FORREST V THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL COA CA785/2010

FORREST V THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL COA CA785/2010 [2 April 2012]IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALANDCA785/2010[2012] NZCA 125BETWEEN BRENDON DOUGLAS FORRESTAppellantAND THE ATTORNEY-GENERALRespondentHearing: 3 November 2011Court: Chambers, Arnold and Ellen France JJCounsel: Appellant in PersonJ Foster for RespondentJudgment: 2 April 2012 at 10 amJUDGMENT OF THE COURTA The appeal is allowed.B A declaration is made, in addition to the declaration made in the High Court, that the second strip search of the appellant in J Block of Christchurch Prison on 18 August 2009 was in breach of s 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.C The respondent must pay to the appellant, subject to the Prisoners' and Victims' Claims Act 2005, compensation in the sum of $600.D No order as to costs.REASONS OF THE COURT(Given by Chambers J)Table of ContentsPara NoA strip search in Christchurch Prison [1]Issues on the appeal [6]Was the Judge right to find the second strip search lawful? [9]What remedy should Mr Forrest be given?Compensation [19]Section 13(1)(a) [23]Section 13(1)(b) [31]Section 14 factors [33]Quantum [41]Result [43]A strip search in Christchurch Prison[1] Brendon Forrest is serving a lengthy custodial sentence in Christchurch Prison for arson, threatening to kill and perjury. Whilst in prison Mr Forrest has required intensive management because of behavioural issues.[2] On 16 August 2009 Mr Forrest was involved in an incident where he threatened prison staff. Because of that, the prison authorities moved him out of Matai Unit to J Block, the highest security block. Two days later, Mr Forrest, along with the other prisoners in J Block, was strip searched. (We shall call that "the firststrip search".) The prison authorities then decided to move Mr Forrest back to Matai Unit. The route from J Block to Matai Unit went through a space in the prison called"the sally port". We shall give a fuller description of this space later in thesereasons, as the nature of this space is of some significance in this appeal. Mr Forrest was left in the sally port for some minutes, waiting for a corrections officer to come and conduct an interview before he was taken back to Matai Unit. The interview room adjoined the sally port. Mr Forrest was taken into it. While he was being interviewed, another corrections officer came into the interview room. Mr Forrest threatened him. The officers present physically restrained Mr Forrest. There was no question now of his immediate return to Matai Unit; they decided he had to go back to J Block.[3] Upon his return to J Block, Mr Forrest was placed in a cell and strip searched.(We shall call this "the second strip search".) It is the legality of that strip search with which this appeal is concerned. Mr Forrest contends it was unlawful andamounted to a breach of s 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Section 21 provides:Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, whether of the person, property, or correspondence or otherwise.[4] These strip searches were not Mr Forrest's sole complaints against the prisonauthorities. He was also cross about other aspects of his conditions of detention, including the adequacy of prison clothing, heating and cleaning equipment. He brought a civil proceeding against the Attorney-General, representing the Department of Corrections, in the High Court at Christchurch. In this proceeding he included all his complaints under various causes of action. He succeeded before Chisholm J on only one of his causes of action.1 That was concerned with the legality of the first strip search. Chisholm J found that search to have been unauthorised and in breach of s 21.2 In respect of that, he awarded Mr Forrest adeclaration that that search had been in breach of Mr Forrest's rights under s 21. HisHonour found against Mr Forrest, however, with respect to all of his other causes of action, including with respect to the second strip search. The Judge found this strip search to have been authorised under s 98 of the Corrections Act 2004.[5] The Crown has not appealed from the fact the Judge made a declaration with respect to the first strip search.3 Mr Forrest has appealed only with respect to theJudge's finding concerning the legality of the second strip search. Mr Forrest submits the Judge was wrong to find that this strip search was lawful. Ms Foster, for the Attorney-General, seeks to uphold the Judge's finding.Issues on the appeal[6] There are two issues on this appeal.[7] First, was the Judge right to find the second strip search was lawful?1 Forrest v Attorney-General HC Christchurch CIV-2009-409-2373, 1 November 2010.2 The Crown had conceded this: at [48].3 The Crown had argued no declaration was necessary: at [49].[8] If the strip search was unlawful, then a second issue arises: what remedy should Mr Forrest be given? Should he be given compensation (as he would like) or should there be a declaration as to the breach, as the Judge gave in respect of the first strip search?Was the Judge right to find the second strip search lawful?