CAMERON PAUL EDWARDS v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2017] NZHC 200

CAMERON PAUL EDWARDS v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2017] NZHC 200 [17 February 2017]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDAUCKLAND REGISTRYCIV 2016-404-000245[2017] NZHC 200BETWEEN CAMERON PAUL EDWARDSAppellantAND NEW ZEALAND POLICERespondentHearing: 7 February 2017Counsel: E Burton for AppellantA Park for RespondentJudgment: 17 February 2017JUDGMENT OF DUFFY JThis judgment was delivered by me on 17 February 2017 at 4.45 pm pursuant toRule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.Registrar/ Deputy RegistrarSolicitors / Counsel:Meredith Connell, AucklandElla Burton, Barrister, Auckland[1] The appellant, Cameron Edwards, received cumulative sentences of fivemonths' imprisonment and 23 months' imprisonment. He appeals against the total sentence of 2 years and 4 months' imprisonment on the ground it is manifestly excessive.Factual background[2] The offences for which Mr Edwards was sentenced span a considerable period of time. They are also different in character. These factors led the sentencing Judge to group the offences into two categories and then to impose cumulativesentences for each group of offences. There is no quarrel with the Judge's approachin this regard, and as I agree with it I propose to maintain the two groups of offences.Family violence offences[3] These offences arise from Mr Edwards' conduct towards his former partner CL. Each is dealt with in chronological order.[4] On 31 August 2015 Mr Edwards posted a threatening comment on his Facebook page in respect of CL and their daughter. Mr Edwards was initially charged with two charges of speaking threateningly and one charge of wilful trespass. He first appeared in the District Court on 10 September 2015. On 20 October 2015 when he appeared in the District Court one of the charges of speaking threateningly and the charge of wilful trespass were withdrawn. Mr Edwards then pleaded guilty to the remaining charge of speaking threateningly.[5] Mr Edwards was served with a temporary protection order on 3 September 2015. On 6 September 2015, he was charged with breaching this protection order following an incident involving CL when he raised his right arm while standing in front of her. He was also charged with speaking threateningly and wilful trespass. His first appearance on those charges was also on 10 September 2015. When he appeared again on 20 October 2015 he pleaded guilty to the charge of breaching a protection order. The other two charges were withdrawn.[6] On 14 September 2015 Mr Edwards appeared in the District Court on a charge of breaching his post-detention conditions prohibiting him from associating with CL. He pleaded guilty to the charge on 20 October 2015.[7] On 6 December 2015, Mr Edwards entered CL's home. There was anexchange between him and CL during which CL became afraid that he was going to remove their daughter from her home. CL grabbed Mr Edwards' clothing,inadvertently scratched his neck, and attempted to punch him. He then bit her finger. He was initially charged with wilful trespass, wilful damage, male assaults female and breach of a protection order. He appeared in the District Court on 7 December 2015. On 8 June 2016 when he again appeared in the District Court the male assaults female charge was amended to one of common assault. The charge of wilful damage was withdrawn. He then pleaded guilty to charges of wilful trespass, common assault and breach of a protection order.[8] The final offence in this group is a further breach of a protection order. On21 March 2016 CL gave birth to Mr Edwards' second child. She refused to tell himher whereabouts. He texted her saying if she did not tell him where she was he would find her, come to the hospital where she was with weapons and hurt anyone who got in his way. When he first appeared in the District Court for this matter he was also charged with wilful damage. When he later appeared on 8 June 2016 he pleaded guilty to breaching the protection order. At that time the charge of wilful damage was withdrawn.Other offending[9] The other offences relate to dishonesty, violence and breach of Court- imposed orders. Each is dealt with in chronological order.[10] Between 14 August 2015 and 4 December 2015, Mr Edwards failed to report to Probation in respect of a community work sentence he had. He was charged with breaching community work. He first appeared in the District Court on 18 December 2015. He entered a guilty plea on 8 June 2016.[11] On 17 October 2015, Mr Edwards caused the vehicle he was driving to undergo a sustained loss of traction, which resulted in a corresponding charge. He first appeared in the District Court on 18 December 2015. He entered a guilty plea on 8 June 2016.[12] On 1 December 2015, Mr Edwards received a stolen car. He was initially charged with unlawfully taking a motor vehicle. His first appearance was on 22 March 2016. On 8 June 2016 the original charge was substituted with a charge of receiving to which he pleaded guilty.[13] On 9 December 2015, Mr Edwards stole a laptop from CL's home and sold itlater that day.1 He had been staying at CL's home with her consent. CL was absent but CL's mother was present. Mr Edwards was given permission to retrieve a bag ofhis clothes, which was in CL's bedroom. CL's laptop was in the bedroom.Mr Edwards stole it and sold it to Cash Converters. He was charged with theft. He appeared in the District Court on 22 March 2016. He pleaded guilty on 28 July 2016.[14] On 25 January 2016, Mr Edwards was granted electronically monitored bail.[15] On 28 February 2016, Mr Edwards demanded cigarettes and money from two victims working at an ice skating rink. He further confronted them outside the building despite his associates urging him to leave, and followed them to the security gates. At this stage one of the victims got out of his car to open the gate. Mr Edwards pushed him to the ground, kicked him in the face and demanded his phone. Mr Edwards was charged with robbery in relation to this incident. He first appeared in the District Court on 22 March 2016. He pleaded guilty to the charge on 28 July 2016.1 The charging document states the offence occurred on 9 December 2015 and this is the date the Judge utilised for sentencing purposes. However the summary of facts says the offence occurred on 14 November 2015.The decision of the District Court[16] For the family violence offences Judge Jelas adopted a starting point of 7months' imprisonment. A discount of two months was granted for Mr Edwards'guilty pleas. The Judge recognised that the entering of guilty pleas avoided the need for CL to give evidence against Mr Edwards. The discount reduced the sentence forthis group of offending to one of five months' imprisonment.[17] In relation to the other group of charges, the robbery charge was treated asthe lead offence. Judge Jelas adopted a starting point of two years' imprisonment. This was uplifted by four months to account for the charges of receiving, theft, and loss of traction while driving a motor vehicle. A further uplift of two months wasimposed to account for Mr Edwards' previous convictions relating to dishonesty anddriving. This brought the sentence to 30 months' imprisonment.[18] A discount of one month was granted for Mr Edwards' preliminary rehabilitative efforts. A further discount of six months was granted for Mr Edwards'early guilty pleas. The result was an end sentence of 1 year and 11 months'imprisonment.[19] The sentences on the two groups of charges were cumulative which resulted in a total sentence of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months.[20] There were a further two charges: one charge of breaching post-detention conditions and one charge of breaching community work. These resulted in fourmonths and three months' imprisonment respectively. The Judge cancelled theoutstanding hours of community work. Both offences were ordered to be served concurrently with the other offences. Judge Jelas did not reference them while going through the steps of sentencing. She included them towards the end of the sentence when she went through the process of formally sentencing Mr Edwards for each individual charge.Grounds of Appeal[21] Mr Edwards accepts that imprisonment was the appropriate type of sentence. He appeals his sentence on the grounds that the sentence was manifestly excessive. In particular, he contends that:(a) Insufficient discount was given for his young age, rehabilitative efforts and remorse. Ms Burton, counsel for Mr Edwards, submits that a discount of 15 percent would have been appropriate; and(b) In the alternative, the totality principle was not applied correctly to reduce the overall sentence. A discount of approximately 4 months for totality would have been appropriate if no discount is given for the personal mitigating factors of youth, rehabilitative efforts and remorse.[22] The remaining grounds of appeal listed in the Notice of Appeal were not pursued.Appellant's submissions[23] Ms Burton submits that the imposition of appropriate discounts on appealwould not be "tinkering" with the sentence imposed, even if they only amount to asmall change in the sentence length. This is submitted on the basis that a smallchange in Mr Edwards' sentence may have large practical ramifications.Mr Edwards spent 305 days on remand prior to being sentenced. He technically became eligible for parole prior to being sentenced, however because he needs to complete lengthy corrections-run courses prior to achieving parole, he likely will not be granted it until the end, or near to the end, of his sentence. Ms Burton submitsthat had his sentence been four months shorter (i.e. two years' imprisonment), or lessit would be a short sentence of imprisonment under the Parole Act 2002, in which case he would automatically qualify for immediate release from prison once he had served half of the sentence.2 Time served includes the time spent while on remand.32 See definition of a short term of imprisonment in s 4 of the Parole Act 2002.3 See s 86 of the Parole Act which makes the release date of a short term sentence the date on which the offender has served half of it; and see s 90 of the Parole Act which deems pre-sentence detention to be time served.By 7 February 2017, he would have served over one year in prison. Thus he wouldthen be eligible for immediate release if his sentence was 24 months' imprisonment or less. On the other hand, if his sentence is longer than 24 months' imprisonment,Mr Edwards becomes eligible for release after serving one third of his sentence.4However, he is required to wait until a hearing can be scheduled before the Parole Board and, even then, will not necessarily be released on parole. This is why Ms Burton strongly urges the Court to reduce the sentence.