EASTON v REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND [2021] NZHC 1347

EASTON v REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND [2021] NZHC 1347 [9 June 2021]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDWELLINGTON REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHECIV-2021-485-316[2021] NZHC 1347BETWEEN BENJAMIN MORLAND EASTONApplicantAND REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT OFNEW ZEALANDRespondentOn the papersCounsel: Applicant self-representedJudgment: 9 June 2021JUDGMENT OF CULL J[1] This judgment concerns Mr Easton's application to review the Registrar'sdecision not to waive a judicial review application fee. That fee is payable on thefiling of his judicial review proceedings against Ellis J's decision to dismiss his appealagainst his traffic infringement convictions.Background[2] In 2019, Mr Easton was convicted of two road transport infringement offencesin the District Court, for parking on a traffic island, and being in charge of a vehiclethat was not displaying a current certificate of fitness. This was appealed on twogrounds:(a) The Court had no jurisdiction in the matter and the relevant legislationhas no application, because of the Declaration of Independence of 1835(the Declaration); and(b) Because Wellington City Council has, by various acts or omissionsbreached the law, it cannot now seek to enforce the law againstMr Easton.[3] Mr Easton also contested whether the area where his car was parked (that beinga raised grassed area in the middle of a road) constituted a traffic island.[4] Justice Ellis dismissed the appeal.1 On the first ground of appeal, sheconsidered the High Court was bound by Ngaronoa v Attorney-General, in which theCourt of Appeal considered the Declaration should not be accorded discrete status asan extrinsic aid to the interpretation of contemporary statutes.2 On the second ground,Ellis J concluded any non-compliance of Wellington City Council with the law was nodefence to Mr Easton's charges.3 The Judge also considered "traffic island" had beeninterpreted correctly and in accordance with the definition provided in the LandTransport (Road User) Rule 2004, and the traffic island conviction was thereforevalid.4[5] Subsequently, Mr Easton applied for judicial review on the grounds of judicialbias. It is this judicial review for which a waiver of the application fee was sought.The statutory test is that the review must be in the genuine public interest.5 TheRegistrar did not accept this was so and declined the fee waiver.Public Interest[6] Regulation 20 of the High Court Fees Regulations 2013 (the Regulations)establishes the criteria to be satisfied for a fee to be waived on the basis of genuinepublic interest:20 Criteria for determining when proceeding concerns matter of genuinepublic interestFor the purposes of these regulations, a proceeding that concerns a matter ofgenuine public interest is—1 Easton v Wellington City Council [2020] NZHC 3351.2 At [20]–[24], citing Ngaronoa v Attorney-General [2017] NZCA 351, [2017] 3 NZLR 643.3 At [25].4 At [17].5 High Court Fees Regulations 2013, reg 20.(a) a proceeding that has been or is intended to be commenced todetermine a question of law that is of significant interest to thepublic or to a substantial section of the public; or(b) a proceeding that—(i) raises issues of significant interest to the public or to asubstantial section of the public; and(ii) has been or is intended to be commenced by an organisationthat, by its governing enactment, constitution, or rules, isexpressly or by necessary implication required to promotematters in the public interest.[7] For Mr Easton's judicial review application fee to be waived, the applicationmust satisfy the criteria of reg 20(a). He must demonstrate that this proceeding willdetermine a question of law of significant interest to the public or to a substantialsection of the public.[8] Mr Easton argues the judicial review is in the public interest as it concernsoperational bias and is brought for the purpose of educating the public. He states theproceeding will engage a "previously untested approach to the condition ofsovereignty." As I understand his application, this relates to the arguments advancedin the appeal around the status of the Declaration of Independence in New Zealandlaw.[9] Mr Easton also refers to the New Zealand Bill of Rights (Declarations ofInconsistency) Amendment Bill currently before the Privileges Committee. He seeksa declaration that the Crown has no authority or jurisdiction to amend or abolish theDeclaration of Independence and believes this Bill is the mechanism to do so. Heconsiders such a declaration to be of interest to the public.[10] However, this perception is misconceived. The purpose of the Bill, which, ifpassed, will formalise the ability of senior courts to make declarations whereenactments are inconsistent with the NZ Bill of Rights 1991 (NZBORA). This isindependent of the Declaration of Independence and does not give the Courts theability to grant Mr Easton the remedy he seeks.[11] I note that these public interest arguments largely relate to the substantivematters of the appeal rather than the grounds of judicial review. It appears Mr Eastonis attempting to relitigate the matter. This goes beyond the scope of the judicial review,which must be confined to ensuring the Judge exercised her powers lawfully.6 Thequestions of law which Mr Easton states are in the public interest cannot be answeredin this context. I acknowledge (as did Ellis J) that there are constitutionalconversations yet to be had about the Declaration of Independence and its place inNew Zealand law.7 However, a judicial review of an appeal upholding two minortraffic offences presents legal difficulties for Mr Easton to overcome and is not theforum for addressing the legal questions he raises.[12] Mr Easton also refers to s 19 of NZBORA in his application, namelydiscrimination on the basis of ethic or national origins, which includes nationality orcitizenship. It is not clear how this right is engaged and if Mr Easton is contendingthat he has been subject to discrimination. It appears this is advanced in relation to hisarguments concerning the Declaration of Independence. Accordingly, the previousanalysis applies.Corruption claims[13] Mr Easton also submits that the Registrar's decision is part of a pattern ofactive corruption within which Registrars and Deputy Registrars have continually anddeliberately attempted to thwart the passage of justice. As I understand hissubmissions, Mr Easton refers to the failure of the High Court to reply in a timelymanner to further applications made and allegations that the earlier proceeding werenot managed in accordance with required rules as examples of corruption.[14] I do not accept that the Registrar's decision under review fits thischaracterisation. Mr Easton's application simply does not satisfy the criteria laid outin the Regulations such that his fee should be waived in the public interest.6 Graham Taylor (ed) Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington,2018) at 3, citing Ririnui v Landcorp Farming Ltd [2016] NZSC 62, [2016] 1 NZLR 1056 perElias CJ at [1].7 Easton v Wellington City Council, above n 1, at [24].[15] Mr Easton's reference to the first clause of the Letters Patent also does notsupport his allegations. This mandates that the Governor-General must exercisepowers and authorities conferred on him without prejudice to the office, powers, orauthorities of any other person appointed.8 Mr Easton seems to interpret "withoutprejudice" as supporting his claim of corruption. Unfortunately, Mr Easton hasmisunderstood the meaning of this provision. This simply affords the GovernorGeneral powers, without affecting the authority of other appointed persons. It doesnot concern bias or corruption.Result[16] The questions of law which Mr Easton advances as in the public interest cannotbe addressed within Mr Easton's judicial review application.[17] I decline Mr Easton's application for review of the Registrar's decision.Cull J8 Letters Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor-General of New Zealand 1983, cl 1.