HARMON v OCEANIA FOOTBALL CONFEDERATION INCORPORATED [2021] NZHC 1210

HARMON v OCEANIA FOOTBALL CONFEDERATION INCORPORATED [2021] NZHC 1210 [27 May2021]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDAUCKLAND REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHECIV-2020-404-760[2021] NZHC 1210BETWEEN LEE HARMONApplicantAND OCEANIA FOOTBALLCONFEDERATION INCORPORATEDRespondentCIV-2020-404-837UNDER Parts 19 and 26 of the High Court Rules andRule 36, Schedule 1 of the Arbitration Act1996BETWEEN OCEANIA FOOTBALLCONFEDERATION INCORPORATEDApplicantAND LEE HARMONRespondentHearing: 24 August 2020Appearances: P W David QC and C D Boswell for Applicant/RespondentN R Williams and W R Potter for Respondent/ApplicantJudgment: 27 May 2021JUDGMENT OF PETERS JThis judgment was delivered by Justice Peters on 27 May 2021 at 3 pmpursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court RulesRegistrar/Deputy RegistrarDate: ...................................Introduction[1] I issued a results judgment in this matter on 30 April 2021, granting theapplication by Mr Harmon and dismissing that by Oceania Football Confederation Inc("OFC"), both of which applications are referred to below.1 These are my reasons.Applications[2] Mr Harmon applies for enforcement of an award by entry as a judgment, theaward being that of the Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS") dated 10 March 2020("award"). This application is made pursuant art 35, sch 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996("sch 1" and "Act").[3] OFC opposes Mr Harmon's application and seeks an order for refusal ofrecognition or enforcement of the award, pursuant to art 36, sch 1. OFC submits thereis a dispute as to the effect of the award and there can be no recognition or enforcementuntil the Court has determined its effect. Failing that, OFC submits the award dealswith a dispute outside the terms of the submission to arbitration; alternatively, that abreach of the rules of natural justice occurred, whether in connection with the makingof the award or so as to render OFC otherwise unable to present its case.Parties[4] OFC is an incorporated society registered in New Zealand, and one of sixregional confederations recognised by the Fédération Internationale de FootballAssociation ("FIFA"), the international organisation for football.[5] Mr Harmon is the President of the Cook Islands Football Association("CIFA"). CIFA is a "member organisation" of OFC. As President, in usualcircumstances, Mr Harmon would represent CIFA on OFC's Executive Committee("Executive Committee").[6] The dispute between OFC and Mr Harmon arose from the ExecutiveCommittee's advice to Mr Harmon that, as a result of matters between him and FIFA,1 Harmon v Oceania Football Confederation Incorporated [2021] NZHC 955.he had become, and would remain for life, ineligible to be a member of the ExecutiveCommittee. The background to the dispute may be summarised as follows.Background[7] In December 2018, FIFA alleged Mr Harmon had breached various of itsregulations by selling tickets allocated to him personally for games or events in the2018 FIFA World Cup.2 Mr Harmon defended the allegations. Following mediation,the parties agreed that Mr Harmon would pay a fine of CHF 20,000 and that he wouldbe suspended for three months from participating in any football-related activity,whether at national or international level. Mr Harmon paid the fine, and his suspensiontook effect on 8 March 2019.[8] Following the settlement between FIFA and Mr Harmon, OFC reviewedMr Harmon's status as a member of the Executive Committee.[9] OFC's internal procedures are governed by its statutes or rules ("statutes").The articles in the statues to which I refer below are set out in the annexure to thisjudgment.[10] The Executive Committee has many important functions in the OFC, includingsetting OFC's strategic direction, determining its policies and regulations, andapproving its annual budget. Membership of the committee is provided for in art 27and includes, amongst others, the "presidents of each Full Member Association". ThusMr Harmon was a member of the Executive Committee by virtue of being thePresident of CIFA.[11] In or about 2018, OFC had established an "Eligibility Committee", whosefunctions included reporting to the Executive Committee if a current office holder,such as a member of the Executive Committee, did not meet, or no longer met, theeligibility or independence criteria in arts 59 and 60 respectively, art 59 being theimportant one for present purposes.2 Mr Harmon did sell the tickets but paid the proceeds of their sale into CIFA's operating account.Mr Harmon did not retain the proceeds for personal gain.[12] On 20 March 2019, the Eligibility Committee advised the ExecutiveCommittee that, having been "sanctioned" by FIFA, Mr Harmon had becomeineligible to be a member of the Executive Committee, and that he would remainineligible for life on the grounds in art 59(g) of the statutes.[13] Article 28(k) of the statutes provides that the Executive Committee may givenotice to a member, terminating his or her appointment immediately, if the EligibilityCommittee advises he or she has become ineligible. OFC gave this notice by letter toMr Harmon of 17 April 2019, in which Ms Lloyd, OFC's in-house solicitor, said:The OFC Eligibility Committee has reported to the Executive Committee ...that you no longer meet the criteria in Article 59, as you have been subject tosanctions by the FIFA Ethics Committee.As the FIFA Ethics Committee has sanctioned you in a Decision of theChairperson of the Adjudicatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committeenotified on 7 March 2019, you are no longer eligible to be OFC President, anOFC elected FIFA Council Member, a member of the OFC ExecutiveCommittee, a member of an OFC Committee, a member of [an] OFC JudicialBody or as OFC General Secretary for life.You are hereby given notice of termination from (sic) your membership of theOFC Executive Committee under Article 28(k).[14] Mr Harmon disputed this outcome, which led to further correspondencebetween the parties. The only point to note regarding the later correspondence is that,in its letter of 29 May 2019, OFC advised Mr Harmon that the members of theExecutive Committee had determined in mid-April 2019 to give notice to Mr Harmonunder art 28(k) and had ratified their decision at a meeting on 9 and 10 May 2019.[15] As it turned out, OFC had already communicated with CIFA about what itcontended resulted from the settlement between FIFA and Mr Harmon. On 12 March2019, OFC advised CIFA that Mr Harmon was ineligible to hold office as a memberof the Executive Committee as a result of art 59(g), and that CIFA would have norepresentative on the committee if it did not elect another president.CAS[16] Article 41 of the statutes provides for recourse to CAS to resolve any dispute.[17] Mr Harmon lodged an appeal to CAS on 17 June 2019, and an "appeals brief"on 3 July 2019. In both documents, Mr Harmon identified his appeal as being againstthe "decision of [OFC's] Executive Committee on 9-10 May 2019 to impose a life banon [him] based on their interpretation of art. 59 of the OFC Statutes". The appealdocument and the appeals brief were both comprehensive, raising several issues aboutthe procedure the Executive Committee had adopted, whether there had been a failureby OFC to give Mr Harmon an opportunity to be heard before reaching a decision, aswell as taking issue with the Committee's construction of art 59. Mr Harmon'sposition on the merits was that any ineligibility continued only until he had paid hisfine and served his suspension, following which he would become eligible to resumehis position.[18] In so far as concerns relief, Mr Harmon sought that the arbitrator:13.1.1 Cancel the respective decisions of the Eligibility Committee on20 March 2019 and the Executive Committee on 9-10 May 2019.13.1.2 Make a declaration that Lee Harmon is eligible to return to the OFCExecutive Committee on 8 September 2019 in accordance with Art.27(1)(b) of the OFC Statutes when he has satisfied art. 59(h) of theOFC Statutes on 7 September 2019.[19] OFC raised a number of defences in its statement of defence, including that theappeal was out of time and that CAS had no jurisdiction to hear the dispute. OFC alsocontended that, if it came to the merits, Mr Harmon was within art 59(g), that the effectof the provision was clear, and that it rendered Mr Harmon ineligible for life forappointment to, or to be a member of, the Executive Committee.[20] OFC sought that Mr Harmon's appeal be dismissed and a declaration that,having been sanctioned by FIFA, Mr Harmon was ineligible for appointment to, or tohold office as a member of, the Executive Committee.[21] Subsequently, the parties agreed an "order of procedure" which provided CAShad:... jurisdiction to determine, by arbitration, the dispute which is the subject ofthat Application brought by Mr Lee Harmon ... dated 17 June 2019 against[OFC] and agree to refer the dispute to CAS for determination by arbitration.Arbitration[22] A sole arbitrator, the Hon. Dr Tricia Kavanagh, heard the appeal on 16 and17 September 2019. Mr Harmon and OFC were each represented at the hearing bycounsel and each filed written submissions. After the hearing counsel confirmed theirrights to be heard "had been fully respected" by the arbitrator and that they had "noissue with respect to the way the CAS procedure or hearing was conducted".3[23] In her lengthy award, the arbitrator dismissed OFC's procedural arguments,and allowed Mr Harmon's appeal. The main, but far from the only, point to emergefrom her award was that any ineligibility brought about by any of the sub-articles inart 59 continued only until the particular event was cured. In this case, that meantMr Harmon was eligible to resume his position as a member of the ExecutiveCommittee once he had paid his fine — which he had already done — and served thethree month period of suspension imposed by FIFA and a further three months asprovided for in art 59(h). (Nothing turns on that extension.)[24] The relief ordered was:The Court of Arbitration for Sport rules that:...2. The Decision of the OFC Eligibility Committee as endorsed by theExecutive Committee of the OFC and notified to Lee Harmon by theExecutive Committee on 17 April 2019 stating Mr Harmon is ineligibleto be a member of the OFC Executive Committee "for life" and theExecutive Committee's associated decision to terminate Lee Harmon'sMembership of the OFC Executive Committee are set aside.3. Lee Harmon is declared eligible under Article 59(h) as President of theCook Islands Football Association to resume his role as a member of theOFC Executive Committee from 9 September 2019....[25] I refer to the declaration in [3] above as "declaration three".3 Harmon v Oceania Football Confederation, above n 2, at [39].Article 11(1)(f) of the statutes[26] OFC acknowledges that on one view of it — the only view of it onMr Harmon's case — declaration 3 allows his immediate return to the ExecutiveCommittee as CIFA's president in accordance with art 27. OFC does not wishMr Harmon to return and relies on art 11(1)(f) as precluding his doing so. In my view,the most that can be said for art 11(1)(f) is that every member of OFC is obliged toensure that none of its officials or members who have been suspended for six monthsor more and/or fined $500 or more in the previous five years can represent it at,broadly, OFC or FIFA events or meetings. It is fair to say art 11(1)(f) is not welldrafted and no doubt there would be argument about its effect but, in any event, OFCcontends it precludes Mr Harmon's return to the Executive Committee as CIFA'sPresident.[27] I turn now to the parties' applications.Arbitration Act 1996, Schedule 1, Articles 35 and 36[28] Mr Harmon's application is made pursuant to art 35(1)(b), sch 1, whichprovides:35 Recognition and enforcement(1) An arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made,—(a) must be recognised as binding; and(b) on application in writing to a court, must be enforced by entryas a judgment in terms of the award, or by action, subject tothe provisions of this article and of article 36.[29] As Mr David QC, for Mr Harmon submits, art 35(1) is mandatory. Subject tocompliance with several procedural steps in art 35(2), which are not in issue in thiscase, the only basis on which to decline Mr Harmon's application is if a ground inart 36 is made out.4 I should record that a CAS award is final and binding on theparties. There is scope for an application to CAS for interpretation of the award or anappeal to another tribunal in the CAS regime but OFC has pursued neither.4 Hi-Gene Ltd v Swisher Hygiene Franchise Corporation [2010] NZCA 359.[30] The parts of art 36 on which OFC relies provide:36 Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement(1) Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of thecountry in which it was made, may be refused only—(a) at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if thatparty furnishes to the court where recognition or enforcementis sought proof that—...(ii) the party against whom the award is invoked was notgiven proper notice of the appointment of anarbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or wasotherwise unable to present that party's case; or(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by ornot falling within the terms of the submission toarbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyondthe scope of the submission to arbitration; or...(b) if the court finds that—...(ii) the recognition or enforcement of the award would becontrary to the public policy of New Zealand.(2) (3) For the avoidance of doubt, and without limiting the generality ofparagraph (1)(b)(ii), it is hereby declared that an award is contrary tothe public policy of New Zealand if—...(b) a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred—(i) during the arbitral proceedings; or(ii) in connection with the making of the award.Grounds of opposition[31] Mr Potter, for OFC, first submits that, in granting or refusing Mr Harmon'sapplication under art 35, sch 1, this Court must first consider the effect of declaration3 in light of art 11. Mr Potter submits that Mr Harmon cannot enforce declaration 3without that first step, as Mr Harmon seeks immediate restoration to the ExecutiveCommittee whereas OFC contends that declaration 3 does not require that, as OFCand CIFA are required to continue to apply art 11.[32] Alternatively, OFC submits that:(a) enforcement of the Award would be contrary to the public policy ofNew Zealand, on the basis that a breach of the rules of natural justiceoccurred in connection with the making of the award, alternatively thatOFC was unable to present its case; and(b) the Award was delivered in excess of jurisdiction, in that it containsdecisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.Construction of declaration 3[33] I am not persuaded that I am required to construe declaration 3 before grantingMr Harmon's application.[34] Mr Potter's (sole) authority for this proposition is the oral judgment RodneyHansen J gave in McDonald v Barfoote.5 In that case, after a longstanding dispute,the defendants sought (amongst other matters), the Judge's view on a particularinterest calculation ordered by an arbitrator. Having sought the parties' submissions,the Judge gave his view of how the calculation was to be carried out.[35] Whilst it may well have been open to the Judge to offer that view, the casecould not be considered authority for the proposition that the same is necessary or evenpermitted prior to granting an application under art 35(1)(b), sch 1. There is nothingon the face of the award to suggest it cannot be enforced in its terms. As Mr Davidsubmits, art 35(1)(b) is a procedural provision and its mandatory terms count againstMr Potter's submission on this particular point.5 McDonald v Barfoote HC Whangarei CIV-2003-488-580, 22 April 2004.Breach of natural justice/inability to present case[36] Mr Potter submits that if Mr Harmon's interpretation of the award is accepted,there has been a breach of the rules of natural justice, both during the arbitralproceedings and in connection with the making of the award, so that recognition orenforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of New Zealand.Alternatively Mr Potter submits that OFC was unable to present its case in the senseof art 36(1)(a)(ii), sch 1.[37] The breach of natural justice is said to have occurred because the hearingbefore the arbitrator focused on the interpretation of art 59 of the OFC statues, and notart 11 or CIFA's obligations under that provision. Mr Potter also submits OFC neededto be heard on declaration 3 if that were intended to override CIFA's obligations underart 11 but that OFC was given no such opportunity. Mr Potter also submits thatdeclaration 3 has ramifications for all of OFC's member associations, and that theymight also wish to be heard, as they have a "clear interest in the proper constitution ofOFC's Executive Committee and other bodies, and in the probity of the governance ofOFC".[38] I do not accept there was any breach of the rules of natural justice or that OFCwas unable to present its case in the sense of art 36(1)(a)(ii), sch 1.[39] First, if, as Mr Potter submits, the hearing focused on art 59 and not art 11, andfor present purposes I shall assume it did, that was a reflection of how OFC saw andran its case on the merits. In that part of its statement of defence which dealt with themerits of the dispute (as opposed to the procedural issues the arbitrator was requiredto determine), OFC said the dispute related solely to the interpretation of art 59, andthat the appeal could and ought to be disposed of by construing that provision. As itappeared in the statement of defence, OFC's case was that the FIFA sanction hadcreated a permanent effect on Mr Harmon's ability to serve on the ExecutiveCommittee, and that the effect at CIFA level was "not pertinent". Although OFC mayhave rested its case on art 59, it was open to it to refer to art 11 if it thought it relevantto the construction of art 59, or separately as a reason for denying Mr Harmon therelief he sought.[40] Secondly, however, OFC did in fact refer to art 11 in its final submissions. Inthose submissions, OFC said that if, contrary to its position, the arbitrator wasentertaining making a declaration that Mr Harmon was eligible to return to theExecutive Committee, other provisions in the statutes would govern and thatMr Harmon had not addressed these. OFC cited art 11 as "likely to come into play",with the effect that Mr Harmon would otherwise be ineligible to serve on the ExecutiveCommittee for five years.[41] Accordingly, art 11 was before the arbitrator before she rendered her award.Indeed the arbitrator discussed art 11 but determined that art 59 prevailed.[42] Thirdly, this was not a situation in which the arbitrator was required to revertto OFC to permit it to make yet a further submission on art 11. Mr Potter referred meto Trustees of Rotoaira Forest Trust v Attorney-General as the leading authority onnatural justice in the arbitration context.6 In that case, Fisher J summarised theprinciples to be applied. One of those is that an arbitrator is not bound to "slavishlyadopt the position advocated by one party or the other" and another is that an arbitratoris not under any general obligation to disclose what he or she is minded to decide "sothat the parties may have a further opportunity of criticising his [or her] mentalprocesses".7[43] Mr Potter's submission that other interested parties might have had an interestin the matter also does not assist OFC. First, it was open to OFC to seek the joinderof any party if it wished, but it did not. Secondly, the "natural justice" provisions ofart 36 seem to me to be concerned with the principles of natural justice vis-à-vis theparties to arbitral proceedings, not third parties. That a third party may have an interestin the outcome of a dispute is not a basis on which to decline an application underart 35(1)(b), sch 1 of the Act.[44] It follows that I am not persuaded OFC was unable to present its case or thatthere was any breach of the rules of natural justice, let alone one constituting such an6 Trustees of Rotoaira Forest Trust v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 452 (HC).7 At 463.affront to the public policy of New Zealand that I am required to decline Mr Harmon'sapplication.Scope of the submission to arbitration[45] Mr Potter also submits that the award, if construed as overriding art 11 of thestatutes, contains a decision on matters beyond the scope of the submission toarbitration, and thus recognition or enforcement may be refused pursuant to art36(1)(iii), sch 1.[46] Mr Potter submits the parties did not agree to arbitrate the effect of art 11 onthe obligations of CIFA, and nor was such implicit in the orders Mr Harmon sought,as art 11 binds CIFA, not Mr Harmon. Mr Potter also submits, again, that the purposeof the arbitration was to determine the scope of art 59(g) and the arbitrator has actedin excess of her jurisdiction if the award is construed so as to permit Mr Harmon'simmediate restoration to the Executive Committee. As before, Mr Potter submits suchwould conflict with art 11 and the obligations it imposes on CIFA.[47] Before I address the substance of this argument, I note the arbitrator expressedreservations regarding OFC's contentions as to the relevance of art 11, its effect, andon whom it may be binding. However, putting that to one side, I do not accept thesubmission to arbitration was purely to determine the meaning of art 59(g). I amsatisfied Mr David is correct in submitting that the issue the arbitrator was required todetermine was whether, and if so when, Mr Harmon might return to the ExecutiveCommittee in accordance with art 27(1)(b). I think this is clear from Mr Harmon'sapplication for appeal, his appeals brief, OFC's statement of defence (relying onprocedural and "merits" grounds to oppose him), the parties' submissions to thearbitrator and the relief sought and ordered. It may be observed that declaration 3 islargely indistinguishable from the relief Mr Harmon sought from the outset.Result[48] I grant Mr Harmon's application and dismiss OFC's.[49] Pursuant to art 35(1)(b), sch 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996, I make an orderenforcing by entry as a judgment the award identified in [2] above.[50] OFC having failed, it must pay Mr Harmon's costs and disbursements. Theparties may make brief submissions in the unlikely event they are unable to agree onquantum.Peters JSolicitors: Wilson Harle, AucklandMeredith Connell, AucklandCounsel: P W David QC, AucklandANNEXUREOCEANIA FOOTBALL CONFEDERATION INCORPORATIONSTATUTES...I. GENERAL PROVISIONS...Article 11: MEMBERS' OBLIGATIONS1. Every Member of the Confederation has the followingobligations:...f) To ensure that none of its Officials and/ormembers who have been found guilty ofbreaching the FIFA and/or OFC Code of Ethicsand as a result have been suspended for a periodof six (6) months or more and/or fined for a sumof at least $500 or more in the previous five (5)years from the relevant date can:i. Be entitled to represent any MemberAssociation or its Members at any OFCMeeting, Congress, Seminar, Course orany OFC or any FIFA event organizedunder the auspices of OFC its members,sponsors or related parties; andii. Be entitled to be appointed to any ad hocand/or standing committee of OFC orOFC representative on any ad hoc and/orstanding committee of FIFA ...IV. ORGANISATIONB. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEEArticle 27: COMPOSITION AND TERM OF OFFICEComposition1. The Executive Committee shall consist of:a) The President who is elected at the Congress;b) The other presidents of each Full MemberAssociation; andc) The two FIFA Council members who are electedin accordance with Article 22 (as a non-votingmember unless they are the president of a FullMember Association) ...Article 28: ROLE AND POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVECOMMITTEE1. The role and powers of the Executive Committee areto:...k) Give notice to any member of the ExecutiveCommittee, Committee member or JudicialBody member terminating their appointmentimmediately if the Executive Committee isadvised by the Eligibility Committee that anysuch member does not meet the EligibilityCriteria set out in Article 59 or the IndependenceCriteria set out in Article 60 (as applicable) ...VII. ARBITRATIONArticle 40: DISPUTES1. Unless specifically provided for in these Statutes or theFIFA regulations, Members, and Clubs, Players,Officials and Match and Player's Agents affiliated toMembers shall not take before any national court oflaw any dispute relating to the FIFA Statutes or theOFC Statutes or Regulations or the administration offootball.Article 41: COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT (CAS)1. Members of the Confederation, their Clubs, membersof their Club and any Players, Officials and licensedmatch agents and players' agents may have recourse tothe Court of Arbitration for Sport, an independentarbitration tribunal with headquarters in Lausanne(Switzerland), recognised by OFC, to resolve anydisputes between FIFA, the Confederations, Members,Leagues, Clubs, Players, Officials and licensed matchagents and players' agents.2. The CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration governsthe arbitration proceedings. With regard to substance,CAS applies the various regulations of FIFA or, ifapplicable, of the Confederations, Members, Leaguesand Clubs and, additionally, Swiss law.3. The Members and Leagues shall agree to recognizeCAS as an independent judicial authority and to ensurethat their members, affiliated Players and Officialscomply with the decisions passed by CAS. The sameobligation shall apply to licensed match and players'agents.Article 42: JURISDICTION OF CAS1. Only CAS is empowered to deal with appeals againstdecisions and disciplinary sanctions of the lastinstance, after all previous stages of appeal available atFIFA, OFC, Member or League level have beenexhausted. The appeal shall be made to CAS withintwenty one (21) days of notification of the decision.2. Recourse may only be made to CAS after all otherinternal channels have been exhausted.3. CAS shall not, however, hear appeals on:a) violations of the Laws of the Game;b) suspensions of up to four matches or up to three(3) months (with the exception of dopingdecisions);c) decisions passed by an independent and dulyconstituted arbitration tribunal of a member orConfederation;d) decisions against which an appeal to anindependent and duly constituted arbitrationtribunal recognised under the rules of a memberor Confederation may be made.4. CAS is also empowered to deal with all disputesbetween a third party and any entities or personsmentioned in Article 42(1) if an arbitration agreementexists.XIII. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIAArticle 59: ELIGIBILITYThe following persons are ineligible from being appointed(or holding office) as President, a FIFA Council member, amember of the Executive Committee, a member of aCommittee, a member of a Judicial Body or as GeneralSecretary:a) A person who is under 18 years of age;b) A person who is an undischarged bankrupt;c) A person who is prohibited from being a director orpromoter of, or being concerned or taking part in themanagement of, an incorporated or unincorporatedbody under the Companies Act 1993, the FinancialMarkets Conduct Act 2013, or the Takeovers Act1993 or any equivalent legislation overseas;d) A person who is disqualified from being an officer ofa charitable entity under section 31(4)(b) of theCharities Act 2005 or any equivalent legislationoverseas;e) A person who has been declared to lack legal capacityto manage their own affairs;f) A person who has been convicted of a crimeinvolving dishonesty (within the meaning of section2 (1) of the Crimes Act 1961) within the last seven(7) years, or any equivalent legislation overseas;g) A person who has been subject to sanctions by theFIFA Ethics Committee or the OFC EthicsCommittee; orh) A person who has been suspended by OFC's EthicsCommittee or the FIFA Ethics Committee (providedthat any such person will be eligible when the term ofany such suspension is lifted and the equivalentamount of time of the suspension has passed since thelifting of the suspension) ...