ATTORNEY-GENERAL SUED IN RESPECT OF ACTS OF THE NZ POLICE V VAIHU HC AK CIV 2005-404-2096

ATTORNEY-GENERAL SUED IN RESPECT OF ACTS OF THE NZ POLICE V VAIHU HC AK CIV 2005- 404-2096 8 November 2005IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY CIV 2005-404-2096IN THE MATTER OF an appeal pursuant to the District Courts Act 1974 BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL SUED IN RESPECT OF ACTS OF THE NEW ZEALAND POLICE Appellant AND MATINI VAIHU Respondent Hearing: 2 September 2005 Appearances: M Davies and J Foster for the appellant N Levy and J Sutton for the respondent Judgment: 8 November 2005 at 10.30amJUDGMENT OF ELLEN FRANCE J Table of contents Para No: Introduction [1] District Court Judge's decision [7] Battery [17] Section 9 [36] Result [63] Costs [64] Appendix A: Overseas equivalents to s 9Introduction[1] In the early hours of the morning on 19 January 2002 the respondent felt unwell. He purchased some toilet paper at a service station and then went to an area of some bushes in New Lynn where he vomited and defecated. [2] While in the process of these activities, he was bitten on his arm by a Police dog. The dog, "Willis", had been on the scent of four people seen kicking over signs outside a service station. The dog was on a chain about five metres ahead of his handler, Constable Taylor, when he came upon the respondent. When Constable Taylor got through the bushes he saw the dog had a hold of a half-naked man by the arm. The respondent was screaming. The Constable immediately called the dog off. [3] Unfortunately, the consequences of the bite for the respondent were such that he lost a great deal of blood. As a result an artery in his arm was severed. He had to have various treatments to get him back to health and be in a position to resume dialysis treatment. [4] The respondent brought proceedings seeking exemplary damages for battery and for a declaration of a breach of s 9 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Section 9 protects the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment. The s 9 claim was amended during the hearing to include a damages claim. [5] The District Court Judge concluded there was insufficient basis to award exemplary damages for the battery but awarded the respondent $10,000 damages as compensation for the affront to the respondent's rights under s 9. [6] The appellant appeals on the basis that the decision in relation to s 9 was wrong. The respondent cross-appeals on the ground that an award of exemplary damages is appropriate in respect of the battery.District Court Judge's decision[7] The District Court Judge found that the respondent was the subject of "an unprovoked, vicious, almost life-threatening attack" by the Police dog. The attack was "compounded" by the respondent's humiliating and embarrassing circumstances. [8] The Judge proceeded on the basis the Attorney-General was vicariously liable for the actions of the Police and that there was a liability in relation to a breach of the Bill of Rights. [9] In terms of the claim of battery, the Judge adopted this formulation by the Court of Appeal in P v T [1998] 1 NZLR 257 per Richardson P at 258:Battery is the application of force to the person of another without lawful justification and assault is the act of causing a person to entertain a reasonable fear of apprehension of immediate battery.[10] In this case, the Judge decided there was insufficient proof of a deliberate intent to commit the tort of battery. Constable Taylor did not order the dog to attack. But, the Judge said, it was sufficient to constitute a battery if the action was "without lawful justification". There was no lawful justification for the dog's actions. In reaching that view, the Judge said the dog should not have treated the respondent's behaviour as threatening. The Judge continued:Nothing could be less threatening than a person in the [respondent's] position vomiting or going to the toilet. A sudden retreat could not be perceived as a threat, nor seeking refuge in a motor car. If Police dogs are trained to react by way of an attack on an innocent bystander who happens to make a sudden movement then, there is something fundamentally wrong with the training. Short of having received the command "rouse" there was nothing to justify the action of the Police dog "Willis" against the [respondent]. (at [50])[11] Accordingly, the Judge found it established the respondent had been the subject of a battery by the application of force without lawful justification. [12] The appellant's contention the respondent had voluntarily assumed some risk by failing to respond to Police warnings was rejected. There was no evidence therespondent heard any warnings but, even if he did, he was not in a position to respond. [13] However, the Judge considered exemplary damages were not appropriate because the respondent had not shown the Constable's actions were "so high-handed and in contumelious disregard of [his] rights and so outrageous as to justify exemplary," damages. The Judge did not see the Police conduct in this case as "gross", in contrast to the conduct in Harris v Attorney-General, (HC Masterton, CP7/96, 23 July 1999, Durie J); Huff v Attorney-General (DC Palmerston North, NP367/98, 31 October 2000, Lovegrove DCJ); Toro v Attorney-General [2003] DCR 261; and Archbold v Attorney-General [2003] NZAR 563. All of those cases involved an intentional injury. [14] Here, the Judge found, Constable Taylor had responsibility for the dog but the actual attack was initiated by the dog. The Judge continued,Although [Constable Taylor] should have been more vigilant in exercising proper control of the dog, I cannot find that he has acted with such reckless disregard of the plaintiff as to justify sanction by way of punitive damages. (at [56]).