EDEN REFUGE TRUST and ORS v HOHEPA and ORS HC AK CIV-2003-404-000539

EDEN REFUGE TRUST and ORS v HOHEPA and ORS HC AK CIV-2003-404-000539 [12 April 2012]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDAUCKLAND REGISTRYCIV-2003-404-000539[2012] NZHC 685BETWEEN EDEN REFUGE TRUSTFirst PlaintiffAND JOANNE LYDIA MALETINOSecond PlaintiffAND CALLUM MACDONALDThird PlaintiffAND ATTORNEY-GENERALFourth PlaintiffAND CHARLES HOHEPAFirst DefendantAND CHARLES FLETCHERSecond DefendantAND LLOYDS OF LONDON; MARKEL(AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD; AMERICANHOME ASSURANCE COMPANYThird PartiesHearing: 28 October 2011Counsel: No Appearance of or for the First, Second, Third and Fourth PlaintiffsNo Appearance of or for the First DefendantD A Wood for the Second DefendantN A Till QC for the Third PartiesJudgment: 12 April 2012JUDGMENT OF DUFFY J[Re Third Party Indemnity Costs]This judgment was delivered by Justice Duffyon 12 April 2012 at 4.30 pm, pursuant tor 11.5 of the High Court RulesRegistrar/Deputy RegistrarDate:[1] This is an application by the third parties (insurers) in this proceeding for an award of increased costs against the second defendant, Charles Fletcher, following Mr Fletcher discontinuing his claim against the third parties, as well as an award of indemnity costs for the costs hearing.[2] The proceeding was about the mishandling of property belonging to a charitable trust by its then trustee, Charles Hohepa, and the solicitor acting for the trust, Charles Fletcher. In Eden Refuge Trust v Hohepa [2011] 1 NZLR 197, I found that claims of breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty and conversion were proved against Mr Hohepa. I also found that claims of breach of fiduciary duty, knowing receipt and dishonest assistance were proved against Mr Fletcher.[3] Mr Fletcher appealed against this decision to the Court of Appeal. On 30 March 2012, the Court of Appeal delivered a judgment dismissing Mr Fletcher'sappeal. The judgment of the Court of Appeal confirmed the findings I had made against Mr Fletcher, including findings that Mr Fletcher had no honest motive for his actions in assisting the trustee to misappropriate the funds of the charitable trust: seeFletcher v Eden Refuge Trust [2012] NZCA 124 at [71]. Earlier, at [68], the Court of Appeal described Mr Fletcher as having the "requisite dishonest state of mind" tosupport a finding of dishonest assistance. In addition to dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal awarded indemnity costs against Mr Fletcher.[4] When the proceedings were commenced in this Court, Mr Fletcher sought the assistance of insurers, who had provided him with professional indemnity insurance (the policy) for the period 1 May 2001 to 1 May 2003. In its original form, the statement of claim contained no allegations of dishonest conduct against Mr Fletcher. In 2003, the insurers took over the conduct of Mr Fletcher's defence inthis proceeding. This was without prejudice to indemnity under the policy. When the statement of claim was amended to include allegations involving dishonest conduct on the part of Mr Fletcher, the insurers refused to cover those allegations. In 2005, the insurers declined to indemnify Mr Fletcher under the policy. Mr Fletcher responded by joining the insurers as third parties to the proceeding on 24 November 2006.[5] The insurers defended the claim brought against them by Mr Fletcher on the ground that Mr Fletcher had breached clause 8.3 of the policy, that he had breached the common law duty of utmost good faith, and that his claim fell within the fraud and/or dishonesty exclusion (clause 7.7) of the policy. On 25 February 2008, four working days before the trial was to commence, Mr Fletcher discontinued his claim against the third parties, with the issue of costs remaining outstanding as between them and him.[6] By memorandum dated 18 June 2008, the insurers applied for increased costs against Mr Fletcher. However, their application was not progressed at the time, dueto the need to await the conclusion of the substantive trial. The insurers' applicationwas not heard by this Court until 28 October 2011. The success of the application hinged on the findings of dishonesty I had made against Mr Fletcher. He had filed an appeal against the decision finding him liable. It was not until the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment on 30 March 2012, following a hearing on 7 March 2012, that the dishonesty findings I had made were confirmed.[7] The insurers seek increased costs on the ground that Mr Fletcher contributed unnecessarily to their time and expense by bringing a claim that lacked merit, by failing to answer interrogatories and by failing to provide discovery ordered by the Court. The insurers also seek indemnity costs or, alternatively, increased costs in relation to their costs application. They do so because of the way in which Mr Fletcher has opposed their application for costs. Mr Fletcher acknowledges that the insurers are entitled to costs but he contends that they should be no more than what could ordinarily be awarded under the schedule to the High Court Rules.