G v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2019] NZHC 411

G v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2019] NZHC 411 [12 March 2019]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDROTORUA REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATE ROTORUA-NUI-A-KAHUMATAMOMOE ROHECRI 2018-463-122[2019] NZHC 411BETWEEN GAppellantAND NEW ZEALAND POLICERespondentHearing: 28 February 2019Counsel: J Temm for AppellantA McConachy for RespondentJudgment: 12 March 2019JUDGMENT OF DUFFY JThis judgment was delivered by me on 12 March 2019 at 12.30 pm pursuant toRule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.Registrar/ Deputy RegistrarSolicitors:Crown Solicitor, AucklandJonathan Temm, Barrister, Rotorua[1] G appeals against his sentence of 13 months two weeks imprisonmentfollowing his conviction on two charges of breaching a protection order.1 The sentencewas imposed on 29 November 2018.Facts and appealed sentenceFacts relevant to offending[2] The facts of the offending are taken from the police summaries of facts onwhich the two convictions rest. On occasion this has been supplemented by othermaterial provided for the appeal.2[3] G and the victim were in a relationship for approximately five years. Therelationship ended in 2015. He is now 29 years old. He would, therefore, have beenaround twenty or twenty-one years old when the relationship began.[4] The first child, T, was born on 22 April 2015.[5] On 16 May 2015 G assaulted the victim and was subsequently convicted on 17July 2015 of the offence of male assaults female, for which he received a sentence ofnine months' supervision with special conditions. Also, at that time, a final protectionorder was made prohibiting G from contacting his ex-partner as well as T.3[6] G and the victim now have two sons. The oldest child T would have been lessthan a month old at the time the protection order was made. The youngest child, A,was born on 6 February 2017, and so was conceived during the currency of theprotection order.[7] Since the protection order was made in July 2015 G has acquired threeconvictions for breaching this order.4 None of those breaches involved violence. Thefirst occurred on 24 November 2017 and resulted in the entry of conviction on 201 Domestic Violence Act 1995, S 49.2 For example, the police summary of facts states the protection order applies to both children. Infact the protection order names only one child though its legal effect may be to apply to bothchildren.3 G FAM 2015-069-000112; CRI 2015-069-0007 06.4 Convictions entered on 20 December 2017 and 03 July 2018.December 2017, at which time G was sentenced to one years' intensive supervision.Then on 24 June 2018 he committed two further breaches of the protection order,which led to conviction on 03 July 2018 and a further sentence of one years' intensivesupervision. It is on the same day that he was sentenced for this offending that hecommitted the first of the breaches now subject to this appeal against sentence.[8] Earlier on in 2018 the victim had seemingly allowed G to have supervisedcontact with his sons. In June 2018 the victim ended this contact and made it clearshe wanted no contact.[9] The first breach on 3 July 2018 arose from an incident that day when G arrivedat the victim's house unannounced and asked for a book.5 Then he left two handwrittenletters in the victim's unlocked motor vehicle.6 The sentencing Judge described oneof the letters as containing a "disturbing riddle", which reads as follows:A Bit of a riddle I might have all ready to you this oneA man goes to work in a 20 story building in the morning he catchs theellivator from the ground floor to the 10th then takes the stairs to the top floorbut when he finishs work he goes straight from the 20th to the ground floorwhy is this who is this manThis thing is made for you and only you and when you use it your dead. Whatis it[10] There is no evidence to establish whether the visit to the victim's home andleaving the two letters in her motor vehicle occurred before or after the sentencing thatday for the two breaches that occurred on 24 June 2018.[11] Approximately a week later G hand delivered two further letters the victim'shome address. These letters contain reference to his "addict nature" and his tendencyto force people to do as he wants. The following week a fifth letter arrived at thevictim's home, seemingly hand delivered as well because it was not in an envelope.Those last three letters fall outside the charge period for the 3 July 2018 offending,however, they were included in the summary of facts to which G pleaded guilty. So,5 A conviction on this offending was entered on 29 November 2018.6 The visit is described as an error by the appellant, based on a misunderstanding of the protectionorder. Judge Mackenzie rejected this explanation at [5].they provide evidence of a continuing course of conduct after this offence, whichamounts to an aggravating feature of the offending.