[9] Mr Forrest and Ms Foster were agreed that the legality of the second strip search turned on s 98 of the Corrections Act. Section 98 sets out the circumstances in which prisoners may be searched:(1) An officer may, at any time, for the purpose of detecting any unauthorised item, conduct –(a) a scanner search of any prisoner:(b) a rub-down search of any prisoner:(c) a search of any cell in a prison.(2) Nothing in subsection (1)(c) limits or affects any power or authority to search or inspect any cell in any prison for any purpose relating to the security of the prison.(3) An officer may conduct a strip search of a prisoner –(a) if the officer –(i) has reasonable grounds for believing that the prisoner has in his or her possession an unauthorised item; and(ii) has obtained the manager's approval to the conductof a strip search; or(b) in the situations referred to in subsection (6).(4) Despite subsection (3)(a)(ii), it is not necessary to obtain the approval of a prison manager for the conduct of a strip search under subsection (3) if the delay involved in obtaining that approval would endanger the health or safety of any person or prejudice the maintenance of security at the prison.(5) The power to conduct a strip search of a prisoner under subsection (3) may only be exercised –(a) for the purpose of detecting any unauthorised item; and(b) if a strip search is necessary in the circumstances for the purpose of detecting an unauthorised item.(6) The situations referred to in subsection (3)(b) are as follows:(a) immediately before the prisoner is locked in a cell to undergo a penalty of cell confinement imposed under subpart 5 of Part 2:(b) on the return of the prisoner to the prison:(c) on the return of the prisoner from work or from a part of the prison that is not supervised:(d) immediately before the prisoner leaves the prison:(e) at any time while the prisoner is being transferred to another prison:(f) at any time while the prisoner is outside the prison in the control of an officer:(g) immediately before or immediately after the prisoner is brought before –(i) a Visiting Justice for the purposes of any hearing or examination under subpart 5 of Part 2 or any appeal under subpart 5 of Part 2:(ii) a hearing adjudicator for the purposes of any hearing or examination under subpart 5 of Part 2:(iii) any tribunal or court:(iv) any hearing before the New Zealand Parole Board:(h) immediately before any person visits the prisoner:(i) immediately after any person has visited the prisoner:(j) if the prisoner is required under section 124 to submit to a prescribed procedure in the situation referred to in section 124(2)(d), immediately before the prisoner submits to that procedure.(7) Every prisoner must be required to undergo a strip search conducted by an officer –(a) on first being admitted to a prison; and(b) immediately before being transferred to another prison; and(c) on being received in a prison on transfer from another prison.[Subsections (8) and (9) omitted.][10] It was common ground before Chisholm J and again before us that the Attorney-General could not rely on subs (3)(a) as justification for the second strip search. Rather, the Attorney-General relied on subs (3)(b) and "the situation"referred to in subs (6)(c). The Attorney-General contended that the sally port was "a part of the prison that is not supervised". Interestingly, none of the officers involved in the strip search referred to this matter as justification for the strip search. Notwithstanding that, Chisholm J accepted the Attorney-General's submission andfound the strip search justified on the basis that Mr Forrest had been "unsupervised when he was in the sally port".4[11] The sally port was a reasonably small room with walls on three sides (A, B and D) and bars on the remaining side (C). Wall A had a locked door leading to a corridor, which eventually went to J Block. Wall D had a door leading to the interview room we have previously referred to. Side C had bars leading into a much larger recreation room for prisoners. Corrections officers were present in that recreation area as, at the time Mr Forrest was in the sally port, there were prisoners in the recreation room. Those prisoners could talk to someone in the sally port through the bars and indeed some did while Mr Forrest was there. We know this because we have seen a video record of everything that happened in the sally port while Mr Forrest was in it: a security camera was running. The prison guards in the recreation area could easily have seen into the sally port. The sally port was devoid of furniture.[12] Contrary to the Judge's finding, we are inclined to categorise the sally port asa supervised part of the prison. We are inclined to that view because it was immediately outside an interview room, it was so located that officers were frequently passing through it, it was covered by a security camera, and officers were out in the recreation area and could see into the space.