CHRISTOPHER KNUTE SKAGEN v WELLINGTON STANDARDS COMMITTEE OF THE NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY [2022] NZSC 145

CHRISTOPHER KNUTE SKAGEN v WELLINGTON STANDARDS COMMITTEE OF THE NEWZEALAND LAW SOCIETY [2022] NZSC 145 [14 December 2022]IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALANDI TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROASC 95/2022[2022] NZSC 145BETWEEN CHRISTOPHER KNUTE SKAGENApplicantAND WELLINGTON STANDARDSCOMMITTEE OF THE NEW ZEALANDLAW SOCIETYRespondentCourt: Glazebrook, Williams and Kós JJCounsel: Applicant in personJ L S Shaw and T J McGuigan for RespondentJudgment: 14 December 2022JUDGMENT OF THE COURTA The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.B The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.____________________________________________________________________REASONS[1] Mr Skagen was a barrister admitted in New Zealand and an attorney admittedin Oregon. In December 2014 the New Zealand Lawyers and ConveyancersDisciplinary Tribunal found him guilty of 12 charges of misconduct and made an orderstriking him from the Roll of Barristers and Solicitors.1[2] Mallon J dismissed Mr Skagen's appeal against that order in April 2016.21 Wellington Standards Committee of the New Zealand Law Society v Skagen [2014] NZLCDT 82.2 Skagen v Wellington Standards Committee of the New Zealand Law Society [2016] NZHC 1772.[3] Mr Skagen then sought leave of the Court of Appeal to appeal four judgments:(a) the substantive High Court decision dismissing his appeal;(b) an interlocutory judgment relating to evidence and discovery;3(c) a recall judgment;4 and(d) a second recall judgment.5In October 2021 the Court of Appeal declined leave to appeal.6 Mr Skagen now seeksleave to appeal all judgments above, together with an array of interlocutory decisionsmade in both courts.[4] By s 254(4) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, the decision of theCourt of Appeal on any appeal under that provision is final. However the respondentaccepts that as the Court of Appeal decision is a denial of leave only, s 254(4) does notapply and the application may proceed jurisdictionally as one for leave to bring aleapfrog appeal against the four decisions of the High Court.7 Necessarily that mustrelate to a distinct question of law.8[5] Because this is an application to bring a leapfrog appeal, leave must be refusedunless both exceptional circumstances justify that course and it is necessary in theinterests of justice to do so.9 Only in an extremely compelling case will a leapfrogappeal be permitted where an appeal to this Court is otherwise precluded by statute(as is the case under s 254).103 Skagen v Wellington Standards Committee of the New Zealand Law Society [2015] NZHC 2634(Collins J).4 Skagen v Wellington Standards Committee of the New Zealand Law Society [2016] NZHC 2799(Mallon J).5 Skagen v Wellington Standards Committee of the New Zealand Law Society [2020] NZHC 762(Mallon J).6 Skagen v Wellington Standards Committee of the New Zealand Law Society [2021] NZCA 566(Gilbert, Courtney and Goddard JJ) [CA judgment].7 Because the proceeding in the High Court commenced prior to the Senior Courts Act 2016 cominginto force, s 8 of the Supreme Court Act 2003 applies.8 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, s 254(1).9 Supreme Court Act 2003, s 14.10 Burke v Western Bay of Plenty District Council [2005] NZSC 46, (2005) 18 PRNZ 560 at [4].[6] The background circumstances are set out in some detail in the judgment ofthe Court of Appeal, and we need not repeat them here. The present application forleave is substantially an intended re-run of the arguments made unsuccessfully in thatforum. We consider the prerequisites for leapfrog leave described at [5] above are notmade out.[7] Additional evidence sought to be admitted on appeal is neither fresh norcompelling, as the Court of Appeal found.11 Nor does it demonstrate a distinctquestion of law.12 The allegation of procurement of judgment by fraud depends onthat evidence, was rejected by both the High Court and Court of Appeal as lackingfoundation, and again raises no distinct question of law.13 The claim of unlawful lienby non-renewal of the applicant's practising certificate is extraneous to the appeal.14The issue of discovery by the respondent involves appeal against an interlocutoryjudgment of the High Court, and is beyond jurisdiction under s 8(c) of theSupreme Court Act. In any event the prospects of success in demonstrating materialityof the documents are insufficient to meet the standard for leave.15 The same may besaid of the issue as to asserted privilege in the applicant's bank statements, rejected byboth Courts below.16 The applicant's remaining grounds (concerning statutoryinterpretation, allegedly unaddressed pleadings and rights under contract) neitherindividually nor collectively meet the standard required for leave in this application.Result[8] The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.[9] The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.Solicitors:Wynn Williams, Christchurch for Respondent11 CA judgment, above n 6, at [22]–[24] and [29]–[32].12 At [31].13 At [28]–[33].14 At [26(d)] and [29], n 42.15 At [33].16 At [35]–[36].