SANSON v MINISTRY OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES [2023] NZHC 780

SANSON v MINISTRY OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES [2023] NZHC 780 [6 April 2023]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDPALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATE PAPAIOEA ROHECRI-2023-454-000005[2023] NZHC 780BETWEEN GEOFFREY JAMES SANSONAppellantAND MINISTRY OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIESRespondentHearing: 5 April 2023Appearances: P L Murray for the AppellantA M Barham for the RespondentJudgment: 6 April 2023JUDGMENT OF GRICE JIntroduction[1] The appellant, Mr Geoffrey Sanson, was sentenced in the Palmerston NorthDistrict Court, jointly with his brother, Mr Richard Sanson, on the following charges:1(a) reckless ill-treatment of animals (x2);2(b) failing to comply with s 10 of the Animal Welfare Act 1999 (x7);3(c) failing to comply with s 11 of the Animal Welfare Act;4 and1 Ministry of Primary Industries v Sanson [2023] NZDC 3679 [sentencing decision].2 Animal Welfare Act 1999, ss 28A(1)(c) and (3)(a) — maximum penalty three years' imprisonmentand $75,000 fine.3 Sections 12(a) and 25(a) — maximum penalty 12 months' imprisonment and $50,000 fine.4 Sections 12(b) and 25(a) — maximum penalty 12 months' imprisonment and $50,000 fine(d) transporting an animal unfit for transport.5[2] On 24 February 2023, Judge Northwood sentenced the appellant to one yearand 10 months' imprisonment.6 The sentencing followed a sentence indication earliergiven by the Judge on 22 June 2022 indicating a sentence of two years and 10 months'imprisonment across all offences, with the possibility of further discounts.7[3] The appellant now appeals his sentence on the basis it is manifestly excessive.In particular, the appellant submits:(a) the Judge provided inadequate discounts for further mitigating factors,including the appellant's remorse, reduced culpability, previous goodcharacter, and other personal matters, leading to an end sentenceimposed that was too high; and(b) the Judge should have imposed a sentence of home detention.[4] In respect of the first ground of appeal, the respondent submits the Judge gaveadequate consideration to each mitigating factor and made no error in weighing themas he did. The respondent says the decisions the Judge made in relation to thediscounts to be applied and not applied were open to him.[5] In respect of the second ground of appeal, the respondent accepts the Judgemight have given disproportionate weight to imprisonment as the only sentence thatcould address the sentencing purposes. However, the respondent submits that asentence of imprisonment was open to the Judge, given his finding that the offendingwas within the most serious category of its kind.Background and sentencing[6] The offending in this case involved the reckless ill-treatment of a large numberof animals being farmed on farms owned and managed by the appellant and the5 Sections 23(2)(c) and s 25(a) — maximum penalty 12 months' imprisonment and $50,000 fine.6 Sentencing decision, above n 1, at [80]–[84].7 Ministry for Primary Industries v Sanson [2022] NZDC 10876 [sentencing indication].appellant's brother.8 Of the 3,995 sheep being farmed across the three properties thatwere able to be assessed (of 4,251 in total), 1,965 were in unacceptable healthconditions, 460 of which in such poor body condition they had to be euthanised.9 Ofthe 126 cattle across the three properties, 86 were in unacceptable health conditions,four of which had to be euthanised.10 In total, 2,096 animals on the three propertiesowned and operated by the appellant and his brother were in unacceptable healthcondition, 464 of which had to be euthanised.11[7] The sentencing followed a sentence indication provided on 22 June 2022, inwhich the Judge indicated a starting point for the animal welfare offending of twoyears and 10 months' imprisonment.12 The Judge indicated a 25 per cent reduction ifguilty pleas were entered and further reductions and adjustments to the sentence werelikely depending on the outcome of reports and submissions.[8] At sentencing, the Judge recorded they had since received that additionalmaterial.13 As the Judge noted, these included a pre-sentence report recommending asentence of home detention, 13 personal references, a medical report, a psychologicalassessment, and a letter expressing remorse.14[9] The Judge recorded the Ministry's position that even if the further discountsresulted in an end sentence below 24 months' imprisonment, the sentence imposedshould nevertheless be a term of imprisonment, not home detention.15[10] Prior to considering the sentence, the Judge noted:16 It is important to return to the basics and review exactly what happenedand why we are here. This matter involves the reckless ill-treatment of anunprecedented number of farm animals over an extended period. Theoffending occurred in the face of previous interventions by the Ministry ofPrimary Industries and a failure to implement lawful directives by them 8 In respect of the appellant's brother, there was also an associated aggravated assault charge, forwhich he was ultimately convicted and sentenced.9 Sentencing indication, above n 7, at [13].10 At [14].11 At [15].12 At [2].13 Sentencing decision, above n 1, at [5] and [7].14 At [11]–[25].15 At [10].16 At [36].[11] The Judge continued:[37] It is important to recall some of the factors that the prosecution pullstogether in its summary of facts. The failings on the farm included massiveoverstocking and serious underfeeding. Poor infrastructure was foundtogether with the lack of stockproof fencing and insufficient reticulated stockwater supply. Differing classes of stock were being run together with noregard for their differing physical and health needs. Animals were chronicallyunderfed, particularly ewes and lambs. There was ineffective parasite controland diseases and injuries were not being treated. Sheep had not been culledfor undershot jaws or for having low or no teeth. There was low or no fertiliserapplication. There was an absence of and unwillingness to have an effectivemeans of euthanasia on the farms. Pasture levels were far higher onneighbouring properties and that was simply established by looking at thoseproperties rather than anything more being required. Fencing, waterreticulation and pasture damage reflected a history of prolonged deterioration.[12] The Judge found that this offending was within the most serious category of itskind. As the Judge stated, it had been "hard to find a more serious case and indeedothers that may have involved a handful of animals have been considered serious, yethere we have a matter involving thousands and over 400 deaths."17[13] The Judge noted the decision in Williamson v R, involving six charges of wilfulill-treatment of six horses which were ultimately euthanised after suffering frommalnourishment and parasites.18 The sentencing Judge imposed a sentence of 16months' imprisonment, declining to impose a sentence of home detention, which wasupheld by the Court of Appeal.[14] The Judge noted that case could be distinguished on the basis it involvedwilfulness and recklessness, but that that distinction "fade[d] into the background"given only six horses were involved in that case, unlike the large number of animalsin this matter.19[15] The Judge noted that although the choice by the prosecution to bring chargesof recklessness had "necessarily resulted in less serious charges in themselves", thefacts of the offending in this case made "the totality of this situation very serious and,indeed, at the upper range of seriousness."20 The Judge found a high level of17 At [38].18 At [39], citing Williamson v R [2015] NZCA 621.19 At [40].20 At [41].recklessness in this case, given the extended period over which the Ministry had todeal with animal welfare issues on the defendants' properties.21 The Judge found thatalthough the defendants were on notice that things at the farm were not good enoughand had to improve, they did not.22[16] The Judge rejected arguments raised by the defendants that the offending wasbrought on by drought or COVID-19 lockdown restrictions. Given the "strong andsubstantial pasture growth" and "excellent grass cover" at adjoining farms at the time,it was clear the extent to which there were poor pastoral conditions and insufficientfeed on the property was due to the "completely inappropriate" number of livestockbeing grazed on the farms, about which the defendants did nothing.23 Similarly, if,due to the COVID-19 restrictions, the defendants could not move or dispose of thestock by stock sales, they were obliged to humanely euthanise the animals, rather thanleaving them to starve.24 The obligation was on the defendants to take steps to removestock where necessary and deal with issues preventing them from doing so.[17] The prosecution sought a prohibition against the defendants farmingproduction animals of any kind. The Judge reviewed the purposes behind the AnimalWelfare Act and considered this was a "clear case" for disqualifying the defendantsfrom holding or obtaining farm production animals on an indefinite basis.25 The Judgemade the order accordingly.[18] The Judge then ordered costs against the defendants for costs reasonablyincurred in respect of veterinary treatment and the costs of destroying the animals inthe same manner as a fine in the amount of $9,054.50 with respect to each defendant.26[19] Against the sentencing indication of two years and 10 months' imprisonment,the Judge applied a 25 per cent discount for guilty plea, a reduction of eight-and-a-halfmonths, resulting in a sentence of two years and one-and-a-half months'21 At [42].22 At [42].23 At [44] and [59].24 At [46]–[47].25 At [49].26 At [50]–[51].imprisonment.27 By way of further reductions, the Judge was not persuaded to providefurther discounts due to the circumstances of COVID-19 or drought conditions.28 TheJudge also declined to reduce the sentence on the basis of the defendants' previousgood character, personal stresses and circumstances or expressions of remorse.29However, the Judge was prepared to reduce the starting points by 10 per cent onaccount of the defendants' poor health and the rigors on the two defendants, both beingin their sixties, of a sentence of imprisonment.30[20] This brought the appellant's sentence to one year and 10 months'imprisonment. The Judge declined to convert that sentence into a sentence of homedetention. The Judge considered the nominated sentencing purposes may not be metby a sentence other than imprisonment, and that no sentence other than imprisonmentwould be consistent with applying the following sentencing principles, namely thegravity of the offending in this case, including the appellant's degree of culpability orresponsibility, the seriousness of the type of offence when compared with other typesof offences, and the fact the offending represented a case within the most seriouscategory of its kind.31Approach to appeal[21] The appellant submits the end sentence imposed was manifestly excessive anda sentence of home detention ought to have been imposed.