HAMPTON v MINTER ELLISON RUDD WATTS [2020] NZCA 291

HAMPTON v MINTER ELLISON RUDD WATTS [2020] NZCA 291 [15 July 2020]IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALANDI TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROACA485/2018CA360/2019[2020] NZCA 291BETWEEN DAVID JOHN HAMPTONAppellantAND MINTER ELLISON RUDD WATTSFirst RespondentOFFICIAL ASSIGNEESecond RespondentCOMMISSIONER OF INLANDREVENUEThird RespondentHearing: 25 February 2020Court: Clifford, Simon France and Lang JJCounsel: Appellant in PersonP H Courtney and G E Slevin for Second RespondentS M Kinsler for Third RespondentJudgment: 15 July 2020 at 12.30 pmJUDGMENT OF THE COURTA The appeals are dismissed.B There is no order as to costs.____________________________________________________________________REASONS OF THE COURT(Given by Clifford J)[1] The appellant, David Hampton, along with his former wife and their associatedcompanies, partnerships and trusts, has since at least the last decade of last centurybeen involved in protracted disputes with the Commissioner of Inland Revenue.In 2008, together with several of those entities, he commenced a proceeding againstthe Commissioner, the Attorney-General, a solicitor and 20 departmental officersclaiming damages for alleged misfeasance in public office (the Misfeasance Claim).That proceeding remains extant, albeit that it was stayed by this Court on18 March 2013 pending the filing of a statement of claim settled by a lawyer with acurrent practising certificate who had reviewed the available evidence.1[2] Three months later on 5 June 2013 Mr Hampton was adjudicated bankrupt.2The petitioning creditor was the law firm Minter Ellison Rudd Watts (MERW).The judgment debt on which the original bankruptcy notice was based was for legalservices provided to Mr Hampton in the course of his disputes with the Commissioner.[3] Mr Hampton filed a statement of affairs one year after his adjudication on19 June 2014. Pursuant to s 290 of the Insolvency Act 2006, he therefore fell to bedischarged three years later on 19 June 2017. Prior to that date, the Official Assigneelodged an objection to Mr Hampton's discharge. A public examination was thereforerequired.3[4] Several applications were subsequently filed. As relevant to this appeal:(a) The Commissioner applied for leave to object to Mr Hampton'sdischarge, and sought the imposition of conditions on that discharge inthe public interest;4 and(b) Mr Hampton applied to be discharged unconditionally.1 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd [2013] NZCA 53, [2013] 2 NZLR679 at [116] and [119].2 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts v Hampton HC Christchurch CIV-2011-409-2055, 5 June 2013.3 Insolvency Act 2006, s 295(1).4 Namely, that Mr Hampton be prohibited from being a director of any company, or taking part inthe management and control of any business, without the Court's consent.[5] Those applications and the associated examination of Mr Hampton were heardby Venning J in the High Court at Christchurch.5 The Judge recorded that, at thehearing, Mr Hampton sought an unconditional discharge while boththe Official Assignee and the Commissioner sought conditions restrictingMr Hampton's ability to control or manage the operation of a company.6 In ajudgment dated 26 July 2018, Venning J decided that Mr Hampton should bedischarged on the conditions sought by the Official Assignee and the Commissioner.Accordingly, he ordered that Mr Hampton be discharged on 30 July 2018 subject toconditions preventing him managing a business without leave of the Court for fouryears.7[6] On 21 August 2018, Mr Hampton filed an appeal against the judgment ofVenning J (CA485/2018, the First Appeal). In the First Appeal, and by way of relief,Mr Hampton sought orders:(a) suspending his discharge from bankruptcy pending the redrafting ofthe Misfeasance Claim;(b) rescinding the High Court's restrictions on his discharge frombankruptcy; and(c) substituting an order for discharge without restrictions, subject to theorder for suspension.[7] In 2018, before the First Appeal was heard, Mr Hampton used family assetsfrom outside his bankrupt estate to instruct Mr Billington QC to finalise his statementof claim for the Misfeasance Claim. That process was completed on 26 April 2019.Mr Hampton therefore considered that he had done what this Court had required ofhim in 2013 and was in a position to enliven the Misfeasance Claim once again.Problematically, however, Mr Hampton's adjudication has vested his interest in that5 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts v Hampton [2018] NZHC 1866 [Discharge and conditions judgment].6 At [35], [38]–[39] and [42].7 At [71]. These conditions mirrored restrictions Mr Hampton faced as a bankrupt pursuant to s 151of the Companies Act 1993 and s 149 of the Insolvency Act.claim in the Official Assignee.8 He is therefore unable to apply for the stay to be lifted.Moreover, once Mr Hampton is discharged, the claim will not revert to him, and thusfrom his perspective it will permanently come to an end.