[24] Ms Burton asserts that there were two factual errors in Judge Jelas' decision.[25] The first was that her Honour appeared to suggest that there was a time delay between when Mr Edwards first harassed the robbery victims, and when he in fact robbed them. Ms Burton submits that there was no time delay, and that it was one continuous confrontation. Her submission is that she is unsure whether the factual error may have been considered an aggravating factor by Judge Jelas. Despite the potential factual misunderstanding, which I do not think is conclusively established, Judge Jelas only noted this issue insofar as it was an aggravating factor that Mr Edwards was persistent. Therefore, I do not consider this factual discrepancy to be material.[26] Regarding the second factual error Ms Burton submits Judge Jelas said thefamily violence offending occurred while Mr Edwards was subject to "a home detention sentence". Ms Burton submits that this was not the case, the detentionaspect of the sentence had expired and Mr Edwards was only subject to post-detention conditions. Judge Jelas comments that Mr Edwards breached his "home detention condition". Judge Jelas made no comment with respect to whether she feltthose conditions included detainment, nor mentioned it as part of her reasoning for giving a particular sentence. Without evidence of her having both thought Mr Edwards was subject to detention and used it to assist in determining Mr Edwards' sentence, I consider that this issue is not material either.[27] At the hearing Ms Burton acknowledged that the sentences for the family violence offences were in the range of available sentences for offending of this4 Section 84(1) of the Parole Act.nature. She also acknowledged that the starting point and uplifts for the sentences for the other offending were stern but nevertheless available to the Judge to adopt. This reduced the focus of her argument on appeal to the allowance made for mitigating factors. Because the timing of the guilty pleas was not readily apparent from the material before me I gave Ms Burton the opportunity to file supplementary submissions.[28] Ms Burton's supplementary submissions, which were filed after the hearing, sought a full discount for Mr Edwards' guilty pleas for the "other group" of chargesas well as additional discounts to reflect his genuine remorse, age and efforts to rehabilitate himself. She was at some disadvantage as she did not appear for Mr Edwards in the District Court and she has been unable to obtain a full account of the circumstances in which the guilty pleas were entered. In some instances inferences can be drawn from the available material as to whether a full discount for the early entry of a guilty plea is warranted. But in other instances the circumstances are not so clear.Respondent's submissions[29] Ms Park, on behalf of the respondent, submits that the discounts given for Mr Edwards' guilty pleas were generous. She quantified the discounts he receivedarithmetically, identifying a 28.6 percent discount given for the family violence offending, and 20.6 percent for the other offending.[30] Ms Park says that she was not privy to information concerning the length of time before guilty pleas were entered and so cannot say whether the pleas were entered at the earliest opportunity. However, she notes that Mr Edwards' pleas werein light of a strong case against him regarding the family violence offending, and that the robbery and dishonesty charges were allocated to a Judge-alone trial, which she suggests means the pleas were not entered at the earliest opportunity.[31] In addition, Ms Park submits that while only a small discount was given for rehabilitative efforts and remorse, and none for age, this did not result in an end sentence that was manifestly excessive.[32] In respect of age as a mitigating factor, Ms Park submits that there is no presumption in favour of a discount for youth, and that no such discount is appropriate here. This is submitted on the basis that the offending involved a degree of premeditation in relation to the family violence offending and the robbery, the offending was persistent and serious, and because Mr Edwards is not a first time offender. Furthermore, s 31(4) of the Sentencing Act 2002 holds that it is not sufficient grounds for appeal if a Judge fails to mention a particular mitigating factor.[33] In relation to remorse as a factor, Ms Park submits that the nature of the offending and the prolonged period in which it occurred suggests that the remorse Mr Edwards expressed at sentencing may not have been genuine. More significantly, Ms Park submits that Mr Edwards did not express much remorse anyway. Therefore, Ms Park submits that no further discount beyond the 3.3 percent given for remorse and rehabilitative efforts is warranted.[34] Ms Park submits that in relation to the totality of offending, Judge Jelas did not err by failing to make a final adjustment for it. This is on the basis that Judge Jelas expressly decided not to, and that it did not result in a total period of imprisonment out of proportion with the offending.[35] In relation to Ms Burton's submission regarding the practical effect onMr Edwards' sentence should it be reduced, Ms Park submits that reducingMr Edwards' sentence because of the implications it may have on his parole period isinappropriate. Furthermore, the programmes the Department of Corrections would require Mr Edwards to complete would be to his benefit, and the reason Mr Edwards was in custody was because he offended while on bail.