COLEMAN v THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPT OF CORRECTIONS [2020] NZHC 1033

COLEMAN v THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPT OF CORRECTIONS [2020] NZHC 1033 [18 May 2020]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDCHRISTCHURCH REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROAŌTAUTAHI ROHECIV-2020-409-000181[2020] NZHC 1033BETWEEN DYLAN EDWARD COLEMANApplicantAND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONSRespondentHearing: 8 May 2020Appearances: M Starling and N R Wham for the ApplicantC J Boshier for the RespondentJudgment: 18 May 2020REASONS JUDGMENT OF NATION J[1] Mr Coleman is currently residing in housing at Tōruatanga, administered bythe Department of Corrections (the Department), adjacent to the Christchurch Men'sPrison. On 5 May 2020, he applied by way of originating application for a writ ofhabeas corpus. There was a hearing as to that application on 8 May 2020. At theconclusion of the hearing, with Mr Coleman present, I gave an oral judgment decliningthe application with reasons to follow. This is the reasons judgment.1The grounds[2] Mr Coleman's application was made on the grounds:1 The Court of Appeal have advised that a notice of appeal has been lodged in respect of mydecision.(a) through a sentence of intensive supervision and an interim supervisionorder (ISO) pending determination of an application for an extendedsupervision order (ESO), he was subject to conditions:(i) to reside at an address approved by a Probation officer and not tomove from that address without prior approval of a Probation officer;(ii) to comply with all tenancy and house rules of an approvedaccommodation provider and to remain at that residence, includingbut not limited to:1. completing the necessary paperwork and other administrativetasks;2. behaving appropriately while living at the address and not givingthe property owner or leaseholder reason to decide to evict him;and3. paying the rent on time.(iii) he be at the approved address between the hours of 10 pm and 6 amdaily unless he had the prior approval of a Probation officer; and(iv) he was subject to electronic monitoring.(b) Mr Coleman was detained because:(i) his approved address is a prison; and(ii) he is required to reside there and not leave that address at all betweenthe hours of 10.00 pm and 6.00 am, seven days per week and to notleave without prior permission and accompaniment otherwise.(c) His detention was unlawful because he is not subject to a sentence ofimprisonment, and the orders for intensive supervision and interimsupervision do not specify special conditions requiring him to remain atthe approved address at all times.[3] In an accompanying affidavit, Mr Coleman said he lives in a house on theproperty of Christchurch Men's Prison in Templeton, that he had been brought downto Christchurch by Probation when he would rather be back in Auckland. His housewas within a secured section with two other houses, like a gated community. Peoplethere could not "just come and go". Since he had been living at this address, he hadnot been allowed to leave the property by himself. There were four scheduled outingsper week. On each occasion, he was accompanied by at least one or two, usually two,staff members. He was only allowed to go to the supermarket once a week. When hewas not doing a programme at the property, he had no organised tuition or classes toattend. He made a number of complaints about the way staff at the facility interactedwith him.[4] Ms Wham began her oral submissions by submitting that Mr Coleman hadbeen moved from Auckland to Christchurch under a sentence of intensive supervision,despite his objections. She submitted:(a) Mr Coleman, under his sentence of intensive supervision and ISO, wassubject to a curfew only between the hours of 10 pm and 8 am;(b) Mr Coleman was detained within a small site managed and staffed by theDepartment and only able to leave it with advance permission and whenaccompanied;(c) although Mr Coleman was subject to a basic programme at the site, therewas substantial downtime when he was not involved with that programmebut was not permitted to leave the property;(d) Mr Coleman was not subject to any order or sentence that required him tobe at the property at all times; and(e) the constraints he was under were such to mean that he was detained forhabeas corpus purposes.[5] Ms Wham argued Mr Coleman's challenge was to his detention, not theconditions of the orders applying to him. She accepted he could challenge decisionsthat had been made in respect of his detention by way of judicial review but arguedthe availability of such recourse was not a ground for denying him a writ of habeascorpus given his unlawful detainment.[6] Ms Boshier appeared for the Department. Ms Boshier said Mr Coleman wassubject to a sentence of intensive supervision and also to an ISO. Her primarysubmission was, pursuant to s 14(1A) Habeas Corpus Act, the Court should refuse theapplication because the application for a writ of habeas corpus was not the appropriateprocedure for considering the allegations made by Mr Coleman. She said, althoughpotentially moot, it was not contested that Mr Coleman was detained. She said,nevertheless, the detention was lawful in terms of both the sentence of intensivesupervision and the ISO.[7] In support of the opposition to the application, the Department filed an affidavitfrom Mr Angelo Houtos, the manager of Tōruatanga, employed by the Department.In that, he provided evidence as to the nature of Mr Coleman's residence and how hewas managed there.[8] Mr Houtos says that Tōruatanga is a community comprising three standalonehouses and a community hub. It is staffed 24 hours, providing "support forreintegrative activities between 6 am and 10 pm. There are currently six residents.House one, where Mr Coleman is currently housed, is a fenced property with a gatethat is not locked and often not closed. There is a fence around the entirely of theTōruatanga property. The front gate is normally open during the day.[9] Mr Houtos says there is no rule that Mr Coleman is not allowed to leave theproperty by himself. He says regular outings accompanied by staff are offered to MrColeman but he is accompanied by staff due to the programme condition imposed bythe Court as part of his intensive supervision sentence. Supermarket trips hadcontinued during the COVID-19 lockdown but other outings had been curtailed inaccordance with Government protocols and advice to stay at home. Mr Houtosreferred to reports of March and April attached to his affidavit which demonstrate amarked lack of engagement by Mr Coleman with the staff which Mr Houtos said hadcorrespondingly limited the activities offered as part of the programme. He said MrColeman regularly refused to engage with staff, attend community meetings or planreintegrative activities.[10] Mr Coleman came to reside at Tōruatanga around 10 February 2020. MrHoutos' affidavit indicated the transfer was necessary because of problems with MrColeman's self-care and behaviour at Christchurch Residential Care (CRC). MrColeman's needs were basic, for instance to try and get him to shower more than onceevery three weeks, safely store food and not eat meat that was raw or food that wasobviously spoiled. A report of 15 April 2020 indicated that Mr Coleman's disabilities: negative any meaningful engagement. Staff attempt to negotiate one smallgoal a day for [Mr Coleman] such as getting out of bed, or placing a few piecesof rubbish in the bin.It said Mr Coleman has significant needs in relation to hygiene, cooking, cleaning andgeneral day to day life. He spends the majority of his time in bed, or under a blanketin the lounge surrounded by food.[11] A report of 18 March 2020, attached to Mr Houtos' affidavit, detailed that MrColeman was fixated on meeting women and would approach anyone aged about 17to 25 at times when he was away from Tōruatanga, even with staff right next to him.He had made contact with a teenager at a shop and his engagement with her had ledstaff at Tōruatanga to the view that a non-association direction needed to be imposeddue to this person's apparent vulnerability and naivety.Background[12] Mr Coleman is aged 27. On 3 July 2015, he was sentenced in the District Courtat Auckland on a charge of exploitative sexual connection after a plea of guilty.2 Thischarge was reduced from initial charges of rape and sexual violation through oral andanal penetration. Mr Coleman was sentenced to imprisonment for four years and twomonths. That sentence was upheld by Brewer J in the High Court at Auckland in ajudgment of 18 December 2015.32 R v Coleman [2015] NZDC 12457.3 Coleman v R [2015] NZHC 3298.[13] In March 2019, the Department applied for an ESO and an ISO in the DistrictCourt at Auckland. On 11 November 2019, the application for an ESO was transferredto the Christchurch District Court. There was to have been a hearing of that applicationon 25 March 2020. It could not proceed because of the COVID-19 lockdown. TheCourt is still to allocate a new hearing date.[14] On 5 April 2019, an ISO under s 107FA Parole Act 2002 was made in theDistrict Court at Waitakere.4 In his judgment of that date, Judge Glubb recorded thatcounsel appearing for Mr Coleman had discussed matters with Mr Coleman. Thejudgment records that Mr Coleman and his counsel both accepted that the interimsupervision order could be made by consent. Mr Coleman was remanded at large onthe ESO application but subject to the Judge recording Mr Coleman was then subjectto the conditions of the ISO. A copy of the ISO, including attached conditions, wasproduced with Ms Boshier's written submissions. Mr Coleman acknowledged receiptof that order and conditions on 5 April 2019.[15] Standard conditions imposed under s 107JA Parole Act required:(a) he had to advise the Probation officer immediately of his residentialaddress, not change it and not move without approval of a Probationofficer; and(b) must not reside at any address which a Probation officer has directed henot reside.