[22] An appeal against sentence is an appeal against a discretion and must only beallowed if the Court is satisfied that, for any reason, there was an error in the sentenceimposed and a different sentence should have been imposed.32 The Court must dismissthe appeal in any other case.3327 At [52].28 At [58]–[59].29 At [60]–[67].30 At [68].31 At [78].32 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [26]–[27].33 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(3).[23] In an appeal against sentence, an appellate court will not intervene unless asentence was outside the range available to the sentencing Judge.34 The focus is onthe final sentence and whether that was in the available range, rather than the exactprocess by which it was reached.35 An appellate court must therefore exercise anappropriate degree of restraint and will intervene only where the sentence imposed is"manifestly excessive" on the basis of some material error so that a different sentenceshould be imposed.36First point on appeal — insufficient discounts provided[24] Under the first point on appeal, the appellant submits the Judge erred in givinginsufficient weight to a number of mitigating factors raised by the appellant and failingto award discounts in respect of them.Culpability[25] The appellant submits there was a clear evidential basis to distinguish betweenthe culpability of the two defendants and the Judge erred in concluding he could notoverlook the fact that the appellant was also involved in the management of the farms.[26] I agree with the respondent's submission that separate levels of culpability is afactor to be assessed at the first stage of the sentencing exercise when setting thestarting point. This has been confirmed in Patel v R, in which the Court of Appealstated that when fixing a starting point the Court must have regard to the gravity of theoffending, which entails consideration of the nature of the offending, the offender'sculpability, the extent of the damage, harm or danger to the community caused by theoffender's conduct and any other aggravating or mitigating factors relevant toculpability.37[27] This is the basis on which the sentencing indication, which was accepted,proceeded. Though the culpability of the defendants might have been different, thiswas a matter for fixing the starting points at the first stage of sentencing, in providing34 Tutakangahau, above n 32, at [36].35 Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15]; and Tutakangahau, above n 32, at [36].36 Kumar v R [2015] NZCA 460 at [81]; and Tutakangahau, above n 32, at [32].37 Patel v R [2017] NZCA 234 at [34].a sentencing indication. The Judge did not err in declining to provide a furtherdiscount at the second stage of the sentencing exercise when considering adjustmentsto be applied to that starting point.Remorse[28] A discount for remorse separately from any guilty plea discount is of courseavailable.38 However, an assessment of genuine remorse over a bare acceptance ofresponsibility is a matter of fact and judgement, and the defendant bears the onus ofshowing it is genuine.39 The Judge considered all relevant material pertaining to theappellant's remorse, including his comments to the psychologist and PAC reportwriter, which the Judge considered directly contradicted his letter of remorse atsentencing.40 The Judge was explicitly open to the possibility of providing a discountfor remorse with respect to the appellant, but ultimately found he was unable to acceptthe appellant's expression of remorse.41 I do not consider the Judge erred in reachingthis conclusion and consequently declining to provide any reduction as a result.Previous good character[29] I am also satisfied there was no error in the Judge's decision declining toprovide a discount for the appellant's previous good character. Admittedly, the Judgeought to have dealt with the appellant's personal references separately from hisdiscussion of the appellant's brother. Nevertheless, I am satisfied the Judge'sconclusions on this point were sound. I also note that, as the Crown submitted, thehistory of concern over animal welfare on the farm does not indicate a positive historyof behaviour when it came to animals, as opposed to good character in general terms.[30] The Judge noted he could not and did not treat the defendants' past behaviouras if they were previous convictions, and that he could not and did not increase thestarting point to take those factors into account.42 But as the Judge said, "the absenceof a conviction [resulting from the appellant's previous interactions with MPI] does38 Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607 at [64]; and Moses v R [2020] NZCA 296,[2020] 3 NZLR 583 at [24].39 Moses v R, above n 38, at [24].40 Sentencing decision, above n 1, at [66].41 At [65]–[67].42 At [61].not mean that what happened prior to 2020 should be disregarded."43 The Judgeconsidered that the fact that the defendants were "appalling farmers [who] deeplymaltreated" their animals overrode the fact that the appellant was "clearly well thoughtof" in his own community.44 I am satisfied that the Judge's conclusions were clearlyreasoned and the decision not to reduce the appellant's sentence on the basis of hisprevious good character sound.Other personal factors[31] The appellant also submits the Judge ought to have provided discounts inrespect of other personal factors, including the death of the appellant's mother,improved farming practices and impact from COVID-19 restrictions and droughtconditions.