WEDGWOOD v CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS [2019] NZHC 831 [15 April 2019]

WEDGWOOD v CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS [2019] NZHC 831[15 April 2019]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDCHRISTCHURCH REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROAŌTAUTAHI ROHECIV-2019-409-181[2019] NZHC 831UNDER the Habeas Corpus Act 2001BETWEEN ASTON EDWARD WILLIAM ERNESTWEDGWOODApplicantCHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THEDEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONSDefendantTeleconference: 15 April 2019Counsel: A McKenzie for ApplicantK South for Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections forDefendantJudgment: 15 April 2019JUDGMENT OF COOKE J[1] On or about 8 April 2019 the District Court at Christchurch receivedhandwritten documentation filed by the applicant, Aston Edward William ErnestWedgwood seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The original documentation was dated4 April 2019. A subsequent addendum dated 5 April 2019 was filed at the DistrictCourt. This documentation was transferred to the High Court by the Registry giventhat a writ of habeas corpus is within the jurisdiction of the High Court, rather than theDistrict Court. It was received by the High Court on Friday 12 April 2019.[2] In accordance with the Habeas Corpus Act 2001 (the Act) writs of habeascorpus are given priority. The matter has accordingly been given a telephoneconference before me today as Duty Judge. As indicated the documentation is handwritten by the applicant himself, but on receipt by the High Court the Registry madeenquiry of Mr McKenzie who acts for Mr Wedgwood in the District Court. Heappeared at the conference, although he had no instructions from Mr Wedgwood.Ms South filed a memorandum on behalf of the Crown opposing the application.[3] In his documentation Mr Wedgwood raises a number of matters, but his keypoint is outlined in the original document entitled as a Writ of Habeas Corpus is in thefollowing way:I, Aston Edward William Ernest Wedgwood, swear that I believe I have servedthree years on home arrest and on remand which is equal or more than theindicated sentence and request to come before the court under habeas corpuswithout delay, for release.[4] Given the requirement for urgency in s 9(2) of the Act, I must ensure that theapplication is disposed of as a matter of priority and urgency. In accordance withs 9(3) the Registrar must allocate an inter-parties hearing no later than three workingdays after the date on which the application is filed. In my view that hearing canproceed by way of telephone. Indeed the requirements for utmost urgency wouldsuggest that that would sometimes be necessary. The key point is that the applicationneeds to be considered on its merits as soon as possible.[5] Ms South appears for the Crown to oppose the application. She advises thatthe applicant is currently remanded in custody as a consequence of a decision of theDistrict Court on 1 April 2019 to revoke bail following the occupier of the EM bailaddress withdrawing consent after alleged damage to the address. She also advisedthat the applicant is scheduled to appear in the District Court tomorrow on the chargeof wilful damage to the EM bail address. Bail can be considered at that time.[6] I have accordingly addressed the application on its merits. I am satisfied herethat the application should be dismissed. Section 14 of the Act provides:(2) A Judge dealing with an application must enquire into the matters offact and law claimed to justify the detention and is not confined in thatenquiry to the correction of jurisdictional errors; but this subsectiondoes not entitle a Judge to call into question—(a) a conviction of an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction,the Court Martial of New Zealand established under section 8 ofthe Court Martial Act 2007, or a disciplinary officer acting underPart 5 of the Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971; or(b) a ruling as to bail by a court of competent jurisdiction.[7] Section 14(2)(b) is applicable have. Mr Wedgwood is in custody as aconsequence of bail decisions. This is a matter that has been considered by the Courtof Appeal, who in Taylor v Superintendent Waikato Prison held:1[10] In argument before us, Mr Pike for the respondent submitted thats 14(2)(b) of the Habeas Corpus Act provides a complete answer to theapplication. We agree. The appellant is presently detained pursuant to thesuccessive orders of Judge Tompkins and Goddard J that he be remanded incustody. Those orders were made pending clarification of the status of thegrant of bail on his application. Both Judge Tompkins and Goddard J wererequired under s 7(5) of the Bail Act to release the appellant unless satisfiedthere was just cause for continued detention. Both ordered continueddetention. The decisions therefore were "rulings as to bail".[8] Here, in exactly the same way, Mr Wedgwood's current detention is aconsequence of the bail decisions made in the District Court. His detention is a matterfor that Court. Accordingly the writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.Cooke J1 Taylor v Superintendent, Waikato Bay of Plenty Regional Prison (2002) 6 HRNZ 679, [2002]NZAR 425 (CA).