BR (BANGLADESH) v CHIEF EXECUTIVE, MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND EMPLOYMENT [2018] NZHC 902

BR (BANGLADESH) v CHIEF EXECUTIVE, MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION ANDEMPLOYMENT [2018] NZHC 902 [2 May 2018]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDAUCKLAND REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHECIV 2017-404-001998[2018] NZHC 902UNDER the Immigration Act 2009IN THE MATTER of an application for leave to appealBETWEEN BR (BANGLADESH)ApplicantsAND CHIEF EXECUTIVE, MINISTRY OFBUSINESS, INNOVATION ANDEMPLOYMENTRespondentCIV 2017-404-002001UNDER the Judicial Review Procedure 2016IN THE MATTER of an application for leave to bring judicialreview proceedingsBETWEEN BR (BANGLADESH)ApplicantsAND IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTIONTRIBUNALFirst RespondentCHIEF EXECUTIVE, MINISTRY OFBUSINESS, INNOVATION ANDEMPLOYMENTSecond RespondentHearing: On the papersJudgment: 2 May 2018COSTS JUDGMENT OF DUFFY JThis judgment was delivered by me on 2 May 2018 at 12.30 pursuant toRule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.Registrar/ Deputy RegistrarSolicitors/parties:BR Applicants, supported by McKenzie friend, Mr Bryan JohnsonMeredith Connell, Auckland[1] The second respondent, who successfully opposed the applicants' applicationfor leave to appeal and judicially review a decision of the first respondent now seekscosts.[2] The costs sought are calculated on a 2B basis. In terms of the allocationschedule the costs total $7,136.00. The respondent also seeks payment ofdisbursements of $270.00 (filing fees for notices of opposition $220.00 and sealingthe costs order $50.00).[3] The applicants acknowledge the second respondent was successful. They seeka reduction in costs and time to pay, relying on r 14.7(g) of the High Court Rules,which recognises the existence of some other reasons which justify the Court refusingcosts or reducing costs, despite the general principle that determination of costs shallbe predictable and expeditious.[4] This rule has been described by this Court as a "catch-all" exception:1[10] The "catch-all" exception in rule 14.7(g) is broad, but requiresidentification of a good reason for departing from the general rule that costsshould follow the event. Examples may include habeas corpus applicationsand claims under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990[5] The applicants acknowledge there were no public interest reasons advanced intheir application, and that such matters as they did advance were specific to them as afamily. They say they are not in a position to pay costs in one lump sum. They suggesta realistic costs award would be in the sum of $2,500 to be paid at $50 per week.[6] The general principle is that costs follow the event. I understand the difficultcircumstances the applicants face and the adverse impact a costs order would have onthem. Nonetheless, the reasons they advance do not provide a basis for departing fromthe general principle regarding costs.[7] In Singh v Immigration and Protection Tribunal Cooper J canvassed the perilsof accepting such an argument:21 Taylor v District Court at North Shore HC Auckland CIV-2009-404-2350, 13 October 2010.2 Singh v Immigration and Protection Tribunal [2014] NZHC 2065.[6] Mr Singh has not engaged with the calculation of costs, and the onlypoints he raises are essentially based on his inability to pay. While I havesome sympathy with the position that he is in, it is not possible to articulate aproper reason for declining an award of costs having regard to the relevantprovisions of the High Court Rules.[7] the only vehicle by which there could be a reduction of costs wouldbe paragraph (g), under which the Court has the broad power to reduce costsif "some other reason exists" justifying the Court taking that step.[8] Acting under that paragraph in the circumstances of this case wouldcreate a precedent of potentially very wide application and ultimately wouldnot be justified having regard to the other, more specific provisions of therelevant rules.[8] In addition, no evidence affidavit or other evidence has been brought beforeme as to the applicants' financial position.3[9] I have carefully considered the matter and am satisfied that the secondrespondent is entitled to category 2B costs. I am also satisfied that the quantum ofthose costs as calculated by the second respondent is correct.[10] Accordingly, I award the second respondent the sum of $7,136.00.[11] Regarding disbursements, the second respondent filed notices of opposition ineach proceeding. I am satisfied the second respondent is entitled to the $220.00 forthe filing fees for the notices of opposition and the $50.00 for sealing the costs order.The total sum being $270.00.3 See AX (Afghanistan) v Immigration and Protection Tribunal [2018] NZHC 52 at [26].