[8] To address those concerns Mr Hampton applied for further relief pending thedetermination of the First Appeal. Specifically, Mr Hampton applied to theHigh Court for interlocutory orders pursuant to r 17.29 of the High Court Rules 2016for a stay of enforcement of Venning J's judgment and a stay of the originaladjudication order made in 2013. In doing so, and unusually, Mr Hampton thereforesought first for his discharge to be stayed under r 17.29, and hence for him to bereturned to bankruptcy; and secondly for the adjudication itself to be stayed, and thusfor the entire bankruptcy to be, in effect, undone. His interest in the MisfeasanceClaim would, he suggested, therefore re-vest in him and he would be able to reapplyto the Court for the 2013 stay to be lifted. In his view, a stay would lift all theassociated restrictions on him personally and the Official Assignee would, thereafterand for the period of the stay, have no interest in his affairs.[9] Those applications were heard by Osborne J. In his judgment dated26 July 2019 the Judge concluded:9(a) there was no jurisdiction to entertain an application for a stay of theoriginal adjudication order; and(b) rule 17.29 did not provide a basis for a stay of Venning J's dischargeorder, pending the hearing of Mr Hampton's appeal.[10] Rather, the Judge considered that the appropriate procedure for a stay ofVenning J's discharge and conditions judgment would have been for Mr Hampton toapply under r 12 of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 pending the hearing ofthe First Appeal in order to ensure that the appeal right Mr Hampton was exercisingwould not be rendered nugatory.10 Allowing Mr Hampton and Ms Sisson some8 Insolvency Act, s 101.9 Re Hampton [2019] NZHC 1774 [Stay judgment] at [18] and [20].10 At [21]–[24]. Rule 12 provides a general power for either the Court appealed from or this Courtto order a stay of a proceeding or execution of a decision pending an appeal.indulgence as, though legally qualified, they were not practising lawyers, the Judgegranted them a stay under r 12 so as not to make the First Appeal nugatory.[11] On 2 August 2019, Mr Hampton filed an appeal (CA360/2019, the SecondAppeal) against the interlocutory judgment of Osborne J. Mr Hampton did notchallenge Osborne J's interlocutory stay order by which, as he described it, the Judgehad:Suspended my discharge from bankruptcy to avoid the operation of s 305 [ofthe] Insolvency Act 2006 that might otherwise extinguish the misfeasanceclaim against the officials of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue,("the Commissioner") on discharge. The purpose of the suspension order is[to] preserve the status of the bankruptcy to allow the application forstay/suspension of the bankruptcy itself pending hearing and determination ofthe misfeasance proceeding.[12] Rather Mr Hampton challenged the Judge's ruling that there was nojurisdiction to stay the original adjudication order under r 17.29 of theHigh Court Rules. In other words, having successfully argued before Osborne J thathe should be returned to bankruptcy, Mr Hampton appealed on the basis the Judge waswrong not to go further and restore him to the position he had been in before hisadjudication.[13] This judgment concerns both Mr Hampton's appeal against Venning J'sdischarge and conditions judgment and his appeal against Osborne J's stay judgment.Having said that, Mr Hampton's primary submission is that pursuant to r 17.29 of theHigh Court Rules, this Court has jurisdiction to, and should, "stay" his bankruptcy.Mr Hampton says unless there is a stay of his adjudication he cannot apply to lift the2013 stay of the Misfeasance Claim as the relevant cause of action vests in the OfficialAssignee. Further, if the stay of his bankruptcy is not granted prior to his discharge,the Misfeasance Claim will not revest in him and, consequently, he will have no wayto pursue that proceeding against the Commissioner.[14] Accordingly, the primary relief Mr Hampton seeks on these appeals is the stayunder r 17.29, which he sought before Osborne J but not Venning J. As Mr Hamptonsees it, if he succeeds, it will not be necessary to address his specific appeal againstVenning J's discharge and condition orders. At the same time, and perhaps recognisingthe difficulties that aspect of this appeal faces, Mr Hampton maintains his challengeto the conditions Venning J imposed on his discharge: in essence, he says thoseconditions have been wrongly imposed because the Judge materially mischaracterisedcertain aspects of his overall dispute with the Commissioner, and his behaviour as ataxpayer more generally.