[12] The second breach of the protection order occurred on Saturday 7 July 2018and arises from G's interaction with one of his sons who is also protected by theprotection order.7 On 6 July 2018, the previous day, the children's paternalgrandparents (G's parents) asked to have the two boys the following day (7 July 2018).They were told this was not possible because other plans had been made for them;they were going to be at their maternal aunt's home that day. The grandparentsaccepted this. Early on the morning of 7 July 2018 the victim took the boys to theirmaternal aunt's home. G arrived at 9.30am that day unannounced and uninvited; heentered the house where he was confronted by the aunty who told him he was notallowed to be there. He became agitated, gave one of the boys a cuddle and then leftabruptly in his car.Facts relevant to sentencing in the District Court[13] G's assigned legal aid counsel, Mr Roose, failed to appear at sentencing in theTaupo District Court, as he was delayed by a proceeding in the Rotorua District Court.His agent Mr Farquhar appeared instead on G's behalf after a short briefing by MrRoose.[14] At sentencing, Judge M A Mackenzie categorised the two breaches as serious.She considered the letters could only be interpreted as G wishing to "perpetuate seriouspsychological harm" on the victim and intimidate her. Further, the first breachhappened on the very day G appeared in Court for his second and third breaches ofprotection order.[15] Finally, the breaches were G's fourth and fifth breaches within a 12 monthperiod, and were committed while he was subject to a sentence designed to assist andrehabilitate.87 The conviction on this offence was also entered on 29 November 2018.8 New Zealand Police v G [2018] NZDC 25367 at [16].[16] Judge M A Mackenzie adopted a starting point of 15 months imprisonment.9The Judge considered the primary sentencing need to be personal deterrence, and thatallowing intensive supervision in combination with community detention, which iswhat the pre-sentence report recommended, was not the least restrictive outcome inthe circumstances. She noted that the previous community-based sentences had notdeterred G from further breaches.10[17] A discount of 10% for late guilty plea was applied, and no uplift was made forprior convictions as the relevant ones were the prior protection order breaches whichhad already been factored in when setting the starting point.11[18] In discussing whether to give an electronic sentence, Judge M A Mackenziedescribed the case as finely balanced, as G had a suitable address, was employed andwas undergoing further rehabilitative steps.12 However, she considered that becauseof the high level of culpability and the need for personal deterrence, that a full timecustodial sentence was the least restrictive outcome.13 Accordingly, G was sentencedto 13 months two weeks imprisonment.Arguments on appeal[19] G submits that the cause of the error in sentencing was G's assigned counselfailing to appear. Making no criticism of counsel who appeared, he notes that whatwas required was advocacy from counsel who was familiar with the facts. Instead,when assigned counsel was unable to appear, an adjournment should have been soughtand granted.[20] G notes that due to counsel being unprepared, the Judge over-emphasizedfactual matters in error. Specifically, in describing the letters as "dark and disturbing",containing "a disturbing riddle" and "wishing to perpetrate serious psychological harmon the victim". At the hearing an explanation for the riddles was advanced. The first9 At [15].10 At [23].11 This is the standard approach to sentencing for breach of protection order, as per Mitchell v R[2013] NZCA 583, (2013) 29 FRNZ 498 at [12]-[14] and [17].12 Above n 5 at [29].13 At [30].riddle related to a dwarf, who was not tall enough to press the elevator button for the20th floor and so had to walk from the 10th floor upwards but could readily reach theground floor button for the way down. The second riddle described a casket. G'scounsel for the appeal, Mr Temm, said that G and the victim had, when times werebetter between them, exchanged riddles. In this way G submits that explanations wereavailable which would have removed the Judge's concerns about the riddles.[21] Further, that the Judge paid no regard to the fact G had relocated to Rotorua,thus distancing himself from the victim who resides in Taupo. Finally, that the victimherself did not seek imprisonment, and had stated as much in her victim impactstatement.[22] Taking account of these errors, G submits that the Judge imposed a sentencethat was so out of line with comparable cases that it can properly be described asmanifestly excessive. Instead he contends that a shorter term of imprisonment shouldhave been imposed and then substituted with home detention or some othercommunity-based sentence. In this regard the pre-sentence report did not recommenda sentence of imprisonment and G and his address had been assessed as suitable foran electronically monitored sentence like home detention.[23] The Crown acknowledged the sentence to be stern, but within the permissiblerange of sentences for subsequent offending of this nature. The Crown identified theworst aspects of the behaviour to be: first, its repetitive nature, in this regard five letterswere delivered to the victim over a short period of time; secondly there were twounannounced visits by G one to the victim's home and the other to the aunt's homewhere the children were; and thirdly the first offence was committed on the day onwhich G was sentenced to intensive supervision in respect of the earlier offendingwhich had occurred on 24 June 2018.14 However, the Crown responsiblyacknowledged that the time of the offending on 3 July 2018 cannot be established andso whether the offending occurred before sentencing on that day cannot be excluded.14 The relevant sentence of intensive supervision was imposed on 3 July 2018 and the first offencenow subject to this appeal was committed on 3 July 2018.[24] The Crown drew attention to the comments of Katz J in Palmer v Police:15Sentencing decisions that relate to offending that occurred prior to 25September 2013 must therefore be treated with some caution, as they are likelyto have a lower starting point than would now be appropriate for comparableoffending. For that reason the three cases I refer to below for "benchmarking"purposes all post-date 25 September 2013.[25] Similar caution was adopted in in Edwards v Police.16Analysis[26] There has been no physical harm or threat of physical harm in this case.However, as the Court of Appeal recognised in Weidemann v R:17Breaches of protection orders are inherently serious. The psychological harmcaused to a complainant by a breach should not be understated.[27] Also important is the factual matrix of the offending; in Anderson v R the Courtof Appeal remarked:18Breaches of protection orders vary enormously in culpability and in degreesof threat and psychological or physical harm to the protected person. Eachcase hinges on its own facts.[28] Here the relevant factual matrix includes the following. First, the couple'searly relationship. G is now 29 years old. The relationship must have commencedwhen he was in his early twenties and it ended in his mid-twenties. The relationshipended shortly after the birth of T. For a man in his mid-twenties the end of a seriousrelationship, particularly not long after the birth of his child, can understandably betraumatic. He may have trouble accepting the relationship is truly at an end. This mayespecially be so when, as is the case here, the relationship is resumed and leads to thebirth of a second child.[29] The offending which first brought the relationship to an end (male assaultsfemale) resulted in a sentence of nine months' supervision with special conditions.This indicates the offence was not the most serious of this type of offending.15 Palmer v Police [2015] NZHC 143 at [16].16 Edwards v Police [2017] NZHC 2834 at [24].17 Weidemann v R [2018] NZCA 381 at [43].18 Anderson v R [2016] NZCA 346 at [26].[30] There is a chequered history of breaches of the protection order, which is notgood. The last four offences all occurred in mid-2018. The fact the first offence thatis the subject of this appeal happened the same day G was sentenced for an earlierbreach that occurred on 24 June 2018 is particularly concerning. This is what has ledthe Judge to conclude that the present sentence should weigh heavily towardsdeterrence and denunciation, because earlier sentences that were imposed with a viewto rehabilitation have seemingly been ineffective in bringing home to G the error ofhis conduct.[31] On the other hand, there are explanations for this offending which place G ina better light. First, the four recent offences are connected with the difficulties G haspresently had with access to his children. I consider the overall character of the lettersto be sad and remorseful rather than threatening. Whilst I acknowledge that they mustbe viewed within a domestic violence context, I note that throughout the letters Gcontinuously expresses his love for his children. As well as the "disturbing riddle",which his counsel sought to mitigate on appeal G attached a poem which he hadwritten about the children and expresses general sadness at not seeing them as muchas he would like to.[32] Secondly, although the victim refused to attend a restorative justice conferencein her impact report she opined that some mediation might help the two of them. Inthis regard she stated:I just want him to stop. I want him to focus on being a better Father, notfocusing on me. I have moved on.Some sit down meditation between us may help. I just don't know where hismindset is right now and I don't know if he is using any drugs.I think that he needs counselling to help him, I don't think prison will helphim and I don't want him to be locked up.[33] No explanation was available to me for why the victim did not want to attendrestorative justice but is seemingly prepared to sit down with G in a mediation todiscuss a way forward for them. However, what her statement in the impact reportdoes tell me is that she is not so fearful of G that she cannot engage with him in theright circumstances. Accordingly, the psychological harm in this case must not be asbad as it has been in other cases where psychological harm alone has been seen towarrant a stern sentence.