SNOW v POLICE [2019] NZHC 2782

SNOW v POLICE [2019] NZHC 2782 [30 October 2019]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDDUNEDIN REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROAŌTEPOTI ROHECRI-2019-412-000016[2019] NZHC 2782BETWEEN CRAIG ANDREW SNOWPlaintiffAND NEW ZEALAND POLICEDefendantHearing: 23 September 2019Appearances: C M Andersen for the AppellantR P Bates for the RespondentJudgment: 30 October 2019JUDGMENT OF NATION JIntroduction[1] Mr Snow faces charges of possession of cannabis, possession of ammunitionand possession of a firearm. The charges were based on evidence obtained on 20 April2018 pursuant to a search warrant.[2] In the District Court, Mr Snow challenged the admissibility of that evidence.Judge Crosbie ruled the evidence was admissible.1 His Honour found that the searchwarrant was invalid and the evidence improperly obtained. Despite that, his Honourfound the evidence was admissible under the balancing test in s 30 Evidence Act 2006.Mr Snow appeals that decision.1 Police v Snow [2019] NZDC 6039.Leave to appeal and principles on appeal[3] Section 79 Criminal Procedure Act 2011 provides for the making of orders asto admissibility of evidence. Appeals against pre-trial evidential decisions made unders 79 in Judge-alone cases are governed by s 215 Criminal Procedure Act 2011. Leaveof the first appeal Court is required.[4] The evidence in question is fundamental to the prosecution case against MrSnow. His is not a case where the issue is best dealt with by an appeal post-conviction.There is no reason why leave should not be granted. There is no opposition to leavebeing granted. I grant it accordingly.[5] The appeal proceeds by way of an oral hearing and, pursuant to s 221 CriminalProcedure Act, the Court has broad powers to confirm, vary or set aside the decisionsubject to the appeal.[6] An appeal under s 221 is a general appeal. Admissibility decisions involvequestions of law, not discretion. Accordingly, I must make my own assessment as tothe admissibility of the evidence.2Background[7] Section 6 Search and Surveillance Act 2012 provides for an issuing officer toissue a search warrant:6 Issuing officer may issue search warrantAn issuing officer may issue a search warrant, in relation to a place,vehicle, or other thing, on application by a constable if the issuing officeris satisfied that there are reasonable grounds—(a) to suspect that an offence specified in the application and punishableby imprisonment has been committed, or is being committed, or willbe committed; and(b) to believe that the search will find evidential material in respect of theoffence in or on the place, vehicle, or other thing specified in theapplication.2 R v Gwaze [2010] NZSC 52, [2010] 3 NZCR 734; Hodgkinson v R [2010] NZCA 547 at [47].[8] An application was made for the issue of three search warrants on 9 April 2018.The application was made for warrants enabling the Police to search places at:(a) 12 Panmure Avenue, Calton Hill, Dunedin City;(b) 10 Panmure Avenue, Calton Hill, Dunedin City; and(c) 14 Grant Dalton Street, Mosgiel, Dunedin City.[9] The application was made by an experienced detective in the CriminalInvestigation Branch (CIB). The application was supported by information providedby the detective. The application included the normal statement as to verification inwhich he confirmed the truth and accuracy of the contents of the application. Warrantswere granted on 9 April 2018. The warrants were for searches to be executed within14 days from the date of issue.[10] On 19 April 2018, the application for search warrants was resubmitted butsought a warrant for 12 Grant Dalton Street, Mosgiel rather than 14 Grant DaltonStreet, Mosgiel. The Police found they had been mistaken in thinking one of thepeople of interest had been residing at 14 Grant Dalton Street.[11] Mr Snow assisted the Police officers in the execution of the search warrant athis address at 10 Panmure Ave on 20 April 2018. As a result of the search, the Policelocated three grams of cannabis, a sawn-off double barrel shotgun and 39 rounds of12-gauge ammunition.[12] Mr Snow was charged with possession of cannabis, possession of ammunitionand possession of a firearm. It is the evidence obtained during that search which ledto the charges Mr Snow faces and which he sought to have ruled inadmissible.[13] On 12 July 2018, Mr Snow's counsel advised there would be a challenge to thevalidity of the warrant. On 20 July 2018, Police applied for an order that the evidenceobtained from the search be ruled admissible and filed an application per s 78 CriminalProcedure Act to have the evidence admitted.[14] On 27 August 2018, the defence applied to have redactions in the searchwarrant application dated 9 April 2018 reviewed. His Honour Judge Phillipssubsequently directed that Amicus be appointed to do this. On 8 October 2018, abarrister Tim MacKenzie was appointed by the Court. Mr MacKenzie was forwardedall relevant documentation from the Court file, including a copy of the unredactedwarrant applications from both 9 April 2018 and 19 April 2018.[15] There was a hearing on 11 February 2019 as to the validity of the searchwarrant and the admissibility of evidence obtained.[16] Before the hearing, Mr MacKenzie filed written submissions. At the outset ofthose submissions, he said he had taken the view he should assume the role of defencecounsel in carrying out the task asked of him.