JINDAL v SIEPRATH [2022] NZHC 2130

JINDAL v SIEPRATH [2022] NZHC 2130 [25 August 2022]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDAUCKLAND REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHECIV-2022-404-1084[2022] NZHC 2130UNDER District Court Act 2016, Lawyers andConveyancers Act 2006BETWEEN GAUTAM JINDALAppellantAND J L SIEPRATH, N W WOODS,S A HUNTER, P T O'HALLORAN,H A HERMAN and P L NORTON (a lawfirm partnership trading as Rice Craig) of8-10 Queen Street Papakura AKLRespondentsRemote hearing: 25 August 2022Appearances: Appellant in personN W Woods in personDate of judgment: 25 August 2022JUDGMENT OF JAGOSE JThis judgment was delivered by me on 25 August 2022 at 2.00pm.Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.Registrar/Deputy RegistrarCopy to:AppellantRice Craig, Auckland[1] Gautam Jindal appeals the 27 June 2022 decision of Judge N R Dawson in theDistrict Court at Papakura, holding Mr Jindal's affirmative defence "does not establishthat this court does not have jurisdiction" and requiring the registry to set the matterdown for a half-day hearing, now allocated a back-up fixture for 20 September 2022.Background[2] The respondents practice as a law firm, in which capacity they invoicedMr Jindal. He has not paid the invoice. They issued proceedings in the District Courtfor payment. Mr Jindal's defence included the allegation the respondents' conduct wasin breach of their professional obligations under the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act2006 and the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care)Rules 2008, and therefore the respondents "should not be allowed to claim fee[s] for'regulated services'". Mr Jindal contended such was effective to remove theproceeding from the District Court's jurisdiction, on which basis he sought theproceeding be struck out.[3] The Judge's impugned decision illustrates he plainly disagreed. On appeal,Mr Jindal complains his application was not heard in accordance with the DistrictCourt Rules 2014; the Judge gave no reasons for his decision; and wrongly assumedjurisdiction to deal with matters arising under the 2006 Act and 2008 Rules.Approach on appeal[4] Appeals to this Court from the District Court are general appeals conducted byway of rehearing,1 in which the appellant bears the onus of satisfying me I shoulddiffer from the District Court's decision. I only am justified in interfering with thatdecision if I consider the decision is wrong — in other words, the Judge erred.2[5] I then am to come to my own assessment of the merits of the case afresh,without deference to the District Court (save for some caution in differing on witnesscredibility, when I have not had the advantage of observing the witnesses).3 I may rely1 District Court Act 2016, ss 124 and 127.2 Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2007] NZSC 103, [2008] 2 NZLR 141 at [13].3 At [13].on the Judge's reasons in reaching my own conclusions, but the weight I give thosereasons is a matter for me.4[6] To the extent the decision involved exercise of the Judge's discretion, I onlymay interfere with it if the appellant establishes the Judge acted on wrong principle,did not address relevant matters or took into account irrelevant matters, or was "plainlywrong".5[7] After hearing the appeal I may make any decision I think should have beenmade, or direct the District Court to rehear the proceeding or consider and determineany particular matter.6Discussion[8] As a substantive appeal, Mr Jindal's complaints the Judge's conductprocedurally was unfair, for failing to deal with his strike out applicationas "unopposed" or to give reasons, do not carry much weight. In any event, nothingbefore me indicates the respondents "stated on the application or in a memorandumfiled in the court that the respondent consents to, or does not oppose, the orders soughtin the application".7 And absence of reasons is mitigated by my consideration "afresh".[9] I do not consider the Judge's substantive decision is at all wrong. Although thebundle of documents for the appeal do not include the respondents' claim,it abundantly is clear from the admissions in Mr Jindal's defence the claim is one indebt for $999. That plainly falls within the District Court's civil jurisdiction.8[10] By definition, an affirmative defence cannot be effective to oust jurisdiction.Rather, as a defence to a claim brought within jurisdiction, it relies upon facts beyondthe admissions and denials of the facts pleaded in the claim, properly to define the4 Kacem v Bashir [2010] NZSC 112, [2011] 2 NZLR 1 at [31].5 May v May (1982) 1 NZFLR 165 (CA); and Blackstone v Blackstone [2008] NZCA 312, (2008)19 PRNZ 40.6 District Court Act 2016, s 128.7 District Court Rules 2014, r 7.308 Section 74.issues for the court's determination.9 If Mr Jindal's point instead is the District Courtlacked jurisdiction to determine his allegations of the respondents' breach of theirprofessional obligations, he should not have raised them.10 The Judge did not err.Result[11] The appeal is dismissed.Costs[12] As the unsuccessful party, Mr Jindal is liable to pay the respondents costs. Therespondents generously seek only 2B costs and disbursements. I order their payment.—Jagose J9 Manukau Golf Club Inc v Shoye Venture Ltd [2012] NZCA 154, (2012) 21 PRNZ 235 at [21]–[22].10 Bridgecorp Management Services Ltd (in receivership) v Roest HC Auckland CIV-2008-404-3013, 14 September 2009 at [11].