[34] Thirdly, there is another aspect to the relationship of G and the victim. A wasconceived and born during the currency of the protection order. This suggests to methat there has been at least one time when the victim was prepared to put the protectionorder to the side and to have close contact with G.19 Such circumstances may go someway to explain why seemingly he has had difficulty accepting their relationship is atan end, and has been less respectful of the prohibitions the protection order imposesthan might otherwise be expected.[35] Fourthly, apart from the breaches of the protection order G's criminal historysuggests that he is someone who does learn from his errors. His first offendingoccurred on 3 November 2007, when he was 17 years old. On the one day he indulgedin a spree of offending which included three burglaries by night and one theft of amotor vehicle. He was convicted on 6 December 2007 and sentenced to communitywork, reparation and supervision. Then on 4 October 2009 when he was 19 years oldhe committed the offence of disorderly behaviour for which he convicted on 13October 2009 and was fined $300. After that he did not offend again until the maleassaults female against the victim in 2015. This informs me that, apart from thebreaches of the protection order G is someone who responds well to criminal sanctionsand who is readily deterred from further offending.[36] Accordingly, I view the breaches of the protection order as something that hasoccurred at a time when he has been emotionally vulnerable and therefore has lesscontrol over his conduct than he might otherwise do. The problems with having accessto his children can be addressed through engaging legal assistance in the Family Court,which will help to alleviate the pressures these problems have created for G. Theoccasional contact he has maintained with the victim may have led him to view theeffect of the protection order less seriously than he should have done. These aremitigating factors that were not drawn to the sentencing Judge's attention, when they19 The Crown correctly pointed out that the conditions of protection orders permit this occurrence.should have been. Had she known of these matters she may have taken a differentview of the appropriate sentence to impose.[37] Moreover, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment resulted in Gserving 51 days of that sentence, which he found a salutary experience. Since then hehas spent 41 days on electronically monitored bail (EM bail) with a 24 hour curfew.Thus, he has had sufficient opportunity to reflect on the wisdom of his conduct. Hehas now re-located from Taupo to Rotorua so there is less opportunity for him tocontact the victim in the way he did before. These are new factors post sentence thatsuggest G has gained new insight into his offending and is less likely to re-offend inthe future.[38] Regarding comparable cases, I consider the sentence of 13 months and twoweeks imprisonment to be beyond the length of sentence imposed in circumstancessimilar to G's. I acknowledge that cases that post-date the increase of the maximumpenalty for breach of a protection order are the most relevant. However, when Iconsider cases that have resulted in terms of imprisonment longer than 12 months Ifind the circumstances of the offending and the offenders to be more serious than isthe case here.[39] The Crown refers to the case of Carlyon v Police.20 Mr Carlyon was sentencedto 18 months' imprisonment for two breaches of a protection order and one breach ofa non-association order. Mr Carlyon appealed the sentence on the grounds that it wasmanifestly excessive. Mr Carlyon had 56 previous convictions, including ones forassault, damage and trespass. Further, he had 11 convictions for breaches of protectionorders. The breaches arose out of two visits by Mr Carlyon to his ex-partner's housein breach of a final protection order. On the first visit Mr Carlyon hid behind the doorand when spotted by his ex-partner, began "ranting and raving" at her. Mr Carlyoneventually left, but located his ex-partner at her friend's house. When the ex-partnerleft that house, he called her and threatened to go to her house and "boot the door in"and spoke abusively to her. After the ex-partner returned home with her daughter,Mr Carlyon arrived at the house and threatened the ex-partner if she refuse to hand20 Carlyon v Police [2017] NZHC 2526.over her phone. She repeatedly told him to leave, which he refused to do, and insteadwent to sleep in one of the bedrooms.[40] The High Court described the Sentencing Judge's categorisation of theoffending as "not particularly serious" as perhaps unduly favourable, but considered astarting point of 18 months' imprisonment to be within the permissible range for astarting point.21[41] I do not consider Carlyon to be comparable. First, the protection orderbreaches by G are substantially less serious. Mr Carlyon was abusive, threatening andcontrolling in his breaches towards his ex-partner. He arrived, and remained at herhouse despite requests to leave. He threatened to "boot her head in" if she did notrelinquish her phone for him to search. G has done nothing of the sort. His breachesare entirely absent the abusive and controlling nature present in Mr Carlyon'sbreaches. Second, Mr Carlyon had substantially more prior breaches of protectionorder. This is exacerbated by his lengthy violent history, including towards his ex-partner. While G does have prior convictions and prior breaches, they are notcomparable to those of Mr Carlyon.