[36] Ms Park also filed supplementary submissions regarding the timing of the entry of guilty pleas. She contends the circumstances do not support the inference that a full discount for early guilty pleas is warranted. She argues that Mr Edwards was given sufficient discounts for relevant mitigating factors and therefore there is no basis for interfering with his sentences.[37] Ms Burton filed reply submissions in which she outlined the difficulties she has faced in providing the Court with evidential material that shows a discount forearly guilty pleas is warranted for the "other offences". This has led to heracknowledging the appropriateness of the guilty plea discounts given in the District Court, but nevertheless arguing for additional discounts.Relevant lawAppellate principles[38] The principles are well settled. The passing of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 has not altered the previous approach taken by courts hearing sentencing appeals.5 Despite this Act making no express reference to "manifestly excessive", the principle underlying this concept is "well-engrained" in the courts' approach tosentence appeals.6 An appellate court will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles. Whether a sentence is manifestly excessive is to be examined in terms of the sentence given rather than the process by which the sentence is reached.7Sentencing principles[39] When it comes to discounts for mitigating factors the first step is to evaluate any mitigating factors relevant to the offender; this establishes a notional sentence from which any discount for entry of a guilty plea is then deducted.8 Discounts for guilty pleas are calculated as a percentage of the notional sentence.[40] Remorse is one of the mitigating factors identified in s 9(2)(f) of the Sentencing Act. In Hessell v R the Supreme Court distinguished between remorse that is no more than the self-pity of a defendant for his or her predicament and genuine remorse. The latter requires separate recognition as a mitigating factor relevant to the offender, and so it will attract its own discount, whereas the former5 See Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279; [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [35].6 Ibid.7 Ibid at [36] and see Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].8 See Hessell v R [2011] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607 at [73]; and see R v Clifford [2011] NZCA 360, [2012] 1 NZLR 23 at [58] to [60].does not.9 The assessment as to which is present requires "a proper and robust evaluation of all the circumstances".10[41] A discount of 25 percent is the upper limit of a guilty plea discount.11 The assessment of the level of discount for a guilty plea:12 must reflect all the circumstances in which the plea is entered, includingwhether it is truly to be regarded as an early or late plea and the strength of the prosecution case. Consideration of all the relevant circumstances will identify the extent of the true mitigatory effect of the plea.Whether the accused pleads guilty at the first reasonable opportunity is always relevant. But when that opportunity arose is a matter for particular inquiry rather than a formalistic quantification. A plea can reasonably be seen as early when an accused pleads as soon as he or she has had the opportunity to be informed of all the implications of the plea.Further, Hessell v R also recognises that:13 there may be cases in which there are significant benefits from a plea,warranting a sentence reduction, even though the plea comes very late.[42] Cumulative sentences are imposed when the offences are different in kind and they were committed at different times.14 With such sentences the sentencing Judge should first approach each sentence or set of sentences as a separate exercise, which includes the required steps for evaluating the relevant mitigation discounts. Then the total sentence is evaluated to ensure it is not "wholly out of proportion to the gravity of the overall offending".15Discussion[43] The sentencing in the District Court was unconventional when it came to setting the discounts for mitigating factors. Further the way in which the discounts9 Hessell v R, above n 8, at [64].10 At [64] the Supreme Court referred to s 9(2)(f) of the Sentencing Act 2002, which treats remorse as being separate from a guilty plea.11 See Hessell v R, above n 8, at [75]. Before the Supreme Court's judgment in Hessell v R a guilty plea at the earliest opportunity could attract a discount of up to 30 to 33 percent, but this included an allowance for remorse.12 At [74]–[75].13 At [76].14 See s 84 of the Sentencing Act.15 See s 85 of the Sentencing Act.were actually set makes it difficult to assess them in accordance with sentencing principles.[44] The family violence offending attracted a discount for guilty pleas that works out arithmetically at 28.6 percent. That is above the standard discount for a guilty plea when it is given at the earliest opportunity. The Judge does not address the circumstances in which the guilty pleas were made. Thus, it is not apparent from the sentencing notes whether the pleas were being treated as entered at the first reasonable opportunity or not. The Judge does expressly address the benefits of the guilty pleas insofar as they avoided the need for a court hearing and for CL and other persons to testify in court.