BENJAMIN MORLAND EASTON v REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND [2021] NZSC 123

BENJAMIN MORLAND EASTON v REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND[2021] NZSC 123 [22 September 2021]IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALANDI TE KŌTI MANA NUISC 82/2021[2021] NZSC 123BETWEEN BENJAMIN MORLAND EASTONApplicantAND REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT OFNEW ZEALANDRespondentCourt: William Young, Ellen France and Williams JJCounsel: Applicant in personD L Harris and T Li for RespondentJudgment: 22 September 2021JUDGMENT OF THE COURTA The application for an extension of time to apply for leaveto appeal is granted.B The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.C The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.____________________________________________________________________REASONSIntroduction[1] The applicant seeks leave to appeal directly to this Court from a decision of theHigh Court.1 The Court dismissed his application for review of the decision of theRegistrar of the High Court not to waive a filing fee in relation to a judicial reviewapplication.1 Easton v Registrar of the High Court of New Zealand [2021] NZHC 1347 (Cull J) [HC judgment].Background[2] The applicant was convicted after trial of two road transport infringementoffences, one of which was that, being in charge of a vehicle, he parked on a road ona flush median or traffic island.2 He appealed unsuccessfully against conviction to theHigh Court.3 The applicant then filed judicial review proceedings seeking to challengethe decision to dismiss his appeal. The Registrar declined to waive the filing fee forthese proceedings. The applicant sought a review of that decision. That applicationwas dismissed by Cull J.4[3] In dismissing the application for review of the Registrar's decision, Cull Jconsidered the application did not meet the criteria for fee waiver, namely, genuinepublic interest.5 The Judge noted the applicant argued the public interest test was metbecause the proceeding concerned "operational bias", was brought in order to educatethe public, and raised issues advanced in the appeal about the status ofHe Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tirene 1835 | the Declaration ofIndependence of the United Tribes of New Zealand 1835.6 The Judge considered theproposed arguments were directed "largely" to the substantive appeal againstconviction dismissed by Ellis J and were an attempt to relitigate that decision.7 Thejudicial review application was not the right legal forum for consideration of mattersthe applicant wished to raise.The proposed appeal[4] In support of the argument that Cull J erred in dismissing the application for afee waiver, the applicant raises a number of matters which were considered in hisearlier appeal against conviction, for example, the failure to provide him with atranscript of the hearing before the District Court and whether the place where the2 Wellington City Council v Easton [2020] NZDC 12300 (Judge Large).3 Easton v Wellington City Council [2020] NZHC 3351 (Ellis J).4 HC judgment, above n 1.5 Regulation 20(a) of the High Court Fees Regulations 2013 defines public interest as, relevantly, aproceeding that will determine a question of law "of significant interest to the public or to asubstantial section of the public".6 HC judgment, above n 1, at [8].7 At [11]. The Judge also did not accept Mr Easton's argument that the Registrar's decision waspart of a pattern of corruption or that the Letters Patent Constituting the Office of theGovernor-General of New Zealand 1983 (the Letters Patent) assisted the argument: at [13]–[15].motor vehicle was parked fitted within the definition of a "traffic island". He also saysthat there are exceptional circumstances justifying a direct appeal to this Court asrequired by s 75 of the Senior Courts Act 2016. In this respect, he argues, amongstother things, that his proposed appeal raises constitutional questions about the statusof the Declaration of Independence and Crown sovereignty,8 and issues of alleged biasand corruption.9 The applicant argues this Court is most suited to determine thesequestions.[5] In opposing leave, the respondent submits that the decision to decline the feewaiver review was correct and, in any event, there is no jurisdiction to seek judicialreview of the earlier decision of the High Court to dismiss the conviction appeal.Our assessment[6] Nothing raised by the applicant calls into question the assessment made byCull J that the criteria for fee waiver were not met. Putting to one side the question ofjurisdiction raised by the respondent, there can be no realistic challenge to theconclusion that the proceeding would not raise any matter of genuine public interest.We also do not consider the proposed appeal raises any question of general or publicimportance,10 nor is there any appearance of a miscarriage of justice.11 Accordingly,the test for exceptional circumstances justifying a direct appeal is also not met.12[7] The application for leave to appeal was filed out of time. The delay isexplained and the respondent accepts the minimal delay has not caused any prejudice.Accordingly, the application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal isgranted. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.8 The applicant notes the Court of Appeal's consideration of the status of the Declaration ofIndependence in Ngaronoa v Attorney-General [2017] NZCA 351, [2017] 3 NZLR 643 (a decisionrelied on by Ellis J in the conviction appeal).9 For example, the approach to the transcript and the treatment of an affidavit is said to demonstratebias. The applicant also takes issue with Cull J's interpretation of the Letters Patent.10 While significant issues relating to the Treaty of Waitangi constitute matters of general or publicimportance, we do not consider the applicant's proposed appeal raises such questions: SeniorCourts Act 2016, s 74(2)(a) and (3).11 Section 74(2)(b). See Junior Farms Ltd v Hampton Securities Ltd (in liq) [2006] NZSC 60, (2006)18 PRNZ 369.12 Section 75.[8] The applicant also sought a return of the filing fee in this Court on the basis ofthe significance of the matters raised by the proposed appeal. Regulation 8 of theSupreme Court Fees Regulations 2003 provides for the registrar, on application, torefund a fee that has already been paid if the criteria in the regulation are met. Theapplicant could make an application to the registrar if he wished to pursue this matteralbeit on the material before us it seems the criteria in reg 8 would not be satisfied.[9] The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.Solicitors:Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent