BENEFICIARY AP v THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT [2019] NZHC 2208

BENEFICIARY AP v THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT [2019]NZHC 2208 [6 September 2019]ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAME OR IDENTIFYINGPARTICULARS OF THE APPELLANT.IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDWELLINGTON REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHECIV-2019-485-213[2019] NZHC 2208IN THE MATTER OF an appeal by way of Case Stated from thedetermination of the Social Security AppealAuthority under section 12Q of the SocialSecurity Act 1964BETWEEN BENEFICIARY APAppellantAND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THEMINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTRespondentHearing: 6 August 2019Appearances: W L Aldred for AppellantK Hutchinson for RespondentJudgment: 6 September 2019JUDGMENT OF COOKE J[1] The appellant appeals by way of case stated from a decision of the SocialSecurity Appeal Authority (the Authority) pursuant to s 12Q of the Social Security Act1964 (the Act).1[2] The appellant is a single parent. Over the years she has needed assistance fromthe Ministry of Social Development (the Ministry) from time to time, including a needfor emergency assistance. Such assistance is effectively treated as a loan advanced by1 The Social Security Act 1964 has since been repealed by the Social Security Act 2018.the Ministry, which is then repaid by taking deductions for benefits otherwise payablein accordance with determinations made under the Act. She sought confirmation fromthe Ministry as to the extent of the amounts that she was required to repay accordingto the Ministry, and then with the assistance of an advocate she contested what theMinistry had done in relation to her case in accordance with her review and appealrights under the Act.[3] In a decision dated 31 March 2017 the Authority decided that the scope of herappeal was limited to the calculation of her indebtedness from 3 October 2008 only.But she had wanted to challenge determinations by the Ministry prior to that date. Ineffect what the appeal concerns is a dispute about the scope of her appeal rights.[4] On 16 April 2019 the Authority formulated a case stated for the appeal pursuantto s 12Q of the Act. The two questions of law formulated are:(a) Did the Authority err in its characterisation of the decision under reviewas being money owed by [AP] from 3 October 2008 only?(b) Did the Authority wrongfully limit the scope of [AP's] appeal when itheld that the Benefits Review Committee report put [AP] "on notice"as to that scope?[5] Written submissions were provided both by Ms Aldred on behalf of theappellant, and Ms Hutchinson on behalf of the Chief Executive on these questions.[6] As I indicated at the hearing, however, it seems to me that the review andappeal processes have been adversely affected by a degree of confusion as to how theappellant's initial request for a review of the decisions affecting her should have beenaddressed. Rather than recording, and then addressing, the submissions that counselhave advanced in relation to the case stated questions, it seems more appropriate toaddress the background, explaining where I think the matter has gone wrong. I willthen address the consequence for questions formulated by way of case stated.General approach[7] It is appropriate to identify the general approach to the interpretation andapplication of the provisions of the Act.[8] In Brosnahan v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development Kós Jreferred to the adoption of a "generous unniggardly interpretation" to ACC legislation.He then held:2[33] I do not think that interpretative approach should be confined to thatAct, as if it were sui generis. In my respectful opinion it is applicable to socialpolicy legislation generally. The reason for that is obvious. In a context suchas the present Act, Parliament is dealing with the expectations of the poor anddisadvantaged. Small individual sums of money may have very significantpersonal consequences. Where those expectations are the fair and reasonableproduct of statutory language, and are consistent with the overall statutorypurpose, they are not, I think, to be read down except by language of theclearest kind. Lines of exclusion in a welfare context need to be drawn clearly.[9] It seems to me that this involves interpreting the text of the enactment in lightof its purpose in the usual way.3 I accept Ms Aldred's submission that such anapproach not only applies to statutory interpretation, but also to the application of theprovisions once interpreted.[10] I also accept that it is not appropriate to place unwarranted administrativeburdens on the Ministry given the nature and scope of decision-making that must beundertaken under the Act, including in relation to the review and appeal functions.This was addressed by the Supreme Court in Arbuthnot v Chief Executive of theDepartment of Work and Income where Blanchard J said for the Court:4[18] We consider first the scheme of the review/appeal provisions of theAct. The Department administers many thousands of social welfare benefits.Naturally, its officials will make many decisions with which a beneficiary orsomeone claiming entitlement to a benefit will disagree. It would not besensible for all of them to have to go immediately to a formal appeal processwithout the decision first being reviewed at a more senior level within theDepartment. Plainly, it would simply not be possible for the Chief Executivepersonally to undertake reviews on this scale. Furthermore, it has seemed2 Brosnahan v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development [2013] NZHC 2618,[2014] NZAR 284 (footnote omitted).3 See McKeefry v Accident Compensation Corporation [2019] NZHC 612 at [8].4 Arbuthnot v Chief Executive of the Department of Work and Income [2007] NZSC 55, [2008] 1NZLR 13.appropriate to have some input into the review process from a person fromoutside the Department. The Act therefore provides for the mechanism of theBRC, which consists of two departmental officials with no involvement in thedecision under review and a third person appointed by the Minister "torepresent the interests of the community". But even that third person must besomeone who is "resident in or closely connected with" the relevant office ofthe Department.[11] It was this very factor that led to the establishment of reviews by committeesas part of the review/appeal structure.5[12] I approach the relevant circumstances of the present case, and the interpretationissues against that background.The relevant circumstances[13] Prior to formally complaining about her case the appellant had spent some timeengaging with the Ministry seeking to understand the level of her indebtedness. Sheencountered some difficulty in receiving clear advice on that issue. Ultimately byletter dated 27 November 2014 Ms Linda Coffin, the Service Centre Manager, sent hera letter commencing as follows:As requested, attached is a copy of the full breakdown of your debt as actionedby National Office for the period August 1996 – June 2014.[14] As suggested there was a full schedule attached to that letter showing the thenindebtedness at the figure of $16,868.90 and the steps that had been taken leading tothat total going back to 1996. The schedule recorded that the debt was currently beingoffset from sole person support payments being made to the appellant.[15] By that stage the appellant had an advocate, Mr Graham Howell, to assist her.The appellant and Mr Howell met with an Assistant Service Centre Manager on1 December 2014. It was explained that the appellant wanted to advance her statutoryreview rights to the Benefits Review Committee (the BRC) under the Act. Under thescheme of the Act, a person can have decisions reviewed by the BRC, and then thereis a right of appeal from decisions of the BRC to the Authority.5 See Bocxe v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development, HC Auckland, CIV-2008-485-1122, 1 October 2008 at [29]–[30].[16] It is important to understand the rights of review the appellant had. Section10A of the Act provides:10A Review of decisions of chief executive made under delegation byother decision makers(1) This section applies to a person and a decision both of which arespecified in any 1 of the rows of the following table, but only if thedecision is made by a decision maker in the exercise of any power,function, or discretion conferred on the decision maker by delegation:Row Person Decision1 An applicant ora beneficiaryA decision of the chief executive madein relation to the applicant orbeneficiary under any enactmentreferred to in any of the paragraphs ofsection 12J(1) (other than a decisionreferred to in section 12J(2) or (3))(1A) A person to whom this section applies may apply in writing for areview of the decision to the appropriate benefits review committeeestablished under this section.(1B) The application must be made—(a) within 3 months after receiving notification of the decision; or(b) if the committee considers there is good reason for the delay,within such further period as the committee may allow onapplication made either before or after the expiration of thatperiod of 3 months.[17] Following the meeting with the Assistant Service Centre Manager, Mr Howellsent an email dated 2 December 2014 to the Ministry confirming the extent of therequested review. It stated:Thanks David for the break-down of advances and RAP provided since 1996and the debt recovery that took place to 20 September 2009 when the debt wasonly $281, and that this amount has been fully re-paid as well. The review isinto the entire outstanding debt of $16,868. This means each individualamount is under review.That is, for example, the outstanding advance of $861 (the original amountprovided was $870 in regards "bond and rent" to the Serbian Church on 3October 2008) and $406 (the original amount provided was $800 in regardsassistance provided on 7 November 2008 for accommodation purposes wherethe assistance was paid to the Serbian Church) and so on ending with the debtof $297.50 (the original amount provided was $350 in regards assistanceprovided on 16 June 2014 for accommodation purposes where the assistancewas paid to Quinovic Property Management).Without going into detail, it is submitted that most, if not all of the debtsbetween 2008 and February 2013 have been re-paid In full, and that theadvances provided since have been re-paid either