[13] In the end, however, we have decided we do not need to resolve whether thesally port was "a part of the prison that [was] not supervised" at the time Mr Forrest was in it on 18 August 2009. That is because we are satisfied that, even if it was, the second strip search was not carried out for the specified statutory purpose set out in4 At [56].subs (5). Chisholm J set out this subsection, among others, at [52] of his judgment but did not refer to it again in his discussion of the legality of the second strip search. He went straight from a finding that "Mr Forrest was unsupervised when he was in the sally port"5 to a finding that it followed "that there was jurisdiction unders 98(6)(c) of the Act for the correction officers to conduct a strip search and thesearch was lawful".6 In defence of the Judge, we should point out that the claim under s 21 of the Bill of Rights in respect of the second strip search came before him in a rather unsatisfactory way. Mr Forrest had to amend his pleadings during the trial. It may be the parties were not completely alive to all the implications of the amendment. In particular, they may not have realised the significance of subs (5).[14] Whether "a strip search [was] necessary in the circumstances" will be a very fact-specific inquiry. For example, if a scanner search or a rub-down search was likely to detect the particular unauthorised item the prisoner was suspected of carrying, then a strip search would be less likely to be found to be "necessary in thecircumstances". Where the prisoner had recently been (for instance, a prison kitchen) might be relevant in an assessment of necessity. The history of the particular prisoner would generally be a very relevant circumstance: a strip searchmay well be considered "necessary" if the prisoner has a history of secreting unauthorised items in body orifices.[15] We should not be prescriptive about when strip searches are or are not appropriate in subs (6) situations. What is undeniable, however, is that officers planning to search in subs (6) circumstances must turn their minds to the circumstances and the options available to them. They may strip search only if theyreasonably conclude such a search "is necessary in the circumstances for the purpose of detecting an unauthorised item". This must involve consideration of whether a scanner search or a rub-down search would suffice. And, of course, any decision must be made in light of two fundamental principles guiding the corrections system,namely the need for "the fair treatment of persons under control or supervision" and5 At [56].6 At [57].the need for "decisions about those persons [to be] taken in a fair and reasonable way".7[16] The officers in the present case did not undertake the sort of analysis implicit in s 98(5). That is perhaps not surprising as none of the officers involved appear to have recognised that this was a subs (6) situation. Three of the six officers involved, to a greater or lesser extent, in the second strip search gave evidence. From their evidence, two justifications for the strip search emerged. One of the officersinvolved said it was conducted because not long before there had been "a control and restraint incident involving threats to staff". That was a reference to what hadhappened in the interview room. A second explanation was proffered by the same officer in cross-examination. He said it was always the practice to strip search inmates on entry to J Block. Another officer who gave evidence confirmed this was the practice.[17] Neither explanation justified the strip search. None of the three officers said he thought Mr Forrest was carrying an unauthorised item or could point to evidence justifying an inference he might be. Some of the evidence would suggest that the prison was running an informal blanket policy of strip searching every prisoner on his admission to J Block. We make no finding on that, as it is unnecessary to do so. Were there such an informal policy, of course, it would have been unlawful. It would have been inconsistent with section B15 (Prisoner and Prison Facility Searching) in the Department of Corrections Manual. The second strip search did not comply with section B15; nor was section B15 referred to by any of the officers involved in the second strip search.[18] We are satisfied on the evidence that the second strip search, like the first, was unlawful. Ms Foster accepted that, if we found the second strip search unlawful,then we should find Mr Forrest's rights under s 21 of the Bill of Rights to have beenbreached. We do so find.7 Corrections Act, s 6(1)(f).What remedy should Mr Forrest be given?Compensation[19] In the High Court, Mr Forrest had sought compensation with respect to both strip searches. Chisholm J declined to grant compensation with respect to the first strip search (the only one he found to be unlawful) but did make a declaration that it had been undertaken in breach of s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act.8 Mr Forrest did notappeal against that part of Chisholm J's decision.[20] Mr Forrest sought compensation before us, but only with respect to the second strip search. He did not nominate a figure. Ms Foster opposed any award of compensation but did accept that, if we found a breach to have occurred, it would be appropriate to grant a declaration with respect to this strip search as well. Shereferred us to ss 13 and 14 of the Prisoners' and Victims' Claims Act 2005.Parliament passed this Act in the wake of Ronald Young J's 2004 decision to awardpublic law damages to Christopher Taunoa and certain other prisoners with respect to their treatment in prison.9 The Judge had awarded the prisoners compensation roughly at a rate of $2,500 a month for the period each prisoner suffered unlawful treatment.10 The calculation had resulted in Mr Taunoa, for instance, receiving an award of $55,000.11 The Government of the day was concerned about the implications of Ronald Young J's decision and responded with a Bill which, when enacted, was called the Prisoners' and Victims' Claims Act 2005. The purpose of subpart 1 of Part 2 of the Act (the subpart with which we are concerned and into which ss 13 and 14 fall) was set out in s 3(1) of the Act:The purpose of subpart 1 of Part 2 is to restrict and guide the awarding of compensation sought by specified claims in order to help to ensure that the remedy of compensation is reserved for exceptional cases and used only if, and only to the extent that, it is necessary to provide effective redress.[21] In broad terms, s 13 prohibits the award of compensation to prisoners for, among other things, breaches of the Bill of Rights they sustain in prison unless two8 At [50] and [67].9 Taunoa v Attorney-General (2004) 7 HRNZ 379 (HC).10 Taunoa v Attorney-General (2004) 8 HRNZ 53 (HC) at [33].11 At [34].conditions are fulfilled. In Ms Foster's submission, neither was fulfilled. Section 14 sets out matters a Court must consider when determining whether compensation is required to provide effective redress and, if it is, the quantum of such award. On Ms Foster's argument, s 14 did not require consideration because Mr Forrest's claim fellat the s 13 hurdle. Ms Foster had presented a similar argument to Chisholm J with respect to the appropriate remedy for the first strip search. His Honour, without giving reasons, accepted her argument that s 13 prevented the award of compensatory or exemplary damages.12[22] Mr Forrest, in submissions which were carefully prepared, sought todistinguish Chisholm J's decision on the basis that his Honour was proceeding on anassumption that there had been only one unlawful strip search, whereas we are now proceeding on the basis there were two unlawful strip searches in the same day. But Mr Forrest did not deal with Ms Foster's argument concerning the limitation oncompensation provided by s 13. Any discussion about whether compensation should be awarded for breach of s 21 of the Bill of Rights must begin with an analysis of s 13 so as to determine its applicability or otherwise.Section 13(1)(a)[23] We turn to the first limb of s 13(1), s 13(1)(a). This provides that, before compensation may be awarded, the Court must be satisfied thatthe plaintiff has made reasonable use of all the specified internal and external complaints mechanisms reasonably available to him or her to complain about the act or omission on which the claim is based, but has not obtained in relation to that act or omission redress that the Court or Tribunal considers effective;[24] The term "specified internal and external complaints mechanisms" is definedin s 7. Ms Foster submitted that, while Mr Forrest did use the prison's internalcomplaints system and also complained to the Ombudsman, his complaint did not cover the second strip search. Accordingly, she submitted, the first limb of s 13(1) was not fulfilled.12 At [50]. The term "compensation" in the Act means "any form of monetary compensation ordamages ... (including, without limitation, an amount of, or in the nature of, exemplarydamages)".[25] We do not accept that submission. While the record is incomplete, it is clearfrom Graeme Hunter's internal report following Mr Forrest's complaints thatMr Forrest was complaining about the second strip search. Mr Hunter records Mr Forrest as saying:He also claims that during the strip search in J Block staff sat on his legs crushing his ankle requiring medical treatment.[26] Mr Hunter took this matter up with the relevant staff, whose account he summarised thus:The footage of the J Block cell area did not give a view inside the cell where prisoner Forrest was being strip searched. Incident reports submitted by staff indicate that due to his threats and behaviour the prisoner was searched while under restraint and completed without incident. Health staff werealerted and after a doctor's assessment he was taken offsite for furtherassessment and treatment. Medical reports indicate prisoner Forrest received minor strain and bruising to his left ankle requiring no further follow up.[27] Mr Hunter's conclusion on this aspect of the complaint was as follows:Incident reports and witness statements indicate that appropriate control and restraint procedures were used. Medical treatment was given to theprisoner's leg at the time. Offsite treatment and x-ray reports indicate no serious injury was sustained as no follow up was required. Given theprisoner's resistance to staff conducting the strip search in the J Block cell the investigator found no conclusive evidence to support prisoner Forrest'sclaim that staff used excessive force on his legs.