Quinn v Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Corporation

IN THE DISTRICT COURT Decision No. 7/ /97 HELD AT WELLINGTON IN THE MATTER of The Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 AND IN THE MATTER of an Appeal pursuant to Section 91 of the Act BETWEEN FRANCIS EDWARD QUINN Appellant (Appeal No. DCA 164/96) AND ACCIDENT REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION INSURANCE CORPORATION a body corporate duly constituted under the provisions of the said Act Respondent DECISION OF JUDGE D A ONGLEY ON AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL This is an application by the appellant for leave to appeal against a judgment of Judge J W Imrie of 30 January 1997 on appeal from a review officer's decision. It is dealt with on the papers. The question on appeal concerned whether the Corporation should have ceased paying compensation to the applicant pursuant to s 142 of the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992. Judge Imrie held that the section applied and that the Corporation had acted correctly. In applying for leave to appeal, the applicant does not dispute the correctness of the decision in terms of s 142 of the Act. The applicant wants to argue on appeal that s 142 should not be applied because it conflicts with age discrimination provisions contained in the Human Rights Act 1993. Such a proposition is not capable of argument in New Zealand. The Human Rights Act, in a similar way to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, contains provisions declaring that other statutes shall not be affected by the provisions of the Act declaring or conferring rights. Doubtlessly, the Human Rights Act would be taken into account if it was relevant to a question of interpretation of a provision in another enactment. In the present case, - 2- there is no room for that kind of application of provisions of the Human Rights Act. The provisions of s 142, as they have been applied in the decision in question, are plain and unambiguous. The applicant has raised no argument pointing out some area of ambiguity that needs to be resolved by the application of principles drawn from the Human Rights Act. For leave to be granted, there must first be a question that is arguable on appeal. In this case there is no such question and accordingly leave is refused. DATED at WELLINGTON this 28th day of April 1997 D A Ongley District Court Judge