HILL v MĀORI TRUSTEE [2016] NZHC 1847

HILL v MĀORI TRUSTEE [2016] NZHC 1847 [9 August 2016]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDPALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRYCIV-2015-454-39[2016] NZHC 1847UNDER the District Courts Act 1947, ss 72(1), 75,76(1)(a), 76(1)(b)(i) and (ii), 76(1)(c), Billof Exchange Act 1908, s 10(2), HighCourt Rules 2005 r 7.55(1), District CourtRules 2009, Crimes Act 1961, JudicatureAct 1908, Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 14,27, 28, 29, Animal Welfare Act, MagnaCarta 1215, Human Rights Act 1993,Property Law Act 2007, Securities Act1978, Personal Properties Act 1999,Interpretation Act 1979 and not limited toothers supporting the intent of thisapplication by appellant in accord withlaw or by lawful amendmentIN THE MATTER OF judgment decision dated 23 February 2015by District Court Palmerston NorthCIV-2011-054-0533BETWEEN FREDERICK PIRIPI KINGI HILLAppellantAND MĀORI TRUSTEERespondentOn papersJudgment: 9 August 2016JUDGMENT OF DOBSON J[Leave to appeal][1] In a judgment issued on 4 March 2016, I dismissed Mr Hill's appeal from ajudgment of the District Court at Palmerston North delivered in February 2015.11 Hill v Māori Trustee [2016] NZHC 364.[2] On 22 April 2016, Mr Hill filed in the Wellington Registry of this Court a first application for leave to further appeal to the Court of Appeal.2 No attempt was made in that document to identify any issue of sufficient importance to warrant the grant of leave for a second appeal.[3] A second application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was filed on 27 April 2016. The document was dated by Mr Hill 10 March 2016, but there is no explanation for the delay between its dating and its filing, also in the Wellington Registry of the Court. That document is 16 pages long. It contains a critical commentary of single paragraphs or groups of paragraphs of a substantial part of my judgment, and foreshadows a re-running of the arguments, all of which I found to be entirely without merit.[4] A third document, also filed with the Wellington Registry of the Court on 2 May 2016, sought a stay of the enforcement of my judgment. Apart from endingwith the statement that the Court of Appeal " is awaiting on the High Court todetermine a leave to appeal application", the document did not address grounds on which the Court might consider a grant of leave for a further appeal.[5] The respondent has filed a succinct notice of opposition to the original application for leave to appeal, contesting that there are any special reasons for granting leave for a further appeal, and contending that my judgment fully canvassedand considered all of the appellant's documents and arguments.[6] Mr Hill has not sought a hearing on his application for leave to appeal. However, I am advised by the Registry of the Court of Appeal that there has been a call in that Court of his application for special leave.[7] I have considered, first, whether it is appropriate to deal with the present application for leave to appeal before me, on the papers.2 The documents filed in Wellington have been allocated the Court file number CIV-2016-485- 273.[8] I am satisfied that it is appropriate to deal with the application on the papers, and that the interests of justice would not be served by delaying a resolution of the application in order to facilitate a short hearing.3[9] The first reason for doing so is the futility of any further steps in this litigation. As I pointed out in my judgment on costs in relation to the appeal before the High Court,4 the essential issue in the proceedings was Mr Hill's allegedentitlement to remain in possession of the rural property, notwithstanding substantial breaches of the lease pursuant to which he had been allowed into possession. That lease expired in December 2015, and any reversal of the findings made in the District Court and the High Court against Mr Hill could not, in any event, be a means by which he could retain possession. The issue in the proceeding is now moot.[10] I am also satisfied that, in his three documents addressing the prospect of leave to further appeal, Mr Hill has reviewed all the issues he wishes to raise.[11] Turning then to the issue on whether a grant of leave is justified, I have reflected on whether anything in any of Mr Hill's documents raises an issue ofsufficient importance to warrant consideration by the Court of Appeal on a second appeal.[12] In criticising the manner in which I dealt with his criticisms of the process by which his proceedings were dealt with in the District Court, Mr Hill repeats the arguments which I found unpersuasive. He adds a criticism that I declined to deal separately with a component of his claim styled as a judicial review. I am satisfied that that matter cannot give rise to an issue of any importance that would justify a second appeal.[13] In other respects, Mr Hill persists with assertions that he has, in effect, twolegal personalities and that the only persona that could be subject to the Court's3 The Party Bus Co Ltd v Attorney-General [2012] NZHC 445.4 Hill v Māori Trustee [2016] NZHC 1072.jurisdiction would require an indication of consent to the jurisdiction, which he has withheld.[14] There is nothing in these propositions, many of which are expressed in nonsensical terms, that could ever constitute a question of sufficient importance to trouble the Court of Appeal.[15] Mr Hill has made points in his various documents that he is seeking a new contractual arrangement with the beneficial owners of the block, and is pursuingother criticisms of the conduct of the Māori Trustee. Further, that his status inrelation to the land is subject to proceedings before the Māori Land Court. None ofthose matters can add anything to an assessment of the grounds for the grant of leave to pursue a second appeal in the present litigation.[16] I am accordingly satisfied that Mr Hill's application for leave, in its variousguises, must be, and is, dismissed.Dobson JSolicitors:Māori Trustee, WellingtonCopy to:F P K Hill