in full or by more than themount Wk&I say.The claim being made we believe will be proven by evidence of the differencebetween the income support our client was entitled to (main benefit,accommodation supplement, disability allowance, child care subsidy andanother income support she was eligible for and that which was issued. Thedifference being debt recovery unless other offsets can be proven. Should inthe course of the proof of entitlement it be discovered our client was under-paid then we believe the chief executive has the ability under section 80AA torectify any under-payments.It is also very possible advances paid direct to landlords may have beenrefunded to the Crown account by landlords in situations where she shiftedand the bond was redeemable.The BRS case sheets indicate a review of decision lodged by BRS on 3 Marchof this year, but our client advises she has been challenging the debt for someconsiderable time and UCVII notes dated 14 February 2013 indicate this. Canwe be provided with the HIYA for the 14 February 2013 application as Ipresume due diligence lodged this with HIYA and a number exists.[18] I accept Ms Aldred's submission that on the face of the email exchange, theappellant was seeking to have considered all of the underlying decisions that wereevidenced in the entries in the schedule to the letter leading to the calculation of thedebt that she owed. The examples referred to in the email post-dated October 2008,but there was nothing in the email that suggested a limitation, and the statement that"each individual amount is under review" must include the amounts in the schedulethat pre-dated October 2008. What was being sought was a full review of her case andthe resulting balance.[19] It may be that most, if not all, of the underlying statutory decisions reflected inthe entries in the schedule to s 10A may have been formally advised to the appellantmore than three months previously so that any review of the underlying decision mighthave to be addressed under the power in s 10A(1B)(b).Scope of the requested review[20] In terms of the ability to challenge statutory decisions of the kind referred to ins 10A(1), there are two ways of viewing the appellant's request for a full review:(a) the request could be treated as a request for a review of all theunderlying statutory decisions that have led to the ultimate balance,including if necessary a review of such decisions out of time unders 10A(1B)(b); or(b) the request could be treated as seeking a review of a new statutorydecision made by the Ministry in relation to the calculation of theamount owing by the appellant, and/or a new decision to recover thatbalance from her under the statutory provisions (such as the recoverydecisions under s 86A).[21] The Ministry proceeded on the basis described in [20](b). By letter dated13 January 2015 the Ministry wrote to the appellant. The first line stated:We have received your application for a review of our decision to seekrecovery of the balance of $16768.90 owed to the Ministry.[22] In an internal review document, the Ministry described the decision beingreviewed in the following terms:The decision to seek recovery of an amount of $16768.90 owed to theMinistry. The decision was made on 27 November 2014.[23] I do not read the letter of 27 November 2014 as a letter communicating a newstatutory decision. All it did was advise what the current balance was and provideschedules to indicate how that was calculated. The schedules recorded that the debtwas being recovered by deductions from the benefit, but no fresh decision had beenmade or communicated. In Arbuthnot the Supreme Court said:6[25] It is fundamental that an appeal must be against the result to which adecision-maker has come, namely the order or declaration made or other reliefgiven, not directly against the conclusions reached by the decision-makerwhich led to that result, although of course any flaws in those conclusions mayprovide the means of impeaching the result. A litigant cannot therefore, saveperhaps in very exceptional circumstances, bring an appeal when they havebeen entirely successful and do not wish to alter the result. The successfullitigant cannot seek to have the appeal body overturn unfavourable factual orlegal conclusions made on the journey to that result which have had nosignificant impact on where the decision-maker ultimately arrived. In short,6 Arbuthnot, above n 4 (footnote omitted).there is no right of appeal against the reasons for a judgment, only against thejudgment itself.[24] That is true of the review of a decision as well.[25] It is important not to take an unduly narrow or formal approach to reviewrequests of this kind, however. Previous practice appears to indicate, appropriately,that no particular form is required to make such an application.7 The letter of27 November might legitimately be treated as a formal letter of advice communicatingwhat the Ministry had decided recover in the exercise of its statutory powers. Thatmay have been an acceptable interpretation in accordance with the principles outlinedat [7]–[10] above.