[17] The search warrant application included information provided by an informant.In relation to the informant's comments, Mr MacKenzie, in the advocacy role he hadadopted, suggested it could be statistically shown that the informant was unreliable.[18] The application referred to the informant having provided 120 informationreports. It gave specific examples of where those reports had been used to obtain asearch warrant which had led to the location of drugs and drug paraphernalia, and aperson being dealt with by the Police based on what was found. Mr MacKenzie arguedthat, of the large number of information reports given by the informant, there had onlybeen a handful of successful searches. He thus sought to dismiss the informant asunreliable.[19] Mr MacKenzie referred to information provided by the Police as to there beingtwo security cameras on the outside of the home at 10 Panmure Ave. He was criticalof the fact that Police had provided no information as to the type of cameras, whenand who had installed them or as to their application. He submitted that, with securitycameras now more readily available and installed in normal household situations, theinformation as to the presence of surveillance cameras added little to justify asuspicion of offending.[20] Mr MacKenzie made submissions criticising the Police for the way he arguedthey had elevated the presence of the cameras as a main plank for their suspicion.[21] A major criticism put forward by counsel was that the search warrant statedthat Mr Skerten, a person with cannabis convictions, may have lived at 10 PanmureAve. Mr MacKenzie sought to attack this information on two grounds. First that MrSkerten had only historical cannabis convictions, and second that the police knew orought to have known that Mr Skerten was not residing at the address.[22] He argued that the information was misleading in that it could have suggestedto the issuer that Mr Skerten had recent convictions for cannabis-related offending.Mr MacKenzie had ascertained from the Police that Mr Skerten's previous convictionswere only for low-level cannabis offending and his last conviction was in 1999. Hesubmitted the Police were in breach of the fundamental duty of candour required inmaking an application for a search warrant. He submitted that, if the Police haddisclosed the historical nature of Mr Skerten's cannabis convictions and the fact theywere only for possession and not for supply, on that basis alone, the issuer may nothave granted the application.[23] Mr MacKenzie referred to relevant authorities in discussing concerns he hadas to the information provided by the informant. He submitted the information in theapplication was capable of misleading the issuer and fell short of leaving the issuerwith reasonable grounds to suspect the alleged offending and that evidential materialwould be found at the address.[24] Written submissions were filed by the Police prosecutor. There was nothing inthose written submissions to suggest the prosecutor took issue with the submissionsmade as to the adequacy of the information in the application and the criticisms MrMacKenzie had made of it. The prosecutor said he would address the informationorally at the hearing. The thrust of his written submissions was that, even with thecriticisms made by Mr MacKenzie, the warrant could still be ruled valid.The District Court decision[25] In his decision, Judge Crosbie first considered whether the search warrant wasvalid. He said the warrant was essentially based on three factors:3(a) The informant's comments about being in the vicinity and being awareof matters that indicated offending in the nature of drug supply oravailability at 10 Panmure Avenue;(b) The fact that there are security cameras on 10 Panmure Avenue; and(c) That Mr Skerten, with historical cannabis convictions, may have lived at10 Panmure Avenue.[26] As to the informant's reliability, the judge said the decision leant in favour ofthe defendant. Limited information about the informant's reliability was provided.He said it appeared that most of the information he had previously supplied did notresult in searches or charges being laid. He referred specifically to the informanthaving submitted 120 information reports and these leading to only four searches thathad recovered evidence of offending.[27] The Judge referred to Mr MacKenzie's criticism as to the information thePolice provided as to a Mr Skerten residing at 10 Panmure Ave, noting the addressconflicted with Court records that had Mr Skerten residing outside of Dunedin. TheJudge also considered there was some force in Mr MacKenzie's submission that, hadthe Police been given a full and correct picture as to his offending, it was unlikelymuch weight would have been placed on the historical cannabis convictions. He notedthe submission made as to the presence of the camera and acknowledged that, while itmight be coupled with other evidence, it should not have been posed as a main plankfor the suspicion. The Judge concluded:[21] When viewed globally, the combined effect of the informationprovided in support of the application was on the margins and did not provideinformation that properly established the necessary linkage between theevidence of a crime, the people and addresses searched, and 10 PanmureAvenue. I do not consider that imprecise and uncorroborated, statements,historical convictions and the presence of a security camera quite reached the"reasonable suspicion and belief" thresholds required for a search warrant,although I accept that an inference might well have been there.3 Police v Snow, above n 1, at [18].[28] The Judge concluded that the search warrant was invalid, and the evidence wastherefore improperly obtained. He then moved on to consider whether, under s 30Evidence Act 2006, the exclusion of the evidence was a proportionate response to theimpropriety.[29] The Judge set out the importance of the rights breached and focused on thebreach of the right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure. He cited Hamed v Rwhere the Court set out the right as protecting the values of property, personal freedom,privacy and dignity.4[30] In terms of the nature of the impropriety, the evidence before the Court wasthat Mr Skerten had an alternative address in Kaitangata although was linked toPanmure Ave. The Judge considered it would have been preferable for Police to havedisclosed the Kaitangata address. The Judge added however that it was unlikely theissuing officer's decision would have turned on that issue. He said there was nothingto suggest the information was intentionally withheld. The judge referred to MrMacKenzie's submissions as to the "duty of candour on the Police and how a failureto observe the duty should not be too readily dismissed on the basis of immateriality".The Judge said that, while there was conduct possibly approaching a "breach ofcandour" in the way Mr Skerten's previous convictions were conveyed, it was a mattermore of form than of substance. The Judge concluded the breach was not deliberateor reaching the point of being reckless.[31] The Judge said the nature and quality of the evidence was crucial to the caseproceeding. He said he did not accept Ms Andersen's submission that the cannabisand ammunition found was not what was sought by Police. It is correct that Policedeposed to believing the property was a safe house for storing cannabis for a gang.However, cannabis, a sawn-off firearm and ammunition may be regarded as indicia ofdealing. The many cases the Court sees involving drug dealing suggests drugs areoften received and disposed of by dealers quite quickly as opposed to them operatingstorage facilities. With no legitimate explanation being offered by the defendant forpossession of a sawn-off shotgun and ammunition, the quality of the evidence obtained4 Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101 at [174] and [263].was strong in relation to a house considered to be used in connection with dealing indrugs.[32] The offending was serious. While the cannabis found was offending at a lowlevel, the sawn-off shotgun and 39 shells found were another matter entirely. TheJudge did not accept there was a legitimate basis for holding such a firearm. The Judgeregarded the Arms Act offending as serious.[33] Judge Crosbie concluded that the right breached in this case was important.While the provision of information and evidence surrounding the application wasarguably not thorough, the Judge said it did not amount to recklessness or deliberateimpropriety. The Arms Act offending was serious, there could be no reasonableexplanation for a person holding a sawn-off shotgun and a large amount of ammunitionin these circumstances, or likely any circumstances. On that analysis, the Judge ruledthe exclusion of evidence would be disproportionate to the impropriety and held theevidence was admissible.Appellant's submissions[34] Ms Andersen referred to what she said were appropriate criticisms made by MrMacKenzie of the information provided by the Police in support of the application.Ms Andersen argued that the deficiencies in the application and the Police conductamounted to gross carelessness. With reference to authorities, she submitted that, withthe search warrant being invalid, the impropriety of the Police in obtaining evidencefrom the search was sufficiently serious to warrant the exclusion of the evidenceobtained under the balancing exercise required by the Evidence Act.5[35] Ms Andersen referred to the factors which the Court had said in Underwood vR were to be considered in carrying out the balancing exercise. She stressed the needto take a long term view of what public confidence and integrity in the justice systemrequired.6 She argued that what occurred was a serious breach of Mr Snow's right tobe free from an unreasonable search of his home.75 Evidence Act 2006, s 30.6 Underwood v R [2016] NZCA 312.7 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 21.[36] Counsel submitted the Judge erred in not assessing the likely starting point forthe offending with which Mr Snow was charged. In her written submission, shereferred to the fact the firearm had not been loaded and was hidden in a hot watercupboard. She suggested there was no evidence from which an immediate risk topublic safety could be inferred. She submitted the Court was incorrect in assessingthe offending as serious.[37] Ms Andersen submitted there had been an error in the Judge having regard tothe fact Mr Snow had not provided a reasonable explanation for the possession of asawn-off shotgun and ammunition. She referred to the judgment in W v R as notingthat the assessment of a violation of a person's right is not dependant on the type ofconduct undertaken by the accused.8[38] There was no error in the way the Judge referred to Mr Snow having noexplanation for having a sawn-off shotgun and ammunition hidden in a cupboard. Thefirearm was, itself, illegitimate and not stored in a way that would have been lawful ofanyone who has possession of a firearm.Respondent's submissions[39] Mr Bates, for the Crown, submitted the deficiencies in the informationprovided to the issuer of the warrant might have justified the Judge's conclusion thatthere was not sufficient information to justify the issuing of a warrant. However, hesaid the finding of a lack of validity in the warrant could not be equated with a findingas to gross carelessness on the part of the Police.[40] The Crown submitted the Judge's reference to information being "on themargins" and that "an inference might well have been there" was consistent with theJudge having concluded that the application was not seriously deficient.[41] The Crown submitted that, in the context of the s 30 balancing exercise,possession of a sawn-off shotgun and ammunition could rightly be classified as seriousoffending. The Crown referred to the recent judgment of Downs J in Natua v R as8 W v R [2017] NZCA 522 (CA597/16).indicating the starting point for the offending would likely be in the range of two totwo and a half years' imprisonment.9 The Crown submitted the Judge made no errorin his assessment of s 30 matters and the ultimate conclusion that the evidenceobtained from the search warrant was admissible.Analysis[42] It was important for the Judge dealing with the matter to recognise that MrMacKenzie was not purporting to provide an impartial, independent view in thesubmissions he was making.[43] It was apparent from the material before the Court that the information suppliedby the informant as to the current episode of alleged offending was through a numberof discrete communications. Measuring the informant's reliability by comparing thenumber of communications with the number of episodes where the Police couldconfirm the information provided was reliable and have successfully relied on it, wasnot a reasonable or relevant way of assessing the informant's credibility. To illustratethe point, an informant might communicate with the Police five different times abouta drug dealing operation. The communications might lead to just one prosecution orseveral prosecutions. It would not be fair to conclude that, with only one outcome asto how the information had been successfully relied on by the Police, the informantwas correct as to only 20 per cent of the reports he had made to the Police.[44] I do not agree with the Judge's view that only "limited information about theinformant's reliability was provided". There was reference to the number ofcommunications from the informant but also reference to a number of occasions whensuch communications had been relied on successfully by the Police, including arelatively recent occasion.[45] I consider the detective's reasoning in the warrant application was sufficient tosatisfy an issuer that the informant's reports were sufficiently reliable. I also considerthose reports provided a basis for a justified reasonable suspicion that people at 129 Natua v R [2018] NZHC 3278.Panmure Ave were involved in cannabis dealing and they had been obtaining or storingcannabis for supply from a person or persons at 10 Panmure Ave.[46] I also consider Mr MacKenzie was incorrect in submitting the informationfrom the informant "didn't specifically raise Mr Snow's address (10 Panmure Ave) atall". Similarly, I would not have accepted the criticisms Mr MacKenzie had made asto the failure of the Police to provide more information about the security cameras.[47] The Police were applying for a search warrant to go to 10 Panmure Ave. It ishard to see how they could have obtained the information Mr MacKenzie said theyshould have provided before they had been able to go onto the property and inspectthe cameras which had been installed.[48] Reading the application, I would also not have accepted his submission thatthe Police had referred to the existence of the cameras "as a main plank for thesuspicion". The Police did, in their application, refer to the existence of these camerasbut as an observation consistent with information provided by the informant.[49] The presence of two surveillance cameras could have been consistent with 10Panmure Ave having a connection to cannabis offending of some sort. The presenceof the cameras could also have been for innocent purposes. As Mr MacKenziesubmitted, the presence of cameras could be relevant "as one component of many otherstronger strands of evidence, leading to a suspicion of offending". That is how it couldreasonably have been considered by the issuer.[50] I do not consider there was any lack of candour in the way the Police referredto Mr Skerten who may have been living at 10 Panmure Ave at the relevant time. ThePolice were not suggesting that Mr Skerten was involved in drug dealing himself. Inthe application, the Police said it was their belief that "the address of 10 PanmureAvenue is being used to store cannabis and possibly other drugs for the occupants of12 Panmure Avenue, Dunedin".[51] In the application, the Police provided compelling information that ChelseaLinton was actively involved in cannabis dealing, was an associate of the MongrelMob in Dunedin and was in a relationship with Christine Durham who was living at12 Panmure Ave. In the application, the Police provided information that indicatedChelsea was obtaining cannabis from her mother Karen Linton who was the flatmateof Garth Tairi, a patch member of the Mongrel Mob Aotearoa, a person with 14criminal convictions for either possession of cannabis, possession for supply,cultivating and selling cannabis. The Police thus had specific and corroboratinginformation which further indicated the information provided by the informantappeared reliable.[52] The thrust of the application was that cannabis was being supplied from 12Panmure Ave but with cannabis that could have been kept at 10 Panmure Ave. As wasappropriate, the Police provided information as to who they understood could havebeen the occupants at 10 Panmure Ave. They referred to one of those occupants asbeing Mr Snow and referred to the fact he had only three convictions for driving-related matters. Although the Police referred to Mr Skerten having some convictionsfor cannabis, they said most of his offending was for dishonesty-related offences.[53] The Police could have provided more specific information as to the offendingwhich led to Mr Skerten being sentenced to imprisonment on 21 December 2018. ThePolice could have referred to the specific nature of Mr Skerten's cannabis offendingbut their failure to do so did not, in my view, demonstrate a lack of candour, nor wouldit have misled the warrant issuer.[54] I would not have accepted Mr MacKenzie's submission that the issuer mayhave thought, from what was said in the application, that Mr Skerten was sentencedon 21 December 2018 for cannabis-related offending. The issuer could reasonablyhave assumed that, if that had been the case, it would have been specifically referredto.[55] In his decision, the Judge had referred to the Police information that Mr Skertenwas residing at 10 Panmure Ave which conflicted with Court records that had MrSkerten residing outside of Dunedin. The initial application for search warrants wasmade on 9 April 2018. On the basis of that application, warrants were issued to search12 Panmure Ave, 10 Panmure Ave and 14 Grant Dalton Street, Mosgiel. On thatapplication, dated 9 April 2018, the Police told the issuer that Mr Skerten had beendealt with by the Police on 20 December 2017, had given his address as 10 PanmureAve but said Court records suggested he had a Kaitangata address.[56] Later, the Police established that, although they had obtained a search warranton 9 April 2018 to search 14 Grant Dalton Street, Mosgiel, they had ascertained theaddress of 14 Grant Dalton Street was not the address of Garth Tairi as they hadsuspected and that his correct address was 12 Grant Dalton Street. On 19 April 2018,the Police lodged a new application for a search warrant to search that address, but itincluded all the information which had been in the earlier application.[57] The information provided in respect of Mr Skerten was updated. The relevantparagraph then read:Eric SKERTEN is aged 45 years and is well known to Police. He has a longlist of criminal convictions, some of which are for cannabis but most of hisoffending is for dishonesty related offences. SKERTEN was dealt with byOamaru Police on 20 December 2017 and appeared in the Dunedin districtcourt on 21 December 2017. He was convicted of the offences he faced andis currently serving a prison sentence at the Otago corrections facility.[58] There was thus no reference to Mr Skerten being in prison for any criminaloffending when a warrant to search 10 Panmure Ave was first issued but the Policereferred to conflicting information as to where he might be living. Consistent withtheir duty of candour, when the Police filed a new but almost identical application toobtain a search warrant for 12 Grant Dalton Street, Mosgiel, they advised the Policethat Mr Skerten was not living at 10 Panmure Ave. He was in prison.[59] In the application of 9 April 2018, the Police referred to information given byan informant as to cannabis dealing from 12 Panmure Ave. Information provided bythe informant indicated the cannabis being sold from 12 Panmure Ave was being storedat Mr Snow's property at 10 Panmure Ave. The information connected the supply ofcannabis from 12 Panmure Ave with cannabis obtained from North Taieri, close toMosgiel where one of the people of interest, Garth Tairi, was said to live.[60] As is appropriate, the information from the informant was in their own words.The information was provided with detail, in terms and with a consistency that wouldhave indicated to the issuer that the statements of the informant were genuine andcredible. It was based on personal observations, and not vague assertions or hearsay.Provision of the information did not appear to be motivated by malice. In theapplication, there was a section in which the Police provided information to justify thePolice and the issuer acting on information from the informant as reliable.[61] On my assessment of the information in the application, I consider the Judgewas in error in saying that the application to search 10 Panmure Ave was based on thefact there were security cameras on the house and Mr Skerten, with historical cannabisconvictions, may have lived there. I consider he erred in saying limited informationabout the informant's reliability was provided.[62] The only respect in which I consider it could reasonably have been said therewas a lack of candour on the part of the Police was with regard to the lack ofinformation as to the precise nature and timing of Mr Skerten's previous criminalconvictions for cannabis offending but I do not consider any deficiency in theinformation as to that was either material, deliberate or properly to be categorised asgross carelessness on the part of the Police.[63] Contrary to the District Court Judge, I would have found that the informationin the application was sufficient to satisfy the issuing officer that there were reasonablegrounds to suspect the offences of selling or supplying cannabis had been or werebeing committed and that cannabis, and evidence of the commission of any offence ofsupply/possession for supply of cannabis, as detailed in the application, would befound at 10 Panmure Ave.[64] Having carefully considered the information in the application, I would nothave summarised the information relied on to obtain the warrants as "imprecise anduncorroborated, statements, historical convictions and the presence of a securitycamera". For the reasons discussed, I consider the information was more compellingthan that.[65] The conclusions I have reached as to the adequacy of the Police application arealso relevant to the s 30 Evidence Act evaluation which was at issue on the appeal.[66] I accept that, if the warrant to search 10 Panmure Ave was in fact invalid, thesearch of 10 Panmure Ave would have involved the breach of an important right,namely, the appellant's right to privacy and protection of his home against an unlawfulentry and search of the property. There is a public interest that the justice system doesnot condone serious breaches of rights by the Police committed deliberately or inreckless disregard of a defendant's rights or where Police conduct has been grosslycareless. On the other hand, the administration of justice would also be brought intodisrepute if any breach leads inevitably to the exclusion of crucial evidence which isreliable and probative of serious crime.10[67] To the extent it might be said there were deficiencies in the information thePolice put in the application, I do not consider those deficiencies could be categorisedas deliberate, reckless or grossly careless. I do not accept there was either a careless,reckless or deliberate lack of candour in the application. I do not consider there wasanything misleading in the information included in the application. The informationproperly and fairly put before the issuer the information which the Police relied on tosatisfy the issue that the grounds had been made out for the issuing of the searchwarrant applied for.[68] The evidence obtained from the execution of the search warrant was of highprobative value, relevant to the case and reliable. The evidence obtained included thelocation of three grams of cannabis, a sawn-off double barrel shotgun and 39 roundsof 12-gauge ammunition. The evidence obtained is crucial to the Crown case. Withoutthat evidence there will be no evidence to support the conviction of the charges thedefendant faces. There is a public interest in conviction where there is evidence ofoffending. The public interest in allowing the evidence to be admitted in such a caseis stronger the more serious the offending it relates to. Here, there are particularlyserious charges as to the possession of the sawn-off shotgun and cartridges.[69] I accept that the lack of explanation was not relevant to any assessment of theseriousness of the breach of any rights. It was however relevant to the seriousness ofthe offence with which Mr Snow was charged.10 R v Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA); (2002) 19 CRNZ 165 at [148].[70] Ms Andersen, for Mr Snow, acknowledged that the starting point sentence forpossession of the sawn-off shotgun and ammunition would be imprisonment and thatoffending can properly be categorised as serious. In the recent decision of Natua v R,Downs J summarised a number of cases in relation to firearms offending.11 Thosedecisions indicated that a starting point for the sort of offending that occurred herewould be two and a half years' imprisonment.[71] In R v Corner, the Court of Appeal referred to possession of a sawn-off singlebarrel shotgun and said:12The possession and use of such weapons is utterly unacceptable and must bediscouraged by the Courts. In the absence of special circumstances, it shouldbe appreciated that possession of such weapons would normally lead to theimposition of a prison sentence and the more so if there is evidence to suggestthat their use might have been contemplated in a criminal connection.[72] In the present case, the appellant was in possession of a sawn-off shotgun andammunition. As identified by the District Court Judge, the sawn-off shotgun had nolegitimate purpose. The possession of such an item is invariably linked with criminalactivity.[73] I agree with the Judge that, if the warrants were invalid because they shouldnot have been issued, so that the evidence obtained from the search of 10 PanmureAve was improperly obtained, on the balancing exercise required by s 30, exclusionof the evidence would not be the proportionate response.[74] For all those reasons, there was no error in the Judge ruling the evidenceadmissible.Conclusion[75] The appeal is dismissed.Solicitors:C M Anderson, Barrister, DunedinRPB Law, Dunedin.11 Natua v R, above n 9.12 R v Corner CA291/87, 17 March 1988.