[42] The Crown also drew my attention to Irvine v Police.22 Mr Irvine wassentenced to eight months' imprisonment for two breaches of a protection order. Heappealed to the High Court on the grounds that the sentence was manifestly excessive.The breach involved 23 telephone calls over a period of about two days. Mr Irvinethen went to the victim's house, where he banged on the window of the house andsubsequently left the property. These were his only breaches of the protection order.The offending occurred whilst subject to sentence, and Mr Irvine had a historyincluding assault and violence, and breaches of community work. The District CourtJudge had adopted a starting point of 10 months' imprisonment. This was consideredto be at the upper limit of the appropriate range.23 I consider G's offending to besimilar to that of Mr Irvine. However, I consider an important factor differentiatingthe two is the actions taken by Mr Irvine in persistently calling his victim, and banging21 At [24]. The appeal was successful, but on the ground of the District Court Judge applying aninappropriately high uplift for prior offending.22 Irvine v Police [2017] NZHC 3085.23 At [17].on the window of her house. Those actions are inherently more intrusive than G'soffending, as they amount to an attempt by Mr Irvine to force his victim to have contactwith him. The act of leaving a letter is not quite as intrusive, and for that I considerG's offending to be slightly less serious. Also, Mr Irvine's criminal history was moreserious than G's.[43] The Crown submissions referred to Turner v Police.24 Mr Turner wassentenced to 13 months' imprisonment for one breach of a protection order. He had alengthy criminal history, involving violence and 11 previous convictions for breachingprotection orders. This particular breach involved sending a text message. Themessage accused his ex-partner of being a lying cheating evil person. Mr Turnerdemanded answers from the victim for why she had stolen his daughter from him and"destroyed" him. The District Court Judge rightly described this sort of behaviour asequally as damaging as a physical assault.25 The victim impact statement stated thatshe had suffered for years from Mr Turner's psychological abuse and his need forcontrol. Brewer J, allowing the appeal, remarked that a starting point of 14-15 months'imprisonment would be appropriate.26[44] I consider Mr Turner's offending to be substantially more serious than G's, andthat entirely different sentencing principles are invoked. As pointed out in Turner,there was a strong need to emphasize personal deterrence to Mr Turner. He had alengthy history of breaching protection orders. In contrast, as discussed above, Iconsider that G has been responsive to court sanctions. Further, while both Mr Turnerand G's offending involve no violence, the controlling and psychologically abusiveelements of Mr Turner's offending are absent from that of G. Similarly, Mr G's victimappears entirely indifferent to the offending. In contrast, Mr Turner's victim wasprofoundly affected by his offending.[45] Finally, the Crown made submissions on Bartlett v Police.27 In that case,Mr Bartlett pleaded guilty to two charges of breaching a protection order and one ofbreaching prison release conditions. He appealed against the refusal of the District24 Turner v Police [2017] NZHC 1113.25 At [5].26 At [30].27 Bartlett v Police [2016] NZHC 850.Court Judge to commute his sentence of 11 months' imprisonment to one of homedetention. The offending arose out of two incidents. First, Mr Bartlett went to hisvictim's workplace and began abusing her. He left when the police were called, butcalled his victim afterwards and continued to verbally abuse her. Second, about twoweeks later he emailed her asking her to contact him. In refusing to commute thesentence to one of home detention, Davidson J emphasized that the primaryconsiderations were deterrence and denunciation.28 However, these comments mustbe seen within the context of Mr Bartlett's offending. Davidson J considered thatMr Bartlett "demonstrated a complete inability or unreadiness to comply withprotection orders, [and an] ability to comply with other kinds of court order".29 I makeno such finding about G. Furthermore, it is possible to adequately achieve deterrencethrough a sentence of home detention.[46] The appellant has referred me to Hart v Police.30 In Hart, there was one breachof a protection order by sending text messages. The text messages threatened todisclose the "dirty secrets" of the victim. Mr Hart did not have any recent convictions,and it was his first breach. Whata J found the sentence of 60 hours community workand nine months intensive supervision was "broadly proportionate with the offending"but reduced the community work to 40 hours.31 I consider G's offending to be moreserious than that of Mr Hart. Unlike Mr Hart, G has previous breaches of theprotection order. As discussed above, prior breaches of a protection order areimportant in determining the gravity of the offending.[47] Among the cases referred to by the appellant is R v Mitchell.32 I consider thiscase, alongside Irvine, to be the most helpful. In Mitchell, Ms Mitchell was convictedof four counts of breaching a protection order. The breaches involved leaving voicemail messages for her former partner. She had a substantial history of breachingprotection orders. The sentencing Judge described the offending as falling within a"category of its own". Nevertheless, the unthreatening nature of the voicemails meant28 At [28].29 At [27].30 [2014] NZHC 2741.31 At [21]. A lot of the cases referred to related to offending before the maximum sentence wasincreased in 2013.32 R v Mitchell [2015] NZCA 442, (2015) 30 FRNZ 534.that the current offending was regarded as not particularly serious. A starting point ofeight months' imprisonment was regarded as "towards the top of the range",33 althoughit was reduced to four months imprisonment to reflect totality.34 The case is indicativeof the principle that while the breaching of a protection order may be inherentlyserious, the number of breaches of a protection order alone does not justify a lengthysentence of imprisonment.[48] I am satisfied that an appropriate starting point here would have beensomewhere between eight and nine months' imprisonment.35 Once the discount of10% for the guilty plea is accounted for an end sentence of imprisonment between justover seven or eight months would result. This shows the sentence imposed on G inthe District Court to be one that was manifestly excessive. Accordingly, I am satisfiedthe appeal against sentence should be allowed.[49] The next question is whether the end sentence should be commuted to one ofhome detention.[50] Following sentence on 29 November 2018 G served 51 days of his sentence.He was then released on electronically monitored bail (EM bail) with a 24-hourcurfew. This has lasted for 41 days to the date of the appeal hearing.[51] Accordingly, G has been on EM bail at his present address now forapproximately 50 days. It is an appropriate address from which to serve a sentence ofhome detention. He has not breached his bail conditions.[52] I have concluded that the present sentence of imprisonment should be reducedto eight months, which means that G would only serve half of that term. Beforesentencing in the District Court he was employed as a concrete worker. He has notbeen to prison before. I consider the prospects of his rehabilitation would be moreoptimistic if he were to remain out of prison. For many young Maori men like G aterm of imprisonment only leads to further such terms.33 At [25].34 At [22].35 I note that in Irvine which is one of the more comparable cases this Court considered the 10 monthstarting point to be at the upper limit of the appropriate range.[53] Further, as the Court of Appeal observed in R v Hill a sentence of homedetention is recognised to have acknowledged advantages including low rates of re-conviction and re-imprisonment, high compliance rates and positive support foroffenders' reintegration and rehabilitation.36 G's early positive response to the earlysentences he received in 2007 and 2009 demonstrate that he is someone who can learnfrom his mistakes. I have every confidence that if a sentence of home detention isimposed on him now he will respond positively.[54] The period of home detention imposed often equates to the time that wouldactually be spent in serving a short sentence of imprisonment, although there is norequirement for this to be so. Sometimes the period can be slightly longer inrecognition that home detention is not exactly comparable with imprisonment.[55] Here I consider a term of between four and five months' home detention wouldhave been appropriate. Given 51 days of the sentence of imprisonment have beenserved I consider the period of home detention should be around four months'imprisonment as this recognises the harsher impact of time spent in prison. I alsoconsider that the time spent on EM bail with an electronic curfew is the equivalent oftime spent on home detention. The restriction on liberty has been the same in this casegiven the 24-hour curfew. Taking all matters into account, I consider that anappropriate sentence of home detention is one that would have run from the date ofsentencing on 29 November 2018 to around 1 April 2019. When this is taken fromthe date of delivery of the judgment on the appeal the period of home detention isreduced to approximately three weeks.Result[56] The appeal against sentence is allowed. The sentence of thirteen months andtwo weeks imprisonment is set aside.[57] G is sentenced to three weeks home detention to commence from the date ofdelivery of this judgment.36 R v Hill [2008] NZCA 41, [2008] 2 NZLR 381 at [33].[58] He is subject to the standard conditions for sentences of home detention.Duffy J