TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD 1. ) RAJAKUMARAN A/L KAMACHI 2. ) KESEMUA INDIVIDU DAN ATAU ENTITI ENTITI YANG BERADA DAN ATAU SEDANG MENJALANKAN SEBARANG AKTIVITI DI KAWASA DI LOT 232 GN 8389 (NOMBOR LOT BARU 5425) MUKIM RINGLET DAERAH CAMERON HIGH

CB-22NCvC-28-12/2019 Kand. 73 27/01/2023 11:20:22 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO: CB-22NCVC-28-12/2019 ANTARA TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD (NO. SYARIKAT: 199001009294) … PLAINTIF DAN 1. RAJAKUMARAN A/L F. KAMACHI (NO. K/P: 580218-08-5461) 2. KESEMUA INDIVIDU DAN/ATAU ENTITI-ENTITI YANG BERADA DAN/ATAU SEDANG MENJALANKAN SEBARANG AKTIVITI DI KAWASAN PLAINTIF DI LOT 232, PN 8389 (NOMBOR LOT BARU: 5425), MUKIM RINGLET, DAERAH CAMERON HIGHLANDS, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 1 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan [1] Ini adalah tuntutan Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar hartanah terhadap Defendan Pertama yang menduduki hartanah tersebut untuk pemilikan kosong hartanah tersebut. [2] Defendan Pertama telah berada di atas hartanah tersebut semenjak tahun 1969. Mereka telah mengusahakan hartanah tersebut dengan aktiviti-aktiviti pertanian dan telah membina rumah kediaman di atas hartanah tersebut. Analisa [3] Berdasarkan kepada keterangan saksi-saksi, dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukan serta hujah pihak-pihak, Mahkamah mendapati isu-isu yang perlu diputuskan adalah seperti berikut: (a) Adakah Plaintif merupakan pemilik berdaftar hartanah yang dipertikaikan; (b) Adakah Defendan Pertama telah menduduki hartanah tersebut dengan kebenaran Plaintif; 2 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (c) Adakah disebabkan Defendan Pertama sudah berada di atas tanah tersebut sejak sekian lama maka mereka berhak untuk diiktiraf sebagai dilindungi oleh prinsip ekuiti; (d) Adakah tempoh masa yang diambil oleh pihak Plaintif untuk tindakan ini membolehkan prinsip pengabaian (laches) digunapakai; dan (e) Gantirugi kepada Plaintif. Adakah Plaintif Merupakan Pemilik Berdaftar Hartanah Yang Dipertikaikan? [4] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa suratan hakmilik yang dikemukakan tertera nama Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Namun demikian, peguam Defendan Pertama berhujah bahawa nombor geran yang terdapat di dalam suratan hakmilik hartanah tersebut tidak mencatatkan nombor geran asal. Ini telah menyebabkan suratan hakmilik tersebut adalah sesuatu yang dipertikaikan. Defendan Pertama menyatakan bahawa Plaintif telah gagal membuktikan hak miliknya ke atas hartanah tersebut. [5] Dalam hal ini adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa dokumen pendaftaran hakmilik yang dikeluarkan oleh Pejabat Tanah di bawah Kanun Tanah Negara (KTN) adalah merupakan dokumen yang mengesahkan hakmilik sesuatu tanah. Ia hanya boleh dipertikaikan sekiranya terdapat keterangan yang dikemukakan bahawa geran atau 3 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal suratan hakmilik telah diperolehi secara frod atau tindakan pemalsuan oleh mana-mana pihak yang memperolehi hakmilik tanah tersebut. Jika diteliti kepada geran yang dikemukakan di mahkamah adalah didapati bahawa pada asalnya tanah ini adalah dimiliki oleh seorang Lip Seng Tak dan kemudiannya diserahkan kepada Central Electricity Board of Federation of Malaysia bertarikh 04hb. Januari 1963 melalui Nombor Perserahan: 15625. Dalam hal ini mahkamah merujuk kepada Akta Bekalan Elektrik (Syarikat Pengganti) 1990 di mana dinyatakan seperti berikut: “3 Establishment and incorporation of National Electricity Board (1) The Minister may, by order published in the Gazette, appoint a transfer date and on such date, all property, rights and liabilities to which the Board was entitled or subject to, immediately before that date shall become by virtue of this section property, rights and liabilities of the successor company. (2) For the avoidance of doubt- (a) any reference to property to which the Board was entitled to, is a reference to land and choses in action of the Board whether situated in Malaysia or elsewhere; and (b) any reference to rights and liabilities to which the Board was entitled or subject to, is a reference to rights which the Board is entitled to or, as the case may be, liabilities to which 4 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal the Board is subject to, whether under the laws of Malaysia or any country outside Malaysia and includes rights and liabilities arising under loans raised. (3) Every chose in action transferred by subsection (1) to the successor company may, after the transfer date, be sued on, recovered or enforced by the company in its own name and it shall not be necessary for the company or the Board to give notice to the person bound by the chose in action of the transfer effected by the subsection. (4) Every right and liability transferred by subsection (1) to the successor company may, on and after the transfer date, be sued on, recovered or enforced by or against the company in its own name and it shall not be necessary for the company or the Board to give notice to the person whose right or liability is transferred by this section of such transfer. (5) In the case of rights and liabilities arising under any loans which vest in the company on the transfer date, the company may enter into such arrangements or agreements over such rights and liabilities with the Government of Malaysia or any third party.” [6] Penyerahan tersebut telah diberikan melalui Gazet PU(A) 273/1990 seperti berikut: “PADA menjalankan kuasa-kuasa yang diberi oleh seksyen 3 (1) 5 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Akta Bekalan Elektrik (Syarikat Pengganti) 1990 [Akta 448], Menteri membuat perintah yang berikut: 1 Nama dan mula berkuatkuasa Perintah ini bolehlah dinamakan Perintah tarikh Pemindahan 1990 dan hendaklah mula berkuatkuasa pada 1hb September 1990. 2 Tarikh pemindahan Tarikh pemindahan segala harta, hak dan liabiliti yang kepadanya Lembaga Letrik Negara Tanah Melayu adalah berhak atau tertakluk dipindahkan kepadaTenaga Nasional Berhad adalah 1hb September 1990.” [7] Jika diteliti kepada Akta Bekalan Elektrik (Syarikat Pengganti) 1990 yang telah digubal bagi menggantikan Akta Bekalan Letrik 1949 (Semakan 1973) telah menggantikan Lembaga Letrik Negara, Tanah Melayu kepada sebuah syarikat. Akta Bekalan Letrik 1949 telah memperihalkan berkenaan kewujudan Lembaga Letrik Negara, Tanah Melayu seperti berikut: “There is hereby established a body, to be known as "Lembaga Letrik Negara, Tanah Melayu" or in English "National Electricity Board of the States of Malaya", which shall be a body corporate and may sue and be sued in its said name, and shall have perpetual succession, and may enter into contracts, and may acquire, purchase, take, hold and enjoy movable and immovable property of every description, and may convey, assign, surrender 6 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal and yield up, charge, mortgage, demise, reassign, transfer or otherwise dispose of, or deal with, any movable or immovable property vested in the Board upon such terms as to the Board seem fit.” [8] Adalah didapati bahawa Plaintif iaitu Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) adalah merupakan syarikat yang telah mengambil alih daripada Lembaga Letrik Negara, Tanah Melayu dan berdasarkan kepada Akta Bekalan Elektrik (Syarikat Pengganti) 1990 tersebut. Ini telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Perwaja Steel Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 CLJ 797 seperti berikut: “[9] Subsequently, the 1990 Act came into force on 1 September 1990 replacing the 1949 Act. The plaintiff was incorporated to substitute LLN. Pursuant to ss. 3(1) and 3(2)(b) of the Electricity Supply (Successor Company) Act 1990, all rights and liabilities of LLN were transferred to the plaintiff.” [9] Ia juga dinyatakan dalam kes Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Majlis Daerah Dungun [2009] 4 CLJ 385 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti berikut: “[3] On 1 September 1990 all property, rights and liabilities of the LLN became, by operation of s. 3 of the Electricity Supply (Successor Company) Act 1990, those of Tenaga Nasional Berhad ("TNB"), a public-listed company and the present appellant. Hence on that date the Power Station became the property of TNB. On the basis that TNB was not a public authority and therefore the 7 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal said art. 156 did not apply to it and it was liable to pay local rates, MDD decided to assess and collect rates in respect of the holding. MDD appointed a firm of valuers to assess the annual value of the holding and accepted the firm's assessment at RM123 million. MDD assessed the annual rate in respect of the holding at 5% of the annual value, which came to RM6,150,000.” [10] Oleh yang demikian, dalam catatan pada suratan hakmilik dinyatakan bahawa TNB itu dinamakan sebagai penerima harta daripada Lembaga Letrik Negara, Tanah Melayu. Dalam erti kata lain pada asalnya tanah ini ialah milik Lembaga Letrik Negara, Tanah Melayu dengan kuatkuasa harta-harta di bawah Lembaga Letrik Negara, Tanah Melayu diletak hak atau dipindahkan kepada TNB iaitu Plaintif. [11] Oleh yang demikian tidak timbul isu bahawa TNB adalah bukannya pemilik berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Mahkamah juga berpendapat bahawa isu sama ada nombor geran lama tidak dinyatakan di dalam suratan hakmilik tidak boleh menjadikan TNB bukannya pemilik berdaftar tanah tersebut. Di samping itu tiada juga keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama untuk menunjukkan bahawa catatan di dalam suratan hakmilik tersebut dibuat secara penipuan (frod) atau pemalsuan dokumen. [12] Mahkamah ini perlu merujuk kepada s. 89 KTN (Semakan 2020) berkenaan dengan kedudukan suratan hakmilik dan kaitannya dengan keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa penama yang dicatatkan dalam 8 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal suratan hakmilik tersebut adalah pemilik berdaftar tersebut tersebut. Seksyen 89 KTN menyatakan seperti berikut: “89 Conclusiveness of register documents of title Every register document of title duly registered under this Chapter shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be conclusive evidence— (a) that title to the land described therein is vested in the person or body for the time being named therein as proprietor; and (b) of the conditions, restrictions in interest and other provisions subject to which the land is for the time being held by that person or body, so far as the same are required by any provision of this Act to be specified or referred to in that document.” [13] Peruntukan s. 89 KTN ini telah dijelaskan kedudukannya di dalam kes Teh Bee v K Maramuthu [1977] 2 MLJ 7 di mana Hakim Ajaib Singh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi menyatakan seperti berikut: “Section 89 of the National Land Code which provides for the conclusiveness of a register document of final title and section 92 which declares its indefeasibility are extended to apply to a register document of qualified title as well by virtue of sections 178(3) and 176(2) of the Code. Indefeasibility of title is the hall-mark of the Torrens system of registration of land titles and out Land Code 9 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal which is based on this system provides, with certain exceptions, for the indefeasibility of registered titles or interests in land and registered leases, charges and easements under section 340…” [14] Ia telah disahkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes yang sama seperti berikut: “The importance of the register document of title in terms of section 178(3) of the Code read with section 89 is that it is conclusive evidence that title to the land in question is vested in the appellant. As the register document of title in this case was produced in court the learned magistrate was justified in holding that the appellant was prima facie the owner of the land.” [15] Prinsip ini telah dijelaskan secara tuntas dan terperinci dalam kes Pushpaleela a/p R Selvarajah & Anor v Rajamani d/o Meyappa Chettiar and other appeals [2019] 2 MLJ 553 seperti berikut: “[146] Now, once the scheme of the provisions of s 89 is seen, it is apparent that since the register document of title is conclusive evidence of ownership and in the present instance since the register document of title bears the name of the first defendant as the registered proprietor, it follows and becomes conclusive evidence that the first defendant is the registered proprietor unless defeasible pursuant to s 340 of the NLC. What appears on the registered document of title is conclusive as the register is everything under the Torrens System. In Gibbs v Messor & Co [1891] AC 248, Lord Watson said: 10 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal The object is to save persons dealing with registered proprietors from the trouble and expense of going behind the register, in order to investigate the history of their author’s title, and to satisfy themselves of its validity. That end is accomplished by providing that every one who purchases, in bona fide and for value, from a registered proprietor, and enters his deed of transfer or mortgage on the register, shall thereby acquire an indefeasible right, notwithstanding the infirmity of his author’s title. [147] In the case of Teh Bee v K Maruthamuthu [1977] 2 MLJ 7, it was held that ‘the fact that the register document of title was in the name of the appellant was conclusive evidence that the title to the land was vested in the appellant’. The concept of indefeasibility of title under s 89 of the NLC applies to the person whose name currently appears as the proprietor on the register document of title and not to a former registered proprietor (see Yap Ham Seow). [148] As pointed out by Teo Keang Sood and Khaw Lake Tee in Land Law in Malaysia, Cases and Commentary (3rd Ed) at pp 182-183: Under the Torrens system, it is the act of registration that vests title or interest; once registered, the title or interest cannot be divested except otherwise statutorily provided. Registration is the cornerstone of the Torrens system. It is not a system of registration or recordation of title, under which what are registered are existing titles or interests; registration under such system does not vest or divest any title or interest. 11 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Under the Torrens system, the registered title or interest is also free of all adverse claims or encumbrances not otherwise noted on the register. The effect of registration is to defeat all prior and subsequent unregistered claims. Under this system, and as underscored by section 89 of the Code, the register is all important and conclusive evidence that the title is vested in the person or body for the time being named as the proprietor and that the land is subject to such conditions, restrictions in interest and other provisions as specified in the title. Theoretically, this is known as the ‘indefeasibility of title’, which is reflected in section 340 of our Code under which it is provided that registration confers an indefeasibility title or interest, until and unless that title or interest is challenged or set aside on any of the grounds set out under section 340(2).” [16] Ini turut ditegaskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Bayangan Sepadu Sdn Bhd v. Jabatan Pengairan Dan Saliran Negeri Selangor & Ors [2022] 2 CLJ 1 seperti berikut: “[30] It is pertinent to note that the principle of indefeasibility of title is one of the main features and attributes of the Torrens system of conveyance. It involves the proposition that once a person is registered as proprietor of certain land or interest in the land, he or she acquires a title that cannot be vitiated except as provided under s. 340 of the NLC. Therefore, s. 450 complements s. 89 (see See Leong Chye & Anor v. United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd & Another Appeal [2021] 6 CLJ 650; Mega Meisa 12 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Mustapah Dorani & Another Appeal [2020] 1 LNS 1480; [2020] 6 MLJ 594).” [17] Di dalam kes ini mahkamah berpendapat bahawa isu sama ada Plaintif adalah merupakan pemilik berdaftar tanah tersebut adalah terjawab dengan jelas dengan penggunaan s. 89 KTN yang merupakan keterangan konklusif berkenaan ketuanpunyaan tanah tersebut iaitu Plaintif. Hujahan yang ditimbulkan oleh Defendan Pertama berkenaan dengan kesahihan hakmilik Plaintif tidak dapat dipersetujui oleh mahkamah. Adakah Defendan Pertama Telah Menduduki Hartanah Tersebut Dengan Kebenaran Plaintif? [18] Keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama menyatakan bahawa beliau telah tinggal di atas tanah tersebut semenjak tahun 1969. Sebelum itu tanah tersebut diduduki oleh ibu bapa Defendan Pertama. Pada tahun 2005 lesen menduduki sementara di atas tanah tersebut telah dikeluarkan kepada ibu Defendan Pertama seperti yang terdapat di halaman 76 Ikatan Dokumen B. [19] Defendan Pertama telah membina rumah di atas tanah tersebut. Pada masa menduduki tanah tersebut Defendan Pertama tidak mengetahui siapakah pemilik tanah tersebut. Dia juga tidak membuat carian rasmi di Pejabat Tanah untuk menentukan siapakah pemilik tanah tersebut. Defendan Pertama hanya mengetahui bahawa Plaintif 13 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal adalah pemilik tanah tersebut setelah menerima notis pengosongan tanah pada 02.08.2018. [20] Namun begitu Mahkamah juga perlu merujuk kepada surat Majlis Daerah Cameron Highlands bertarih 12.07.2002 di halaman 71 Ikatan Dokumen B. Surat tersebut adalah berkaitan dengan kelulusan cadangan membina sebuah rumah kediaman satu tingkat di atas Lot LMS/MR/BT.28-33/D-7, Mukim Ringlet, Habu, Cameron Highlands untuk Pn. Elsi a/p Kali Gounden iaitu ibu kepada Defendan Pertama. [21] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada halaman 80, 77 dan 30 Ikatan Dokumen B bagi menentukan sama ada tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan Pertama tersebut bukannya milik Plaintif. Penelitian kepada dokumen-dokumen tersebut dan keterangan-keterangan saksi menunjukkan bahawa tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan Pertama adalah merupakan milik Plaintif. Ini disahkan juga dengan laporan Juruukur Kristal di halaman 34 yang mengesahkan bahawa tanah milik Plaintif telah diceroboh. Ini menguatkan kes Plaintif bahawa tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan Pertama adalah milik Plaintif yang tiada sebarang keraguan berkenaannya. [22] Mahkamah berpendapat keterangan Defendan Pertama ini tidak dapat menunjukkan bahawa Plaintif telah memberi kebenaran untuk Defendan Pertama menduduki tanah tersebut. Mahkamah juga mendapati tiada keterangan yang menunjukkan pada bila-bila masa Defendan Pertama telah diberikan kebenaran oleh Plaintif untuk menduduki tanah tersebut. 14 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [23] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menduduki harta tanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran daripada Plaintif. Adakah Disebabkan Defendan Pertama Telah Berada Di Atas Tanah Tersebut Tanpa Sebarang Bantahan Daripada Plaintif Menyebabkan Plaintif Telah Menghilangkan Haknya Untuk Meminta Defendan Pertama Mengosongkan Tanah Tersebut? [24] Apakah kegagalan Defendan Pertama untuk mendapatkan kebenaran daripada Plaintif untuk menduduki tanah tersebut menyebabkan Defendan Pertama adalah penceroboh atau setinggan di atas tanah tersebut. Dalam konteks ini mahkamah merujuk kepada takrifan setinggan yang telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Johor Bahru di dalam kes Bukit Lenang Development Sdn Bhd v Penduduk-Penduduk Yang Menduduki Atas Tanah HS(D) 151079 – HS(D) 151601, Mukim Plentong, Daerah Johor Bahru [1999] 6 MLJ 25. Di dalam kes tersebut ia adalah berkaitan dengan permohonan untuk pemilikan kosong di bawah A. 89 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1990. Hakim Zainun Ali di dalam kes tersebut telah memberikan takrifan berkenaan dengan setinggan seperti berikut: “However the authorities cited above would suggest that a person who enters upon another's land and remains thereon to the detriment of the present owner is a trespasser, pure and simple. 15 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal The defendants' presence is literally a blot on the landscape, for the plaintiffs are hindered in the uninterrupted usage of their own property. This observation is further fortified by Idris Yusoff J's remark in Esso Malaysia Bhd v Hills Agency(M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1994] 1 MLJ 740, where His Lordship stated that at p 746D–E: The law is settled that the summary proceedings for possession of land can be employed in a situation where a person entitled to possession of the land claims possession of such land occupied by another person without his licence or consent or the licence or consent of any of his predecessor-in-title or in another situation where a person who has entered into occupation of the land with the licence or consent of the person entitled to possession of the land or any of his predecessor-in- title but remains in such occupation without licence or consent of the person entitled to possession or any predecessor-in-title of his. (Emphasis added.) Thus on the facts, this court finds that the defendants were squatters simpliciter and are therefore not possessed of any rights.” [25] Mahkamah juga merujuk kes Bristol Corporation v Person unknown [1974] 1 All ER 593 di mana telah dinyatakan pemakaian A. 113 Rules of Supreme Court United Kingdom yang ‘pari materia’ dengan A. 89 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 seperti berikut: 16 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal “Looking at the words of that rule, it seems to me to be clear that the order covers two distinct states of fact. The first is that of some person who has entered into occupation of the land without the licence or consent of the person entitled to possession or any predecessor in title of his, and secondly that of the person who has entered into occupation of the land with a licence from the person entitled to possession of the land or any predecessor in title of his but who remains in such occupation without the licence or consent of the person entitled to possession or any predecessor in title. That that is the true construction appears to be perfectly clear from the use of the word 'or' and if the rule did not cover the second state of affairs which I have mentioned, that is to say of entry with licence and remaining in occupation without licence, then the words 'or remained' would, so far as I could see, have no significant meaning at all. Obviously there never could be proceedings against someone who had entered but did not remain in occupation of the land.” [26] Apa yang jelas di dalam kes Bukit Lenang Development Sdn Bhd v Penduduk-Penduduk Yang Menduduki Atas Tanah HS(D) 151079 – HS(D) 151601, Mukim Plentong, Daerah Johor Bahru (supra) dan Bristol Corporation v Person unknown (supra) ia adalah dalam ruang lingkup pemilikan kosong oleh tuan punya tanah dan telah disimpulkan bahawa sesiapa yang tidak mendapat kebenaran memasuki tanah tersebut ia adalah dianggap sebagai penceroboh dan setinggan. 17 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [27] Jika diteliti kepada takrifan setinggan dalam Kamus Dewan Edisi Keempat Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka 2021 ia telah ditakrifkan seperti berikut: “Setinggan orang yang menempati tanah kerajaan secara haram.” [28] Dalam Black’s Law Dictionary Seventh Edition istilah setinggan telah ditakrifkan seperti beritkut: “Squatter. 1. A person who settles on property without any legal claim or title. 2. A person who settles on public land under a government regulation allowing the person to acquire title upon fulfilling specified conditions.” [29] Adalah menjadi prinsip yang jelas bahawa apabila terdapat takrifan perundangan yang diberikan kepada sesuatu istilah maka mahkamah perlu memberikan keutamaan kepada takrifan perundangan tersebut dan tidak mengambil kira takrifan yang diberikan dari segi aspek bahasa. Mahkamah ini merujuk kes CTEB & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 4 MLJ 236 yang turut dinyatakan di dalam kes Mahisha Sulaiha Abdul Majeed dan Lain-lain v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran & Anor [2022] 1 LNS 1754 seperti berikut: “In CTEB’s case, it was also held that besides defying the basic premise that citizenship by operation of law requires no application, the grammatical construction suggested is wholly 18 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal irrelevant for yet another reason. Between the grammatical interpretation approach and the legislative history of the constitutional provisions, the latter outweighs the former. Legislative history plays an important role in interpreting and understanding the context of a constitutional provision (at para. [76]).” [30] Mahkamah juga perlu mengambil kira persoalan kebenaran untuk menduduki tanah Plaintif itu perlu dibuat secara bertulis atau sebaliknya. Di samping itu, Mahkamah juga perlu menimbangkan sama ada kegagalan Plaintif mengambil tindakan terhadap Defendan Pertama boleh digolongkan sebagai kebenaran tersirat telah diberikan oleh Plaintif untuk Defendan Pertama menduduki tanah tersebut. [31] Mahkamah berpendapat ianya tidak menggugurkan hak ketuanpunyaan Plaintif terhadap tanah tersebut. Ini bermakna, Defendan Pertama adalah penceroboh di atas tanah tersebut. Adakah Prinsip Kecuaian, Pengabaian (Laches) Dan Keakuran (Acquiescence) Terpakai Di Dalam Kes Ini? [32] Defendan Pertama telah menimbulkan isu bahawa prinsip pengabaian (laches) dan keakuran (acquiescence) terpakai di dalam kes ini terhadap Plaintif. Ini adalah disebabkan Plaintif telah mengambil masa yang lama dan tidak munasabah untuk mengambil tindakan kepada Defendan Pertama. Ini ditambah dengan fakta dan keterangan bahawa ketika Defendan Pertama berada di atas tanah tersebut tiada 19 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal sebarang tindakan diambil sehinggalah notis dikeluarkan pada tahun 2018. Jika dilihat kepada catatan di dalam suratan hakmilik tanah tersebut TNB telah dicatatkan sebagai pemilik sejak tahun 1993 di mana tiada tindakan diambil daripada tarikh tersebut sehinggalah tahun 2018. [33] Pihak Plaintif tidak menafikan bahawa tindakan diambil kepada Defendan Pertama dengan mengeluarkan notis pengosongan premis pada tahun 2018. Ini dilakukan setelah Plaintif mempunyai unit khas bagi mengenalpasti tanah-tanah milik Plaintif dan mengambil tindakan yang sewajarnya kepada mana-mana individu yang berada di atas tanah tersebut. Dalam erti kata lain individu-individu berada di atas tanah Plaintif selepas penubuhan unit tersebut akan diminta untuk mengosongkan tanah tersebut. Apa yang jelas ialah semenjak tahun 2018 barulah Plaintif ingin menzahirkan dan menguatkuasakan hak mereka sebagai pemilik berdaftar kepada tanah tersebut. [34] Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang jelas bahawa pengabaian (laches) adalah satu prinsip ekuiti yang melindungi pihak- pihak supaya pihak yang berhak di dalam sesuatu tindakan tidak akan mengambil tindakan yang terlalu lewat sehingga menjejaskan keadilan. [35] Secaranya umumnya pengabaian (laches) adalah satu prinsip di bawah undang-undang ekuiti. Ia membawa maksud Mahkamah tidak boleh menerima satu tindakan yang mengambil masa yang lama untuk difailkan di Mahkamah. Jika ini dilakukan ia seolah-olah suatu keakuran (acquiescence) Plaintif terhadap tindak tanduk Defendan Pertama. Ia 20 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal berdasarkan kepada maksim vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt (equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent). Ia adalah merupakan salah satu daripada maksim ekuiti yang terdiri daripada 12 maksim seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam Snell’s Equity Twenty-Ninth Edition P.V. Baker and P. ST. J. Langan di halaman 27 seperti berikut: “The 12 maxims are as follows; (1) Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. (2) Equity follows the law. (3) Where there is equal equity, the law shall prevail. (4) Where the equities are equal, the first in time shall prevail. (5) He who seeks equity must do equity. (6) He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. (7) Delay defeats equities. (8) Equality is equity. (9) Equity looks to the intent rather than to the form. (10) Equity looks on that as done which ought to be done. (11) Equity imputes an intention to fulfil an obligation. (12) Equity acts in personam.” [36] Pemakaian prinsip pengabaian (laches) telah diterangkan 255 tahun yang lalu di dalam kes Smith v Clay BRO. C.C. 646; [1767] 29 ER 743 di mana Lord Camden menyatakan seperti berikut: “A court of equity which is never active in relief against conscience, or public convenience, has always refused its aid to 21 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal stale demands, where the party has slept upon his right and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this court into activity, but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence; where these are wanting, the Court is passive, and does nothing. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced, and therefore from the beginning of this jurisdiction, there was always a limitation to suits in this court.” [37] Mahkamah ini juga telah dipandu oleh keputusan di dalam kes Alfred Templeton & Ors. v. Mount Pleasure Corp. Sdn. Bhd. [1989] 1 CLJ Rep 219 yang menerangkan tentang prinsip pengabaian (laches) ini dengan amat jelas dan nyata seperti berikut: “Laches is an equitable defence implying lapse of time and delay in prosecuting a claim. A Court of Equity refuses its aid to a stale demand where the plaintiff has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time. He is then said to be barred by laches. In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches the Court considers whether there has been acquiescence on the plaintiff's part and any change of position that has occurred on the part of the defendant. The doctrine of laches rests on the consideration that it is unjust to give a plaintiff a remedy where he has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though not waiving the remedy, put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted (Halsbury's Laws of 22 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal England 3rd Edn. Vol. 14 p. 641 paras. 1181, 1182). Laches has been succinctly described as "inaction with one's eyes open". Now, can lapse of time, and delay, however gross in a suit seeking final, as opposed to interlocutory relief, of itself, amount to the equitable defence of laches. It is clear that delay in some circumstances can amount to evidence from which the inference can be drawn that the plaintiff has released (or waived, there seems to be no difference) the claims which he asserts: lapse of time always gives rise to a presumption that a stale suit is ill- founded: for a reasonable man is not likely to sleep on his claims if they are well founded. Whether it does or does not is a question of fact in each case. It is possible to point to a number of cases in which plaintiffs have been successful in spite of spectacular delays. In England, in Burroughes v. Abbott [1922] 1 Ch 86, rectification of an instrument was granted after a delay of 12 years: in Weld v. Petrie [1929] 1 Ch 33 the Court of Appeal held that a mortgagor's redemption suit was not barred by a delay of 26 years and in Pickerring v. Lord Stamford [1795] 30 ER 787 was held that after a delay of 35 years, a portion of a testator's residuary estate which had been devoted by ten trustees of the testator's will to charity was really held by them on trust for the testator's next of kin. In Australia, a decree of specific performance was granted by the High Court in Fitzgerald v. Masters [1956] 5 CIR 420, 26 years after the cause of action arose and in Bester v. Perpetual Trustee & Co, Ltd. [1970] 33 NSWR 30, Street J rejected a defence of laches where a plaintiff waited 20 years before commencing a suit 23 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal to rescind a transaction on grounds of undue influence. There are many cases which indicate that mere delay is not a defence in Equity. In 1795, in Pickering v. Lord Stamford (ibid), Arden MR inclined to the view that delay in a situation where no statute of limitation applied, could have legal effect only if it amounted to a release implied from conduct or was coupled with detriment to the defendant or a third party. In Fitzgerald v. Masters (ibid) equitable relief was granted after an inordinate length of time had elapsed. On the point under discussion, Dixon CJ and Fullager J at p. 433 held that there were no circumstances apart from delay for refusing relief, thereby (and in my opinion; correctly) holding that mere delay of itself cannot constitute laches. In Fullwood v. Fullwood [1878] Ch D 176, Fry J held that mere lapse of time affords no bar in Equity. My research into the authorities on the subject leads me to the conclusion that there are no fixed rules or principles on which the Court acts and each case is considered on its merits and particular facts. In the case of in Re Jarvis [1958] 2 All ER 336 Upjohn J said at p. 341: I have been referred to a number of text books and authorities on this question of laches, acquiescence and delay, but I forbear from referring to them, for in this realm of law each case depends so much on its own facts that the citation of other cases having some points of similarity and some of difference does not really assist. 24 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal In this context, the case of Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd & Ors. [1874] LR 5 PC App. Cas. 221 merits reading. The defence of laches is only allowed where there is no statutory bar (Halsbury ibid p. 641 para. 1181). Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1953 (Revised 1981), provides that "nothing in this Act shall affect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence, laches or otherwise." [38] Prinsip pengabaian (laches) ini telah dikanunkan di bawah s. 32 Akta Had Masa 1953 bagi tujuan pemakaian di bawah undang-undang negara ini. Seksyen 32 Akta Had Masa 1953 memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “32 Acquiescence Nothing is this Act shall affect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence, laches or otherwise.” [39] Di dalam kes Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd (1874) L.R. 5 P.C. 221 telah diperjelaskan prinsip pengabaian (laches) seperti berikut: “Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not 25 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.” [40] Sementara itu pra-syarat untuk pemakaian prinsip pengabaian (laches) ini telah disimpulkan dengan menarik di dalam artikel Doctrine Of Laches And Its Application In Actions Founded On Contract In Malaysia [2002] 2 MLJ lxxx yang tulis oleh Nuarrual Hilal bin Md Dahlan menyatakan seperti berikut: “The doctrine of laches is a common law doctrine originating from the court of equity. This doctrine is well entrenched in the Malaysian Limitation Act Page xcv 1953, in particular in s 32. However, it is disheartening that this doctrine is not fully applied in Malaysia where in most cases, the courts, with due respect, pay scant regard to this doctrine and its application. This would result in the course of justice being deflected. If the doctrine were fully appreciated and properly applied, it would serve as a good defence for the defendant (or in some cases for the plaintiff). In conclusion, 26 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal a few observations can be made and recapitulated from the scrutiny of the above cases. (a) The parties must plead the defence of laches in their pleading either in the statement of defence or in a summon to strike out the pleadings pursuant to O 18 r 9 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. This has been emphasized in s 4 of the Limitation Act 1953. (b) It is not enough to plead the defence of laches where the defendant (sometimes the plaintiff) has unreasonably delayed the commencement of an action. In order to succeed, the position of the defendant (or the plaintiff) must have been altered in such a way that makes it unjust to grant the relief. This has been defined by the judicial committee in Lindsay Petroleum Company v Hurd, ICF Spray and Peh Swee Chin J in Cheak Kim Ton & Anor v Taro Kaur; (c) The defence of laches is still available and is an untrampled defence, even though the limitation period still subsists in accordance with ss 6(6) and 32 of the Limitation Act 1953. This means that in spite of the fact that the limitation period still subsists, the plaintiff's (or the defendant's) action could still be destroyed if in the course of the delay there is laches on his part; (d) The court has no inherent power under O 92 r 4 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 to raise and adjudicate laches if the 27 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal parties in the proceedings fail to plead the defence of laches expressly.” [41] Dalam kes ini, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa tuntutan yang ingin dikemukakan oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan Pertama ialah untuk mendapatkan kembali tanah Plaintif yang mana rekod ketuanpunyaan tanah tersebut menunjukkan ia adalah milik Plaintif. Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa Plaintif telah mengambil tempoh yang agak lama sebelum menzahirkan tindakan untuk menguatkuasakan haknya. Namun ia tidak dapat ditunjukkan bahawa kelewatan tersebut telah menyebabkan ketidakadilan kepada pihak Defendan-Defendan. Ini adalah disebabkan dengan peruntukan di bawah s. 89 KTN dan s. 340 KTN adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa Plaintif adalah pemilik yang sah kepada tanah tersebut. Defendan Pertama tidak dapat menyangkal ketuanpunyaan tanah-tanah tersebut. Mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa tiada keterangan daripada Defendan Pertama yang dapat menunjukkan bahawa tanah-tanah tersebut telah diperolehi secara frod dan tidak mematuhi peruntukan di bawah Kanun Tanah Negara sehingga menyebabkan ketuanpunyaan tanah tersebut dapat disangkal. Oleh itu sebarang kelewatan pihak Plaintif untuk mengambil tindakan terhadap Defendan Pertama tidak akan menjejaskan kepentingan Defendan Pertama di dalam kes ini. Sekiranya Plaintif memfailkan tindakan lebih awal ia tidak akan menyebabkan Defendan Pertama boleh meletakkan sebarang pembelaan atau keterangan bagi menyangkal ketuanpunyaan tanah tersebut. Halnya berbeza sekiranya Defendan Pertama mempunyai keterangan bahawa terdapat frod di dalam pemilikan tanah tersebut. Jika ini berlaku sebarang kelewatan 28 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal dilakukan oleh Plaintif dalam memfailkan tindakan ini sudah pasti akan menjejaskan Defendan Pertama disebabkan kemungkinan saksi Defendan Pertama sudah tiada atau dokumen-dokumen yang relevan untuk pembelaan Defendan Pertama telah tiada ekoran daripada tempoh masa yang panjang daripada tarikh pemfailan tindakan oleh pihak Plaintif. Ia tidak berlaku di dalam kes ini. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat isu pengabaian (laches) dan keakuran (acquiescence) yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan Pertama dalam kes ini tidak terpakai. [42] Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa seseorang pemilik tanah harus memastikan bahawa haknya untuk menikmati tanahnya adalah tidak diganggu oleh mana-mana pihak. Pada masa yang sama beliau juga tidak boleh berdiam diri dengan tidak mengambil apa-apa tindakan bagi menzahirkan kepentingan di atas bidang tanah tersebut. Ini akan menyebabkan pihak-pihak yang tidak mengetahui berkenaan dengan pemilik tanah tersebut akan menduduki tanah tersebut atas kepercayaan bahawa tanah tersebut tiada dimiliki oleh mana-mana pihak. [43] Pihak yang menduduki tanah tersebut mungkin akan membuat binaan dan mengusahakan tanaman di atas tanah tersebut. Apabila sudah diketahui siapakah pemilik asal tanah tersebut dan pemilik tanah tersebut ingin mendapatkan semula tanah tersebut ia akan mengundang kekecewaan kepada pihak yang menduduki tanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran. Ia juga akan memberikan satu gambaran bahawa ketidakadilan telah berlaku kepada pihak yang menduduki tanah tersebut kerana mereka terpaksa mengosongkan tanah tersebut 29 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal yang telah diduduki bertahun-tahun lamanya sebelum Plaintif mengambil tindakan untuk mendapatkan kembali tanah tersebut. [44] Oleh yang demikian adalah amalan yang baik untuk pemilik tanah terutamanya pihak berkuasa atau syarikat-syarikat multinasional memastikan bahawa terdapatnya beberapa petanda di atas tanah tersebut didirikan bagi menunjukkan bahawa tanah tersebut adalah milik mereka. Ini akan mengelakkan daripada pihak yang tidak sepatutnya menduduki tanah tersebut tidak berbuat demikian setelah mengetahui bahawa tanah tersebut adalah milik badan-badan atau syarikat tertentu. Sekiranya mereka ingin menduduki tanah tersebut maka tindakan boleh dibuat dengan mengadakan rundingan dengan tuan punya tanah sama ada ingin menyewa atau mendapat kebenaran bertulis daripada pemilik tanah tersebut. [45] Pada masa yang sama mana-mana individu yang ingin menduduki tanah-tanah yang tidak jelas siapakah pemiliknya perlu mengambil langkah yang berhati-hati bagi memastikan siapakah pemilik tanah tersebut. Ia boleh dilakukan dengan melakukan semakan atau membuat carian di Pejabat Tanah yang berkaitan. Ini adalah disebabkan salah satu keunikan sistem pentadbiran tanah di bawah Kanun Tanah Negara ialah segala urusan, transaksi dan hakmilik semuanya perlu dilakukan di Pejabat Tanah dan didaftarkan di Pejabat Tanah. 30 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Gantirugi Kepada Plaintif [46] Dalam satu tindakan tort yang berkaitan dengan pencerobohan garis panduan yang dinyatakan oleh McGregor On Damages by Harvey McGregor 16th Edition Sweet & Maxwell 1997 di muka surat 1449 menyatakan seperti berikut: “Trespass to goods straddles the boundaries of loss by misappropriation and of loss by damage or destruction. Hence it bears affinities of the one hand to conversation and on the other hand to the tort of negligence. The damages are, of course, to be worked out on different principles in the case of loss by misappropriation and in the case of loss by damage or destruction. Only the former falls for consideration here.” [47] Malahan di dalam kes Rundle v Little [1844] 6 QB 174 dinyatakan seperti berikut: “In the case a rule nisi was obtained for a new trial in consequence of the admission of improper evidence; viz., in an action of trespass for seizing the plaintiff’s good, a judgment recovered, which had been afterwards set aside for irregularity by the Court; also that the defendant repaid the money levied after action brought. This at all events, we think objectionable. The rights of parties at the trial are the same as they were at the commencement of the suit: or if they are changed, a plea puis darrein continuance ought to place the new facts on the record. It is important to uphold the principle that a plaintiff is entitled to recover by way of damages all that at the 31 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal commencement of the suit he has lost through the wrongful act for which the defendant is sued.” [48] Pada masa yang sama mahkamah juga perlu mengambil kira tujuan gantirugi dalam kes-kes tort iaitu secara umumnya ia meletakkan kedudukan Plaintif seperti tiadanya tindakan tort yang dilakukan oleh pihak Defendan atau dikenali sebagai prinsip restitutio in integrum yang dinyatakan juga dalam kes British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185 di halaman 197. [49] Mahkamah juga dipandu oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan yang telah memberikan ringkasan kepada prinsip gantirugi di dalam kes tort seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes Terra Damansara Sdn Bhd v Nandex Development Sdn Bhd (supra). Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Bayangan Sepadu Sdn Bhd v. Jabatan Pengairan Dan Saliran Negeri Selangor & Ors (supra) seperti berikut: “[57] The principles that can be distilled from case of Terra Damansara may be summarised as follows: (i) trespass to land is actionable per se without any proof of damage; (ii) continuing trespass will last so long as objects are inserted into the land and it gives rise to actions de die in diem - for so long as it lasts; and (iii) a trespass of this nature will only abate once the objects are removed. Successive actions will lie from day to day until the 32 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal objects are removed and in each action damages are assessed up to the date of the action.” [50] Di dalam kes ini Mahkamah juga mengambil maklum bahawa gantirugi adalah bayaran yang diperintahkan untuk pihak tertentu membuat pembayaran setelah dibuktikan bahawa terdapatnya perlanggaran hak yang telah dibuktikan di Mahkamah. Misalnya berlakunya perlanggaran kontrak dan tuntutan di bawah undang- undang tort. [51] Secara ringkasnya ia telah dinyatakan di dalam McGregor on Damages 16th Edition London Sweet & Maxwell 1997 di halaman 3 seperti berikut: “Damages are the pecuniary compensation, obtainable by success in ac action, for a wrong which is either a tort or a breach of contract.” [52] Pertimbangan yang diberikan dalam gantirugi terhadap tindakan pencerobohan telah dinyatakan dengan jelas oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Johandra Realty Sdn Bhd & Satu Lagi lwn. Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pengairan Dan Saliran Malaysia & Satu Lagi [2021] 2 CLJ 485 seperti berikut: “[57] Persoalannya, berapakah jumlah ganti rugi yang munasabah dan wajar diberikan setelah pihak plaintif berjaya membuktikan D1 melakukan pencerobohan ke atas tanah 33 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal mereka? Berhubung dengan persoalan tersebut, Halsbury 's, edisi ke-4, jilid 45 di perenggan 1403 ada menyatakan: 1403. Damages. In an action of trespass, if the plaintiff proves the trespass, he is entitled to recover nominal damages, even if he has not suffered any actual loss. If the trespass has caused the plaintiff actual damage, he is entitled to receive such amount as will compensate him for his loss. Where the defendant has made use of the plaintiff's land, the plaintiff is entitled to receive by way of damages such a sum as would reasonably be paid for that use. Where there is an oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional trespass by a government official or where the defendant cynically disregards the rights of the plaintiff in the land with the object of making a gain by his unlawful conduct, exemplary damages may be awarded. If the trespass is accompanied by aggravating circumstances which do not allow an award of exemplary damages, the general damages may be increased. (penekanan ditambah) [58] Daripada apa yang dinyatakan tersebut, jelaslah bahawa latar belakang sesuatu pencerobohan perlulah diteliti dan diambil kira semasa mempertimbangkan jumlah ganti rugi….” [53] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Othman Ali & Ors v. Bukit Lenang Development Sdn Bhd [2016] 6 CLJ 508. Fakta kes di dalam kes tersebut menunjukkan bahawa pihak Plaintif telah menuntut pemilikan kosong dan gantirugi akibat daripada tindakan Defendan 34 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal yang telah secara tidak sah menduduki tanah Plaintif. Penolong Kanan Pendaftar telah mengawardkan RM63,873.00 kepada Plaintif. Mahkamah Rayuan telah mengenepikan perintah gantirugi yang diberikan oleh Penolong Kanan Pendaftar yang telah disahkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dan menyatakan seperti berikut: “[31] It was undeniable that in a normal case where once a trespass to land or a deprivation of use of land had been established, the normal measure of damages to be applied would be the actual proof of 'loss of rental' or a reasonable estimation of such a 'rental return' that was directly attributable and flowing from