[26] But treating the request for review in this way could cause difficulties if therewere any suggestion of a limitation on the scope of the review — for example, if itwas later said that the underlying statutory decisions could not be considered in thatprocess. And there was such a limitation imposed here. The Ministry said thatanything that happened prior to 3 October 2008 was not within the scope of therequested review, as at that date the appellant's recorded balance was zero. In otherwords, the Ministry was proceeding on the basis that the review would not consideranything that occurred prior to that time. As a result, the appellant's request was notbeing properly responded to. She was asking for her balance, and then saying thebalance was not correct, indicating that all inputs into it were part of her request forreview. That request for review needed to be dealt with on its merits and should notbe defeated by procedural formalism. In my view this is where this case has first gonewrong.Decisions on scope of review[27] The appellant and Mr Howell were sent the Ministry's internal report dated27 January 2015 to the BRC which stated that the decision being reviewed was thedecision to seek recovery of the outstanding balance, limited to the steps that had takenplace after 3 October 2008.7 See, for example, Daniels v Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Work and Income [2002]NZFLR 998, [2002] NZAR 615 (HC) at [6(c)].[28] By letter dated 20 May 2016 Mr Howell subsequently objected to thecharacterisation of the review. He said that the review was of the overall debt, and theonly time that it could legitimately be considered at zero was at the outset (on8 October 1996). He itemised in detail the steps that had been erroneously taken todetermine the overall size of the debt, including as a consequence of decisions takenbefore 3 October 2008.[29] The BRC decision was nevertheless limited to what had occurred beforeOctober 2008. It also said it was only reviewing "the decision to seek recovery of anamount of $16,768.90 owed to the Ministry" said to have been made on 27 November2014. This introduced a further possible limitation on the review to the extent it wassuggested that the appellant could not challenge the underlying decisions themselves.The BRC appeared to address the accuracy of the calculation of the debt, and not justthe decision to recover it, however. The BRC said:Advance payments of benefits and Special Needs Grants are payments madeon specific application by the Applicant. The making of such payment doesnot normally in the Committee's view amount to an error. The Applicant didnot provide evidence to suggest that these payments were made in error andthe Applicant had not applied for these.In relation to Overpayments established against the Applicants variousbenefits, the Applicant was unable to point to any error on part of the Ministryin establishing these overpayments therefore no grounds for any debt write-off.[30] On this basis the BRC agreed to uphold the decision, albeit with one adjustmentto the calculation, leading to the calculation of the total owing being $651.27 so thatthe total debt was said to be $16,117.63. The $651.27 was written off.8 That decisionwas sent to the appellant and Mr Howell by letter dated 25 May 2016.[31] On 11 August 2016 an amended version of the decision appears to have beenreleased by the BRC. An additional paragraph was added to the decision stating:The Committee acknowledges that the Applicant had an expectation theCommittee would review each individual debt incurred with the Ministry,including debts already repaid as the Applicant believed some of the8 Before the Authority the amount said to be owing by the Ministry was further reduced to$15,339.62.recoverable assistance should have been non-recoverable. The Committeeadvised the Applicant that this hearing was to establish whether the Ministrywas correct in seeking recovery of the existing debts. The Committee advisedthe Applicant that in order to review each individual debt ever established, theReview of Decision process is to be followed for each individual decisionrequiring review.[32] As previously indicated, as a matter of substance that had actually been whatthe appellant and Mr Howell originally sought. The letter of 27 November 2014 hadprovided advice on what was calculated as owing as a consequence of earlierdecisions, following which the appellant had advised that she wanted to review all ofthe underlying inputs.[33] I accept that a calculation by the Ministry of the total amount owing by abeneficiary could result in a statutory decision to recover that amount under theprovisions of the Act, and that decision could by itself be subject to a right of review.It might be possible to see the Ministry's letter of 27 November 2014 in that way. Buteven if it was treated in that way there were two problems with the Ministry'sapproach:(a) First, the assessment of what is owing goes back no further than3 October 2008 simply on the basis that, on the Ministry's calculations,the appellant had a zero balance at that stage. But the appellant wascontending that that was wrong, as decisions prior to that date hadinvolved over-recovery by the Ministry. If the 27 November 2014 letteris treated as a calculation of the amount owing, and a fresh statutorydecision to recover that amount, then a request to review the balancewould incorporate all calculation errors alleged.(b) Secondly, the review seems to have been limited to the exercise of thestatutory powers of recovery rather than those exercised to establish thedebt in the first place. It is apparent that the appellant wanted tochallenge the underlying decision as part of her review.Decision by Authority[34] An appeal to the Social Security Appeal Authority was then lodged by theappellant. There are such rights of appeal under s 12J(1)(a) of the Act in relation to"any decision or determination" of the Chief Executive of Part 1A of the Act.9[35] An issue of the scope of the requested review, and accordingly of the appeal,was then raised. The appellant and Mr Howell said she was challenging all theunderlying decisions that had led to the calculation of the amount owing. The Ministrydid not agree. The Appeal Authority decided to deal with that by way of a preliminarydecision. It described the issue in the following way:10[1] At the hearing on 17 March 2017 the subject of this appeal wasdisputed by the parties. [AP] says that she appeals all decisions made by theMinistry since 1998.[2] The Ministry submit that the appeal is limited to the calculation ofdebt incurred by [AP] since 2008.[36] The Authority determined the matter in the Ministry's favour. It held:[17] For the following reasons we conclude that the subject of theapplication to the Benefits Review Committee, and therefore the subject ofthis appeal, is the decision issued on 27 November 2014, that is, thecalculation of the debt that the Ministry states [AP] owes from 3 October 2008.[37] The Authority then went on to provide the reasons for that view.[38] The appeal proceeded with this limitation. By decision dated 22 November2017 the Authority, after hearing from the parties, dismissed the appeal.11 During thecourse of its reasoning it reiterated the limits on the scope of the appeal. It addressedparticular grants made to the appellant, and accepted the Ministry's position on thosegrants.9 In Arbuthnot, the Supreme Court held there was no material significance in the use of the worddetermination as well at decision: above n 4, at [24].10 Re P [2017] NZSSAA 011.11 Re P [2017] NZSSAA 066.Analysis[39] As indicated it seems to me that both the review by the BRC, and the appealby the Authority have been limited by a misinterpretation of the rights the appellanthad, and what she was seeking. At the very least there has been a misunderstanding.[40] The rights of review under s 10A are only in relation to decisions. Thecorrespondence informing the appellant of the calculation of the balance said to beowing is not necessarily a statutory decision, but the extent to which it was, there wasnothing about 3 October 2008 that created a cut-off point to any challenge to thecalculations. The calculations are the product of underlying decisions in relation tothe appellant's case. As I have found, the appellant wished to have these reviewed.The Ministry's internal approach was to suggest that the letter of 27 November 2014involved a fresh statutory decision to seek recovery of that amount, but even if thatapproach is taken, it cannot be presumed that everything done before October 2008was accurate simply because the Ministry said there was a nil balance at that date. Theappellant did not accept that, and this was the very issue she wanted to have reviewed,and then appealed.[41] The correct position was that the appellant had effectively sought a review ofall the decisions/calculations made leading to the suggested calculation of a debtowing by her in the amount of $16,868.90. To the extent that involved a request toreview decisions out of time, she had the right to have that request considered on itsmerits under s 10A(1B)(b). That sub-section was not applied by the BRC. Neitherwas the position clarified. The consequence is that her rights of review, andsubsequent rights of appeal have been curtailed. It is the person seeking review thatdetermines the intended scope of it. It is not for the BRC, or indeed the Authority toitself decide what the scope of the review will be.Case stated questions[42] The first question of law in the Case Stated Appeal is:(a) Did the Authority err in its characterisation of its decision under reviewas being money owed by [AP] from 3 October 2008 only?[43] The Authority did so err. What the appellant had sought to have reviewed, andthen to have appealed, were all decisions made by the Chief Executive leading to thecalculation of her total indebtedness. That was so whether or not the decisions weremade before or after 3 October 2008. That may well have encompassed a request forthe review of decisions out of time under s 10A(1B)(b) which should have been, butwas not, considered on its merits.[44] In any event, to the extent that the 27 November 2014 letter was a freshstatutory decision to recover a particular balance, the request for the review coveredall inputs into that balance, whether or not that encompassed matters that occurredbefore 3 October 2008.[45] On either approach, the appellant's rights of review, and then appeal, weremisinterpreted by both the BRC and the Authority.[46] The second question of law in the Case Stated Appeal is:(a) Did the Authority wrongfully limit the scope of [AP's] appeal when itheld that the BRC report put [AP] "on notice" as to that scope?