GREGORY JOHN JONES v NEW ZEALAND BLOODSTOCK FINANCE AND LEASING LIMITED [2023] NZSC 133

GREGORY JOHN JONES v NEW ZEALAND BLOODSTOCK FINANCE AND LEASING LIMITED [2023]NZSC 133 [11 October 2023]IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALANDI TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROASC 100/2022[2023] NZSC 133BETWEEN GREGORY JOHN JONESApplicantAND NEW ZEALAND BLOODSTOCKFINANCE AND LEASING LIMITEDRespondentCourt: Glazebrook, Williams and Kós JJCounsel: Applicant in personF A King and A Osama for RespondentJudgment: 11 October 2023JUDGMENT OF THE COURTA The application to adduce further evidence is dismissed.B The application for recusal is dismissed.C The application for recall is dismissed.____________________________________________________________________REASONS[1] This is an application for recall of the judgment of this Court delivered on2 August 2023 (declining leave to appeal),1 and for leave to adduce further evidence,recusal of Judges, stay of execution and further directions. It proves unnecessary todeal with the latter two applications.1 Jones v New Zealand Bloodstock Finance and Leasing Ltd [2023] NZSC 98 (Glazebrook,Williams and Kós JJ) [SC leave judgment].[2] The background is set out in the leave judgment.2 It need not be repeated here,beyond recording that the case is concerned with orders for summary judgment in debtmade against the applicant in the High Court.Further evidence?[3] The applicant seeks to adduce further evidence (beyond that already filed hereand in courts below) relating to the transactions resulting in his indebtedness to therespondent. A very large part concerns an injury said to have occurred to a filly andthe possibility that this was deliberately caused. Other aspects concern adverse saleprices received for the applicant's horses. Yet other aspects rehearse complaints aboutthe manner in which he was treated in courts below, asserting that Judges in theHigh Court have made elementary and fundamental mistakes and have treated theapplicant appallingly.[4] We consider this proposed evidence involves the relitigation of factual mattersin other courts and not germane to the particular applications before us. It is neitherfresh nor cogent to those applications. Leave to adduce it is declined.Recusal?[5] The recusal application asserts that the present panel is required to disqualifyitself for bias and should not itself determine the application. It is necessary to addressthis in a little more detail.[6] It will be recollected that the applicant had made a series of complaints aboutJudges dealing with his litigation in other Courts. He then requested Judges of thisCourt recuse themselves where they had personal knowledge of the issues he referredto, had a personal relationship with the Judges complained of or where they haddiscussed the applicant or any aspect of his litigation with those Judges. As werecorded in our judgment, it is not for a litigant to interrogate Judges on such matters,but the very short answer indeed was that no Judge of this Court, whether assigned to2 At [1]–[5].the panel or not, had any such knowledge, relationship or discussion.3 So that is thestarting point in analysing any apparent bias necessitating recusal.[7] It will also be recollected that the applicant had filed an affidavit deposingcircumstances which might require two members of this panel to recuse from hearinghis application:4(a) As to one member, that he had seen the Judge in the TAB at Eastridgeon several occasions; that while the Judge's presence "was notintimidating in any way I gained the impression that he was awarethat I was under pressure at that time from the types of parties of whichI now complain"; but also that he had no reason to assume that theJudge "even now knows of me or my identity".(b) As to the second member, that people would "present themselvesimmediately on the making of a telephone call or other possibleconnector" and that he recollected "this occurred in a judicialmanagement conference in which [the Judge] was presiding and myimpression was that he was responsible for an activity of [that]type".[8] These assertions are baffling. In the first case, the applicant submits that theJudge may well not know who the applicant is at all, but that the Judge might,somehow, have gained an impression—in the course of attending a TAB he has neverbeen to5—that the applicant was under pressure of some sort. In the second case, theJudge is said, somehow and on the basis of impression, to have caused people to"present themselves" in the vicinity of the applicant's office.[9] We recite the evidence simply to put the applicant's assertions in their propercontext. Whatever one is to make of these claims, and howsoever they ought to beresolved, a litigant may not make unsupported and irrelevant allegations about Judges3 At [6].4 At [10].5 At [10], n 13.and then assert they should no longer undertake their judicial responsibilities. Thestandard for recusal, laid down by this Court in Saxmere, is not remotely met.6Recall?[10] Recall is an exceptional procedure; recall apart, a decision of this Court—whether concerned with leave to appeal or a substantive appeal—is, and must be,final.7 A judgment will only be recalled in exceptional circumstances, being thoseidentified in Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2), as applied by this Court inSaxmere Co Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd (No 2).8 A recall applicationcannot be used to relitigate the reasons for refusing leave.9 Recall will be appropriatewhere some procedural or substantive error has occurred that would result in amiscarriage of justice.10[11] The recall application asserts that there has been a miscarriage of justice inrefusing leave. It is said to arise from the need to consider further evidence, andbecause of "errors or misjudgements" in the leave decision.[12] The first of these we have already addressed and declined.11 The secondinvolves an attempt to relitigate the reasons for refusing leave, which isimpermissible.12 That impression is confirmed by the terms of the applicant'smemorandum in support of the application. In short (and it is not short) it seeks, bymisconstruction of the decision below, and renewed analysis of authority and reviewof facts adduced in evidence below or in the fresh evidence application, to assertevaluative error by this Court at [15]–[16] of the leave judgment.6 Saxmere Company Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Company Ltd [2009] NZSC 72, 1 NZLR35.7 Wong v R [2011] NZCA 563 at [13]; and Uhrle v R [2020] NZSC 62, [2020] 1 NZLR 286 at [20].8 Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2) [1968] NZLR 632 (SC) at 633; Saxmere Company Ltd v WoolBoard Disestablishment Company Ltd (No 2) [2009] NZSC 122, [2010] 1 NZLR 76 at [2]; andGreen Growth No 2 Ltd v Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust [2018] NZSC 115 at [20].9 Nuku v District Court at Auckland [2018] NZSC 39 at [2].10 Uhrle, above n 7, at [25]–[27].11 See above at [4].12 See above at [10].[13] This, as we have just said, is an attempt to relitigate the reasons for refusingleave, which is impermissible in terms of the principles stated at [10] above. Nothingraised by the applicant meets the threshold for a recall application to be granted.Result[14] The application to adduce further evidence is dismissed.[15] The application for recusal is dismissed.[16] The application for recall is dismissed.[17] As no substantial response was required of the respondent, we make no orderfor costs.Solicitors:McKenna King Dempster, Hamilton for Respondent