a lawful use of the land but denied by that wrongful action. This was consistent with the two underlying basic principles in law which required that any damages awarded would, so far as money can, put the affected or deprived party in the same position as he would have been if the tort had not occurred subject to the further overriding consideration that such damages to be awarded was in any event not too remote or speculative in nature.” [54] Selanjutnya di perenggan [33] kes Othman Ali & Ors v. Bukit Lenang Development Sdn Bhd (supra) dinyatakan seperti berikut: “[33] The question then was how, these established principles governing the issue of 'damages' recoverable where one has been wrongfully deprived of the use of land, was to be applied to the facts of this case. It was our considered view that on the peculiar facts of this case (as outlined above), what was incumbent upon the plaintiff was to adduce: 35 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (a) Credible evidence indicative of the projected 'profits' the plaintiff had been denied by the fact that the land could not be developed as was intended (ie, when it was purchased); (b) Alternatively, reliable evidence of either what would represent a fair rental at market rates that the plaintiff would have in all probability earned from the particular area of the land that was occupied respectively by each of the defendants, or what would be a fair rental-benefit that would have likely accrued to each of defendants from the respective areas within the land that each of them had wrongfully occupied.” [55] Berdasarkan kepada duluan kehakiman di atas adalah jelas apabila Plaintif dapat menunjukkan bahawa Defendan Pertama telah melakukan pencerobohan tanah maka Plaintif adalah berhak untuk mendapatkan gantirugi. Mahkamah akan mentaksirkan amaun yang munasabah berdasarkan kepada keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan Mahkamah. Sebelum pentaksiran itu dibuat Mahkamah perlu memberikan penghakiman bahawa Plaintif berhak kepada gantirugi tersebut. Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang umum seseorang yang berjaya di dalam tindakan untuk pencerobohan tanah adalah berhak untuk mendapatkan gantirugi walaupun tidak dapat ditunjukkan kerugian yang sebenar. Lihat kes Patel and Others v W. H. Smith (Eziot) Ltd. and Another [1987] 1 W.L.R. 853. 36 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [56] Walau bagaimanapun Mahkamah berpendapat di dalam menentukan sama ada gantirugi perlu diberikan kepada Plaintif Mahkamah perlu mengambil kira fakta, keterangan dan keadaan bagaimana pencerobohan itu berlaku. Ini dapat memberikan gambaran yang menyeluruh berkenaan sama ada bersesuaian atau sebaliknya gantirugi diberikan kepada Plaintif. Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga perlu melihat remedi yang dipohon oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan Pertama ekoran daripada pencerobohan tanah tersebut. Di samping itu Mahkamah juga perlu melihat sama ada terdapat apa-apa keadaan yang menunjukkan Defendan Pertama mencerobohi tanah tersebut ia telah menghalang Plaintif untuk menikmati apa-apa hak sebagai seorang pemilik tanah kepada tanah-tanah tersebut. Ini adalah wajar bagi membolehkan Mahkamah mengimbangkan di antara kepentingan Plaintif sebagai pemilik tanah dengan Defendan Pertama yang dikatakan mencerobohi tanah tersebut. [57] Berdasarkan kepada keterangan dan fakta kes dalam kes ini Mahkamah mendapati perkara-perkara berikut perlu diberikan pertimbangan di dalam penentuan sama ada gantirugi boleh diberikan kepada Plaintif atau sebaliknya. Di antara faktor-faktor tersebut ialah: (a) Plaintif telah tidak menunjukkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa dalam tempoh pencerobohan Defendan Pertama ke atas tanah Plaintif, Plaintif ada cuba untuk melakukan apa-apa tindakan sebagai pemilik tanah. Misalnya Plaintif ada membuat apa-apa binaan di atas tanah tersebut. Sebaliknya kewujudan Defendan Pertama di atas tanah 37 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal tersebut yang diketahui oleh pihak Plaintif atau pegawainya tidak diambil apa-apa tindakan sehingga menyebabkan Defendan Pertama telah membuat binaan dan tanam- tanaman di atas tanah tersebut. (b) Plaintif hanya mengambil tindakan terhadap Defendan Pertama dengan memberikan notis pengosongan pada tahun 2018 setelah diwujudkan satu unit khas Plaintif untuk menyemak kedudukan tanah-tanah milik Plaintif dan mengambil tindakan yang sewajarnya untuk meminta penceroboh-penceroboh tanah Plaintif untuk mengosongkan tanah tersebut. (c) Keterangan juga menunjukkan bahawa Defendan Pertama ada membuat binaan. Walaupun tindakan tersebut tidak direstui oleh Mahkamah disebabkan ia adalah suatu pencerobohan tanah Plaintif namun perlu diambil kira bagi memastikan keadilan dapat dilaksanakan di mana Defendan Pertama akan mengambil masa dan mengeluarkan perbelanjaan untuk mengosongkan tanah tersebut dalam tempoh yang diberikan oleh Mahkamah. (d) Mahkamah juga mendapati tiada keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif bahawa mereka memerlukan tanah tersebut dengan kadar segera untuk digunakan sebagai pemilik tanah tersebut. 38 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [58] Fakta-fakta di atas dipertimbangkan dengan sewajarnya oleh Mahkamah dan Mahkamah berpendapat gantirugi adalah tidak wajar diberikan kepada Plaintif. [59] Mahkamah juga berpendapat tempoh 14 hari yang dipohon oleh Plaintif untuk Defendan Pertama mengosongkan tanah tersebut juga adalah sesuatu yang perlu dipertimbangkan dengan sewajarnya oleh Mahkamah dengan mengimbangkan kepentingan keadilan kepada Defendan Pertama untuk mengosongkan tanah tersebut dalam tempoh yang singkat sedangkan mereka telah berada di tanah tersebut puluhan tahun sebelum diminta untuk mengosongkan tanah tersebut. Oleh yang demikian walaupun Plaintif mempunyai hak sebagai pemilik tanah tersebut namun keadilan kepada Defendan Pertama perlu diambil kira dalam memberikan tempoh yang munasabah untuk Defendan- Defendan mengosongkan tanah tersebut. Mahkamah berpendapat tempoh 90 hari dari tarikh perintah adalah satu tempoh yang munasabah untuk Defendan Pertama mengosongkan tanah milik Plaintif sejajar dengan maksim keadilan perlu dilaksanakan bersama belas kasihan. Bertarikh: 27hb. Januari 2023 (ROSLAN MAT NOR) PESURUHJAYA KEHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR 39 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Plaintif Dato’ Alvin John, Sharan Chandrasekeran, Ahmad Hasif Ahmad dan Amanda Rayhel John Tetuan Alvin John & Partners No. 210 Blok E, Phileo Damansara 1 No. 9, Jalan 16/11 46350 Petaling Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan Bagi Pihak Defendan-Defendan G. S. Ramannaidu Tetuan Ng Chu Beng R. Naidu & Partners No. 58/1, Persiaran Raja Perempuan Mazwin Taman Tinggi 30100 Ipoh Perak Darul Ridzuan 40 S/N hIwu76CZR0ul8/fp9F9d9w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal