A (CA102/2022) v R [2023] NZCA 533

A (CA102/2022) v R [2023] NZCA 533 [30 October 2023]NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAMES, ADDRESSES, OCCUPATIONS ORIDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF COMPLAINANTS PROHIBITED BYS 203 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011.IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALANDI TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROACA102/2022[2023] NZCA 533BETWEEN A (CA102/2022)AppellantAND THE KINGRespondentHearing: 2 October 2023Court: Mallon, Churchman and Osborne JJCounsel: P K Hamlin and S R Hames for AppellantB J Thompson for RespondentJudgment: 30 October 2023 at 10 amJUDGMENT OF THE COURTA The appeal against conviction is dismissed.B The appeal against sentence is dismissed.C The need to correct the error pursuant to r 7.1(6) of the Criminal ProcedureRules 2012 is drawn to the attention of the District Court.____________________________________________________________________REASONS OF THE COURT(Given by Churchman J)Introduction[1] A was convicted of sexual violation by rape against two women following ajury trial in the Manukau District Court.1 He was sentenced by Judge Patel toeight years and 10 months' imprisonment.2 He now appeals against his convictionsand sentence.[2] The appellant raises four grounds of appeal. The first and second are in supportof the submission that a miscarriage of justice has occurred and the convictions shouldbe quashed. The third and fourth allege that the sentence imposed was manifestlyexcessive. The grounds are that:(a) The Judge erred by not giving a direction on reliability in relation toone of the complainants, given the evidence of her extreme level ofintoxication on the night of the alleged sexual violation.(b) The Judge asked questions during the appellant's evidence that wereunfair, repetitive and leading.(c) The Judge was wrong to find that the offending in relation to one of thecomplainants involved a breach of trust, leading to an excessively highstarting point.(d) The combined discount allowed for mental health issues and relativeyouth of 20 per cent was insufficient.The Crown caseB[3] The first complainant, B, is the appellant's first cousin. She was aged 22 at thetime of the alleged offending. The appellant was aged 28.1 Crimes Act 1961, ss 128(1)(a) and 128B — maximum penalty 20 years' imprisonment.2 R v [A] [2022] NZDC 2164 [sentencing decision].[4] On 13 July 2019, the appellant's parents hosted a party at their home in theBay of Plenty. B had intended to stay the night there before returning to her home inAuckland the next day, as the appellant had previously agreed to drive her back.[5] That evening, B became very intoxicated at the party. She was put to bed,where she vomited on the floor.[6] At around midnight, the appellant decided to drive home to Auckland, ratherthan stay the night. B was assisted into the back seat of his car and given a containerto vomit into during the journey. She vomited during the first part of the journey andwas in and out of sleep as they drove.[7] At some point near Waihi, the appellant stopped the car and emptied the vomitcontainer. He got into the backseat and made sexual advances towards B. He pulleddown his pants, exposing his penis, and said he wanted to make her feel good. Shescreamed and he got back into the driver's seat and continued driving.[8] The appellant next stopped in Paeroa. He again got into the backseat of thecar. This time he pulled B's legs apart, moved her underwear to the side and insertedhis penis into her vagina until he ejaculated.[9] Afterwards, the appellant drove B back to her home in Auckland. The nextday, B told her parents that the appellant had raped her. She was medically examinedand the appellant's semen was located on swabs taken from her vagina and underpants.B gave a DVD evidential interview on 16 July 2019. The appellant was charged withrape in relation to B on 22 November 2019.C[10] The second complainant is C, a close family friend of the appellant's family.The alleged offending against her occurred in around September 2014. At the time, Cwas 16 years old. The appellant was 22.[11] C attended a party with the appellant's younger brother. It was arranged thatshe would stay at the appellant's parents' house that night.[12] C became very intoxicated at the party. She also smoked cannabis. At onepoint in the night, she wandered off and became lost in an area of bush. She telephonedher mother in a distressed state. Her mother called the appellant's mother, who locatedC and took her back to the appellant's family home.[13] The appellant's father carried C inside the house and she threw up on him. Theappellant's mother helped to shower C. She was then put to bed on a mattress in arumpus room downstairs wearing a dressing gown and underwear.[14] The appellant was also staying at the house that night, having recently movedback home after a relationship break-up. C woke up to him having sex with her. Hetold her to be quiet and shut up or he would put his penis in her mouth to keep herquiet. C felt like she "deserved it" because she had let herself get so drunk so she keptquiet and tried to go back to sleep so she could pretend it never happened.[15] C was picked up the next day by her mother. She told her mother that theappellant had touched her but did not explain the extent of it. About a week later, theappellant sent C a Facebook message asking if she wanted to have sex with him. Therewas some disagreement about the content and nature of the message. C's evidencewas that the appellant asked if she wanted to have sex with him again. The appellantdenies that, and said it was a generic text message sent to many different women as hewas looking for a "rebound".[16] C went to the police in November 2019 after finding out that the appellant wasfacing the charge in relation to B. She gave a DVD evidential interview on10 December 2019. The appellant was charged with rape in relation to C on10 March 2020.Defence at trial[17] The trial took place over six days in July 2021. The appellant gave evidencein his defence and called seven witnesses.[18] His defence in relation to B was that sexual intercourse occurred but wasconsensual. He said B had kissed him as he was scraping vomit from her dress andthat he believed she was a willing participant. He contended that B, who was in arelationship at the time, felt ashamed about having sex with her cousin.[19] His defence in relation to C was that the encounter described by C neverhappened. He said she had a false recollection, as a result of her intoxication, or waslying.[20] Of the seven witnesses the appellant called at trial, four were not at either the13 July 2019 or the September 2014 party. They essentially gave "good character"evidence. Two said that although they had been in situations where they had beendrunk in the appellant's presence, he had not taken advantage of them. One said thatthe appellant had propositioned her when she had been intoxicated but that when shehad refused the invitation, he did not pursue the matter further. The fourth, a familymember of the appellant, said that there had been occasions when friends of hers,affected by alcohol, had stayed at the appellant's parents' house, none had raised anyissue about the appellant doing anything inappropriate to them. One of the remainingwitnesses had been at the 13 July 2019 party. He said that he did not really see howmuch the complainant had to drink that night.[21] Two of the witnesses had been at the party in September 2014. They describedthe complainant as being drunk and having smoked cannabis.[22] The appellant did not call any expert evidence as to the effect of theconsumption of alcohol or cannabis on memory.Appeal against convictionFirst ground — refusal to give a reliability direction[23] The appellant requested that the Judge give the jury a reliability warning unders 122 of the Evidence Act 2006 in relation to C's evidence. The Judge then heardsubmissions from counsel on the matter. At the commencement of his summing up on5 July 2021, the Judge indicated that he would not be giving such a direction. Hesubsequently provides his reasons in a ruling dated 13 July 2021.33 R v [A] [2021] NZDC 14227 [section 122 ruling].[24] The Judge first considered this Court's decision in Bruce v R.4 That was asuccessful appeal against conviction based on a failure by the trial Judge to give anadequate reliability warning in circumstances where the complainant of sexualviolation was highly intoxicated with alcohol and cannabis at the time of the allegedoffending. The Judge noted that in Bruce there were several external and internalinconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, and that there were said to be "someprofound issues as to her memory in relation to the crucial issues leading up to thesexual activity".5[25] In contrast, the Judge observed that there was no evidence in the present caseas to the extent of any impairment in C's memory at the time of the alleged incident.6Rather, C's recollection of events prior to being put to bed was largely consistent withother witnesses, such as her mother and the appellant's parents.7 The Judge noted thatwhile C said in a preliminary interview that she could not remember exactly whathappened, "she gave a clear account of the defendant having sex with her when sheawoke and what the defendant said to her".8 The Judge also noted the appellant'sevidence that there was sufficient light in the room to see that C's body was uncovered,and that the defence did not seek an identification warning.9 Finally, the Judgerecorded that if C's evidence of the Facebook message was accepted, there would beevidence supporting her complaint in the form of an admission by the appellant.10[26] The Judge concluded that a warning as to the reliability of C's evidence wasnot required.11 He stated, however, he would give a direction to the jury that they"ought to take into consideration that [C] had [consumed] alcohol and cannabis andwhat impact that might have on her reliability".124 Bruce v R [2015] NZCA 332, (2015) 28 CRNZ 150.5 Section 122 ruling, above n 3, at [13].6 At [14].7 At [14].8 At [14].9 At [14].10 At [15].11 At [16].12 At [16].[27] In the summing up, the Judge gave the following warning:Now it's common knowledge, members of the jury, that the consumption ofalcohol, cannabis and other drugs can have a negative effect on memory bothin terms of the ability to form memories and the ability to recall memories.You may have the experience of not recalling events that occurred whenyou've been drinking alcohol or you might've said to someone who'd beendrinking alcohol whether they recalled an event only to be told "no". Now,members of the jury, just like any part of the evidence it's for you to determinewhat impact the consumption of alcohol, cannabis or other drugs has on thecredibility and the reliability of the complainants and [A]. It's for you todecide whether witnesses were telling the truth or if, because of alcohol,cannabis or drug consumption, they were honest but mistaken. That is, thatthey did not form memories or could not remember parts of the night or thattheir memories are not accurate because of the impact of alcohol, cannabis orother drugs.Submissions[28] Mr Hamlin, for A, submitted that C's level of intoxication and what hesubmitted to be factual similarities with Bruce (namely the consumption of alcoholand cannabis to the point of throwing up) meant that a reliability warning was required.He submitted that, while it could be said that the effects of alcohol would be well-known amongst members of the jury, this was not necessarily the case as to the effectsof alcohol combined with cannabis. He further submitted that the necessity for areliability warning was reinforced by the fact that the allegation was a dated one andapproaching the 10-year time frame when a reliability warning would be required.[29] For the Crown, Mr Thompson submitted the Judge was right to distinguishBruce on the basis that C's evidence on the critical details was clear, cogent and largelyconsistent with that of other witnesses. Mr Thompson submitted that the present caseis more closely analogous to Daradkeh v R, where this Court held no warning unders 122 was required.13 In any event, it was said that the Judge ensured the jury waswell aware of the parties' respective arguments, including the defence submissionsregarding C's reliability and consumption of alcohol and cannabis, and, overall, nowarning under s 122 was needed.13 Daradkeh v R [2016] NZCA 172.Analysis[30] Section 122 of the Evidence Act provides (as relevant):122 Judicial directions about evidence which may be unreliable(1) If, in a criminal proceeding tried with a jury, the Judge is ofthe opinion that any evidence given in that proceeding that isadmissible may nevertheless be unreliable, the Judge maywarn the jury of the need for caution in deciding—(a) whether to accept the evidence:(b) the weight to be given to the evidence.(3) In a criminal proceeding tried with a jury, a party may requestthe Judge to give a warning under subsection (1) but the Judgeneed not comply with that request—(a) if the Judge is of the opinion that to do so mightunnecessarily emphasise evidence; or(b) if the Judge is of the opinion that there is any othergood reason not to comply with the request.(4) It is not necessary for a Judge to use a particular form of wordsin giving the warning.[31] For the reasons we now set out, we consider that the Judge did not err inrefusing to give a warning under s 122.[32] In Bruce, it was not in dispute that the sexual contact occurred.14 The issuewas whether there had been consent or a reasonable belief in consent. Thecomplainant's evidence in that case was that she had been extremely drunk and thather memory was "patchy" after smoking cannabis.15 She said she could remember"about 60 per cent" from entering the bedroom to falling asleep.16 Given her level ofintoxication, and the evidence of a third party who saw them holding hands andhugging each other, there was always a real chance that a jury would infer reasonable14 Bruce v R, above n 4.15 At [13].16 At [13].doubt as to consent.17 In those circumstances, there was an obvious concern about thepotential impact of cannabis and alcohol on the complainant's memory and perceptionin relation to the sexual contact.[33] In that case, this Court found that a more comprehensive warning was requiredthat:18(a) addressed the potential adverse effects of marijuana on perception ormemory input;(b) drew attention to the key inconsistencies in the complainant's evidenceconcerning certainty as to undressing and penetration;(c) counselled caution in adopting the prosecutor's assertion that thecomplainant's "clear patches" of memory were lucid and reliable in thecircumstances (this was inconsistent with the agreed impact of cannabison perception, and the complainant's evidence undercross-examination); and(d) noted that the context impaired not only the complainant's reliabilitybut also the defendant's, as well as his ability to mount an effectivedefence.[34] In contrast, the issue in this case was simply whether the alleged sexual contacthappened or not. In effect, the defence submission is that a reliability warning wasrequired because there was a risk that C, by virtue of her intoxication, essentiallyimagined the entire episode. However, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest thatC was so affected by alcohol and cannabis that she imagined the alleged offending.On the contrary, C's evidence was largely consistent with that of other witnesses. Inparticular, her account of what occurred after she was brought back to the house wasconsistent with that of the appellant's parents. This suggests that her recollection was17 At [14].18 At [26]. The Court also identified other matters of concern, including the Judge's decision todecline to accept expert evidence about the impact of alcohol and drugs on memory, the failure toconsult counsel on the content of the reliability warning, and the provision to the jury in summingup of inconsistent written and oral directions on reliability.reliable in the period of time leading up to the alleged offending. The fact that C couldnot recall events before being picked up but was able to give an account of whathappened back at the house is also consistent with the effects of the substancesgradually wearing off or, in other words, with her "sobering up".[35] The Judge gave a direction about the effect of alcohol and cannabis on theability to form and recall memories, and the need to take this into account whenassessing credibility and reliability. The direction squarely raised that issue in relationto the question the jury was required to determine, namely whether the alleged sexualcontact with C occurred or not.[36] We agree that Daradkeh is more analogous to the present case.19 In that case,an intoxicated passenger fell asleep in a taxi and awoke to find the driver indecentlyassaulting her. This Court rejected an argument that a s 122 warning should have beengiven due to the complainant's lack of recall about the events of that night, saying:[40] We do not consider that the fact that the complainant was under theinfluence of alcohol and medication, and unconscious for much of the timewhen she was in the taxi, meant that a reliability warning was required. Shewas very clear about what she found happening when she came to, namelythat Mr Daradkeh's hands were down her pants. She was very clear that shehad not consented to this. There was nothing to indicate that the fact that shehad been unconscious for much of the preceding period affected her ability toremember what happened when she became conscious.[37] Likewise, as noted above, there is nothing to suggest that in this case C's earlierintoxication and gaps in memory affected her ability to remember what happenedwhen she woke up. Her account of what she saw and experienced when she did wasclear, detailed and consistent with the evidence of other witnesses. She recalledwaking up and hearing the appellant breathing heavily, the words that he used in tellingher to be quiet, and what she was wearing at the time.[38] Bruce is not authority for the proposition that a s 122 warning is required inevery case involving a complainant who is intoxicated and has consumed cannabis.That would be contrary to the language of the section, which confers a discretion onthe presiding judge.19 Daradkeh v R, above n 13.[39] We also consider that the age of C's allegations did not give rise to particularreliability concerns additional to the complainant's intoxication. C's allegation wasnot about an event that was close to the 10-year period where a reliability warningwould be required. She first made her allegation approximately five years after theevent and in the circumstances she explained. The trial took place relatively promptly,less than two years later.[40] The Supreme Court has recently considered the circumstances where a s 122warning will be required, albeit, not in a case involving possible memory impairmentas a result of consumption of alcohol or cannabis, but a case involving events whichhad occurred some 16 to 17 years previously.20 The Supreme Court indicated that ifcounsel requests a reliability warning the trial judge must have "good reason" todecline it.21 The majority considered that s 122(3)(b) is not prescriptive and any "goodreason" in the context of the trial will suffice.22[41] The majority identified "good reasons" as including where: the defendant hashad a proper chance to respond to allegations of events occurring many yearspreviously;23 a warning would fundamentally cut across the defence case;24 and, asexpressly provided for in s 122(3)(a), a warning might inappropriately emphasiseother allegations against the defendant.25 The majority emphasised that what is a"good reason" in a particular case will depend on an assessment of its factual context.26[42] In the present case, the appellant had the opportunity to fully respond to theallegations; there is no dispute that both the complainants were intoxicated and thejury was not required to grapple with expert evidence about the effect of intoxicationon memory or recall. As is clear from the Judge's warning quoted above at [27], theJudge did expressly draw the jury's attention to the potential impact of alcohol andcannabis consumption on the ability to form and recall memories.20 R (SC78/2018) v R [2023] NZSC 132.21 At [4] per Winkelmann CJ, O'Regan and Williams JJ and at [172] per Glazebrook andEllen France JJ.22 At [4] and [51]–[53] per Winkelmann CJ, O'Regan and Williams JJ.23 At [52] per Winkelmann CJ, O'Regan and Williams JJ.24 At [52] per Winkelmann CJ, O'Regan and Williams JJ.25 At [4] per Winkelmann CJ, O'Regan and Williams JJ.26 At [53] per Winkelmann CJ, O'Regan and Williams JJ.[43] In relation to the 2019 incident involving B, an over-emphasis on theintoxication of the complainant could have adversely impacted the defence case,which was one of consent. As well, if such a warning had been given in respect of onecomplainant and not the other, the jury may well have become confused.[44] These circumstances set out above, in our view, amounted to "good reason"and the Judge made no error in not giving a formal reliability warning under s 122.The directions given were adequate in the circumstances of this case.Second ground — questions from the bench during the appellant's evidence[45] The second ground of review is that the Judge is said to have repetitivelyquestioned the appellant during his evidence on a point that was unhelpful for thedefence case, and in a manner that was unfair, repetitive and leading. Mr Hamlinrelied on the following exchange:Q. I wasn't quite clear on the number of times that you said that she hadvomited on the trip back, this is just on the trip back?A. Just the once.Q. So was that in the bucket?A. Yes, it was in the ice-cream container, yes.Q. And you emptied that?A. Yes I did.Q. And was that on the first stop?A. Yes it was.Q. Then you said that there was some vomit on her dress as well?A. Yes.[46] The relevant principles governing judicial intervention in criminal trials, whichlargely reflect the authorities cited by Mr Hamlin in support of this ground,27 are wellestablished, and are set out in this Court's decision in Milosevic v R.2827 See R v H (2002) 19 CRNZ 518 (CA) at [33]; and E H Cochrane Ltd v Ministry of Transport[1987] 1 NZLR 146 (CA) citing R v Matthews (1983) 78 Cr App Rep 23.28 Milosevic v R [2022] NZCA 479 at [46]–[48] (footnotes omitted).[47] A judge may ask a witness any question that in the judge's opinion "justicerequires".29 In deciding if justice requires questioning a witness in a criminal trial, thejudge should take into account the defendant's right to a fair trial, the separate roles ofthe judge and jury, the need to let counsel pursue their examination andcross-examination of witnesses, and the possibility that such judicial questioningcould cut across a defence which a defendant wishes to rely on.30 A judge may notintervene in a criminal trial so as to cause a reasonable observer to think the courtpartial as between the parties.31 When a judge is considering questioning in the courseof cross-examination of a defendant who has elected to give evidence in a criminaltrial, "considerable caution is required".32 A judge must avoid any appearance of biasor advocacy.[48] It seems that a confusion in the evidence about the number of times theappellant had stopped the vehicle as a result of B vomiting prompted the Judge's initialquestion but there does not seem to have been any obvious need for him to havefollowed up with the other questions. It would have been better if he had not askedthem. However, it goes too far to categorise the questioning as being repetitive orshowing partiality. The questions do not obviously cut across a defence that theappellant was advancing. Indeed, the questions could be seen as supportive of thedefence that B was very intoxicated and her memory was unreliable. We do notconsider that there is anything in the questions that might have given an appearancethat the Judge was becoming an advocate for the prosecution. We do not consider thequestions from the Judge give rise to any unfairness or risk of any miscarriage ofjustice.[49] Accordingly, the appeal against conviction is dismissed.29 Evidence Act 2006, s 100(1). See also Milosevic v R, above n 28, at [148].30 Milosevic v R, above n 28, at [48].31 At [46] citing Tahere v R [2013] NZCA 86 at [31].32 At [47] citing M v R [2015] NZCA 183 at [38].Sentence appealThird ground — finding of breach of trust[50] In sentencing, the Judge listed breach of trust as an aggravating feature of theoffending against B. He said:33(g) Breach of trust. [B] is your first cousin. You had been entrusted toreturn her to her family safely, and you abused that trust by offendingagainst her. [51] Mr Hamlin submitted that the Judge erred in finding breach of trust to be anaggravating feature of the offending, and he submitted that this led to a manifestlyexcessive starting point. He pointed out that B and the appellant were 22 and 28 at thetime of the offending, an age gap of only six years. He said the appellant was not in aposition of trust or authority and there was no power imbalance between them.Further, sexual intercourse between cousins, while potentially embarrassing, is notprohibited.[52] We are unable to accept this submission. As Mr Thompson pointed out, thedefendant in Daradkeh, who indecently assaulted an intoxicated passenger in his taxi,was found to have acted in breach of trust. The appellant's offending in this case wasa more serious breach of trust because the relationship between the appellant and Bwas much closer. B was in a very vulnerable state due to her intoxication. Theappellant was B's older cousin and he had been entrusted to return her safely to herparents. The reason he was entrusted with that task was because he was sober. Theappellant even called B's father during the trip to reassure him that everything wasokay. When B's boyfriend called asking to speak to her, he refused to put her on thephone, saying she was too drunk. The Judge was correct to find that the breach oftrust in this case was an aggravating factor in these circumstances. This finding didnot result in a starting point that was excessive.33 Sentencing decision, above n 2, at [18(g)].Fourth ground — insufficient discount for mental health issues and youth[53] In sentencing the appellant, the Judge allowed a discount of five per cent to theappellant for previous good character, reflecting that he had no previous convictionsbefore his offending against C. The Judge accepted that the appellant's attentiondeficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) "played a contributing role to the commissionof the offences",34 and this was "causative of the offending to a degree".35 The Judgeconsidered a reduction in the appellant's sentence was necessary to reflect this. TheJudge also provided a discount for the appellant's relative youth. The Judge adopteda discount for the appellant's ADHD and relative youth of 15 per cent together with adiscount of five per cent for good character, resulting in a "global discount" of20 per cent.36[54] The appellant challenged this discount. He suggested that discounts totalling30 per cent would have been more appropriate.[55] We disagree. The overall discount of 20 per cent was appropriate recognitionof the appellant's personal circumstances. That level of discount was consistent withthis Court's decision in Wira v R, in which the Court considered a 20 per cent discountwas required for Mr Wira's ADHD, serious childhood post-traumatic stress disorder(PTSD) and other circumstances, including an extremely violent and dysfunctionalupbringing in a gang environment.37 The Judge in this case considered Wira and madeno error in determining that a lesser discount was required. He applied the discountwas applied to both sets of offending notwithstanding that the appellant would nothave qualified for a discount for youth, or indeed previous good character, in relationto the 2019 offending. The discount could not be said to have resulted in a sentencethat was manifestly excessive.[56] The appeal against sentence is dismissed.34 At [28].35 At [30].36 At [32]–[33].37 Wira v R [2021] NZCA 98.Final matter[57] An additional matter raised by Mr Hamlin is that the first strike warningdocument and the warrant of committal in relation to the charge against C describesthe offence as "male rapes female aged 12 – 16", whereas C was at least 16 when theoffending occurred. The actual charge was sexual violation by rape and it did not referto the age of the victim. Mr Hamlin submitted that the appellant faces barriers torehabilitation and reintegration if the nature of his offending is said to relate to sexualviolation of a minor, compared to a sexual act with a person aged 16 years or older.He sought that the description be changed to correctly refer to the charge of which hewas convicted.[58] We are satisfied the description of the offending is incorrect. We do not acceptthe Crown's submission that this description is intended to include a person who is16 years of age. The Crimes Act 1961 consistently draws a distinction between sexualacts against people under 16, the legal age of consent, and those 16 and older. Thereis no reason, in our view, why the description should not be corrected. We do notconsider that it is necessary to show detriment in order to rectify this error. In anycase, we accept a description of the charge which suggests the appellant is guilty of asexual act with a minor carries a greater stigma and may be a greater barrier to theappellant's rehabilitation.[59] Rule 7.1(6) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2012 provides:A judicial officer or Registrar may at any time correct an entry made by thatperson in the permanent court record, or direct that it be corrected, if satisfiedthat it is erroneous in any respect.[60] As the error was not made by this Court or a Registrar of this Court, thecorrection will have to come from the District Court. We draw the matter to theattention of that Court and anticipate that the Court record will be amendedaccordingly.Result[61] The appeal against conviction is dismissed.[62] The appeal against sentence is dismissed.[63] The need to correct the error pursuant to r 7.1(6) of the Criminal ProcedureRules 2012 is drawn to the attention of the District Court.Solicitors:Crown Law Office | Te Tari Ture o te Karauna, Wellington for Respondent