[15] Ms Courtney and Mr Slevin, appearing for the Official Assignee, contendedthat Osborne J was correct to find r 17.29 was not apt to stay Mr Hampton'sbankruptcy in the manner he desired. The Court lacked jurisdiction to order theprimary relief Mr Hampton sought and the Second Appeal should be dismissedaccordingly. As for the First Appeal — against the conditions imposed onMr Hampton's discharge — there was ample evidence before Venning J to justifythese and Mr Hampton had pointed to no material error by the Judge in this regard.The First Appeal should also, therefore, be dismissed.[16] Mr Kinsler appeared for the Commissioner primarily to support Venning J'sjudgment and to address Mr Hampton's allegations regarding the conduct ofdepartmental officers.[17] At the hearing of this appeal, and in this judgment, we therefore address theissues in the following order:(a) Does jurisdiction exist under r 17.29 to stay Mr Hampton'sadjudication?(b) If yes, should a stay of Mr Hampton's adjudication be granted?(c) If no, did Venning J err in ordering conditions when dischargingMr Hampton from bankruptcy?Does jurisdiction exist under r 17.29 to stay Mr Hampton's adjudication?[18] Rule 17.29 of the High Court Rules provides:17.29 Stay of enforcementA liable party may apply to the court for a stay of enforcement or other reliefagainst the judgment upon the ground that a substantial miscarriage of justicewould be likely to result if the judgment were enforced, and the court maygive relief on just terms.[19] The purpose of the rule is to enable parties who are held liable under ajudgment of the Court to apply for a stay of enforcement of the judgment or otherrelief against it. That is a poor fit for the situation here because Mr Hampton is not aliable party under a judgment: rather, he has been adjudicated bankrupt, andbankruptcy is a status rather than a form of liability. Before us, Mr Hamptonmaintained that he was a judgment debtor to MERW and thus a "liable party" in termsof r 17.1. However, that confuses the original judgment obtained by MERW inFebruary 2010 with the adjudication order made by Associate Judge Matthews in June2013.11 Unlike the 2010 judgment, the adjudication order could not be "enforced" byMERW. Once made, it took effect by operation of law: there is nothing further thecreditors could do.[20] Mr Hampton further contended that the word "judgment" could be definedbroadly to encompass an adjudication order and pointed to the suggestion a court ordercould be "enforced in the same way as a judgment" in r 17.2 and the broad definitionadopted elsewhere in r 11.1. Again, however, we reject that submission simplybecause it misdescribes the nature of an adjudication order, which as we have noted,cannot be "enforced" and is not what is contemplated by r 17.2.[21] The correctness that conclusion can be confirmed by considering the effect ofthe orders Mr Hampton sought in the context of fundamental principles of insolvencylaw.[22] A fundamental aspect of that law is that the adjudication of a bankrupt veststhe remaining assets of that person in the Official Assignee. It is the Assignee whothereafter has full control of those assets. They are to be disposed of for the benefit ofthe bankrupt's creditors. Subject to the possibility of there being a surplus afterrealisation and application, the insolvent person can have no interest in the assets of11 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts v Hampton HC Christchurch CIV-2009-409-1700, 11 February 2010;and Minter Ellison Rudd Watts v Hampton, above n 2.their insolvent estate absent (perhaps) disclaimer of onerous property which theinsolvent nevertheless values.12[23] The Insolvency Act goes on to provide that bankrupts may apply to the Courtto annul their adjudication. Section 309 provides:309 Court may annul adjudication(1) The court may, on the application of the Assignee or any personinterested, annul the adjudication if—(a) the court considers that the bankrupt should not have beenadjudicated bankrupt; or(b) the court is satisfied that the bankrupt's debts have been fullypaid or satisfied and that the Assignee's fees and costsincurred in the bankruptcy have been paid; or(c) the court considers that the liability of the bankrupt to pay hisor her debts should be revived because there has been asubstantial change in the bankrupt's financial circumstancessince the date of adjudication; or(d) the court has approved a composition under subpart 1 ofPart 5.