[32] I am satisfied the Judge considered each personal factor properly and made noerror in declining to provide any discount for any of these factors. The Judge notedthe impact of the death of the appellant's mother on the appellant but was entitled torefuse to accept, against the longstanding animal welfare problems, that this wascausative of the offending. The Judge's conclusions as to the impact of drought andCOVID-19 restrictions were also sound. Given the satisfactory pasture growth in therelevant area at the time, the Judge was entitled to adopt the conclusion of theveterinarian that the poor condition of the properties was due to the defendants havinga "completely inappropriate" number of livestock being grazed on the farms.45 As theJudge also correctly noted in respect of the COVID-19 restrictions, the obligation wason the defendants to humanely euthanise the animals if they could not dispose of themby stock sales (notwithstanding that stock sales remained available at the relevant timeas they were essential businesses), and in any case the suffering of the animals beganlong before the commencement of the lockdown in March 2020.46 Overall, the Judgesummarised the point well in describing the farming disaster as "avoidable and a43 At [62].44 At [60] and [62].45 At [44] and [59].46 At [47].long time coming."47 The Judge made no error in declining to provide a discount inrespect of these factors.Conclusion on first point on appeal[33] I am satisfied the Judge properly considered each personal mitigating factor inturn, and provided 25 per cent and 10 per cent discounts appropriately to recognise theappellant's guilty plea and poor health respectively. I do not consider the Judge erredin declining to make any further adjustments by way of discounts.Second point on appeal — failure to commute sentence to home detention[34] The second point raised on appeal is that the Judge erred in declining to convertthe sentence to a sentence of home detention. The appellant submits imprisonmentwas not the only way to achieve the relevant sentencing purposes, and the Judge wasrequired to impose the least restrictive outcome available in the circumstances whichwould achieve the purposes of sentencing.[35] Ms Barham for the Crown accepts it is not clear from the sentencing noteswhether the Judge took into account the indefinite disqualification from farming whenassessing whether a sentence of home detention was appropriate. However, therespondent says the purposes of sentencing require something more than an indefinitedisqualification. The respondent says that given the Judge's finding that the offendingwas within the most serious of its kind, the Judge's finding that no sentence other thanimprisonment would be consistent with the principles of sentencing was available tothe Judge.[36] Section 16 of the Sentencing Act provides:16 Sentence of imprisonment(1) When considering the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment forany particular offence, the court must have regard to the desirabilityof keeping offenders in the community as far as that is practicable andconsonant with the safety of the community.47 At [63].(2) The court must not impose a sentence of imprisonment unless it issatisfied that,—(a) a sentence is being imposed for all or any of the purposes insection 7(1)(a) to (c), (e), (f), or (g); and(b) those purposes cannot be achieved by a sentence other thanimprisonment; and(c) no other sentence would be consistent with the application ofthe principles in section 8 to the particular case.[37] The nominated purposes under s 7(1) are the following:(a) to hold the offender accountable for harm done to the victim and thecommunity by the offending; or(b) to promote in the offender a sense of responsibility for, and anacknowledgment of, that harm; or(c) to provide for the interests of the victim of the offence; or(e) to denounce the conduct in which the offender was involved; or(f) to deter the offender or other persons from committing the same or asimilar offence; or(g) to protect the community from the offender [38] In considering whether to impose either a sentence of imprisonment or a lessersentence, a sentencing Judge must therefore consider and set out whether a sentenceshort of imprisonment could achieve the relevant purposes and principles ofsentencing.[39] In this case, the Judge considered that "the least restrictive outcome is arguablyhome detention".48 However, the Judge determined that imprisonment was the onlyway one or more of the nominated sentencing purposes could be achieved. The Judgenoted those purposes were the need to hold the appellant accountable for the harmdone, to promote in the appellant a sense of responsibility, to denounce the appellant'sconduct, to deter others and the appellant from committing the same or a similaroffence, or "possibly to protect the community" from the appellant.4948 At [77].49 At [77].