[45] The alterations that were made to some of the family violence charges, in particular the reduction in seriousness, the withdrawal of others and the amendments to the summary of facts, which are apparent from the handwritten alterations on the court file, suggest to me that the pleas to those charges were entered at the earliest opportunity. Accordingly, I am satisfied that Mr Edwards would have been entitled to a full 25 percent discount for those pleas.[46] There remains the question of whether he was entitled to any discount for personal mitigating factors. The respondent would have this accommodated in the balance of the discount that was given. However, this would result in a discount of no more than 3.6 percent for personal mitigating factors.[47] The respondent argued that the Judge only focussed on personal mitigatingfactors when it came to sentencing for the "other offences", as it was in this context that the Judge referred to Mr Edwards being "truly remorseful."16 The respondentsought to persuade me that the Judge's reference to remorse in relation to the "other offences" indicated the Judge did not find Mr Edwards to be "truly remorseful"when it came to the family violence offences. This argument might carry some weight if CL was only a victim in the family violence offences, but she was not. She was also the victim of the theft offence, which forms part of the "other offences". Unless there is some justification for thinking an offender is only "truly remorseful"16 See [56] of the sentencing notes: New Zealand Police v Edwards [2016] NZDC 24256.in relation to some of his offences a true expression of remorse should be understood as applying to all the offending.[48] Here there is nothing that suggests Mr Edwards was only remorseful inrelation to the "other offences". Before he could be treated as such an express finding to that effect would be required. The Judge's omission to refer expressly to remorse when sentencing on the family violence offences may have been no more than an oversight. In any event I consider that insufficient allowance was given forMr Edwards' personal mitigating factors.[49] Mr Edwards was 21 years old at the time of the offending.17 The Judgeaccepted that he was "truly remorseful"18 and that he was taking steps to rehabilitate himself by attending relevant available courses while on remand.19 Once the Judge accepted these mitigating factors were present she should have given them greater recognition in terms of discount.20 The Court should do all it can to encourage ayoung adult offender's attempts to rehabilitate himself. A discount of 10 percent forpersonal mitigating factors is warranted.[50] I do not accept Ms Burton's submission that the personal mitigating factorsshould attract a discount of 15 percent; that is overly generous. A discount in excess of 10 percent would only be appropriate where the level of remorse and the steps towards rehabilitation were extraordinary, or where the offender was younger than Mr Edwards. In Rowles v R, where the depth of remorse was greater than here, the Court of Appeal opined that a discount of 8 percent for remorse alone would have been appropriate.21 This suggests to me that the discount for remorse given for Mr Edwards should be in the vicinity of 5 percent with an additional 5 percent to reflect the other personal mitigating factors.[51] When a 10 percent discount is subtracted from a starting point of sevenmonths' imprisonment it leaves a notional sentence of 6.3 months' imprisonment.17 See s 9(2)(a) of the Sentencing Act.18 See s 9(2)(f) of the Sentencing Act.19 See s 9(4) of the Sentencing Act; I consider steps taken towards rehabilitation to be a relevant mitigating factor.20 See discussion in Rowles v R [2016] NZCA 208 at [18] where a global discount of 4.8 percent for personal mitigating factors was found to be insufficient.21 Rowles v R, above n 20.From this a 25 percent discount for a guilty plea results in a sentence ofapproximately four months' imprisonment.22[52] There is no reason why the discount for personal mitigating factors shouldnot be the same when it comes to the sentences for the "other offences". When a10 percent discount is subtracted from a starting point of 30 months' imprisonment it leaves a notional sentence of 27 months' imprisonment.[53] The six months' discount the Judge gave for Mr Edwards' guilty pleas worksout at approximately 22 percent of the 27 month notional sentence.23 A discount of22 percent would result in an end sentence of approximately 21 months'imprisonment. However, I recognise that this percentage may well be coincidental given the absence of any reference to percentage discounts in the sentencing notes.