SEYMOUR v SPARK NEW ZEALAND TRADING LIMITED [2023] NZHC 3193

SEYMOUR v SPARK NEW ZEALAND TRADING LIMITED [2023] NZHC 3193 [13 November 2023]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDPALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATE PAPAIOEA ROHECIV-2023-454-067[2023] NZHC 3193UNDER the Disputes Tribunal Act 1988IN THE MATTER of an appeal from a District Court decisionBETWEEN GREGORY CHARLES SEYMOURAppellantAND SPARK NEW ZEALAND TRADINGLIMITEDRespondentHearing: 13 November 2023Counsel: Appellant in personN J C Wilson for RespondentJudgment: 13 November 2023ORAL JUDGMENT OF RADICH J[1] The appellant, Mr Gregory Charles Seymour, seeks to appeal a decision of theDistrict Court in which his Honour Judge Collins rejected Mr Seymour's appeal froma decision of the Disputes Tribunal. The Disputes Tribunal had rejected the claim byMr Seymour that a payment he made to the respondent, Spark New Zealand TradingLtd, of $604.98 was an overpayment.[2] I agree, as I am compelled to, with counsel for Spark that no right of appeal tothis Court exists. Therefore the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appealand I cannot grant Mr Seymour leave to appeal. I go on now to explain the basis forme having to reach that conclusion.[3] Mr Seymour has applied for leave to appeal to the Court in reliance on, first,s 124(1) of the District Court Act 2016 and, secondly, ss 24, 28 and 31 of the Contractand Commercial Law Act 2017.[4] Section 124 of the District Court Act sets out a general right of parties toDistrict Court proceedings to appeal to the High Court. Section 124(1) provides:124 General right of appeal(1) This Part applies to a decision of the court, other than a decision of akind in respect of which an enactment other than this Act—(a) expressly confers a right of appeal; or(b) expressly provides that there is no right of appeal.[5] The Disputes Tribunal Act 1988 makes it clear that there is no right of appealfor a decision originating in the Disputes Tribunal to the High Court. Section 23 ofthat Act provides that "every order made by the Tribunal under s 18(8)" – and that isa section that provides that orders made to give effect to the Tribunal's determinationof a dispute – "are final and binding on all parties" and "no appeal shall lie in respectof such an order" except as provided in s 50.[6] Section 50, in turn, provides that a party to proceedings before the Tribunalmay appeal an order made by the Tribunal to the District Court on the ground that theproceedings were conducted in a manner that was unfair to the appellant andprejudicially affected the result of the proceedings.[7] The words in s 23 of the Disputes Tribunal Act, "except as provided insection 50, no appeal shall lie", make it clear that s 50 confers a single and final rightof appeal to the District Court and not beyond that Court. There is no provision in theDisputes Tribunal Act, the District Court Act or in the High Court Rules that wouldenable a further appeal to this Court. The provisions I have mentioned give effect tothe Tribunal's intended role as a forum for swift, inexpensive, fair and substantialjustice where lawyers have no place, and I am referring there to a case called Mellowv Tsang.1 The Tribunal could not fulfil that role if parties to proceedings face the1 Mellow v Tsang [2004] NZAR 537 (HC) at [24]. See also Macsmith's Tires Limited v GeorgeStock and Company Limited [2022] NZHC 438 at [38] and Rafiee v Daruwalla [2023] NZHC1554 at [8].prospect of more than one appeal from the Tribunal's decision. As I have mentioned,the right of appeal that does exist, to the District Court, is limited to procedurally basederrors.[8] In the District Court, his Honour Judge Collins addressed the procedurallybased errors that were put to him. He found there to be no procedural error as allegedand dismissed the appeal for the reasons that he gave in his decision. As I say, therewas no further right of appeal beyond his decision.[9] Therefore, in terms of s 124(1) of the District Court Act, the general right ofappeal of District Court decisions does not apply here because ss 23 and 50 of theDisputes Tribunal Act preclude it from doing so.[10] Furthermore, it is not possible for Mr Seymour to rely on the Contract andCommercial Law Act 2017 as providing authority for a right of appeal to this court.The provisions that I have just mentioned mean that it cannot be relevant to thisinquiry. Section 24 of the Contract and Commercial Law Act provides, at an initiallevel and not on appeal, a right to claim that a party entered into a contract as a resultof a mistake. The provisions could only ever have applied in relation to Mr Seymour'sentry into his contract with Spark at the very outset. Further, it could not be raised forthe first time on appeal. And, in any event, for the reasons given, there is no right ofappeal on any basis to this Court.[11] Mr Seymour has, in documents filed, raised a number of concerns stemmingfrom his views on the basis for Spark saying that the sum of $604.98 was anoverpayment. However, for the reasons that I have given, there is no ability for thisCourt to address those particular concerns and there is no ability to bring an appeal inthis Court in order to have those views addressed.[12] Accordingly, I do not grant Mr Seymour leave to appeal because, for thereasons that I have explained, there is no right of appeal to this Court. Accordingly, itis not possible for me to go on to consider the merits of the claims, including the claimsnow raised under the Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017.[13] So, Mr Seymour, they are the reasons for my decision and for those reasons Iam afraid that this Court is unable to take any further steps.[14] The question of costs was not addressed at the hearing. The respondent isentitled to costs on a 1A basis. If it wishes to claim costs, it should liaise withMr Seymour in the first instance. If need be, a memorandum may be filed with theCourt within 15 working days of the date of this decision. If the respondent does filea memorandum, then Mr Seymour may file any memorandum in response within15 working days of the day on which he receives the respondent's memorandum. Iwill then deal with any issues arising on the papers. Any memoranda on costs are tobe limited to three pages in length.____________________Radich JSolicitors:Russell McVeagh, Auckland for Respondent