(2) In the case of an application on one of the grounds specified insubsection (1)(a) to (c) by an applicant who is not the Assignee,—(a) a copy of the application must be served on the Assignee inthe manner and within the time that the court directs; and(b) the Assignee may appear on the hearing of the application asif the Assignee were a party to the proceeding.(3) The adjudication is annulled—(a) from the date of adjudication, in the case of an application onthe ground specified in subsection (1)(a):(b) from the date of the court's order of annulment, in the case ofan application on one of the grounds specified in subsection(1)(b) to (d).Mr Hampton applied unsuccessfully for an annulment under this section on twoprevious occasions.1312 The High Court may, on a bankrupt's application, order the return of property disclaimed bythe Assignee to the bankrupt if it is fair to do so: Insolvency Act, s 119(2).13 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts v Hampton [2013] NZHC 2434 [First annulment judgment]; andHampton v Official Assignee [2014] NZHC 1458 [Second annulment judgment]. Mr Hamptonunsuccessfully appealed against the second annulment judgment to this Court: Hampton v OfficialAssignee [2015] NZCA 264.[24] Mr Hampton now seeks, in effect, a temporary annulment, an order notcontemplated by the Act and which would cut across the insolvency regime in itsentirety. His proposition is that his assets, including those represented by the benefit(such as it may be) of the Misfeasance Claim, would revert to being his property, inwhich the Official Assignee would have no interest nor any right to determinedisposition. There is simply no room, given the fundamental principles of insolvencylaw and the specific terms of the Act, for such an order. We are satisfied that,howsoever r 17.29 might be interpreted, it cannot have that effect.[25] We are therefore satisfied that Osborne J's decision there was no jurisdictionto make the order Mr Hampton sought under r 17.29 was correct and theSecond Appeal is dismissed accordingly.[26] We turn to the remaining issue, namely whether in the judgment stayed byOsborne J pending the resolution of the First Appeal, Venning J erred when he imposedconditions on Mr Hampton's discharge. If Venning J did not err, so that Mr Hampton'sappeal of that decision is dismissed, Osborne J's stay will come to an end andMr Hampton will be discharged from bankruptcy.Did Venning J err in ordering conditions when discharging Mr Hampton?[27] Venning J considered that several aspects of Mr Hampton's conduct gave causefor concern. Among other things, there was a troubling failure to file tax returnsthroughout the late 1990s which could not wholly be due to the Commissioner, evenif Mr Hampton's complaints are accepted.14 He had also been convicted of a chargelaid under of the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 of intentionally misleadingthe Commissioner,15 and on another occasion was the subject of adverse credibilityfindings after giving evidence before Judge MacAskill.16 In his present bankruptcy,Mr Hampton had taken over a year to file a statement of affairs notwithstanding thelegislative requirement for that to be done within 10 working days.17 Moreover, afterfiling his statement of affairs, he had adopted a generally uncooperative stance and14 Discharge and conditions judgment, above n 5, at [56].15 Hampton v Inland Revenue Department (1994) 16 NZTC 11,243 (HC).16 Hornby Finance Ltd v Hampton [2012] DCR 229 (DC) at [65]–[70].17 Insolvency Act, s 69.had failed to provide the Assignee with his current address or disclose the whereaboutsof a Daihatsu truck.18[28] Venning J was particularly critical of "the rather unsatisfactory position" inrelation to a property at 67 Augusta Street, Christchurch.19 The registered owner ofthat property was, at one point, Ms Sisson. Notwithstanding, following a mortgageesale in December 2013, the surplus proceeds were paid to the Assignee in the estate inbankruptcy of Mr Hampton, as the Assignee and the Commissioner both consideredMr Hampton was beneficial owner of the property. That payment was directed byFogarty J in a minute dated 10 December 2013 and was consented to byMr Hampton.20[29] Three years later, however, when it appeared the monies held by the Assigneemight be distributed to the Commissioner, Ms Sisson sought a declaration fromthe High Court that the beneficial owner of 67 Augusta had not been not Mr Hamptonbut rather was the Anolbe Family Trust (the Trust). It followed that the proceeds ofthe mortgagee sale could not be applied to Mr Hampton's creditors but needed to bereturned to the Trust. In support of that application, Mr Hampton filed a memorandummaintaining that it had always been his understanding and intention that the beneficialowner of the property was the Trust. That proceeding was later abandoned byMs Sisson on the fourth day of trial, and Mr Hampton consented to a costs order beingmade against him personally.21[30] Venning J considered that the issue reflected badly on Mr Hampton in anumber of ways. First, Mr Hampton claimed to have acted both as settlor and trusteeof the Trust, which was not permitted by the Trust deed and suggested a certaincarelessness by him. Secondly:22 Mr Hampton effectively used the Trust as another financial vehicle whenit suited him. He failed to disclose any interest in the property (even as trustee)when filing a Statement of Affairs but then subsequently initially claimed,following the sale of the property at mortgagee sale that it was his propertybeneficially and agreed to the funds being paid into his bankrupt estate.18 Discharge and conditions judgment, above n 5, at [59]–[60].19 At [61]–[66].20 Mr Hampton confirmed in his written submissions that he had consented to the order.21 Sisson v Official Assignee [2017] NZHC 555.22 Discharge and conditions judgment, above n 5, at [65].Submissions[31] Mr Hampton submitted the Judge's analysis mischaracterised his behaviourboth before and during his bankruptcy in several ways. In general terms, where therehad been delays or miscommunications between him and the Assignee, this couldlargely be explained by ongoing attempts by Mr Hampton to annul his bankruptcy andlimited internet connectivity in his then rural location, amongst other factors.Mr Hampton pointed to several examples of him actively co-operating with theOfficial Assignee as evidence of his efforts to comply with the obligations bankruptcyplaced upon him.[32] Mr Hampton also refuted Venning J's assessment that his conduct in relationto the Augusta Street property had been unsatisfactory. He had hardly concealed theexistence of the property by failing to disclose an interest in his statement of affairs:at that point, the property had already been sold at mortgagee sale with the proceedspaid to the Assignee. Mr Hampton observed that, moreover, the Judge had misstatedthe proper chronology in the passage quoted above at [30]: Mr Hampton in fact filedhis statement of affairs in 2014, the year after the mortgagee sale in 2013.The implication that the mortgagee sale followed the filing of his statement of affairswas therefore incorrect.[33] Mr Hampton challenged many of the other criticisms made by Venning J,including the reference to other Judges' criticism of Mr Hampton's conduct and thesuggestion that Mr Hampton had acted contrary to the Trust deed. For reasonsexplained immediately below, however, we do not consider it necessary to addressevery submission advanced by Mr Hampton in order to decide the appeal.Analysis[34] Venning J referred to a wide variety of conduct ranging over the past 25 yearsin his assessment, and Mr Hampton disputed the greater part of that analysis. In ourview, however, two matters before the Judge were of principal significance for theassessment of whether the imposition of conditions on Mr Hampton's discharge wasjustified. The first was Mr Hampton's failure "to properly distinguish between theassets, liabilities and general affairs of the separate Chesterfield entities", asexemplified in the treatment of the Augusta Street property.23 The second wasMr Hampton's lack of co-operation with the Official Assignee during his bankruptcy,as demonstrated by the delay in filing the Statement of Affairs and the delay indisclosing the whereabouts of a Daihatsu truck. We consider that the potential concerngenerated by these criticisms is such that if Venning J's consideration of these pointswas correct, then he was also correct to impose conditions on Mr Hampton's dischargeand there is insufficient substance in the remaining points raised by Mr Hampton forhis appeal to succeed.[35] Turning first to the Augusta Street property, we accept Mr Hampton'ssubmission that the Judge slightly mischaracterised the correct order of events in thequotation above at [30]. However, we do not think that Mr Hampton's criticismultimately detracts from the Judge's central criticisms in relation to the Augusta Streetproperty.[36] First, Mr Hampton does not satisfactorily explain why he consented toFogarty J's order that the proceeds of sale from the mortgagee sale be paid tothe Official Assignee. Mr Hampton submitted before us that Fogarty J was actingupon what he termed a "Court imposed trust" in making the necessary order and thathe had therefore not changed his stance as to beneficial ownership of the proceeds.If Mr Hampton was suggesting that the Court considered, at that point, that beneficialownership of the Augusta Street property remained an unsettled issue, then we rejectthe submission for conflicting with the clear terms of Fogarty J's order. That orderdirected the mortgagee "to account to the Official Assignee in the estate in bankruptcyof David John Hampton as the beneficiary entitled to the proceeds of the sale ofAugusta Street".24 The obvious premise of the order was that Mr Hampton wasbeneficial owner of the property. Mr Hampton confirmed in his written submissionson this appeal that he had consented to the order. There remains, therefore, noadequate explanation for why in 2016 Mr Hampton adopted the contradictory stancethat he was not beneficial owner.23 At [61].24 Chesterfields Preschools Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue HC ChristchurchCIV-2008-409-722, 10 December 2013 (Minute of Fogarty J) at [3(a)].[37] Second, Mr Hampton's suggestion that it was reasonable for him to omit theAugusta Street property from his statement of affairs because the Official Assigneealready held the proceeds of sale does not sit easily with the suggestion that the Trusthad been beneficial owner. Mr Hampton declared his interest in the Trust in hisstatement of affairs and listed its assets as shares in Chesterfield Preschools Ltd andAnolbe Enterprises Ltd. But if Mr Hampton was correct that the Trust was beneficialowner of the property, then the proceeds of sale ought to have been listed as an asset,and the suggestion that he had kept the Official Assignee fully apprised of his dealingswith the property does not bear scrutiny.[38] Mr Hampton raised several other factors which, he suggested, refuted theconclusion that he failed to distinguish between assets and liabilities of theChesterfield entities and which, in his submission, Venning J erroneously failed toconsider. These included the fact that although Fogarty J had previously commentedon the "incredibly complicated transactions swirling around" the taxpayers'entities,25 this had to be viewed in the context of his assessment that Mr Hampton was"not dishonest" and the absence of any finding of actual unlawfulness.26 Further, thecomments were made while Mr Hampton was suffering the disadvantage caused bythe Commissioner's failure (as asserted in the Misfeasance Claim) to properly disclosematerial that would have assisted his case.[39] We do not accept that any of the matters raised by Mr Hampton materially alterthe context for judging his dealings with the Augusta Street property or detract fromVenning J's criticism in that regard. Fogarty J's assessment cannot assist Mr Hamptonas the Judge quite explicitly qualified his assessment of Mr Hampton's honesty bynoting his ability to enter into "ingenious transactions",27 and thereby dubiously avoidobligations he had previously entered into:28 as I have said and reiterate that the plaintiffs in my judgment are notdishonest people, but are nevertheless persons who believe that transactionscan be created readily enabling the movement of assets, that they may be ofthe state of mind that they would not be breaching undertakings, if they did25 Chesterfield Preschools Ltd v Hampton HC Christchurch CIV-2004-409-1596, 13 September2005 at [16].26 At [49].27 At [18].28 At [49].something which appeared to be not quite caught by the undertaking orsomehow outside. The safer course is to subject their conduct to thesupervision of the Court.[40] Nor do the allegations contained in the Misfeasance Claim assist Mr Hamptonhere. Mr Hampton's shifting treatment of the Augusta Street property, which is in factentirely consistent with the criticism of Fogarty J, exemplifies a pattern of behaviourwhich cannot be attributed to the Commissioner. Other factors raised by Mr Hamptonon this point, such as the fact Ms Sisson was not present in Court the day he consentedto the proceeds of the sale of the Augusta Street property being paid to the Assignee,are simply not relevant and we do not address them.[41] We turn next to Venning J's criticism of Mr Hampton's lack of cooperationwith the Official Assignee, which we also consider was justified. The most obviousexample of this was the delay in filing his statement of affairs, which was filed a yearlate on 19 June 2014.29 We agree with Venning J that Mr Hampton penalised himselfinsofar as he postponed his automatic discharge,30 but the broader point is thatMr Hampton disrupted the administration of his bankruptcy and the ability of theOfficial Assignee to realise assets in the estate. We do not accept Mr Hampton'sassertion that the need for "care and precision" in relation to his allegations againstIRD officers accounted for the delay, as the statement of affairs only referred to theMisfeasance Claim in passing. Nor does either of Mr Hampton's attempts to annulthe bankruptcy explain matters. The first application was dismissed on17 September 2013, nine months before the statement of affairs was filed.31The second was not filed until the following year, and was in any event ultimatelydismissed several days after Mr Hampton eventually filed his statement of affairs.32This conflicts with Mr Hampton's suggestion that the administration of his estate wasconsidered to be "in limbo" at that time (preventing him from finalising his statementof affairs), a comment made by Fogarty J to describe the status of separate proceedingsagainst the Commissioner, but which Mr Hampton endeavoured to relate to theadministration of his estate.29 The statement of affairs was due to be filed 10 working days after receiving the Official Assignee'snotice requiring the statement of affairs, which is dated 6 June 2013: Insolvency Act, s 69.30 Discharge and conditions judgment, above n 5, at [59]; and see Insolvency Act, s 290.31 First annulment judgment, above n 13.32 Second annulment judgment, above n 13.[42] Even if a generous allowance is made for both annulment attempts and theinterlocutory matters that arose over the course of the bankruptcy, the many monthsthat passed (while no annulment application was pending) without Mr Hampton filingthe statement of affairs has not been adequately explained. Mr Hampton pointed tomany other examples of his interaction with the Assignee which he said demonstratedhis ongoing co-operation during his bankruptcy, but none of these detract from thesimple point that for months he apparently disregarded his statutory obligation topromptly file a statement of affairs. This was an important step in the administrationof his estate which specifically provided for by ss 67–69 of the Insolvency Act and thefailure to comply with this obligation was appropriately treated as a cause of concern.[43] The other example of poor communication relied upon by Venning J was thetreatment of a Daihatsu truck, which was noted twice in his statement of affairs ashaving a resale value of either $10,000 or $30,000 but which could not be recoveredby the Official Assignee, despite numerous requests, until three years later whenMr Hampton advised that he had sought a verbal appraisal which had valued the truckat just $2,000. Mr Hampton submitted that letters sent by the Assignee to aChristchurch address regarding the truck did not reach him as they were addressed to8 Kahu Road (his adjudication address) rather than 8A Kahu Road (the address givenin his statement of affairs), and in any case he was at that point working in a ruralNorthland location with poor post and email access.[44] Even treating Mr Hampton's explanations at face value, we do not agree thathis approach to the Daihatsu truck was satisfactory. On Mr Hampton's evidence hehad notice of the Official Assignee's interest in the truck no later than August 2014,33when he replied to an email advising him that a summons would shortly issue due tohis failure to reply to at least two months' worth of letters. Yet even then Mr Hamptonignored the request for details of the truck until, it appears, the following January, anda clear statement on the physical whereabouts of the truck was only provided by him33 This followed an earlier email sent on 30 July 2014, which appears not to have been acknowledgedby Mr Hampton.when he was publicly examined before Venning J in 2018.34 Significant delays canalso properly be ascribed to Mr Hampton's decision to move to Northland whilemaking no proper arrangements for continued contact with the Official Assignee.In the end, we are quite satisfied that Venning J was right to consider that Mr Hamptonhad displayed a lack of responsibility towards his obligations as a bankrupt.[45] We conclude that Venning J was correct to determine that Mr Hampton'sconduct sufficient concern such that it was appropriate to impose conditions on hisdischarge. As Mr Hampton disputed the basis for those conditions rather than theirspecific terms, that is sufficient to dispose of the First Appeal and we dismiss itaccordingly.Result[46] The appeals are dismissed.[47] There is no order as to costs.Solicitors:Crown Law Office, Wellington for Second and Third Respondents34 Mr Hampton told the Assignee in 2015 that he "lived in" the truck but did not want to deal withassets while litigation before this Court was proceeding. We do not think this vague descriptiondetracts from Venning J's assessment at [59] that the whereabouts of the truck only became clearuntil 2018, when Mr Hampton disclosed that it was at 8A Kahu Road.