[54] Evaluating the appropriate credit for the guilty pleas for the "other offences"is more problematic than for the family violence offences. The lead offence was the robbery offence.24 Mr Edwards pleaded guilty on the day of the Judge-alone trial, which does not suggest the plea was entered at an early opportunity. However, on that day the summary of facts was amended in a way that reduced the seriousness of the offending. On one view it can be said that until the summary properly reflectedMr Edwards' offending he was in no position to enter a guilty plea. Hence the pleawas entered at the earliest opportunity. On the other hand it can be said that he had already received the benefit of an amended summary of facts that placed his offending in a more favourable light. So he should not receive the benefit of a full discount for a guilty plea as well. These concerns are identified in Hessell v R.25[55] As regards the remaining "other offences" some of those charges werereplaced with other charges and some summaries of facts were amended in Mr Edwards' favour, whereas others were not.22 This being 4.725 months' imprisonment rounded down.23 Being 22.2 percent rounded down.24 It carried a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment: Crimes Act 1961, s 234(2).25 See discussion in Hessell v R, above n 8, at [60] to [62].[56] Where there are a range of charges and some of them alter over time it would be better if the appropriate discount for a guilty plea were identified at the time guilty pleas are entered. The persons who are then dealing with the charges are in a better position to know whether the pleas are being entered at the earliest reasonable opportunity or not.[57] I have looked over the material available to me to determine whether I can ascertain the appropriate discount for the guilty pleas. I do not have sufficient information available to me to allow me to form a view on the appropriate discount. Mr Edwards no longer challenges the guilty plea discounts. There is no basis now for departing from this level of discount.[58] The process I have followed leaves Mr Edwards with sentences of up to 4months' imprisonment for the family violence offences and sentences of up to 21months' imprisonment for the "other offences". These cumulative sentences come to a total of 25 months' imprisonment.[59] In terms of totality I see no reason to make any further adjustment to these sentences. They are well within the range for this type of offending and the circumstances of this offender. The appeal ground based on totality was an alternative ground of appeal that was only pursued if the Court rejected the argument the sentences were manifestly excessive as they gave insufficient discount for personal mitigating factors.[60] I consider that a sentence of 25 months' imprisonment is significantly different from a sentence of 28 months' imprisonment. I am satisfied that here the Judge's departure from settled principles has led to sentences that are manifestly excessive, and which therefore require adjustment.[61] I realise that the outcome which I have arrived at is something of a hollow victory for Mr Edwards. His appeal was motivated by the impact the considerable time he has spent on remand will have on the time he actually spends in prison. Hisgoal was to have the sentence reduced to one of 24 months' imprisonment or less, ashe would then qualify under the Parole Act 2002 for immediate release.[62] A sentence of 25 months' imprisonment will leave Mr Edwards eligible forparole after he has served one third of the sentence. Given the pre-sentence time he has already spent in custody he is well beyond having served spent a third of his time in prison and so he is currently eligible for parole. However, I understand there have been delays in him obtaining a hearing before the Parole Board.[63] In short, because of the long time Mr Edwards has spent in custody he will end up serving considerably more than the usual one third of a 25 month sentence in custody. However, this concern is not relevant to the sentencing process. The Sentencing Act provides that time spent in custody has no role in sentencing.26Accordingly, a sentencing Judge should not be concerned about the impact of anoffender's time in custody on parole; that is a matter for the Parole Board todetermine.27 The sentencing process is not to be tinkered with to achieve an outcome which reflects concerns beyond the bounds of the sentencing process.[64] To reduce the sentences to a total of twenty five months' imprisonment it is only necessary to set aside the sentences of five months' imprisonment for the family violence offending and the sentence of 23 months' imprisonment for the robbery offence. The sentences on the remaining offences are appropriate.Result[65] The appeal against sentence is allowed in part.(a) On the charge of breaching a protection order on 6 September 2015,the sentence of five months' imprisonment is set aside; in its place Iimpose a sentence of 4 months' imprisonment.(b) On the charge of breaching a protection order on 6 December 2015,the sentence of five months' imprisonment is set aside; in its place I impose a sentence of 4 months' imprisonment.26 Section 82 of the Sentencing Act.27 See discussion in R v Patrick [2008] NZCA 115 at [22].(c) On the charge of assault on 6 December 2015, the sentence of fivemonths' imprisonment is set aside; in its place I impose a sentence of 4 months' imprisonment.(d) On the charge of breaching a protection order on 21 March 2016, the sentence of five months' imprisonment is set aside; in its place I impose a sentence of 4 months' imprisonment.(e) On the charge of robbery, the sentence of 23 months' imprisonment is set aside. In its place I impose a sentence of 21 months'imprisonment, to be served cumulatively on top of the 4 months'imprisonment for the offence in CRN 15090006802, which results incumulative sentences totalling 2 years and 1 month's imprisonment.(f) The balance of the sentences imposed in the District Court remains the same.