[40] The Judge considered no sentence other than imprisonment was consistentwith applying the following principles of sentencing, namely the gravity of theoffending, including the appellant's degree of culpability or responsibility, theseriousness of the type of offence when compared with other types of offences, andthe fact the offending represented a case within the most serious category of its kind.50[41] I have reached the view, however, that the Judge erred in finding that only asentence of imprisonment could achieve these purposes and principles. I consider theJudge erred in concluding that a sentence of home detention would be insufficient tomeet these purposes and principles. In the circumstances, I consider the leastrestrictive sentence available was one of home detention, and that to impose a sentenceof imprisonment here was manifestly excessive and a difference sentence should havebeen imposed.[42] Where home detention is available, the Court must make a considered andprincipled choice, identifying which sentence is the least restrictive taking into accountall the purposes of sentencing.51 The Judge accepted that home detention was"arguably" the least restrictive outcome in the circumstances, but felt unable to imposesuch a sentence for the reasons described. However, I consider that in reaching hisconclusions, the Judge failed to take into account adequately the effect of the indefinitedisqualification from farming, in combination with which a sentence of homedetention would have achieved the purposes and principles of sentencing.[43] The respondent accepts the imposition of such an indefinite disqualification isa full answer to protecting the relevant "community", here being other animals. Therespondent also accepts the indefinite disqualification is relevant to holding theappellant accountable for the harm done, promoting in the appellant a sense ofresponsibility and acknowledgement of that harm, denouncing the appellant's conduct,and deterring both the appellant and others from such offending.[44] I consider that the indefinite disqualification in combination with a sentence ofhome detention would achieve all the relevant purposes and principles of sentencing.50 At [78].51 Fairbrother v R [2013] NZCA 340 at [30].[45] In terms of personal deterrence, I consider imprisonment will serve no furtherpurpose of deterring the appellant from offending again than the disqualification andhome detention would. Given the disqualification, the appellant will never again bein a position to commit offences of this nature.[46] In terms of general deterrence, I consider such a disqualification by itself isenough, and sufficient to prevent others from offending in a similar way, given that iffound to have engaged in such offending it would mean they would never be able tofarm again. Imprisonment is not also necessary.[47] Imprisonment is undoubtedly a strong denunciation of this clearlyreprehensible conduct. However, home detention is a severe sentence in its own right,and as the Court of Appeal has acknowledged, a sentence of home detention carries aconsiderable measure of deterrence and denunciation.52 Although it is important suchgross and inhumane behaviour is strongly censured, I believe the less restrictivesentence of home detention is able to achieve this.[48] I am also of the view a sentence of home detention would adequately promotein the appellant a sense of responsibility for and acknowledgement of the harm of hisoffending. It is notable in this regard that the appellant has expressed remorse for hisactions in the form of a letter to the sentencing Judge, as well as entering a guilty pleato the charges. While not enough to warrant an adjustment to the sentence, theappellant appears to understand and acknowledge the wrongness of his actions and theharm he has done to these poor animals. I am satisfied a sentence of imprisonment isnot also necessary in this respect.[49] Finally, I note the importance of holding the appellant accountable for the harmhe has done. The offending in this case is atrocious. However, the appellant will neverbe able to inflict such ill-treatment on animals again. He has in this way been heldaccountable for the harm. The appellant has been duly arrested, charged and requiredto face criminal prosecution and liability for what he has done. He will also after mydecision be required to serve a sentence of home detention. With these, I consider the52 See R v Iosefa [2008] NZCA 453 at [41].appellant has been held accountable for what he has done. A sentence of imprisonmentis not also necessary to do so.[50] I turn to those principles of s 8 consistency with which the Judge alsoconsidered required him to impose a sentence of imprisonment. Again, these were (a)the gravity of the offending, including the appellant's degree of culpability orresponsibility, (b) the seriousness of the type of offence when compared with othertypes of offences, and (c) the fact the offending represented a case within the mostserious category of its kind.[51] The offences carry a maximum penalty of a term of imprisonment of threeyears. The offence is undoubtedly a serious offence, opening someone to a criminalsentence of the most restrictive type for a number of years. The Judge was alsoundoubtedly correct in describing this offending as within the most serious cases of itskind. Section 8(c) therefore requires the Court to impose the maximum penaltyprescribed for the offence, unless circumstances relating to the offender make thatinappropriate. Given the final sentence imposed, the Judge clearly considered suchcircumstances existed. And I agree. I note in particular here the appellant's poor stateof health, having been diagnosed with cancer in 2020, from which he reportedly stillexperiences symptoms and requires ongoing monitoring, as well as his limited sightin one eye and painful shoulder condition.[52] I also consider the appellant's degree of culpability (a principle of sentencingin its own right under s 8(a)) is relevant in this regard. As noted, the Judge made noerror in declining to provide the appellant a discount for a lesser role in the offending.Nevertheless, as the Judge noted, all the evidence and material before the Judgesuggested the appellant's brother was the primary manager of the farm and perpetratorof the harm caused, and I accept the appellant's clearly lesser culpability was germaneto the question of whether it was appropriate to impose home detention. I consider theappellant's lesser degree of culpability in respect of the gravity of the offending isrelevant both in respect of s 8(a) and as a circumstance relating to the offender makingthe maximum penalty of imprisonment inappropriate in respect of the appellant unders 8(c). I am therefore of the opinion the maximum penalty prescribed was not requiredto be imposed under s 8(c).[53] I conclude that the Judge made a material error in determining that no sentenceother than imprisonment would achieve the relevant principles and purposes ofsentencing. Given the indefinite disqualification in this case, I am satisfied a sentenceof home detention would have been adequate to achieve the necessary purposes andprinciples. A sentence of imprisonment was not necessary, and was in thecircumstances manifestly excessive.[54] Mr Sanson has been serving his sentence of imprisonment in WhanganuiPrison since 23 February 2023. Therefore taking into account tomorrow he has spentapproximately 41 days in prison. That should be taken into account.Conclusion[55] I am satisfied the Judge properly considered each personal mitigating factor inturn and made no error in declining to make any further adjustments by way ofdiscounts.[56] However, I consider the Judge erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment.Given the indefinite disqualification from farming imposed, I am satisfied a sentenceof home detention was adequate to achieve the purposes and principles of sentencing,and the end sentence of one year and 10 months' imprisonment was manifestlyexcessive.[57] I have not reached this conclusion lightly given the serious nature of theoffending. However, in this case a sentence of home detention together with thedisqualification in particular meets the principles of sentencing, including those ofdeterrence and denunciation. Imprisonment is a sentence of last resort,53 and s 16(1)of the Sentencing Act clearly contemplates that an offender should be kept within thecommunity insofar as that is practicable and consonant with the safety of thecommunity.54 Such offending is to be censured in our society. However,imprisonment in this case was not necessary to do so.53 R v Rawiri [2011] NZCA 244 at [18].54 See also R v Iosefa, above n 52, at [17].Result[58] The appeal is allowed. I would have set aside the sentence of imprisonment ofone year and 10 months' and instead imposed a sentence of 11 months' homedetention. However, in view of the fact that Mr Sanson has served over one month ofthe term of imprisonment I impose a sentence of nine months' home detention. Thisis not a sentence capable of mathematical precision but reflects the totality ofoffending. As I have only converted the sentences of imprisonment which have beenimposed to be served concurrently, the original sentences remain prorated across theoffences in the same proportions as the original sentences. The terms of the homedetention and supervision are set out below.[59] In all other respects the sentence imposed and the orders made in the DistrictCourt remain in place.[60] The terms applying to the home detention and post-release conditions for sixmonths as set out in the PAC report of 14 September 2022 apply as follows:(a) to travel immediately from Palmerston North District Court to [thehome detention address] and there await the arrival of a ProbationOfficer and a representative of the monitoring company;(b) to reside at [the home detention address] for the duration of homedetention;(c) to abstain from the consumption and/or possession of alcohol andnon-prescription drugs, unless prescribed to you by a medicalpractitioner, for the duration of home detention;(d) any dogs are to be contained away from the main dwelling at all timesto allow unhindered access to the property for the Probation Officer, theMonitoring Company and Police for the duration of the home detentionsentence;(e) not to be in possession or control of an airgun or firearm for the durationof the home detention sentence; and(f) to complete an assessment and undertake any counselling/treatment/programmes as directed by the Probation Officer and to thesatisfaction of the Probation Officer and provider.[61] The post-detention conditions are:(a) to complete an assessment and undertake any counselling/treatment/programmes as directed by the Probation Officer and to thesatisfaction of the Probation Officer and provider.____________________Grice J