 3rd Respondent and costs of RM1,000.00 in favour of the 1st and the 2nd Respondents as they were wrongly named as respondents in this Appeal and their counsel had attended the hearing. Dated this 25th day of August, 2022 -SGD- (WAN MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN WAN YAHYA) Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division (NCC 3)) COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT Dato’ Gobinath Mohanna (Azizul Helmi (pupil-in chambers) together with him) Messrs The Law Office of Mohanna & Co No 2A, Jalan 2/8, Bandar Baru Selayang 68100 Batu Caves Selangor. Tel: 03-6120 1943 Email: lawofficemohanna@gmail.com S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 21 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal COUNSEL FOR THE 1st and 2nd RESPONDENTS Neoh Pei Yan Messrs A. Baskaran & Co Unit 2-1, The Cube Jalan 6/18A, Taman Mastiara Jalan Ipoh 512000 Kuala Lumpur. Tel: 03-6179 4711 Email: abaskaranco@gmail.com COUNSEL FOR THE 3rd RESPONDENT Ooi Chi-Jen (Wong Chee Wai and See Shu Min together with him) Messrs Chang, Haryaty & Co Level 5, Block C, Excella Business Park Jalan Ampang Putra 51200 Kuala Lumpur. Tel: 03-4278 6911 Email: legalfirm@changharyaty.my LEGISLATION / RULES CITED Rules of Court 2012 ▪ Order 18 Rule 19 (1)(a)(b)(c) and (d) ▪ Order 15 Rule 6 (2)(a) Contracts Act 1950 ▪ Section 66 S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 22 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal CASES CITED 1. Abdul Aziz Bin Lebai Milin & Ors v. Suruhanjaya Pengangkutan Awam Darat [2016] MLJU 1873 2. Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v. Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75) 3. Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd v. United Malaysian Banking Corp Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 4. Caparo Industries Plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 5. Ku Pon & Ors v. Pemandangan Sinar Sdn Bhd & Ors [2004] 3 CLJ 46 6. Middy Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Arensi-Marley (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 3 MLJ 511 7. Raja Zainal Abidin Bin Raja Haji Tachik & 3 Ors. v. British-American Life & General Insurance Bhd. [1993] 3 CLJ 6 8. Ribaru Bina Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Bakti Kausar Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [2007] 1 CLJ 552 9. Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 MLJ 1 10. Smith And Others Appellants And Littlewoods Organisation Ltd. Respondents Maloco Respondents [Consolidated Appeals] [1987] A.C. 241 11. Tenaga Nasional Malaysia v. Batu Kemas Industri Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2018] 6 CLJ 683 12. The President of Majlis Perbandaran Tawau v. Amiruddin Rasake & Ors And Another Appeal [2017] 6 CLJ 519 13. United Malayan Banking Corp. Bhd. v. Palm & Vegetable Oils (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. [1983] 1 MLJ 206 S/N /1Z2aqSluUmEhq0gOZKmw Page 23 of 23 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal