GORGUS v THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS [2020] NZHC 2249

GORGUS v THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS [2020] NZHC 2249 [1September 2020]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDAUCKLAND REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHECIV-2019-404-1477[2020] NZHC 2249UNDER the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, Part 30of the High Court Rules 2016, theDeclaratory Judgments Act 1908 and thecommon lawIN THE MATTER of an application for judicial review anddeclarationsBETWEEN ASHOR GORGUSApplicantAND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THEDEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONSRespondentHearing: 7 May 2020 with further memoranda on 11, 18, 20, 27 May, 5, 8June and 10 July 2020Appearances: The applicant in person (by AVL)S K Shaw for the respondentDate of judgment: 1 September 2020JUDGMENT OF PALMER JThis judgment was delivered by me on Tuesday, 1 September 2020 at 10.00am.Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.Registrar/Deputy RegistrarParty/Solicitors:ApplicantMeredith Connell, WellingtonSummary[1] Mr Ashor Gorgus challenges prison management decisions by the Departmentof Corrections that affect him. He applies for interim orders for access to wordprocessing facilities, a transfer to another prison which can provide that access andwhich is closer to his family and rehabilitation provider, and appointment of a counselto assist the Court. I consider the Court's wide discretion to order interim reliefextends to being able to prohibit Corrections from using its unique ability to inhibitproceedings against itself by prisoners, even if it is not done for that purpose. The lackof access to word processing facilities is a disadvantage for a litigant. The time mightnot be far away when prisoners exercising their rights to conduct legal proceedingsmay be required to be granted access to word processing facilities.[2] Here, the disadvantage has not been fatal to Mr Gorgus' ability to access theCourt in order to pursue his challenge to date. But his proceedings have progressedvery slowly, due to his current medical condition exacerbating the disadvantage ofhaving to handwrite his submissions. That is likely to significantly lengthen thetimeframes for his litigation and may inhibit him from pursuing them at all. There isundoubtedly disadvantage to Corrections in a court interfering in its administration ofa prison. But, overall, I consider the balance of convenience favours Mr Gorgusbecause, crucially, of the effect of his medical condition on his ability to meaningfullyrealise his right to pursue legal proceedings. I grant an interim order regarding accessto word processing facilities. I do not make an interim order to transfer Mr Gorgus toanother prison because he can apply again. I do not appoint a counsel to assist theCourt in the proceedings at this stage.What happened?Mr Gorgus's difficulties[3] On 18 July 2019, Mr Gorgus applied for judicial review of decisions related tohis placement by Corrections on directed segregation on 9 July 2019, under s 58 of theCorrections Act 2004 (the Act). There have been delays because of errors in theproceeding being served and at the request of Mr Gorgus. In November 2019,Mr Gorgus applied for interim orders for access to word processing and other facilitiesto conduct his litigation. That was resolved in agreement with Corrections byAuckland Prison working towards providing Mr Gorgus with access to a computerwith word processing facilities for two hours per day up to seven days a week,conditional on the operational capacity at the Prison.1 Then, on 19 December 2019,Mr Gorgus was transferred to Rimutaka Prison for "muster management" reasons.2[4] On 23 December 2019, Mr Gorgus was released on bail, on conditions. Hewas then allegedly assaulted and suffered a broken jaw and nose. A letter from Dr Carrof 28 January 2020 attested to the effects of Mr Gorgus's facial fractures on hisphysical health and cognitive impairment, in terms of short-term memory loss anddifficulties with visuo-spatial processing and planning and recommended inpatienttraumatic brain injury rehabilitation.3 Mr Gorgus says he has been strugglingcognitively and is not physically able to prepare substantial handwritten submissions.[5] On 28 January 2020 Mr Gorgus was again remanded in custody, at RimutakaPrison. He is charged with aggravated burglary in Palmerston North. He has been heldat Rimutaka's management unit for health reasons.4 Because all defendants on remandare unclassified in terms of security, they are treated and managed as high risk.5 Hehas made several complaints about his treatment at the Health facility. While incustody Mr Gorgus has been assessed for concussion and consequently received ACC-funded rehabilitation counselling services by a brain specialist located in Wairarapa.ACC also approved a medical case review and a neuro-psychological assessment.[6] At Rimutaka, Mr Gorgus's concerns about access to facilities revived. Theevidence of Mr Simon Hicks, Custodial Systems Manager at Rimutaka is that the issuewas raised him with on 10 February 2020 and escalated to the Prison Director.6Mr Gorgus was informed it was not possible to provide access to computer facilitiesat Rimutaka at the moment.7 Rimutaka has one set of computers in the Secure Online1 Memorandum of the parties, 28 November 2019.2 Affidavit of Simon Hicks, 5 March 2020 (Hicks, March 2020), at [3].3 Letter from Dr Gawen Carr to the Presiding Judge, regarding Mr Gorgus' medical information (28January 2020).4 Hicks, March 2020, at [4].5 At [4].6 At [7].7 At [7].Learning Suite, currently fully occupied with prisoners using it to engage ineducational and training programmes.8 There is a wait list to use the suite for thatpurpose. Until January 2020 there had been an arrangement for low security prisonersengaged in litigation to use the Suite at specified hours but that no longer applies, forresourcing reasons.9 They now use a computer in a low security segregated unit whichis physically unable to be moved.10 Mr Hicks' evidence in March 2020 was that therewas insufficient resource for Corrections to monitor and supervise a prisoner beingmanaged as high risk in the Suite outside the educational hours.11 If the position wereto change, access by Mr Gorgus would be revisited.[7] Corrections has a system for prisoners to request access to facilities to supportlitigation, using (a five-page) F.07 form under the Prison Operations Manual.12 On20 April 2020, Mr Gorgus requested a writing pad, correction tape, highlighters andA4 envelopes and access to case law and legal authorities. The stationery (though notthe A4 writing pad) was provided.13 His legal research request was declined as tooopen-ended, given insufficient staff available to search for material.14 Mr Hicks'evidence, and the decision noted on the F.07 form, is that if Mr Gorgus specifies therequest then staff may be able to assist.15[8] Mr Gorgus has sought several transfers to other prisons which have beendeclined as Corrections considered there was no operational need to make thetransfers.16 In April 2020, he requested a transfer to Whanganui prison to be close tohis family and where he is being charged and to facilitate his rehabilitation with theWairarapa specialist.17 Corrections declined this transfer as non-essential under AlertLevel 4.18 He was told he could apply again once Alert Levels changed.19 I do nothave evidence about the computer facilities at other prisons.8 At [8].9 At [9].10 At [13].11 At [10].12 At [14].13 Affidavit of Simon Hicks, 24 April 2020 (Hicks, April 2020) at Exhibit SH-2 and SH-5.14 At [5].15 At [5].16 Hicks, March 2020, at [17].17 Hicks, April 2020, at Exhibit SH-1.18 At [3].19 At [4].[9] In February 2020, Mr Gorgus applied to the Court for interim orders for accessto facilities and for appointment of a counsel to assist the court. There were furtherdiscussions with Corrections but the application was not resolved. I deferredconsideration of appointment of a counsel to assist the court.Hearing and aftermath[10] On 7 May 2020 I heard Mr Gorgus' amended application of 20 April 2020, forinterim orders:(a) An order directing the respondent to transfer the applicant to a facilitywhere reasonable access to facilities can be accorded him for thepurposes of preparing and assisting in this and other litigation;(b) An order directing the respondent to provide the applicant adequateand reasonable access to research material such as caselaw andauthorities for the purposes of progressing this proceedingappropriately and efficiently;(c) An order directing the respondent to provide the applicant adequateand reasonable access to stationery material such as A4 writing pads,A4 envelopes, Twink and highlighters etc.(d) An order that an amicus curiae is appointed to aid assistance to theCourt.[11] He also requested a transfer to Whanganui or Palmerston North Correctionalfacilities which would enable him to explore other options for accessing facilities toassist his litigation and would enable him to maintain family support, given his partnerand children live in Whanganui. I declined an application by Mr Gorgus to cross-examine the deponent of Corrections' affidavit.[12] After the hearing Mr Gorgus, sought leave to file further evidence:(a) On 11 May 2020 he sought leave to file an affidavit demonstrating thatCorrections knew about his medical condition, contradicting asubmission he believed had been made by Corrections.20 He alsorequested a transcript of the hearing.21 Ms Shaw, for Corrections,opposes admission of the affidavit on the basis it was not relevant. It20 Memorandum of A Gorgus, 11 May 2020.21 Letter to Registrar by A Gorgus, 12 May 2020.abided the Court's decision on the transcript. I have reviewed theaffidavit and consider a few aspects of it may be relevant. I havereflected those in the judgment. I do not consider a transcript of thehearing would be helpful and do not order it.(b) On 27 May 2020 Mr Gorgus sought leave to adduce a further affidavitshowing he represents himself in a criminal appeal in the Court ofAppeal.22 He submits it is relevant because Corrections denies s 24(d)of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of Rights Act) appliesto a civil, rather than a criminal, proceeding. Ms Shaw, for Corrections,opposes the application because she submits it attempts to shift thegoalposts of his application for facilities from this proceeding toanother proceeding. Other than in providing evidence of the fact thatMr Gorgus is engaged in criminal proceedings, I do not consider theevidence is relevant and do not admit it.(c) On 10 July 2020, Mr Gorgus sought leave to file an affidavit attachinga minute of the Court of Appeal regarding his criminal appeal. Theminute recognises that Mr Gorgus has difficulty handwriting and isseeking access to word processing facilities at Rimutaka Prison andgives him more time than usual in order to advance the appeal.23 I takethat into account.[13] On 20 August 2020, Mr Gorgus filed an amended statement of claim that seeksto add to the application for judicial review actions for damages under the Bill ofRights Act and in tort. He says he is still experiencing significant difficulties hand-writing substantial amounts of material due to this medical condition. He estimated itwould have taken him two or three days after the hearing to amend the statement ofclaim if he had had access to word processing facilities. Without them, it took himthree and a half months.22 Memorandum of A Gorgus, 27 May 2020.23 Minute of Courtney J, 2 June 2020, at [3].Relevant law of interim orders[14] Under s 15 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016, the court may makeinterim orders "if, in its opinion, it is necessary to do so to preserve the position of theapplicant". Section 15(3) provides for interim orders against the Crown (of whichCorrections is a department). When an application is made for an extraordinaryremedy under r 30.4 of the High Court Rules 2016, "the court may make an interimorder on whatever terms and conditions the court thinks just".[15] The Court has a wide discretion to consider all the circumstances of the casein deciding whether to grant interim relief.24 It is relevant to consider:(a) whether there is a serious question to be argued;(b) the strength of the applicant's case;(c) the balance of convenience between the parties; and(d) the overall justice of the position.[16] Interim orders are usually intended to preserve the applicant's position asprovided for in s 15. That can include restoring an applicant to a position they wouldhave been in but for the alleged unlawfulness.25 Interim orders that require arespondent to do something, rather than restrain the respondent from doing something,are rare but the jurisdiction to grant them is available.2624 Carlton & United Breweries Ltd v Minister of Customs [1986] 1 NZLR 423 (CA) at 430.25 Whiskey Jacks Rotorua Ltd v Minister of Internal Affairs HC Wellington CIV-2003-485-1901, 11September 2003 at [40]; Greer v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections [2018] NZHC 1240,[2018] 3 NZLR 571 at [22]-[26].26 Taylor v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2010] NZCA 371, [2011] 1 NZLR 112at [26]-[27].Issue 1: Should Mr Gorgus be provided with computer facilities or transferred?Relevant law[17] Relevantly, and subject to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can bedemonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s 5, the Bill of RightsAct protects:(a) the right to freedom of expression, "including the freedom to seek,receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form",under s 14;(b) the right of everyone charged with an offence to "have the right toadequate time and facilities to prepare a defence" under s 24(d);(c) the right to the observance of the principles of natural justice by anypublic authority "which has the power to make a determination inrespect of that person's rights, obligations, or interests protected orrecognised by law", under s 27(1);(d) the right to apply for judicial review of a determination in respect of aperson's rights, obligations, or interests, under s 27(2); and(e) the right to bring civil proceedings against the Crown, and to have thoseproceedings heard, according to law, "in the same way as civilproceedings between individuals", under s 27(3).[18] Section 8(1)(a) of the Corrections Act requires the Chief Executive ofCorrections to ensure the corrections system operates in accordance with the purposesin s 5 and the principles in s 6. Section 5 provides that the Act's purpose is "to improvepublic safety and contribute to the maintenance of a just society" in several waysincluding by:(a) ensuring that custodial sentences are administered "in a safe, securehumane and effective manner"; and(b) providing for corrections facilities to be operated in accordance withthe Act and regulations based, among other things, on the UnitedNations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.[19] Section 6(2) requires any person exercising a power under the Act orregulations to take into account the principles guiding the corrections system whichinclude:(a) "The maintenance of public safety is the paramount consideration indecisions about the management of persons under control", under s6(1)(a).(b) "[T]he corrections systems must ensure the fair treatment of personsunder control" including by "ensuring that decisions about thosepersons are taken in a fair and reasonable way and that those personshave access to an effective complaints procedure", under s 6(1)(f)(ii).(c) Sentences "must not be administered more restrictively than isreasonably necessary to ensure the maintenance of the law and thesafety of the public, corrections staff, and persons under control", unders 6(1)(g).(d) "[C]ontact between prisoners and their families must be encouragedand supported, so far as is reasonable and practicable and within theresources available, and to the extent that this contact is consistent withthe maintenance of safety and security requirements" under s 6(1)(i).[20] Regulation 193 of the Corrections Regulations 2005 (the regulations) requiresa prison manager "must, as far as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances"ensure a prisoner involved in specified criminal or immigration proceedings isprovided with adequate facilities "to the extent that this is consistent with themaintenance of safety and security requirements". Policy F.07 of the PrisonOperations Manual provides for certain facilities, including computer facilities, to beprovided for prisoners for litigation more generally. It provides:27Reasonable access to facilities to assist with any other litigation may beprovided to any prisoner at the discretion of the prison director. Access tofacilities may be available before the commencement of litigation, where theprisoner is contemplating filing proceedings in the near future.[21] It also outlines the relevant considerations to which a Prison Manager musthave regard in exercising the discretion.28[22] In 2003 in R v Greer, the Court of Appeal held that lack of access to a computerby a prisoner had not resulted in a miscarriage of justice in a criminal case, includingunder s 24(d) of the Bill of Rights Act, but observed:29[39] We comment that it may be open to doubt in the twenty first centurythat the provision of writing materials only to an inmate, could in all cases beregarded as adequate facilities with which to prepare that defence, particularlyif the inmate plans to conduct his or her own defence. It may therefore betime for the regulations relating to computers in cells to be revisited or at leastfor prisons to ensure that access to computers is provided in another mannerto those who may need them to prepare their defences.[23] The Court later directed prison authorities to provide Mr Greer with access toa computer and printer.30 In Taylor v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections(No 2), Allan J declined an application for interim orders seeking access to a computerand special workroom. That was on the basis it would improve, rather than preservethe applicant's position, would be practically impossible to monitor given the prisonenvironment, the need for the Prison Manager to make decisions as things changewithout warning would involve the Court in directing the day to day operationalmanagement decisions of the prison, and there was no reasonable prospect such reliefwould finally be obtained in a judicial review.3127 Prison Operations Manual, 23 July 2018 at [F.07].28 At [F.07.03].29 R v Greer CA197/01, 4 June 2003.30 R v Greer CA 179/06, 25 May 2006 at [9].31 Taylor v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (No 2) HC Auckland CIV 2011-404-3227, 5 August 2011.[24] In 2018, in Greer v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, CookeJ declined to grant interim orders directing provision of a computer to Mr Greer.32 Heobserved that interim relief is not limited to maintaining the status quo but can placethe applicant in the position it would have been in but for the alleged illegality.33 Heaccepted the orders could legitimately be regarded as preserving Mr Greer's position.34He accepted the lack of access to computer facilities was a material disadvantage toMr Greer (and the Court) but was not fatal because he was still able to handwrite hissubmissions.35 He held the disadvantage to Mr Greer was not so great that the Courtshould intervene in the Prison Manager's decision-making by way of interim orders,before Corrections had a full opportunity to outline the prison management issuesinvolved.[25] Recently, in Cheng v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections, Downs Jdeclined an application by a sentenced prisoner facing new charges for interim ordersrequiring provision of a personal laptop with an email system and web browser,international audio-visual connections and telephone calls and unmonitored mail andemail delivered in a timely manner.36 Mr Cheng apparently already had a computerand telephone in his cell.37 Downs J held that Mr Cheng was trying to improve hisposition, not preserve a previous position, in distinction to Greer.38[26] Section 54 of the Act empowers the chief executive to transfer prisonersbetween prisons for specified reasons, including "to place that prisoner closer to hisor her family" or to grant a prisoner's request. Under s 54(4)(c), in considering atransfer, the chief executive must have regard to "the desirability of ensuring that theprisoner is detained at a location as close as is practicable to his or her family".[27] In Reekie v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections Ellis J declinedan application for interim orders transferring Mr Reekie from one prison to another.3932 Greer v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections, above n 25.33 At [22]-[25].34 At [26].35 At [29]-[30].36 Cheng v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections [2020] NZHC 2158.37 At [9] and [13].38 At [19].39 Reekie v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2012] NZHC 1412.She considered that he had no position to "preserve" under s 8 of the JudicatureAmendment Act 1972 and an applicant cannot obtain by interim orders what could notbe obtained at the substantive hearing.40 She noted the Court of Appeal's reference inTaylor v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections that there are strong policyreasons against granting mandatory interim orders which may involve "inappropriateintervention by the court in decisions about the best use of scarce resources or thebalancing of delicate priorities which are best left to the discretion of the responsibleauthorities".41Submissions[28] Mr Gorgus submits:(a) Corrections has unreasonably declined his request to access facilities toassist in his litigation, particularly word processing facilities but alsoaccess to case law and legal authorities. His clinical condition obstructshis physical ability to handwrite substantial amounts of material. Ifthose facilities cannot be made available at Rimutaka, he objects tobeing imprisoned there, both for that reason and because it is furtheraway from his family and his counsellor than are other prison facilities.(b) The purpose of the Corrections system is achieved by operatingaccording to the Act and regulations and United Nations standards.Corrections' evidence indicated all remand prisoners at Rimutaka aredenied reasonable access to facilities to assist in litigation, contrary toF.07 and F.08 of the Prison Operation Manual (POM). Corrections hasalso breached ss 14 and 27(1) of the Bill of Rights Act, which includesthe right to impart information for the purposes of exposing abuse ofpower. It also demonstrates contemptuous disregard for his dignity andhumanity.40 At [17].41 At [20], citing Taylor v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, above n 26, at [26].(c) Corrections has not taken into account the fact he has sustained life-threatening injuries which make it nearly impossible for him to hand-write substantial legal submissions. Corrections has deliberately placedhim in a disadvantaged position.[29] Ms Shaw, for Corrections, submits the application for interim orders should bedismissed because:(a) Although there is a disadvantage in form in not having access to acomputer to type up Court documents, there is no substantivedisadvantage to Mr Gorgus where the timetable can be amended toprovide him with the time he needs. The orders sought would improve,not preserve, Mr Gorgus' position and would require positive action,which is rarely granted. There is no reasonable prospect that access toa computer would be obtained as relief in the substantive proceeding.(b) Corrections is not able to provide computer access to Mr Gorgus atRimutaka. Ordering that would override prison management's decisionon operational matters and engage the Court in day-to-day managementof finite resources in prisons. It would also detrimentally affect otherprisoners who use the computer suite or are wait-listed for onlineeducational classes. There is no legal right to access computerfacilities. Section 24(d) and the right to a fair trial does not extend tocivil proceedings.(c) The application to transfer to another prison was premature whenrestrictions were in place due to COVID-19. Relief would be animproper substitution for the Chief Executive's discretion to maketransfer decisions, particularly on an interlocutory application. Thereis no specific evidence at to whether the location of Mr Gorgus's familywas taken into account in considering the request.(d) An order for access to facilities is not reasonably necessary givenMr Gorgus' requests have been facilitated where possible, by provisionof stationery and the ability to file handwritten documents. His requestfor research materials will be considered if and when he specifiesreasonable parameters that can be met by prison staff.Should I grant an interim order?[30] The Court of Appeal made clear in Taylor v Chief Executive of the Departmentof Corrections that the High Court has a wide jurisdiction to issue mandatory interimorders under the predecessor to s 15 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016. Thecommon law jurisdiction of the High Court under pt 30 of the High Court Rules 2016is even wider. I consider, similar to Cooke J's holding in Greer v Chief Executive ofthe Department of Corrections, that interim orders of the nature sought here couldlegitimately be regarded as preserving Mr Gorgus' position. He previously had anagreement from Corrections to work towards provision of word processing facilitiesin prison. He seeks restoration of that, by being granted access to computer facilitiesin Rimutaka or by being transferred to another prison.[31] The denial of those facilities is not an element of his substantive challengehere, which focuses on his segregation. But, even if Mr Gorgus had not previouslyagreed with Corrections over the provision of facilities to conduct his litigation,I consider he may be entitled to seek that by way of interim orders. Corrections has aunique ability in practice, as a respondent in a judicial review, to make more difficultthe progress of those proceedings by a prisoner plaintiff. I consider the Court's widediscretion to order interim relief extends to prohibiting a respondent from inhibitingproceedings against itself, even if it is not done for that purpose. Section 27(3) of theBill of Rights Act reinforces that.[32] I also agree, as accepted by Cooke J in Greer and by both parties here, that lackof access to word processing facilities is a disadvantage for a litigant. In 2003, theCourt of Appeal doubted that provision of writing materials only to an inmate could,in all cases, be regarded as adequate facilities to conduct his or her own defence. Asnew generations rely ever more heavily on computers, and lose proficiency inhandwriting, the validity of that point will only grow. The time might not be far awaywhen prisoners exercising their rights to conduct legal proceedings may be requiredto be granted access to word processing facilities. Corrections would be wise tointegrate that possibility into its medium-term planning. Ms Shaw is correct thats 24(d) of the Bill of Rights Act only applies directly to defendants charged withcriminal offences. But the considerations are similar in relation to plaintiffs exercisingtheir rights to challenge official decisions by way of judicial review and to conductcivil proceedings against the Crown,, the importance of which is recognised in ss 27(2)and 27(3) of the Bill of Rights Act, as an element of the right to justice.[33] The disadvantage has not been fatal to Mr Gorgus' ability to access the Courtin order to pursue his challenge to date. His proceedings have progressed. He hasbeen provided with materials for handwriting his submissions and he has eleganthandwriting. Ordinarily, perhaps, that might (just) suffice, even in 2020. But theproceedings have proceeded very slowly, contrary to the objective that judicial reviewproceedings should be prompt.[34] I accept that Mr Gorgus' medical condition, including short-term memory lossand difficulties with visuo-spatial processing and planning exacerbates hisdisadvantage from laboriously having to handwrite his submissions. It is likely tosignificantly lengthen the timeframes for his litigation, as the three and a half monthstaken to file his amended statement of claim demonstrates. Even taking into accountthe prison mail system, my impression is that Mr Gorgus' ability to progress theproceeding before his injuries is significantly slower than after those injuries. Andthat may inhibit him from pursuing the proceedings at all. Corrections is aware ofMr Gorgus' medical condition. This must be relevant to the decision whether toprovide him with access to word processing facilities. But, as Ms Shaw agreed, thereis no evidence that Corrections took into account Mr Gorgus' medical condition inmaking its decision.[35] I do not accept that Corrections has a physical inability to provide Mr Gorguswith access to word processing facilities. The evidence does not establish that. Thecase of Mr Cheng illustrates that some (sentenced) prisoners have access to wordprocessing facilities. But there is undoubtedly disadvantage to Corrections in a Courtinterfering in its administration of a prison. The Court of Appeal has done so before,as outlined above. But it has also warned of the seriousness of doing so. I accept thatoperation of the corrections system involves complex and multi-faceted balancing ofsecurity and freedoms. Mr Hicks' evidence of the context of computer facilities atRimutaka makes that clear. And there are important considerations of equity betweenprisoners that must be taken into account. If there is no material distinction betweenMr Gorgus and any other remand prisoner who desires to access computer facilities,any interim order I grant could have significant precedential effects. And it would beinvidious if a court order in favour of Mr Gorgus deprived other prisoners from accessto computer facilities for rehabilitative purposes.[36] Finally, as a relevant consideration, I assess the merits of Mr Gorgus'substantive application for judicial review. As amended, the claim is complex. Myimpression at this stage, without the benefit of evidence or even an amended statementof defence, is that much of it is unlikely to succeed. But I cannot discount thepossibility that aspects of it might succeed.[37] Overall, I consider the balance of convenience favours Mr Gorgus, because ofthe effect of his medical condition on his ability to meaningfully realise his right topursue legal proceedings. I did not hear argument from counsel or Mr Gorgus aboutwhether issues arise concerning discrimination on the prohibited ground of disabilityunder the Human Rights Act 1993. But, given his medical condition, I consider thefair treatment of Mr Gorgus required by s 6(1)(f)(ii) of the Act would be achieved byhim having access to word processing facilities, which would be "reasonable" underthe discretion in Policy F.07 of the Manual.[38] It is important to note that the precedent of Mr Gorgus being given access toword processing facilities in this judgment depends crucially on his medical conditionotherwise prolonging and therefore inhibiting his access to Court in his proceedings.For that reason, I consider he should be provided with access to computer facilities forthe purpose of word processing only. That does not extend to internet access, whichis no doubt a more significant security concern. And Corrections' position about legalresearch is reasonable. In order to minimise interference with prison management,I do not make directions as to how access to word processing facilities is to beachieved. But I do order that it be achieved, similarly to Mr Gorgus' previousagreement with Corrections, in a timely manner.[39] As I understand it, Mr Gorgus seeks a transfer to another prison in order tohave a better prospect of accessing computer services and in order to be closer to hisfamily in Whanganui. There is no evidence that Corrections took into account thelocation of Mr Gorgus' family in declining the latest transfer request. That may bebecause the decision was made under Alert Level 4. But Corrections has made clearthat Mr Gorgus is able to make a further request for transfer.[40] I do not make interim orders for a transfer of Mr Gorgus to another prison.Mr Gorgus is able to make a further request for a transfer. And Corrections is to ableto transfer him on its own initiative. Section 54(4)(c) of the Act requires Correctionsto have regard to the desirability of ensuring he is detained at a location as close aspracticable to his family. And Corrections will be able to establish whether a transferwould better enable it to provide Mr Gorgus with access to word processing facilities.Issue 2: Should I appoint a counsel to assist the court?[41] The High Court has inherent jurisdiction to appoint a counsel to assist theCourt, usually where an important and difficult point of law arises and includingsometimes as a contradictor when a litigant is self-represented.42[42] Mr Gorgus submits that this revised statement of claim seeks exemplarydamages, though it is not clear to me it does. He submits it concerns him beingunlawfully punished by being segregated without having the opportunity to go throughthe normal disciplinary process. Accordingly, he submits the issues in the proceedingrequire a counsel to assist the Court. Corrections abides the Court's decision on theappointment of a counsel to assist the Court but does not consider there is a matter ofgeneral or public importance that warrants such an appointment here.[43] I do not consider a counsel to assist the Court should be appointed at this stage.There is factual complexity. But it is not clear whether the legally complex claimshave any evidential basis. If it appears that they do, once the proceedings haveprogressed further, I can consider appointment of counsel assisting again, if the issueis raised.42 Erwood v Holmes [2017] NZHC 1278, [2017] NZAR 971 at [34]-[36], [45]-[46].Result[44] I make an interim order declaring that the Chief Executive of Corrections mustnot prevent Mr Ashor Gorgus from accessing word processing facilities for thepurpose of conducting his legal proceedings against the Crown, for two hours per dayup to seven days a week. The timing and precise extent of access is conditional on theoperational capacity of whatever prison at which Mr Gorgus is held, but the provisionof access at all is not to be conditional on that.Palmer J