[15] Turning then to s 9 of the Bill of Rights, the Judge's summation of matters was as follows:I consider the attack by "Willis", being an extension of the arm of the Police, to be an act of detaining. From that point on, the [respondent's] freedom of choice, to go about his business, had gone. He had no option but to suffer the detention by virtue of the dog's grip until in due course released. In fact, he remained in detention after the dog had been restrained as Constable Taylor believing the dog to have made a successful apprehension, treated the [respondent] as an offender by giving him his Bill of Rights. It was only after the discovery of the faeces, the toilet paper and the [respondent's] profuse bleeding, that it was realised he was an innocent member of the public. I am quite satisfied that the actions of the dog attacking the [respondent] in the course of his apprehension amounted to cruel, degrading and disproportionately severe treatment by an arm of the State. The attack was without any justification whatsoever. (at [59])[16] For the reasons already outlined, the Judge rejected the claim for exemplary damages under this head. However, in reliance on Wilding v Attorney-General[2003] 3 NZLR 787, the Judge saw no reason why the breach of s 9 which resulted in a battery, could not be marked by an award of damages. The Judge said:It would be hard to contemplate an instance more humiliating and embarrassing than to be seeking the privacy of a secluded place, for the purpose of unfortunate health business, only to be attacked, while one's trousers are down, by a dog, let alone a Police dog. Such can only be described as a gross indignity. .. although the [respondent] is unable to reach the threshold whereby he would be entitled to exemplary damages, .. he is entitled to compensation for what the Court of Appeal terms – the affront. The affront of a dog bite to an offender whilst attempting to avoid detection or capture such as may have been the case with Mr Wilding, would be far less than to an innocent member of the public, such as the [respondent]. (at [62])Battery(i) Submissions on battery[17] The appellant and the respondent both say that the Judge has not considered whether the necessary mens rea for battery was proven. [18] The respondent says the proper conclusion is that the requisite mens rea is proven. "Intention" in the context of battery has an extended meaning and encompasses subjective recklessness. Constable Taylor was subjectively reckless. The risk he took in allowing the dog to go into the bushes was disproportionate to the end sought. [19] It follows, the respondent submits, that exemplary damages should have been awarded. [20] The appellant says that on the Judge's factual findings, there was no deliberate action by the officer and so there can be no mens rea. If the Judge had considered this aspect then, on the basis of his factual findings, he would have said there was no battery. [21] The appellant further submits that even if the mens rea requirement can be met by the subjective recklessness test, what occurred here is not subjective recklessness. Hence, the Judge was correct that what occurred was not such as to warrant exemplary damages. At best, the respondent had a claim of negligence but the case was not pleaded or run on that basis.(ii) Discussion[22] The Judge has not considered the mens rea. Rather, the Judge has concluded it was sufficient that the action was without lawful justification. In this context, the appellant says it is not apt to draw an analogy (as the Judge did) between the Police dog and the use of a Police baton. The appellant says the baton cannot start an attack without being intentionally used by the holder. The appellant relies on Pollard v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [1998] EWLA Civ 732 for this proposition. Henry LJ there rejected a submission the force used by the dog should be treated as though it was a force by a baton. That was because the dog has a will of its own. [23] Henry LJ continued,The question is one of mens rea. Was the assault by the dog an assault by the handler? In the unlikely scenario that the handler set the dog on the suspect, ordering a trained dog to attack, yes, it would be. If the handler intended the dog to attack, yes, it would be. There was no evidence here and no finding that the handler intended the dog to bite the suspect. Did the handler foresee that the dog would act otherwise than correctly, according to its training? There is no evidence whatsoever that the handler did. Dogs being dogs, there is an irreducible risk that the dog will bite the suspect if the suspect does not surrender when warned and thereafter does not stand still and shows any aggression or what the dog interprets as aggression. So there is an irreducible risk that bites will happen from time to time, as Mr Jack for the appellant conceded.[24] In this case, it is plain what occurred was not deliberate. The Judge's findings are that, first, there was insufficient proof of deliberate intent. (There was no evidence that Constable Taylor ordered "Willis" to attack the respondent.) Second, the Judge concluded that "although Constable Taylor had responsibility for the dog, the actual attack was initiated by the dog itself, not deliberately by Constable Taylor." [25] The respondent cannot rely on negligence because that was not pleaded and nor was negligence argued. The failure to plead negligence is not a technical point because it affects the evidence called. Further, Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 relied on by the appellant, is authority for the proposition that negligence and battery are two different causes of action.[26] The respondent has to rely then on his argument that intention can include subjective recklessness. The appellant says the respondent's case was put on the basis of intentional actions and so that argument is not now open to the respondent either. The relevant pleadings are as follows:The Police Officer ordered and/or allowed the dog to attack the [respondent]. .. The acts and omissions of the Police Officer controlling the dog throughout the attack on the [respondent] were high handed, and in contumalious disregard to the [respondent's] rights.[27] Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (21st ed, by Heuston and Buckley) explain that it is,A disputed question how far the term "battery" was, or is now, confined to cases of wilful or intentional acts. As the line of division between trespass and case depended on whether the damage was direct or indirect and not on whether it was intentional or negligent, a long series of cases affirmed that a battery did not necessarily involve intention. It is the act and not the injury which must be intentional. (at 121-122) (see also Wilson v Pringle [1987] 1 QB 237 at 249 per Croon-Johnson LJ.)[28] On that analysis the pleading "ordered and/or allowed" is, correctly, focused on intentional acts as the appellant submits. [29] The appellant does accept there may be "debate" as to how far the definition of battery extends in cases of recklessness and that is apparent from the approach taken by some of the other commentators. For example, Todd, The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4ed) at 4.4 cites P v T (adopted by the Judge in the present case) as authority for this definition of battery:A battery is the act of intentionally applying force to the body of another person without that person's consent or other lawful justification. (my emphasis)[30] The definition in Laws of New Zealand is as follows:A battery is an act of the defendant, either intentionally or negligent, which directly causes some physical contact with the person [of] the plaintiff without the latter's consent. To constitute a battery in tort there must be some act of the defendant whereby force is applied directly to the person of the plaintiff. The forceneed not cause actual personal injury: the least touching of another in anger is a battery. . Harm inflicted indirectly is not battery, although it may give rise to liability on some other basis. (See, similarly, Street on Torts, ed Brazier and Murphy (10ed) at 30-31; see also, Balkin and Davis, The Law of Torts (3ed) at [3.2]; and Trindade and Cane, The Law of Torts in AustraliaI(3ed) at 27).[31] Finally, Halsbury's Laws (4ed reissue) Vol 11(1) at para 488 says:The mental element of the offence of battery is satisfied by proof that the accused intentionally or recklessly applied force to the person of another. (See also Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 18ed at 13-01-13-06.)[32] Clayton and Tomlinson, Civil actions against the Police (3ed at 4-010) refer to the "particular" problems arising from cases involving the use of dogs. The authors dispute the suggestion in Pollard that an assault would only be committed if the Police dog handler "set the dog" onto the suspect but not where the handler released the dog to "apprehend" the suspect in accordance with its training. Clayton and Tomlinson take the view (with reference to Murgatroyd v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police (8 November 2000, CA)) that if the handler releases the dog and the handler intends or perceives that the dog will "touch" the plaintiff after release, "arguably a battery will be committed." [33] I do not decide this point and nor do I decide whether there was subjective recklessness. On either approach to intention, I consider the Judge was correct to conclude that what occurred was not such as to justify an award of exemplary damages. At best, as the Judge put it, the Constable should have been "more vigilant" in exercising proper control of the dog. This is a long way from "such reckless disregard" as to justify exemplary damages. The respondent made something of the inappropriate use of a Police dog in the context of alleged wilful damage. There is no finding about that. Rather, the Judge took issue with the dog's reaction when confronted with the respondent. [34] To illustrate, the Privy Council in A v Bottrill [2003] 2 NZLR 721 accepted exemplary damages in negligence cases were not confined to cases of intentional wrongdoing or conscious recklessness. But, in saying that, their Lordships said that the "absence of intentional wrongdoing and conscious recklessness will always point strongly away from the case being apt for an award of exemplary damages."