[47] Amongst the reasons outlined for the Authority taking the view that the scopeof the review before the BRC was limited was that the BRC had sent a report dated27 January 2015 to Mr Howell and the appellant putting them notice that "the scopeof this review was post 3 October 2008".12 The Authority said that neither theappellant or Mr Howell disputed the scope of the review before 20 May 2016. TheAuthority then said:[18] We do not consider it reasonable for Mr Howell to consider that hecan extend the scope of a BRC review through submissions, particularly whenthey are sent some 18 months after the Report to the BRC.[48] In my view this approach was misconceived. The real issue was the scope ofthe review originally requested, which turns on what the appellant said at the firstmeeting, and what Mr Howell said in his follow up email of 2 December 2014. That12 Re P, above n 10, at [17](c).was not analysed by the Authority. The fact that the appellant and Mr Howell weresent documents by the Ministry/BRC which stated that they were limited what wasbeing reviewed is beside the point if they had misinterpreted what had been sought.Moreover a person in the appellant's position always has the ability to apply for areview out of time under s 10A(1B)(b), so even the submission of 20 May 2016 couldhave been treated as such a request.[49] Further, and in any event, if both the Ministry and the BRC had decided toproceed on the basis that the appellant was entitled to have reviewed the calculationof her debt, and the recovery of the debt as advised in the letter of 27 November 2014,then she was entitled to have reviewed all of the inputs into that calculation, and thatrecovery. If she wanted to say that it was wrong to say she had a nil balance as at 3October 2008, then that was within the scope of the review.[50] On any view of it the approach was inappropriate and failed to recognise thereview and appeal rights established under the Act. The process has become distractedby a formalistic question on the scope of the review, rather than getting on andaddressing any issues on the merits.[51] I am mindful of not reaching decisions creating an undue burden in theadministration of the Act. But the amount of time and energy taken up by theformalistic question on the scope of the review (including this very appeal) wouldhave been far better spent on the merits of the appellant's case.Result and relief[52] Given that I have concluded that both of the questions in this case stated shouldbe answered in the appellant's favour, I then need to decide on the appropriate formof any remedy this Court should grant. Rule 21.14 of the High Court Rules 2016provides as follows:21.14 Determination of questionsAfter hearing and determining the question of law or fact (or both) ina case stated, the court must do 1 or more of the following things:(a) in the case of an appeal, reverse, confirm, or amend the decisionin respect of which the case was stated:(b) in the case of an appeal, remit the matter to the tribunal forreconsideration and decision in accordance with the opinion ofthe court on the question of law or fact (or both):(c) in every other case, remit the matter to the tribunal with theopinion of the court:(d) in any case, make any other order that is just.[53] At the hearing I discussed with counsel whether the true error in the currentcase was that the BRC had failed to consider the appellant's application as anapplication for a review out of time under s 10A(1B)(b). If so the appropriate ordermight need to remit the case to the BRC under r 24.14(d) in order for it to make thatdetermination.[54] For a series of reasons I have decided not to do that. First it is not theconventional relief that the Court would give, which would usually be to remit thematter to the Authority under r 21.14(b). Secondly the Ministry and the BRC treatedthe appellant's review request as a review of a fresh decision — the decisionsupposedly indicated in the letter of 27 November 2014 encompassing the calculationof the amount owing, and the recovery of that amount. They then illegitimatelyconfined any dispute about the calculation to the inputs after 3 October 2008 only.The process has thereby become procedurally confused. To remit the matter back tothe BRC to start all over again, with the potential that leave to review after out of timewould not be granted, would have the potential to create yet further legal formalism.[55] What now needs to happen is for the appellant's arguments on appeal to beconsidered on their merits. That would encompass all arguments she makes relatingto the Ministry's decisions before 3 October 2008. That includes all the criticisms setout in Mr Howell's letter to the BRC coordinator dated 20 May 2016. That mayencompass a review of decisions out of time under s 10A(1B)(b), but it seems to methat the case needs now to be treated on the basis that good reason to do so has beenestablished.[56] Accordingly I remit the matter to the Authority with the direction that theyconsider the appeal in light of this judgment.Cooke JSolicitors:O'Regan Arndt Peters & Evans Solicitors, Wellington for AppellantCrown Law, Wellington for Respondent