[28] Mr Forrest apparently wrote two letters to the Ombudsman. We have seen one of them (his letter of 24 August 2009) and the response to that letter (dated 17 September 2009) from John Couch-Lewis, an investigator with the Office of the Ombudsmen. From Mr Couch-Lewis's letter, we know that he showed Mr Forrest'scomplaints to Acting Manager Custodial Systems Paul Rushton. Mr Couch-Lewis refers to Mr Rushton's response to Mr Forrest's complaints. The relevant response,for current purposes is this:Once located in J Pod, it is alleged when the handcuffs were removed and Brendon [Forrest] was to be searched, objection occurred and the need to restrain Brendon was required. During this it is alleged (from Brendon) an injury to Brendon occurred. Unfortunately this was not video recorded therefore cannot be confirmed.[29] Mr Couch-Lewis, having set out Mr Rushton's response at length, said thiswith respect to the second strip search: you will appreciate that it would be difficult for the Ombudsman to come to a definitive conclusion as to who was in the right as it would, in the end, come down to your word against that of the prison staff present.[30] In our view, Mr Forrest did make reasonable use of the specified internal and external complaints mechanisms available to him to complain about, among other things, the second strip search. And, in our view, he did not obtain, in relation to that second strip search, redress we consider effective. Neither investigator turned his mind to whether the strip search was lawful.13 In addition, both investigators arguably applied an inappropriate burden of proof. Mr Hunter appears to haverejected Mr Forrest's account on the basis that it was not "conclusive".Mr Couch-Lewis rejected Mr Forrest's complaint without even apparently reviewing Mr Hunter's report, still less interviewing the prison staff concerned.Section 13(1)(b)[31] We turn to the second limb of s 13. Before compensation can be awarded, the Court must also be satisfied thatanother remedy, or a combination of other remedies, cannot provide, in relation to the act or omission on which the claim is based, redress that the court or Tribunal considers effective.[32] Ms Foster submits that the other remedy which would be "effective" is a formal declaration, such as Chisholm J ordered as redress with respect to the first strip search. Whether the second limb of s 13 is satisfied cannot be looked at in isolation from s 14, which, as we have said, sets out the matters a Court must take into account in determining whether compensation is required to provide effective redress. The need for reading ss 13(1)(b) and 14 in tandem becomes clear when one considers what otherwise might happen: if each provision was looked at with blinkers on, the Court might conclude that a declaration on its own was not an effective remedy (under s 13(1)(b)) but might then conclude under s 14, after taking13 We accept Mr Forrest did not specifically question the legality of the strip search as opposed to its forceful manner. Nonetheless, in the circumstances of this case, the first thing theinvestigators should have enquired into was whether the strip search was lawful.into account the mandatory considerations in s 14(2), that compensation was not required. Obviously it is sensible to look at the two provisions together.Section 14 factors[33] We turn to consider the mandatory considerations under s 14(2). So far as mitigation is concerned (para (a)), there was nothing Mr Forrest could reasonably doto mitigate the "loss or damage" he suffered from the unlawful strip search, save tocomplain, which he did. While the Department of Corrections did investigate Mr Forrest's complaints, no one appears to have turned his mind to whether the stripsearch was lawful in the first place.[34] As to (b), we do not consider the officers concerned set out deliberately tobreach Mr Forrest's rights under s 21 or acted in bad faith. At the same time, they appear not to have considered at all whether this was an occasion in which a strip search was lawful and did not turn their minds to whether such a search was necessary in the circumstances. For whatever reason, the officers considered re-entry into J Block as justification in itself for a strip search.[35] As to (c), while Mr Forrest had been threatening earlier, he does not appear to have done anything at the time of the strip search to have rendered it necessary. The Judge found Mr Forrest did resist the strip search; in our view, he was entitled to, as the officers were not acting lawfully in attempting to strip search him.[36] As to (d), the consequences for Mr Forrest of the breach have not been significant. The indignity he suffered was short-lived and witnessed by only four officers. The Judge concluded that the injury to Mr Forrest's ankle, sustained duringthe second strip search, was minor and "occurred accidentally".14 Nonetheless, it did occur while Mr Forrest was attempting to defend himself against what was an unlawful search and accordingly an unlawful assault by the officers concerned.