(at [37]). The "ultimate touchstone" is that of "outrageous" conduct calling for punishment (at [43]). The Judge was right that the present case is some way off that standard. [35] The cross-appeal accordingly fails. Because of my conclusion on the unavailability of exemplary damages, it is not necessary to consider whether the appellant could be held vicariously liable for the actions of the Police when exemplary damages are claimed (see: Wilding v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 787).Section 9(i) The submissions on s 9[36] The arguments on s 9 are similar to those advanced on the battery/exemplary damages aspect although the focus is a little different. [37] The appellant says that s 9 requires treatment of a level of severity which is not present here. It is relevant that, first, the bite was unintentional. Second, the use of the dog was reasonable and the officer followed standard procedures. Third, the respondent was partially responsible for what occurred. [38] It is further submitted that the Judge's finding the conduct did not merit exemplary damages must be almost determinative in this case. [39] Even if there was a breach of s 9, a declaration would be sufficient remedy where the injuries have been remedied by accident compensation and there is no finding of wrongful or egregious conduct by the Police. [40] Alternatively, the $10,000 award was excessive. On the basis of the Court of Appeal's approach in Attorney-General v Udompun [2005] 3 NZLR 204, compensation of less than the $4,000 in that case would be appropriate.[41] The respondent says that the conclusion compensation was available for a breach of s 9 was available and appropriate. The biting was disproportionately severe treatment by an arm of the State such as to outrage the standards of decency. The focus is not on the Police conduct but on the breach of the respondent's rights. $10,000 was an appropriate figure for compensation.(ii) Discussion[42] Section 9 of the Bill of Rights is one of many provisions in a range of different human rights instruments world-wide protecting the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment. In the Appendix to this decision, examples of the overseas equivalents to s 9 are set out for comparison. The repetition of this protection in such a wide range of instruments illustrates the fundamental nature of the right protected by s 9. Indeed, the prohibition on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a rule of customary international law (see: Advisory Council of Jurists, the Asia Pacific Forum, "Reference on Torture", Interim Report 26 August 2005 at p22; and see Sieghart, "The International Law of Human Rights", 1983 at 14.3.4 for a discussion on the history of this right.). [43] Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights equates with s 9. The aim of that Article has been described as protecting "both the dignity and the physical and mental integrity of the individual." (Joseph, Schultz, and Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - Cases, materials and commentary (2ed at 9.21)). There is a link between the protection in s 9 and the protection in s 23(5) of persons deprived of liberty to be "treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the person." [44] As to the fundamental nature of the protection in s 9 see, for example, Clayton and Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (at para 8.14); and Lester and Pannick, Human Rights and Practice (at 4.3.1ff). [45] It is clear that the threshold before treatment will comprise a breach of s 9 is a high one. The Court of Appeal in Puli'uvea v Removal Review Authority (1996)2 HRNZ 510 at 523 did not doubt that removal of Mrs Puli'uvea from New Zealand would "cause considerable distress, sadness and difficulties for the family." But, the Court continued, the action of removing Mrs Puli'uvea could not be said to begin to attain to "the high threshold" required by the prohibition in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act on disproportionately severe treatment. That approach was adopted by McGrath J in Zaoui v Attorney-General [2005] 1 NZLR 577 at [103]. On this point, O'Regan J agreed with McGrath J that there had not been any breach of s 9 (at [267]). (The Supreme Court did not deal with this aspect in the appeal to that Court.) [46] Although concluding that the standard for a breach of s 9 was met in another removal case, Taito v The Chief Executive, Department of Labour (HC AK CIV 2004-485-1987, 23 September 2004, Baragwanath J), His Honour observed that the European Convention cases on the equivalent to s 9 show that for aliens, the standard is high. "There must be a