[8] At the time the insurers made their claim for an award of costs against Mr Fletcher, the former High Court Rules (now repealed) were in force. The relevant rules were rr 46 to 48, along with r 476C. The latter rule made express provision for awards of costs where a plaintiff discontinued a claim.[9] Rule 476C provided that unless the defendant otherwise agreed, or a Court otherwise ordered, a plaintiff who discontinued a proceeding against a defendant must pay costs to the defendant of and incidental to the proceeding up to andincluding discontinuance. The relevant scale is category 2B. Scale costs on a 2B basis amount to $28,320.[10] The insurers also seek disbursements of $17,453.45, which includes engaging two experts in trial preparation at a total cost of $15,664.30. The general approach now is that costs associated with expert witnesses are recoverable in their entirety: see Body Corporate 189855 v North Shore City Council HC Auckland CIV-2005- 404-5561, 2 October 2008 at [15]; and Air New Zealand v Commerce Commission[2007] NZCA 27, [2007] NZLR 494 at [64]. It follows that for the disbursement claim relating to expert witness fees, I approve the amounts the insurers seek. I am satisfied that the balance of the disbursements is also reasonable.[11] I will deal first with the application for increased costs for the proceeding and then with the application for indemnity costs for the costs application.Increased costs[12] Rule 48C sets out specific criteria for an award of increased costs:48C Increased costs and indemnity costs(1) Despite rules 47 to 48B, the Court may make an order(a) Increasing costs otherwise payable under those rules (increased costs); or(b) That the costs payable are the actual costs, disbursements, and witness expenses reasonably incurred by a party (indemnity costs).(2) The Court may make the order at any stage of a proceeding in relation to any step in the proceeding.(3) The Court may order a party to pay increased costs if—(a) The nature of the proceeding or the step in the proceeding is such that the time required by the party claiming costs would substantially exceed the time allocated under band C; or(b) The party opposing costs has contributed unnecessarily to the time or expense of the proceeding or step in the proceeding by—(i) Failing to comply with these rules or a direction ofthe Court; or(ii) Taking or pursuing an unnecessary step or an argument that lacks merit; or(iii) Failing, without reasonable justification, to admit facts, evidence, documents, or accept a legal argument; or(iv) Failing, without reasonable justification, to comply with an order for discovery, a notice for further particulars, notice for interrogatories, or other similar requirement under these rules; or(v) Failing, without reasonable justification, to accept an offer of settlement whether in the form of an offer under rule 48G or some other offer to settle or dispose of the proceeding [13] The insurers base their claim for an award of increased costs on r 48C(3)(b)(i) to (v).[14] Both parties accept that in terms of scale costs, the proceeding would fit within category 2B of that schedule, which is helpful, as the first step when considering whether to increase the level of costs awarded is to identify the appropriate scale costs to which the party claiming costs is entitled: see Holdfast NZ Ltd v Selleys Pty Ltd (2005) 17 PRNZ 897 (CA) at [43]. In addition, the party claiming costs must establish that the available scale costs do not cover the time and effort that it spent on the proceeding: see Holdfast NZ Ltd at [43]-[48] where the Court of Appeal applied a four-step test for determining when an award of increased costs is warranted:(a) The party should categorise the proceeding under r 48A;(b) It should then identify a reasonable time for each step in the proceeding under r 48B;(c) As part of the step two exercise, a party can under r 48C(3)(a) apply for extra time for a particular step; and(d) At this point, the applicant for costs should step back and look at the costs award to which it could be entitled. If a party can argue foradditional costs under r 48C(3)(b), it should do so; but any increase above 50 per cent on the costs produced by steps one and two is unlikely, as the daily recovery rate is two-thirds of the daily rate considered reasonable for the proceedings.[15] The relevant scale here is category 2B, which would provide a costs award of $28,320. I am satisfied that the circumstances of this case are such that an award of scale costs would not be appropriate. All the factors in r 48C(3)(b) favour an award of increased costs.[16] This is an unusual case. In this Court, there was an objective assessment of Mr Fletcher's conduct that resulted in clear strong findings of dishonesty on his part: see [211] of the High Court judgment. The Court of Appeal upheld this finding and also found that there was an implicit subjective assessment of Mr Fletcher's conductthat was to like effect: see [68]-[72] of the Court of Appeal judgment. At [89] of its judgment, the Court of Appeal referred to this Court awarding scale costs to the plaintiffs and said:Neither [of the plaintiffs] sought indemnity costs against Mr Fletcher in the High Court and, as already noted, neither has cross-appealed to this Court against the High Court orders for scale costs in their favour. At our suggestion, however, both have sought orders for indemnity costs against Mr Fletcher in respect of his appeal to this Court.By r 53 of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 this Court has a wide discretion to make any orders as to costs that seem just. Further, under r 53E(3) the Court has express power to order a party to pay indemnity costs if the party has acted "unnecessarily" in bringing an appeal or some otherreason exists which justifies the Court making an order despite the principle that the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious. It is well-established that pursuit of a hopeless case may well justify an order for indemnity costs: Bradbury v Westpac Banking Corporation [[2009] NZCA 234, [2009] 3 NZLR 401 (CA) at [29] and [73]-[74]].For Mr Fletcher, Mr Wood opposed any order for indemnity costs on the ground that nothing more than an order for scale costs was warranted. We do not agree. Once it was accepted, as Mr Wood did, that the High Court factual findings, which justified Mr Fletcher's liability for dishonest assistance, were not realistically open to challenge on appeal, the appeal was inevitably doomed to fail. Neither of the grounds raised by Mr Wood for challenging the High Court finding of liability for dishonest assistance was going to survive examination in this Court. Indeed, having heard Mr Wood'ssubmissions on these grounds, it was unnecessary for us to call on counsel for Mr MacDonald and the Attorney-General to respond. The appeal wastherefore a hopeless one which warrants orders for indemnity costs against Mr Fletcher.[17] It seems to be implicit from these passages of the judgment that the Court of Appeal considered that Mr Fletcher should have been required to pay indemnity costs in relation to the hearing in this Court, even though the plaintiffs did not seek an award of that nature. This suggests to me that the Court of Appeal had formed a very dim view of Mr Fletcher's dishonesty.[18] The views of this Court and the Court of Appeal regarding Mr Fletcher'sdishonesty would not have been known at the time he discontinued his third party claim against the insurers. Nonetheless, Mr Fletcher, as the perpetrator of the dishonest conduct, would have been aware of the material facts and he must have realised that others might regard his conduct as dishonest. This is not a case where his conduct fell into a grey area over which there might be differing opinions. As the Court of Appeal found at [91] of its judgment, once the material facts on which the dishonesty findings rested were not challenged, the legal consequences that flowedfrom them were so clear that any appeal was "hopeless".[19] Given the fraud and dishonesty exclusion in the policy, I consider that on any realistic assessment, it would have always been apparent to someone in Mr Fletcher's position that his insurers had every right to decline to indemnify himand that any claim he brought against them in that regard would fail.[20] Mr Fletcher has sought to argue that the prospects of the plaintiffs bringing a successful claim against him were not good at the time he discontinued his third party claim. But the weakness in the case against him that he alludes to has nothing to do with any weakness in the factual foundation for his dishonesty.[21] Mr Fletcher has argued that:Not only was the approach of the [insurers] based on unproved facts and unfounded assertions, the eventual beneficiary of the judgment is not the person or entity that the indemnifiers were addressing at the time. Other parties were added which in the end led to the conclusions in the judgment in their favour. There were no conclusions in favour of the only plaintiff available for consideration by the third parties at the time the solicitorsundertook their "review" or when the cover was declined.He submits, therefore, that the approach of the third party's indemnifier tohis claim was unsound. It cannot be argued on that basis that Mr Fletcher's claim "lacked merit".[22] This submission completely misses the point. Whilst the insurers were working on unproven facts and unfounded assertions, as the person engaged in the dishonest conduct, it would have been obvious to Mr Fletcher that the factual allegations made against him were capable of proof.[23] Further, for him to argue that it was only after the discontinuance when other parties were joined as plaintiffs that conclusions could be drawn, which resulted in a judgment against him, is only to his discredit. This argument is directed at the fact that the standing of the first and second plaintiffs to bring the proceeding was open to question. But it is no explanation for Mr Fletcher to say that the prospects of the claims made against him being successful were not good, such that his claim for indemnity against the insurers had merit, simply because at the relevant time the standing of the persons making allegations of his dishonesty was open to question. The same allegations of dishonest assistance that were made by the first and second plaintiffs were later pursued successfully by the third and fourth plaintiffs. The questionable standing of the first and second plaintiffs can have no effect on the core issue as between the insurers and Mr Fletcher, which was whether he was facing allegations of dishonesty that placed him outside the scope of the policy.[24] I am satisfied that Mr Fletcher's claim against the third parties wascompletely lacking in merit. Whilst it is a general rule that in considering costs on a discontinuance, the Court will not consider the merits of the competing contentions,in exceptional cases where the merits are clear, they will influence the Court'sdecision as to costs: see North Shore City Council v Local Government Commission(1995) 9 PRNZ 182 (HC) at 185. The proper course for the Court to make is a broad assessment of the merits, rather than attempt a definitive analysis of the issues: seeOggi Advertising Ltd v McKenzie (1998) 12 PRNZ 535 (HC) at 537. I consider that the present case is exceptional. I consider that it should have been apparent to Mr Fletcher from the outset that there was no merit in his third party claim. He has acknowledged as much himself through his decision to discontinue the third party claim four working days before the trial commenced. This was done incircumstances where there was no substantial change to the case he faced from the plaintiffs or the insurers. The only logical inference to be drawn from this is that he was prepared to allow the claim to run on and for the insurers to run up costs until the time came when even he realised that he could no longer maintain the fiction of having a claim against his insurers. I consider that this finding falls within r 48C(3)(b)(ii) and (iii).[25] Another factor supporting an increased award of costs is Mr Fletcher's failureto provide discovery. He accepts that he was late in doing so and only did so after the insurers were obliged to seek orders from the Court that his third party claim be dismissed for non-compliance. I consider that this finding falls within r 48C(3)(b)(i) and (iv).[26] A further factor supporting an award of increased costs is Mr Fletcher's failure to accept the insurers' settlement offer. The settlement offer was made close to the trial date. The insurers were prepared to let costs lie where they fell, if Mr Fletcher discontinued his claim against them on the basis the parties had reached a full and final settlement of their dispute. However, despite not wanting to proceed to trial against the insurers, Mr Fletcher wanted to preserve his ability to resurrect a claim against the insurers for indemnity under the policy, in the event that he successfully defended the proceedings against him. He offered to pay the insurers $6,700 costs on the basis that his rights to bring a claim against them remained alive. They rejected this costs offer. As no full and final settlement was reached, the discontinuance was effected by Mr Fletcher in circumstances where there was no agreement as to costs and where it was expressly recorded in the notice of discontinuance that costs remained outstanding between the parties.[27] The settlement offer the insurers made to Mr Fletcher was a generous one. The settlement offer was made in circumstances where the insurers had almost fully prepared for trial, including engaging and briefing expert witnesses and witnesses of fact, preparing briefs of evidence, collating documents for inclusion in the agreed bundle, and drafting opening submissions. At the time, they had incurred actual costs of approximately $151,000. Nonetheless, they were prepared to allow costs to lie where they fell, if they obtained finality regarding the end of the disputed claim.In the circumstances, Mr Fletcher's refusal to accept the insurers' offer wasunreasonable.[28] The insurers have sought an uplift of 75 per cent. An uplift of 75 per cent of category 2B scale costs brings costs to $49,560. I am satisfied that the circumstances of this case warrant an uplift of 75 per cent. Such an uplift is also consistent with the implicit indication given in the Court of Appeal's judgment that itconsidered that indemnity costs were warranted for the High Court trial. The same reasoning would also apply in the case of the third parties. This is because at all material times, Mr Fletcher has adopted an intransigent manner towards those making soundly based claims against him, which has caused them to incur greater expense than might otherwise be expected.[29] I accept the insurers' argument that the conduct of Mr Fletcher is more severethan that in recent cases where increased costs of 50 per cent have been awarded. I accept that the appropriate precedent is Mueller v Hendren (2009) 19 PRNZ 432 (HC) where Heath J awarded a 75 per cent uplift where grounds for indemnity costs had been established, but a lesser award was warranted. I accept the arguments thatsome of Mr Fletcher's conduct arguably amounted to grounds for indemnity costsunder r 48C(4) in that arguably Mr Fletcher acted improperly or unnecessarily under r 48C(4)(a) in proceedings against the third parties, as it should have been apparent to Mr Fletcher that indemnity was excluded by the fraud and/or dishonesty exclusion. In addition, he also ignored or disobeyed an order or direction of the Court in terms of r 48C(4)(b).[30] It follows that the insurers are entitled to an award of costs relating to the claim against them in the sum of $49,560, plus disbursements of $17,453.45.Indemnity costs[31] Initially, Mr Fletcher contended that he had reached an agreement with the insurers regarding costs when he discontinued his third party claim against them. Mr Fletcher said that it was agreed that he would pay the insurers $6,700 in costs. The insurers strongly denied this. They filed evidence to show that in theirdiscussions with Mr Fletcher, they had originally been prepared to let costs lie where they fell, but they wanted a full and final settlement with Mr Fletcher. He, in turn, wanted to discontinue his claim against them in circumstances where he kept alive his right, following the outcome of the proceedings against him, to resurrect the third party claim against the insurers. This was the basis on which Mr Fletcher offered to pay the insurers costs of $6,700. The offer was refused. In addition, the notice ofdiscontinuance was expressed to leave open the question as to costs. It stated "issuesrelating to costs remain outstanding between the second defendant [Mr Fletcher] andthe third parties".[32] The effect of the stance that Mr Fletcher took was that the insurers' legalrepresentatives, who had been involved in the discussions over the discontinuance, had to become witnesses in the costs hearing. In a Minute (No 13) dated 18 August 2010, I made it clear that unless the parties reached agreement over the facts in issuein relation to the insurers' application for costs, the facts would need to beestablished by affidavit evidence. Mr Fletcher required the insurers to provide this evidence. The insurers engaged senior counsel, who prepared for an opposed hearing on costs, with the expectation that the factual dispute between the parties would need to be resolved by a hearing involving cross-examination of the witnesses whose evidence was in conflict.[33] The evidence the third parties rely on to show they never reached agreement with Mr Fletcher on costs, along with the wording of the notice of discontinuance, make it clear that there was no agreement on costs. Unless costs are agreed, the general rule is that following discontinuance, the party bringing the discontinuedclaim is responsible for the other party's costs. Against this background, it isdifficult to see how Mr Fletcher thought he could adopt the stance that costs had been settled as between himself and the insurers. Finally, he recognised this himself. As with the prosecution of his claim against the third parties, when the day of reckoning drew near, with the hearing date for the costs application looming over him, Mr Fletcher abandoned the opposition based on there already being a concludedsettlement. The insurers describe Mr Fletcher's conduct as "extraordinary" and nowseek indemnity costs for the trouble they have been put to in order to refute whatthey described as "unjustified" allegations of the existence of a concluded costs settlement.[34] I am satisfied that Mr Fletcher should pay indemnity costs to the insurers for this application. Given all that had already occurred, his stance that the insurers had reached a settlement over costs for the third party claims, which reflected on thehonesty of the insurers' legal representatives, is truly extraordinary. It is difficult tosee what Mr Fletcher hoped to gain from taking this stance. The stance he has taken is well within the description of someone acting "vexatiously, frivolously, improperly or unnecessarily in commencing and continuing a proceeding" in termsof r 48C(4)(a). In terms of r 48C(4)(f), I consider there is also "some other reason"that justifies the Court making an order for indemnity costs and that is the implicit suggestion in Mr Fletcher's stance that the insurers' legal representatives were not acting honestly. By asserting the existence of a settlement