[16] Special conditions imposed under s 107FA Parole Act required that MrColeman:(a) be subject to GPS monitoring at all times;(b) reside at an address approved by a Probation officer and not move fromthat address without the approval of a Probation officer;4 Police v Coleman [2019] NZDC 6499.(c) "4. comply with all tenancy and house rules of an approvedaccommodation provider and to remain at that residence,including (but not limited to):i. Completing necessary paperwork and otheradministrative tasks;ii. behaving appropriately while living at the residence andnot giving the property owner or leaseholder reason todecide to evict you; andiii. paying the rent on time";(d) be at the approved address between 10 pm and 6 am daily unless he hadthe prior written approval of a Probation officer; and(e) "7. To attend an assessment with a departmental psychologist andcomplete any programmes/counselling as recommended bythe assessment to the satisfaction of your Probation officer andprogramme provider".[17] On 23 October 2019 in the District Court at Waitakere, Judge Glubb sentencedMr Coleman on three charges to which he had pleaded guilty. A breach of supervisionorder related to his failing to answer calls by the monitoring team as required by theconditions for GPS monitoring to which he was subject. The other charges were forassault and intimidation. Those charges arose out of his behaviour in makingunwanted advances to and pursuing young women.[18] A Department of Corrections pre-sentence report was prepared. A copy of thereport was attached to Ms Boshier's submissions. That report advised that, prior tohis remand in custody on the charges, Mr Coleman had resided at Goodwood Park,Ramarama, which was supported accommodation contracted by the Department tohouse offenders with complex needs. The report referred to Mr Coleman as having "adisordered lifestyle where both he and his living quarters will be in an unkempt anduntidy condition. He is unable to maintain his own accommodation to an acceptablesanitary standard unless he has external support".[19] The report referred to the high concerns the Department had as to the way thecharges before the Court involved Mr Coleman approaching women, paralleling hisprevious offending pathway. The Probation officer wrote:This is of high concern for the Department and, as such, Mr Coleman wouldbenefit from a high level supported living accommodation with a reintegrationprogramme where his lifestyle could be structured in a way that encourageshim to assist in productive activities as opposed to ruminating about womenand placing himself in high risk situations. The Department of Corrections isworking towards sourcing an appropriate provider, however accommodationis not confirmed at this time. Therefore, it is recommended that there is acondition whereby he engages in a programme for up to 12 hours per day.That would allow for Mr Coleman to obtain the best assistance to allow himto develop reintegrative skills and to mitigate his risk in the community. Ifaccommodation with a suitable provider is located, a curfew condition for theremaining 12 hours will be required to ensure consistency with other residents.It will also mitigate the risk of Mr Coleman leaving the propertyunaccompanied and placing himself in high risk situations.[20] At his sentencing, Mr Coleman was represented by counsel. The Judgerecorded there was then a proposal that Mr Coleman go to the Christchurch ResidentialCare programme and that a suitable address was not available for an electronicallymonitored sentence. His risk to the community was such that the recommendation ofthe report writer had been for imprisonment. Mr Coleman's counsel referred to MrColeman having been in custody for a period and that the option of the CRC was nowavailable. Mr Coleman's counsel submitted that a sentence of supervision would be abetter outcome because "it might enable Corrections to monitor Mr Coleman morefully and over a longer period and ensure that he received the rehabilitative assistancehe needed to mitigate the risk of further offending moving forward". Mr Coleman'scounsel also indicated there was no objection to the conditions detailed in the pre-sentence report. Those conditions included conditions that he:(a) comply with requirements of electronic monitoring;(b) reside at an address approved by a probation officer and not move fromthat address without the prior written approval of a probation officer;(c) comply with all tenancy and house rules of an approved accommodationprovider and remain at that address, and behave appropriately while at thataddress;(d) attend an assessment with a departmental psychologist and completed anyprogrammes/counselling as recommended by that assessment to thesatisfaction of his probation officer and programme provider;(e) be at his approved address between 10 pm and 6 am daily unless he hadthe prior approval of a probation officer.[21] The report also included on page 9 a special condition which the Departmentrecommended be imposed as a condition of release conditions if Mr Coleman wassentenced to a short term of imprisonment. Those conditions required Mr Coleman:1. To undertake, engage in and complete a reintegration programme approvedby your Probation Officer, for up to 12 hours per day, seven days a week.Whilst participating in the programme, to submit to being supervised andmonitored as necessary to ensure your attendance at classes or participatingin other activities associated with the programme. To abide by the rules ofthe programme to the satisfaction of your Probation Officer.2. Not to loiter near public transportation hubs and/including bus-stops, trainstations, and ferry terminals, unless you have the prior written permissionof your managing probation officer.3. Not to use any form of public transport unless you have the prior writtenpermission of your managing probation officer.4. To be at your approved address between the hours of 8.00PM and 8.00AMdaily unless you have the prior written approval of a probation officer.[22] On 23 October 2019, the Judge sentenced Mr Coleman to two years' intensivesupervision on the conditions detailed in the report. He also expressly imposed specialconditions as set out on page 9 of the pre-sentence report. These were the conditionsjust referred to.5[23] On 24 October 2019, the Court sealed amended orders for sentence ofsupervision. These orders referred to the sentence of two years' intensive supervisionimposed on 23 October 2019. Included with the orders were standard conditions forintensive supervision but, also under s 54F Sentencing Act, the four special conditionsjust referred to. These were set out just as they had been on page 9 of the pre-sentencereport. Mr Coleman acknowledged receipt of the amended orders with the conditions5 At [21].referred to by signing the document at the Christchurch District Court on 24 October2019.6AnalysisSection 14(1A)Habeas Corpus Act[24] Relevantly, s 14 Habeas Corpus Act states:14 Determination of applications(1) If the defendant fails to establish that the detention of the detainedperson is lawful, the High Court must grant as a matter of right awrit of habeas corpus ordering the release of the detained personfrom detention.(1A) Despite subsection (1), the High Court may refuse an application forthe issue of the writ, without requiring the defendant to establish thatthe detention of the detained person is lawful, if the court is satisfiedthat—(b) an application for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus is notthe appropriate procedure for considering the allegationsmade by the applicant.[25] Mr Coleman is essentially seeking to use the Habeas Corpus procedure tochallenge either the administration of his sentence and/or the conditions of hissentence. This is not the appropriate procedure to do so.[26] It was not submitted by his counsel that the copies of the relevant orders andconditions, which were produced with the submissions of counsel for the Department,were not true copies of the order, sentence and conditions to which Mr Coleman issubject.[27] Mr Coleman, in his application, in his affidavit and through counsel, acceptedthat he was subject to both the ISO and the sentence of intensive supervision, and theconditions attaching to both the sentence and the ISO.6 There is a handwritten note on the document recording Mr Coleman's address as being CRC, 13Ferguson Avenue, Mairehau. I infer from this that Mr Coleman had been brought to the CRCimmediately following his sentencing in the Waitakere Court and so signed the amended orders inChristchurch.[28] If Mr Coleman remains dissatisfied with the conditions of his placement atTōruatanga, the rules or conditions to which he is subject at that particular residence,the procedures he could take to obtain a remedy for his grievances include:(a) judicially reviewing the decision of the Department to place him there; or(b) applying to the District Court pursuant to s 54K Sentencing Act to havehis intensive supervision sentence varied or cancelled; or(c) applying to the District Court for a variation of the ISO conditionspursuant to s 107FA Parole Act 2002.[29] In Manuel v Hawkes Bay Regional Prison, the Court of Appeal said:7[49] A person who detains another can fairly be expected to establish,effectively on demand, the legal justification for the detention. In casesinvolving imprisonment or other statutory confinements, this will involve theproduction of a relevant warrant or warrants or other documents whichprovide the basis for the detention. We accept that apparently regular warrants(or other similar documents) will not always be a decisive answer to a habeascorpus application. But it will be a rare case, we think, where the habeascorpus procedures will permit the Court to inquire, into challenges onadministrative law grounds to decisions which lie upstream of apparentlyregular warrants. This is particularly likely to be the case where the decisionmaker is not the detaining party. There may not be a bright line whichdistinguishes between those arguments which are available on habeas corpusapplications and those which can only be deployed (if deployed at all) injudicial review proceedings. Nonetheless we see the test as coming down towhether the arguments in issue are properly susceptible to fair and sensiblesummary determination. If they are, they can be addressed in habeas corpusproceedings. If not, they must be held over for evaluation in judicial reviewproceedings. In such proceedings, an application for interim relief (includingrelease from custody) would be dealt with urgently and the Judge dealing withsuch an application would be in a position to give directions as to the futureconduct of the litigation to ensure prompt substantive determination.[30] In Wilson v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections, Mr Wilson wassubject to an ESO.8 It was a condition that he reside in a Corrections property atWhanganui and not leave that district without the written approval of his probationofficer. He asked the Minister of the Department to allow him to travel to the SouthIsland to visit his ill mother. In the absence of a decision, Mr Wilson applied for a writof habeas corpus to allow him to do so. Collins J accepted that other procedures were7 Manuel v Superintendent of Hawkes Bay Regional Prison [2005] 1 NZLR 1618 Wilson v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections [2018] NZHC 2322, [2018] NZAR 1357.available to him, namely application for judicial review if his request was refused oran application to the Parole Board to vary the conditions of the ESO to specificallyenable him to visit his mother. Collins J applied s 14(1A)(b) Habeas Corpus Act andheld the application for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus was not the appropriateprocedure for considering Mr Wilson's concerns.[31] In Bennett v Superintendent, Rimutaka Prison, the Court of Appeal wasconcerned with the refusal of writs of habeas corpus on applications by two prisoners.9One had objected to his being reclassified as high-medium security, resulting in histransfer to another prison. The other objected to his being placed in non-voluntarysegregation.10 The Court of Appeal said "in our view, the appropriate way in whichsentenced prisoners contest the lawfulness of the conditions of their incarceration isby application for judicial review".[32] The Court of Appeal also stated:11It is also our view that a change to the conditions on which an inmate is beingdetained, either by segregation, reclassification or transfer to another property,does not create a new detention under an enactment for the purposes of s 23(1)of the Bill of Rights. Nor, if an inmate is unlawfully treated while detained,is the detention itself rendered unlawful. The remedy is the cessation of theunlawful element, not the cessation of the detention.[33] In this instance, Mr Coleman was not subject to a prison sentence. There washowever no dispute that he is subject to intensive supervision. It was not suggestedthat he was not required to reside at Tōruatanga as a condition of that sentence. It wasaccepted that he was subject to a curfew which restrained him from leaving that placeand that, while there, he was required to participate in any such programme as mightbe directed in accordance with the conditions of intensive supervision. Mr Colemanwas attempting to use the habeas corpus writ procedure to challenge an element of therestraints or detention he was under pursuant to his sentence of intensive supervisionin the same way as the two prisoners did in Bennett as to their prison sentence. As theCourt of Appeal held was the case in Bennett, an appropriate procedure to do this isby judicial review.9 Bennett v Superintendent, Rimutaka Prison ]2002] 1 NZLR 616 (CA).10 At [65].11 At [62].[34] I accept also, as submitted for the Department, that Mr Coleman could applyunder s 54K Sentencing Act to the District Court for an order cancelling or varyingthe conditions or sentence of intensive supervision on grounds referred to in s 54K(1).[35] Mr Coleman could also seek to have the conditions of the ISO varied throughan application under s 107FA Parole Act 2002 to suspend that ISO which, if successful,would allow the District Court to, in effect, vary the conditions of the ISO.[36] Mr Coleman's application was thus refused applying s 14(1A)(b) HabeasCorpus Act.Detainment[37] The constraints Mr Coleman is under are such that he may not have been heldto be in close custody in the sense discussed by the Court of Appeal in Drever vAuckland South Corrections Facility and Schuchardt v Commissioner of Police(Habeas Corpus: Bail Conditions).12 There was however probably detainment in thesense which Collins J found to exist for Stuart Murray Wilson in Wilson v ChiefExecutive, Department of Corrections. It also fits within the Court of Appeal'sdefinition of detention, as recently discussed in its judgment in A v Ardern. There, theCourt said:13In order to constitute detention under the Act, restraint of a person's libertymust entail more than intermittent or limited constraint upon his or her generalright of movement Detention under the Act requires holding a person inclose custody or in a similarly restrictive environment not shared by the publicgenerally.[38] As earlier noted however, Ms Boshier, for the Department, accepted that MrColeman was subject to detainment.12 Drever v Auckland South Corrections Facility [2019] NZCA 346, [2019] NZAR 1519; andSchuchardt v Commissioner of Police (Habeas Corpus: Bail Conditions) [2017] NZAR 1689(HC).13 A v Ardern [2020] NZCA 144 at [20].Lawfulness of the detainment[39] The essence of Mr Coleman's complaint is that he is unlawfully detainedbecause, when he is not subject to curfew and not participating in a programme asrequired by his probation officer, he is unlawfully restrained from leaving Tōruatangaand going where he wants.[40] It was however accepted that Mr Coleman is subject to the sentence ofintensive supervision imposed by Judge Glubb on 23 October 2019, and the conditionsattached to that sentence as recorded in the amended orders of 24 October 2019. Oneof the conditions required him to engage in a reintegration programme approved byhis probation officer for up to 12 hours per day, seven days a week. He was alsorequired to submit to being supervised and monitored as necessary to ensure hisparticipation in the programme. Another condition of intensive supervision requiredMr Coleman to be at his approved address between 8 pm and 8 am daily unless he hadthe prior written approval of a probation officer. The Judge made it clear that, with asentence of supervision, Mr Coleman would be restrained by having to participate ina programme through being at Tōruatanga for up to 12 hours per day and be subjectto a curfew for the other 12 hours. Mr Coleman acknowledged receipt of the amendedorders which included the relevant conditions of the intensive supervision sentence.His counsel had asked for that sentence to be imposed. The initially approvedresidence was to be the CRC.[41] Mr Coleman had thus not been transferred to Christchurch as part of hissentence against his objections.[42] The evidence from Mr Houtos satisfies me that Mr Coleman is engaging in arehabilitation programme through having to live at Tōruatanga. Mr Coleman's needsare so basic and the risks to himself and others in the community so intense that thereintegration programme requires him to stay at Tōruatanga unless he can beaccompanied on approved outings. The programme also allows the staff to interactwith him in a way that might assist him to complete the most basic tasks that might,at some stage, enable him to live within the community.[43] Section 54G Sentencing Act states:54G Special conditions related to programmesA court may impose any special condition or conditions related to aprogramme if the court is satisfied that—(a) there is a significant risk of further offending by the offender; and(b) standard conditions alone would not adequately reduce that risk;and(c) the offender requires a programme to reduce the likelihood offurther offending by the offender through the rehabilitation andreintegration of the offender.[44] Pursuant to s 54H, for the purposes of s 54G, programme means, amongst othermatters, "placement in the care of any appropriate person, persons, or agency approvedby the chief executive of the Department of Corrections ". Mr Coleman has beenplaced in the care of the Department at Tōruatanga. Mr Coleman is thus subject to aprogramme in accordance with the conditions of his sentence of intensive supervisionthrough having to reside at Tōruatanga. It is through that condition Mr Coleman isrequired to remain at Tōruatanga for 12 hours per day in addition to being subject tothe curfews imposed as part of the ISO and intensive supervision sentence.[45] Furthermore, if Mr Coleman wished to dispute that determination, for reasonsalready discussed, that issue would appropriately be the subject of alternativelyavailable proceedings rather than be pursued through a habeas corpus application.[46] The conditions of Mr Coleman's ISO also required him to complete anyprogramme to the satisfaction of his probation officer and programme provider. Theevidence establishes that the programme provider is now the Department through itsstaff at Tōruatanga. Mr Coleman must thus meet and comply with the requirementsthe Department have made of him to remain at Tōruatanga, and not leave it withouttheir approval and oversight.[47] I thus accept the submission for Ms Boshier, contrary to the submissions madefor Mr Coleman, that the conditions of both the intensive supervision sentence and theISO allow the staff at Tōruatanga to require Mr Coleman to stay within the confinesof Tōruatanga 24 hours a day except for outings on terms approved by the staff. Thismeans that, to the extent he is detained at Tōruatanga, the Department has satisfied methat such detainment is lawful.Summary[48] The application was dismissed, applying s 14(1A)(b) Habeas Corpus Act. Ihave also held that, to the extent Mr Coleman was detained, that detainment was lawfulin accordance with both the ISO and intensive supervision sentence to which he wassubject.[49] For all the above reasons, Mr Coleman's application for a writ of habeas corpuswas denied.Solicitors:M Starling, Barrister, ChristchurchRaymond Donnelly & Co., Christchurch.