Farquhar v Accident Compensation Corporation
Leave to appeal was declined because the impugned decision was based on factual findings rather than any question of law, the applicant failed to file submissions identifying a question of law despite directions, and there was no merit in the application to warrant referral to the High Court.
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2008] NZACC 29
- Parties
- Applicant: Bruce Scott Farquhar; Respondent: Accident Compensation Corporation
- Court
- District Court
- Jurisdiction
- New Zealand
- Judgment Date
- 1 February 2008
- Procedural Posture
- Application for Leave to Appeal to the High Court Under Section 162 of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001 / Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal (district Court)
- Outcome
- Leave to appeal to the High Court is declined.
- Legal Topics
- Leave to Appeal, Suspension of Entitlements, Consent to Disclosure, Judicial Review of Statutory Powers, Sections 72 and 117(3)(a) IPCRA 2001
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Bruce Scott Farquhar
Applicant
Accident Compensation Corporation
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Application for Leave to Appeal to the High Court Under Section 162 of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001 / Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal (district Court)
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether a question of law existed to justify leave to appeal to the High Court
- 2 Whether the respondent was entitled to suspend the applicant's entitlements for refusal to sign a consent to disclosure under ss 72 and 117(3)(a) of the Act
- 3 Whether the District Court's decision was a factual determination or raised a point of law
Ratio Decidendi
Leave to appeal was declined because the impugned decision was based on factual findings rather than any question of law, the applicant failed to file submissions identifying a question of law despite directions, and there was no merit in the application to warrant referral to the High Court.
Court Disposition
Leave to appeal to the High Court is declined.
Orders
- Leave to appeal to the High Court is declined.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT HELD AT WELLINGTON Decision No. 29 /2008 IN THE MATTER of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001 AND IN THE MATTER of an application for Leave to Appeal to the High Court pursuant to Section 162 of the Act BETWEEN BRUCE SCOTT FARQUHAR (Al 163/03) Applicant AND ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION Respondent DECISION OF JUDGE M J BEATTIE ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE HIGH COURT [1] By letter dated 6 July 2005, the applicant advised the Registry that he intended to seek leave to appeal to the High Court from the decision of His Honour Judge Cadenhead, delivered on 15 June 2005 under Decision No. 176/05. [2] By letter dated 7 July 2005 to the applicant, the Registry advised him of the procedure required for the obtaining of leave, and in particular the requirement for the filing of submissions identifying the question of law that was sought to be referred to the High Court. 3] Subsequent requests from the Registry to the applicant to file submissions have brought no response. The last request from the Registry to the applicant was made on 17 October 2007 in which the applicant was given 28 days to file his submissions and in the event of failure to do so the file would be referred to a Judge for further action. 163.03 (pg) 2 [4] No submissions have been received from the applicant to the present day. [5] The issue in the decision sought to be appealed was whether the respondent was entitled to suspend the applicant's entitlements under the Act for so long as he refused to sign a consent to the disclosure of information, the respondent's decision being made pursuant to Sections 72 and 117(3)(a) of the Act. [6] In his decision the Learned Judge traversed the facts surrounding the actions of the applicant and his decision is encapsulated in Clause 43 of his Judgment when he stated as follows: "The purpose of the respondent's request was to obtain a consent from the appellant to enable it to proceed to assessments. This was a prim consideration or purpose envisaged by the statutory provisions. Viewed objectively / consider that the insistence of the appellant not to provide his consent in these circumstances, in context, was unreasonable for the reasons that I have given. Very much this is a case decided on its own facts. It is not a mandate for the respondent to act in an arbitrary way, as at the end of the day the exercise of the statutory powers will be closely examined in the contextual circumstances." [7] I consider that the decision of His Honour was one made solely on the facts as he found them and that no question of law was involved, particularly not one which warranted referral to the High Court for further consideration. [8] In the absence of any submissions from the applicant identifying a question of law, and having regard to the lapse of time since the advice of an intention to seek leave in which no steps have been taken by the applicant, I find that there is no merit in the application whatsoever and leave to appeal is accordingly declined. DATED at AUCKLAND this ( " day of February 2008 M J Beattie District Court Judge