DURY AND ORS V PALMERSTON NORTH CITY COUNCIL & OR SC 91/2007
Leave to appeal was dismissed because the proposed grounds were insufficiently arguable and fact specific, raised no issue of public or general importance, and there was no apparent substantial error in the Court of Appeal; additionally, post-decision evidence was rightly excluded because the legality of the...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- SC 91/2007
- Parties
- Applicant: G C Dury and Ors; Respondent: Palmerston North City Council; Respondent: Second and Third Respondents
- Court
- Supreme Court
- Jurisdiction
- New Zealand
- Judgment Date
- 1 April 2008
- Procedural Posture
- Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court / Leave Application Heard on Papers; Oral Hearing Declined
- Outcome
- Application for leave to appeal dismissed
- Legal Topics
- Resource Consent Notification, Leave to Appeal, Admission of Evidence on Appeal, Application of Precedent (discount Brands)
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
G C Dury and Ors
Applicant
Palmerston North City Council
Respondent
Second and Third Respondents
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court / Leave Application Heard on Papers; Oral Hearing Declined
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether leave to appeal should be granted
- 2 Whether the Court of Appeal misapplied Discount Brands Ltd v Westfield (NZ) Ltd
- 3 Whether post-decision evidence of traffic movements should have been admitted
Ratio Decidendi
Leave to appeal was dismissed because the proposed grounds were insufficiently arguable and fact specific, raised no issue of public or general importance, and there was no apparent substantial error in the Court of Appeal; additionally, post-decision evidence was rightly excluded because the legality of the non-notification decision is judged on the material available at the time.
Court Disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed
Orders
- Leave to appeal dismissed
- Costs awarded: $1,000 to the first respondent and $1,000 jointly to the second and third respondents
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
DURY AND ORS V PALMERSTON NORTH CITY COUNCIL & OR SC 91/2007 1 April 2008IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND SC 91/2007 [2008] NZSC 17BETWEEN G C DURY AND ORS Applicants AND PALMERSTON NORTH CITY COUNCIL & ORS Respondents Court: Elias CJ, Blanchard and Tipping JJ Counsel: H F Drake, one of the Applicants in person J W Maassen for First Respondent G A Paine for Second and Third Respondents Judgment: 1 April 2008JUDGMENT OF THE COURT The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs of $1,000 to the first respondent and $1,000 jointly to the second and third respondents. REASONS[1] We have received and considered written submissions from all parties, including the further submissions dated 4 March 2008 from the applicants. It is not necessary to have an oral hearing in order to decide whether leave should be granted as it is plain that it should not be. The proposed grounds of appeal are either insufficiently arguable and/or fact specific, giving rise to no issue of public or general importance, i.e. no issue of concern to anyone other than the parties.Furthermore, there is no error in the Court of Appeal reasons sufficiently apparent and substantial as to give rise to a miscarriage of justice in a civil case. 1[2] The proposed appeal relates to a decision of the first respondent to proceed to hear and decide a resource consent application without notification. Since the High Court decision, which was in favour of the present applicants and was overturned by the Court of Appeal, the second and third respondents, the owner and lessee of the subject property, have obtained another resource consent after making a fresh and notified application to the Council. But that other consent imposes rather more restrictive conditions on the use of the property than does the original consent which has subsequently been restored by the decision of the Court of Appeal. [3] There may be a temporary awkwardness in having two extant consents but the second and third respondents were entitled to have the original consent restored in circumstances where it should not have been set aside by the High Court and the other consent was validly issued in the circumstances pertaining when that was done. The second and third respondents can now notify the Council under s 138 of the Resource Management Act 1991 that they are surrendering the other consent. If they do not do so, the original consent must be treated as the most recent (by reinstatement) and the second and third respondents would certainly be entitled to rely on it. [4] Contrary to the submissions of the applicants, in our view the Court of Appeal has not misinterpreted the decision of this Court in Discount Brands Ltd v Westfield (New Zealand) Ltd. 2 The relevant issue on the proposed appeal could only be whether that Court has misapplied Discount Brands in the particular circumstances of this case, where, the applicants assert, the Council dispensed with notification without having enough information about traffic movements and parking. That issue has no significance for anyone other than the parties and is of no public or general importance. Nor is it plain that the Court of Appeal has erred in this respect.1 Junior Farms Ltd v Hampton Securities Ltd (in liq) [2006] 3 NZLR 522n.2 [2005] 2 NZLR 597.[5] The refusal of the Court of Appeal to take into account evidence concerning traffic movements after the orthodontic practice commenced business was justifiable given that the validity of the non-notification decision had to be determined in light of the material considered or available to the Council at the time that decision was made. The proposed evidence from the neighbours could at best raise a concern that perhaps further enquiries by the Council at the time might have shown that there would be problems of the kind which are said to have arisen. But that is both speculative and fact specific. The Court of Appeal had a discretion concerning admission of the evidence and we are not persuaded it was wrongly exercised.Solicitors: Cooper Rapley, Palmerston North for First Respondent Bruce Andrews, Palmerston North for Second Respondents