COOK v HOUSING NEW ZEALAND CORPORATION [2017] NZHC 2405

COOK v HOUSING NEW ZEALAND CORPORATION [2017] NZHC 2405 [3 October 2017]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDAUCKLAND REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHECIV-2017-404-000216[2017] NZHC 2405BETWEEN DESMOND WILLIAM COOKAppellantAND HOUSING NEW ZEALANDCORPORATIONRespondentHearing: On the papersJudgment: 3 October 2017JUDGMENT OF DOWNS J(Application for leave to appeal)This judgment was delivered by me on Tuesday, 3 October 2017 at 1 pmpursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.Registrar/Deputy RegistrarSolicitors:Meredith Connell, Auckland.Fortune Manning, Auckland.Copy to: Appellant[1] On 17 January 2017, Judge Hinton struck out a civil claim brought by Mr Cook against Housing New Zealand Corporation, or more easily Housing New Zealand.1 Mr Cook appealed. On 31 July 2017 I dismissed that appeal.2 Mr Cook seeks leave to bring a second appeal to the Court of Appeal.3 Housing New Zealand opposes the application.[2] My judgment contains the background, which I do not repeat.[3] Mr Cook's proposed appeal grounds relate to the appeal hearing. Mr Cookconsiders the hearing was hurried in that whereas a full day had been allocated forthe appeal, I concluded a half day would be sufficient. Mr Cook contends I did not"trust" his submissions or consider relevant observations made by other Judges inconnection with his not inconsiderable litigation with Housing New Zealand.Mr Cook contends I wrongly precluded him from playing a recorded conversation orconversations at the hearing, and I erred in declining to release a transcript of theappeal hearing.[4] I continued Mr Khan's appointment as amicus curiae for the purpose of thisapplication. Mr Khan contends a serious question of law arises as to whether theResidential Tenancies Act "is the correct legislation to define [Mr Cook's]relationship with [Housing New Zealand]".[5] Principle is clear and uncontroversial. The appeal must raise some questionof law or fact capable of bona fide and serious argument in a case involving someinterest, public or private, of sufficient importance to outweigh the costs and delay ofa further appeal. Not every alleged error of law is of such importance, eithergenerally or to the parties, as to justify further pursuit of litigation already twiceconsidered and ruled upon by a Court, so the test is a restrictive one. The scarcetime and resources of the Court of Appeal are not to be wasted, or additional expensefor the parties incurred "without realistic hope of benefit".41 Cook v Housing New Zealand Corporation [2016] NZDC 676.2 Cook v Housing New Zealand Corporation [2017] NZHC 1781.3 Senior Courts Act 2016, s 60.4 Snee v Snee [2000] NZFLR 120, (1999) 3 PRNZ 609 (CA) at 125-126, 612-613; Waller v Hider[1998] 1 NZLR 412 (CA) at 413.[6] Mr Cook's proposed grounds of appeal raise no question of law. Nor couldthey sustain serious argument. Mr Cook's appeal was ventilated with the benefit offull oral argument and the assistance of amicus curiae. Mr Cook was notdisadvantaged by the determination he was not to play audio or video recordings asthe appeal was from a strike-out decision; hence in circumstances in which pleadedfacts are assumed to be true. Observations of other Judges about Mr Cook's HousingNew Zealand accommodation had little relevance on appeal.[7] The ground of appeal identified by Mr Khan does not satisfy the test for asecond appeal as my judgment does not purport to define the relationship betweenMr Cook and Housing New Zealand.[8] Mr Cook observes he will seek the Court of Appeal's leave for a secondappeal if I decline this application. That is a matter for the Court of Appeal. Theapplication is dismissed.[9] I thank Mr Khan for all his assistance with the case...Downs J