flagrant, gross or fundamental breach to warrant intervention by English courts." (at [61]). [47] The appellant in the present case cites N v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Terrence Higgins Trust intervening) [2005] 2 WLR 1124. That case dealt with the deportation of a woman with AIDS. Lord Hope, for example, referred to the need for "exceptional" grounds to resist expulsion on the basis of the equivalent provision to s 9 in the European Convention (at [48]). His Lordship referred to the fact that this was a high test (at 1141; and see also Baroness Hale at 1147; and Lord Brown at [80]). [48] Foster suggests there are indications that in relation to prison conditions, at least, the European Court of Human Rights is prepared to take "a more active role" ("Prison conditions, human rights and Article 3 ECHR" [2005] Public Law 35). It is, however, still clear that a minimum level of severity will be required and s 9 should not be trivialised, "i.e. understood to prohibit other than the most serious forms of ill-treatment" (Harris, O'Boyle, Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (1995) at 55, see also 61; Duffy, "Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights" (1983) 32 ICLQ 316 at 318 distinguishes between "acertain roughness" in treatment and what will comprise a breach of the European equivalent to s 9, see also pg 320 and 345; and see Pannick at 4.3.6). [49] That the threshold is a high one must be so on the wording of s 9. In particular, the protection is not to be subjected to "torture or to cruel, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment." Whilst torture is obviously different conduct, the meaning of "treatment" is nonetheless coloured by the inclusion of torture in the same provision. Foster, Human Rights and Civil Liberties,at 65, suggests that,the distinction between torture and inhuman treatment and punishment lying in the intensity of the acts and, possibly, the intention of the perpetrators. The distinction between the terms inhuman and degrading then appears to be based on the type of harm suffered by victim, inhuman treatment causing physical, mental or psychiatric harm, and degrading treatment constituting an attack on a person's dignity, although the distinction could also be made on the level of the harm suffered.[50] The position taken by the Advisory Council of Jurists is that the difference between the prohibited forms of treatment and torture relates "to the purpose of the perpetrator rather than any gradation in suffering." (at pg 22) [51] Clayton and Tomlinson, Civil Actions Against the Police (at 16-062) suggest that in terms of the equivalent provision in the European Convention, "mistreatment" of a suspect during an arrest or while in Police detention may constitute a breach of Article 3. The authors continue:In appropriate cases, Article 3 claims can be added to allegations of assault and battery.[52] The authors go on to refer to an illustration of the application of Article 3 in Police cases in Rebbock v Slovenia (judgment of November 28, 2000) where a suspect who was unarmed was arrested by six men with shotguns and pistols. He was dragged onto a car, handcuffed with his hands behind his back and hit with cudgels and fists. As a result he had a double fracture of the jaw and facial contusions. The force used was seen as excessive and unjustified and caused serious suffering amounting to a breach of Article 3 (at 16-062).[53] Whether the threshold is met will depend on all the circumstances (see Foster, at 63 and 65; Harris at 56; Schultz at 9.26; Clayton at 8.15; Advisory Council of Jurists, Interim Report, at p22 where the Council also notes that the treatment need not be intended to cause suffering). In the frequently cited case of Öclan v Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 238 the European Court of Human Rights noted as follows:The Court has considered treatment to be "inhuman" because inter alia it was premeditated, was applied to hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. Furthermore, in considering whether a punishment or treatment is "degrading" within the meaning of Art.3, the Court will have regard to whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Art.3. In order for an arrest or detention in connection with Court proceedings to be degrading within the meaning of Art.3, the humiliation or debasement to which it gives rise must be of a special level and in any event different from the usual degree of humiliation inherent in arrest or detention. (at 303-304)[54] Here, the focus must be on Constable Taylor's conduct. In that sense, I take a different view from the District Court Judge who saw an analogy between the dog as an extension of the arm of his handler and the use of a baton or other lethal weapon. I see the use of a Police dog as having some differences from use of a Police baton. The baton literally has no other life of its own. The same cannot be said for the Police dog. [55] It is also possible to query whether what occurred in this case was in fact "treatment" as envisaged by s 9. Rishworth, Huscroft, Optican, Mahoney, The New Zealand Bill of Rights make the point that the term "treatment" has the potential to expand the scope of s 9. But, the authors continue,.. although an expansive conception of the term "treatment" is certainly possible, the right must be read in context. Section 9 operates primarily as a limitation on actions by state officials. Causation is, therefore, a relevant issue. (at 240-241).[56] Harris etc suggest that conduct giving rise to inhuman treatment may take various forms including physical assault (pg 62). Here, the relevant conduct is - at its highest - allowing the dog to go into the bushes knowing the dog may bite. However, as the appellant in this case did not argue that what occurred was not "treatment", I do not take that point further.[57] In terms of the pertinent factors in this case, it must at least be highly relevant that the actions here were not deliberate. There are some suggestions in the commentary on the overseas equivalents that while intention is a necessary prerequisite for torture, that is not the case in terms of breaches of s 9 (see Harris at 62n8, and Schultz at 9.23; and see also Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR commentary, at 128n8). But, once it was accepted that what occurred took place inadvertently, it would be surprising if that constituted a breach of s 9. [58] In addition, the officer did issue a warning albeit the respondent did not hear that. [59] Next, it must be relevant that what occurred was of short duration although with significant consequences for the respondent. While the dog bite did have a serious effect on the respondent, he was given proper treatment once it was realised what had occurred. [60] Further, although the respondent queries the use of the dog in the present situation (i.e. tracking persons suspected of causing wilful damage, not a more serious charge) that has to be seen in context. Namely, an unintentional bite by a Police dog. [61] As to the level of humiliation, it is difficult to say that what occurred here breaches the "gross" level required (see Duffy at 319 and Pannick at 136-137) especially where the respondent's own unforeseen actions were what made it humiliating. [62] For these reasons I have concluded that the District Court Judge was wrong to conclude that the s 9 test had been met in this case.Result[63] The appeal is accordingly successful and the cross-appeal unsuccessful. The judgment entered by the District Court is vacated.Costs[64] The appellant indicated at the hearing that costs would not be sought given the appeal raised matters of more general importance. The respondent is, in any event, legally aided. No costs award is made. _______________________ Ellen France JAppendix A: Overseas equivalents to s 9 Delivery time in accordance with Rule 540(4): 10:30am, 8 November 2005Solicitors/Counsel:Crown Solicitor, PO Box 2213, Auckland Crown Law office, PO Box 2858, Wellington Copeland Fitzpatrick, PO Box 22 014, Otahuhu, Auckland N Levy, PO Box 10 443, Wellington J Sutton, PO Box 276 167, Manukau, AucklandAppendix A: Overseas equivalents to s 9 (largely taken from R Clayton and H Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rightsand Second Annual Updating Supplement) Bill of Rights 1688 (Imp):Fines and punishments – And excessive fines have been imposed, and illegal and cruel punishments inflicted:Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 12:Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.European Convention on Human Rights, Article 3:No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. (Section 3 of the Constitution of Bermuda and s 17 of the Jamaica Constitution are in the same terms.)International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 7:No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his consent to medical or scientific experimentation.Namibian Constitution, Article 8:(1) The dignity of all persons shall be inviolable. (2) (a) In any judicial proceedings or in other proceedings before any organ of the State and during the enforcement of a penalty, respect for human dignity shall be guaranteed. (b) No persons shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.Papua New Guinea Constitution, s 36(1):No person shall be submitted to torture (whether physical or mental), or to treatment or punishment that is cruel or otherwise inhuman, or is inconsistent with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.Seychelles Constitution, Article 16:Every person has a right to be treated with dignity worthy of a human being and not be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.South African Constitution, s 12:Freedom and security of the person 12. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right .. c. to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; d. not to be tortured in any way; and e. not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. (2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, ..Sri Lanka Constitution, Article 11:No person shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.United States Constitution, Eighth Amendment:Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 5:No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. (See also, American Convention on Human Rights, Article 5; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 5)