based on the insurers'entitlement to costs of $6,700 following discussions with the insurers'representatives about the discontinuance of the third party claim, Mr Fletcher put his credibility in conflict with that of the insurers' legal representatives. In the context of this proceeding, Mr Fletcher's credibility has found to be wanting more than once and by more than one judicial officer. I consider that in circumstances such as this, ifsomeone in Mr Fletcher's position chooses to make unfounded assertions, which callinto question the credibility of others, he will expose himself to indemnity costs; particularly when having made such allegations, they are retracted at the eleventh hour. These circumstances are analogous to those in Bradbury v Westpac Banking Corporation [2009] NZCA 234, [2009] 3 NZLR 400 where the Court of Appeal set out the circumstances in which indemnity costs have been awarded under rr 14.6(4)(f) (the current equivalent of r 48C(iv)(f)):[29] We therefore endorse Goddard J's adoption in Hedley v Kiwi Co- operative Dairies Ltd (2002) 16 PRNZ 698 at para 11 of Sheppard J'ssummary in Colgate Palmolive Company v Cussons at pp 232 to 234. While recognising that the categories in respect of which the discretion may beexercised are not closed it listed the following circumstances in whichindemnity costs have been ordered:(a) The making of allegations of fraud knowing them to be false and the making of irrelevant allegations of fraud;(b) Particular misconduct that causes loss of time to the court and to other parties;(c) Commencing or continuing proceedings for some ulterior motive;(d) Doing so in wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law; or(e) Making allegations which ought never to have been made or unduly prolonging a case by groundless contention summarised in French J's "hopeless case" test.[30] Each of these concerns conduct which would fall within r 14.6(4).[35] In the present case, the actual costs incurred by the insurers in relation to their costs application amounted to $63,383.15. These costs were itemised in a scheduleannexed to the insurers' submissions. I am satisfied that such costs are a fair reflection of the work the insurers had to undertake in order to pursue their claim for costs against Mr Fletcher. The time was increased by the need to file affidavit evidence to counter the factual allegation by Mr Fletcher that the insurers had already settled the question of costs on the discontinuance, as well as to seek ahearing. In addition, Mr Fletcher's stance that there was no justification for the insurers finding the fraud/dishonesty exclusion in the policy applied to him has been shown to be untenable in this Court and in the Court of Appeal. I find, therefore, that the insurers are entitled to the indemnity costs of $63,383.15.[36] Over the relevant time, Mr Fletcher's obdurate holding to an untenable position regarding payment of costs has meant that the insurers have had to wait for their costs. His liability for costs would have been apparent from the day he discontinued the third party claim. I consider, therefore, that they are also entitled to interest at the rate provided for in the Judicature Act 1908 from the date of the discontinuance of the third party claim against them to the date of this judgment, and from the date of judgment to the date of payment: see Dunes Café & Bar Ltd v 623 Rocks Road Ltd HC Nelson CIV-2006-442-481, 31 March 2010, at [114] in which Hugh Williams J acknowledged that costs are regarded as part of the judgment debt, and so interest may be awarded:Allowing interest on costs, disbursements and expenses has been open for a lengthy period (Landowners' West of England and South Wales LandDrainage and Inclosure Co v Ashford [ (1885) 33 WR 836 at 837] and the practice has been confirmed relatively recently at the highest levels (Erven Warnink BV v J Towning & Sons (Hull) Ltd (No 2), [[1982] 3 All ER 312],Hunt v R N Douglas (Roofing) Ltd.) [[1990] 1 AC 398] The principle has been applied in New Zealand (AFFCO New Zealand Ltd v ANZCO Foods Waitara Ltd) [(2005) 17 PRNZ 676 at 678] with costs awards being regardedas part of the "sum for which judgment is given" and "the judgment debt"and thus attracting interest under s 87, and r 11.27(1) (McGechan on Procedure para HR 11.27.06 p 1-1329).[37] If the parties cannot agree on the arithmetical calculation of the award of interest, they have leave to seek the assistance of the Court[38] I am also satisfied that they are entitled, as reasonable disbursements, to claim disbursements of $393.53.Duffy JCounsel: N A Till QC 61 Armagh Street Christchurch 8013 for the Third PartiesD A Wood P O Box 1452 Shortland Street Auckland 1140 for the Second DefendantCopies To: G Bogiatto P O Box 106120 (DX CP19060) Auckland City Auckland 1143Armstrong Murray P O Box 331028 (DX BP66018) Takapuna North Shore City 0740The Solicitor-General Crown Law P O Box 2858 (DX SP20208) Wellington 6140