[37] As to (e), the liberties protected by the right against unreasonable search are very important. As McGrath J commented in Taunoa v Attorney-General, strip14 At [38]. Mr Forrest did not appeal against that finding.searching is of its nature "demeaning", with the consequence that "the practice mustbe closely regulated".15 Against that, however, there must be an air of reality about life in prison. Strip searches are possible in many situations and are, in some situations, mandatory.16[38] As to (f), there does appear to be a need to deter unlawful strip searches, as the evidence in this case suggests other prisoners have been strip searched on occasions where such searches may not have been lawful. Departmental officers were mistaken in their appreciation as to when strip searches were permitted.[39] Paragraph (h) also permits the Court to take into account "other matters" itconsiders relevant. Another matter we consider very relevant is the fact Mr Forrest was subjected to two unlawful strip searches in the same day.[40] Taking into account all these matters, we are satisfied that giving Mr Forrest another declaration with respect to the illegality of the second strip search will not provide effective redress for him. On balance, the s 14(2) factors, and in particular the fact Mr Forrest underwent two unlawful strip searches in the same day, make thisan "exceptional case" requiring an award of compensation if redress is to be effective. Accordingly, in terms of s 13(1)(b), we are not satisfied that a remedy other than compensation can provide effective redress. Neither limb of s 13(1) has been satisfied, with the consequence that we are not precluded from awarding compensation.Quantum[41] We now turn to the question of quantum. Again, this brings into play the matters specified in s 14(2), which we have just discussed above. What is important in this regard is the fact that the period of the strip search was brief, it was witnessed only by the officers conducting it, and there have been no ongoing consequences to Mr Forrest from it. In fixing quantum, we have considered the cases listed in the15 Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429 at [349].16 See s 98(7).appendix to chapter 4 of Civil Remedies in New Zealand.17 We have placed most reliance, however, on the amounts of compensation approved by the Supreme Court in Taunoa, given the level at which that case was decided and the similarity of subject matter. The awards in that case were modest. Mr Forrest's complaint wasmuch less serious than the prisoners' complaints in Taunoa. We fix the compensation at $600.[42] In fixing that figure, we have ignored the downstream consequences of an award of compensation in this case. The fact is it is highly unlikely that Mr Forrest will receive any of the $600 we have ordered to be paid. That is because of the provisions in subpart 2 of Part 2 of the Prisoners' and Victims' Claims Act. The Department will have to pay the compensation to the Secretary for Justice in accordance with s 17 of the Act. The Secretary must then deal with the sum in accordance with subpart 2. Others will probably have a better statutory claim to the money than Mr Forrest has.18 We regard the subpart 2 regime as irrelevant to the question of whether the wrongdoer should have to pay compensation and, if so, how much should be paid.19Result[43] We allow the appeal.[44] We make a declaration that the second strip search of Mr Forrest in J Block of Christchurch Prison on 18 August 2009 was in breach of s 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. This declaration is in addition to the declaration Chisholm J made in the High Court.17 Geoff McLay "Damages Under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990" in Peter Blanchard(ed) Civil Remedies in New Zealand (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2011) 203 at 220–224.18 For example, the victim of this arson. We have no details of the arson Mr Forrest committed andwhat compensation, if any, whether by way of reparation or otherwise, the victim has received.Almost certainly, the victim has not been fully compensated and will have a claim under the Act.19 The Court of Appeal and Supreme Court in Taunoa were not concerned with the Prisoners' and Victims' Claims Act restrictions on compensation as subpart 1 of Part 2 of that Act (into which ss 13 and 14 fall) did not apply to the claims that had been brought by Mr Taunoa and his co- plaintiffs: see s 12.[45] We order the Attorney-General to pay to Mr Forrest, subject to the Prisoners' and Victims' Claims Act, compensation in the sum of $600.[46] There will be no order as to costs. Mr Forrest represented himself. He incurred no disbursements as the Registrar waived court fees. The Crown Law Office assumed responsibility for preparing the case on appeal and the booklet of joint authorities.Solicitors:Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent