HEENAN FAMILY TRUST 1960 AND ORS V DA VELLA JUNE GORE AND ORS HC DUN CIV 2006-412-1023

HEENAN FAMILY TRUST 1960 AND ORS V DA VELLA JUNE GORE AND ORS HC DUN CIV 2006-412- 1023 8 October 2007IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY CIV 2006-412-1023 CIV 2006-412-1031BETWEEN HEENAN FAMILY TRUST 1960 First Plaintiffs AND AMENDED HEENAN FAMILY TRUST 1960 Second Plaintiffs AND AMENDED HEENAN FAMILY TRUST NUMBER TWO Third PlaintiffsContinued Hearing: 28 and 29 June 2007 and memoranda filed by defendants (12 July 2007 and 17 July 2007) and on behalf of plaintiffs (23 July 2007) Appearances: D Heenan for Plaintiffs M Ryan for Third to Eleventh, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Twenty- Third and Thirtieth Defendants A J Fincham for Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Twenty-First, Twenty-Second, Twenty-Fourth, Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-Sixth, Twenty-Seventh and Twenty-Eighth Defendants J G French for Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Twenty-Ninth and Thirty-First Defendants Judgment: 8 October 2007 at 3:00 p.m.JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE GENDALLThis judgment was delivered by Associate Judge Gendall on 8 October 2007 at 3:00 p.m. pursuant to r 540(4) of the High Court Rules 1985.Solicitors / Parties: Mr D Heenan Ms M Ryan, Anderson Lloyd, Solicitors, Queenstown Mr A J Fincham, Russell McVeagh, Solicitors, Auckland Mr J G French, French Burt Partners, Solicitors, InvercargillAND DA VELLA JUNE GORE First Defendant AND WAYNE RICHARD GORE Second Defendant AND PHILIP JONES Third Defendant AND JOHN FOOKES Fourth Defendant AND ALISTAIR MCLAY Fifth Defendant AND HEENAN FAMILY TRUST NUMBER TWO Sixth Defendant AND NEVILLE PETRIE FAGERLUND Seventh Defendant AND ROBERTA JANE MARY HEENAN Eighth Defendant AND HFK TRUSTEES LIMITED Ninth Defendant AND EUAN HILSON Tenth Defendant AND MICHAEL KEYES Eleventh Defendant AND CAMERON FLEMING Twelfth Defendant AND JEFFREY ROBERT MORRISON Thirteenth Defendant AND VASILI ENTERPRISES LIMITED Fourteenth Defendant AND RHYES JAMES CAIN Fifteenth Defendant AND ROBIN ALAN MACDUFF Sixteenth DefendantAND GRAHAM MCGARRY Seventeenth Defendant AND BRUCE BOIVIN Eighteenth Defendant AND GREG ROSS Nineteenth Defendant AND ALASDAIR ROY Twentieth Defendant AND STUART DAVID MORGAN Twenty-First Defendant AND ALEXANDER EDWIN CUTHBERT Twenty-Second Defendant AND JOHN PAUL HEDGES Twenty-Third Defendant AND GERARD CURRY Twenty-Fourth Defendant AND JAMES GARETH DONKIN Twenty-Fifth Defendant AND WARWICK GRIMMER Twenty-Sixth Defendant AND ROGER SINCLAIR Twenty-Seventh Defendant AND JERARD HANSON Twenty-Eighth Defendant AND EXECUTORS OF LYN SAUNDERS Twenty-Ninth Defendant AND HENRY STOKES & PUBLIC TRUST Thirtieth Defendant AND JOHN FRENCH Thirty-First DefendantIntroduction[1] The applications before me involve a consideration of the proper exercise of the Court's power under the High Court Rules to strike out proceedings to finally determine a case at an early or intermediate stage of its history. The present case raises an issue as to the need for what I conclude here is a thoroughly unmeritorious claim to be terminated before it becomes an unjustified drain on the resources of those parties who undeservedly find themselves caught up in the litigation. [2] In my view, the situation in the present case bears a striking resemblance to that which this Court was required to comment upon in Attorney-General v Hill(1993) 7 PRNZ 20 and in Attorney-General v Collier [2001] NZAR 137, although each of those cases, unlike the present, involved applications to declare a party a vexatious litigant in terms of s 88A Judicature Act 1908. [3] In Attorney-General v Hill at p 26 the High Court described the case before the Court there in the following way:The proceedings show a pattern of complex, prolix, and sometimes incomprehensible pleadings. They also show the defendant to be an almost compulsive litigant, with a widening circle of defendants being drawn within his mesh. Individual proceedings have involved extravagant claims. The very frequency with which part or all of statements of claim have been struck out is a clear indication of the vexatious nature of a considerable part of the litigation, as is the extent to which proceedings are allowed to lie extant and are not pursued.[4] And in the later case, Attorney-General v Collier, this Court again considered an application to declare a party a vexatious litigant. There, the Court, at para [36], described the general pattern of vexatious litigation in the following way:Vexatious litigation is frequently accompanied by complex pleadings, a widening circle of defendants as litigation proceeds, frequency of striking out of part or all of the statements of claim, inability to accept unfavourable decisions, escalating extravagant or scandalous claims (frequently invoking allegations of conspiracy or fraud) and failure to pursue proceedings once instituted.[5] At the outset I make these comments and refer to the decisions at paras [3] and [4] above as they describe and strike at the heart of the plaintiffs' entire claim in this proceeding, a claim they bring against the 31 different parties they name as defendants.Present applications[6] In the present proceeding, before the Court are applications by the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, twenty-first, twenty-second, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, twenty- eighth, twenty-ninth, thirtieth, and thirty-first defendants to strike out both the claim by the plaintiffs against them and the plaintiffs' appeal against a District Court decision on 5 December 2006 striking out a similar claim by the plaintiffs against 29 of those present 31 defendants. [7] These strike out applications are opposed by the plaintiffs. For the reasons I will now set out, however, the applications succeed and notwithstanding that the first, second, nineteenth, and twentieth defendants do not join in these strike out applications, the claim by the plaintiffs against all defendants is struck out in its entirety. I will refer later in this judgment to the position concerning the first, second, nineteenth, and twentieth defendants.Preliminary matters[8] Before I begin a consideration of the arguments put to me on the strike out applications, there are several preliminary comments to be made. [9] The present strike out applications came on for hearing before me on 28 June 2007 at about 12:10 p.m. They were set down for one-half day. In fact they took over one-and-a-half days of hearing time plus further time for all parties to prepare and provide reply memoranda.[10] The hearing on 28 June 2007 commenced with submissions advanced in support of the application by counsel for the various defendants. [11] Mr French for the fifteenth, sixteenth, twenty-ninth, and thirty-first defendants led off the defendants' submissions to the Court. This took some 45 minutes. [12] Ms Ryan for the third to eleventh, seventeenth, eighteenth, twenty-third, and thirtieth defendants then presented her submissions. These took some 10 minutes. [13] Mr Fincham for the twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, twenty-first, twenty- second, twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, and twenty-eighth defendants then presented his submissions, which occupied approximate 30 minutes. [14] At 1:35 p.m. Mr David Heenan ("Mr Heenan"), who was appearing as a lay litigant on behalf of the plaintiffs, then commenced his submissions in opposition. They ran from 1:35 p.m. to 6:10 p.m. on 28 June 2007 and from 9:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. on 29 June 2007. They occupied over eight hours of sitting time. As Mr Fincham, counsel for ten of the defendants, had been unavailable on 29 June 2007 (he needed to return to Auckland for other commitments), and Ms Ryan, counsel for 13 of the other defendants had other commitments and was required to leave at 2:00 p.m. on 29 June 2007, by agreement of all parties, the hearing of the strike out applications concluded then at 2:00 p.m. This was on the strict basis that written submissions from the defendants in response to Mr Heenan's submissions were to be provided by memoranda following receipt by all parties of the transcription of the record of all submissions which had been made in this proceeding from 9:30 a.m. on 29 June 2007. In addition, although it may seem somewhat unusual for plaintiffs to have a right to further respond to reply submissions made by counsel for defendants, I directed that Mr Heenan was to have a period of ten working days from the date he received the defendants' reply submissions to himself make further written submissions in response. In a minute I issued at the time, I made it clear that these directions were to allow Mr Heenan as a self-represented litigant every opportunity to reply to the defendants' submissions before any final decision in this matter was reached.[15] On 12 July 2007 and 17 July 2007, counsel for the defendants filed their reply memoranda. On 23 July 2007, Mr Heenan for the plaintiffs himself filed a memorandum in response. I have now had an opportunity to consider all this material and have taken it into account in reaching the decision outlined in this judgment. [16] As I have noted, Mr Heenan is a lay litigant. At the hearing before me on 28 and 29 June 2007, for this reason, I endeavoured to give him considerable leeway, both as to the presentation of his submissions and in the manner in which he addressed the Court and other parties to this litigation. [17] Notwithstanding that, I need to say at this point that Mr Heenan's submissions, both oral and written, were in large measure entirely unfocussed, repetitive, inflammatory, and on occasions they could only be described as abusive. Throughout his oral submissions and in the 38 pages of written submissions he advanced for the hearing, Mr Heenan proceeded to accuse virtually every one of the 31 defendants, their respective counsel, and most of the Judges who had dealt with any matters involving Mr Heenan in the past as "corrupt", biased, dishonest and guilty of both lying and other outrageous conduct. This behaviour on the part of Mr Heenan was quite unacceptable, but despite repeated warnings during the hearing, he was quite incapable of deviating from this track. Throughout, he vehemently insisted that almost every matter of which he complained had involved a conspiracy and corrupt and scandalous behaviour on the part of members of the judiciary, counsel and all the defendants. [18] I raise these matters at the outset to express the degree of concern which I have with respect to the way this matter has progressed. The plaintiffs' claims involve 31 defendants. They cover a very wide range of different complaints which the plaintiffs make. At the hearing before me, I endeavoured to listen patiently to Mr Heenan and to follow his arguments and the raft of documents he took me through to understand the nature of the plaintiffs' grievances and claims. The reality, however, was that almost every claim the plaintiffs made had been repeatedly litigated on earlier occasions, and that Mr Heenan was quite unable to show that any part of the pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action against any defendant, and wasanything other than an abuse of the Court's process. In essence, Mr Heenan was wasting the time of the Court and all the defendants. My reasons for reaching these conclusions will follow. But first I turn to briefly consider the complex procedural and factual background to this whole matter.Background[19] This strike-out application involves two proceedings. The first proceeding, 1031, is an appeal by the "plaintiffs" against a judgment of Judge Somerville in the District Court at Dunedin on 5 December 2006. In that judgment the plaintiffs' claims against 29 of the 31 defendants in proceeding 1023 were struck-out against all defendants as an abuse of process. The "plaintiffs" have appealed that decision and this appeal proceeding is the subject of the present strike-out application. [20] The second proceeding, 1023, is brought in the High Court against the same 29 defendants in the appeal proceeding. The plaintiffs have purported to add in two further "defendants" in proceeding 1023 namely "Henry Stokes & Public Trust" as 30 th defendants and "John French" as 31st defendant. [21] The claims in the two sets of proceedings are for all purposes virtually identical. [22] On 15 June 2007 Associate Judge Christiansen made an order consolidating the appeal (proceeding 1031) and the general proceeding (proceeding 1023) to enable the present strike-out application which relates to both proceedings to be heard together. [23] The plaintiffs in the appeal and the general proceeding are noted as the Heenan Family Trust 1960, the Amended Heenan Family Trust 1960 and the Amended Heenan Family Trust Number Two. Mr Heenan who is an undischarged bankrupt purported to appear on behalf of each of the three trusts. [24] In essence, however, the concerns expressed in these proceedings are those of Mr Heenan. Mr Heenan as an undischarged bankrupt, however, has no authority tomake claims in relation to these matters personally without the consent of the Official Assignee. Such consent has not been granted. Nevertheless he purports to further these proceedings.Background factsThe judgment debt and bankruptcy[25] Mr Heenan's concerns arise from an Alexandra District Court judgment given on 3 April 2000 that found against him in an action brought by the first defendant, Ms Gore, on a $20,000 post-dated cheque issued to her which had been dishonoured. In addition to judgment for this sum of $20,000, the District Court gave judgment for the sum of US$1,000 as a further reimbursable payment between the parties and for general damages of $2,500 and costs. [26] Ms Gore then brought bankruptcy proceedings in reliance on the unsatisfied judgment debt and Mr Heenan was adjudged bankrupt on 11 December 2000, despite his opposition on the grounds that the cheque had been materially forged, in that its date had been altered. [27] Prior to being adjudicated bankrupt Mr Heenan had applied to the Alexandra District Court for a rehearing of the proceeding brought by Ms Gore. That application was dismissed. Mr Heenan then applied for judicial review of the substantive District Court decision. On 1 December 2000 that application was considered on its merits by William Young J and it was dismissed. [28] As I have already noted, on 11 December 2000 Mr Heenan was adjudicated bankrupt. He remains an undischarged bankrupt today. [29] The validity of Mr Heenan's adjudication was also brought before the Court by Mr Heenan on several occasions. First, he had defended the bankruptcy petition itself. Then he applied for an annulment of the bankruptcy which was unsuccessful. Later, in June 2001 a further application to review or quash the bankruptcy washeard before John Hansen J. Despite procedural deficiencies in that proceeding the Court considered the application on its merits and dismissed it. [30] Since that time there have been many subsequent proceedings brought and hearings on various related matters. Mr Heenan and/or other entities represented by him (as in the present case) have been parties to those proceedings. In all of them Mr Heenan has contended that Ms Gore should not have won her case because of the alteration made to the cheque and therefore he should not be bankrupt. [31] Mr Heenan then initiated a number of proceedings against various parties. The application he brought against Ms Gore called a "discharge from bankruptcy" was dismissed by Christiansen AJ on 13 May 2005. Christiansen AJ considered this proceeding to be an abuse of process and made an order placing restrictions on Mr Heenan bringing any further applications for discharge. [32] Despite this order, Mr Heenan again made an application for annulment of his bankruptcy and this again was dismissed by Christiansen AJ on 27 June 2005. Again it was seen as an abuse of process being a further attempt to litigate matters that had already been determined by the Court. [33] Mr Heenan is still undischarged from his bankruptcy. The Official Assignee has refused consent to Mr Heenan issuing proceedings. Therefore it is clear in my view that he has resorted to issuing the present proceedings under the names of the "Heenan Family Trust 1960", the "Amended Heenan Family Trust 1960", and the "Amended Heenan Family Trust Number Two". As will appear later, I am satisfied this is a mere subterfuge.Mortgagee sale of 11 Brunswick Street, Queenstown[34] The present appeal and general proceeding stem not only from Mr Heenan's bankruptcy and the related litigation but from the circumstances surrounding the sale of a property at 11 Brunswick Street, Queenstown ("the property").[35] The property was purchased by Mr Heenan and his wife at the time, the eighth defendant, on 10 July 1985 and the title to the property registered in their names. Before me Mr Heenan disputed that the property was purchased by him and his wife but as will appear later he failed to advance any cogent reason to support this contention. [36] Then around 1 August 1999 the Heenan Family Trust Number Two was formed. The trustees were Mr Heenan, Mrs Heenan, the eighth defendant, and Mr Fagerlund, the seventh defendant. The property was then transferred by Mr and Mrs Heenan to the trustees of the Heenan Family Trust Number Two by a transfer dated 11 August 1999. [37] Subsequent to his bankruptcy, Mr Heenan voluntarily retired as a trustee of the Heenan Family Trust Number Two on 14 May 2002. As a consequence of that the title to the property was transferred on 27 June 2002 to Mrs Heenan and Mr Fagerlund alone. Mr Heenan signed this transfer. [38] Following Mr Heenan's adjudication, the Official Assignee ascertained that the Heenan Family Trust Number Two owed Mr Heenan $69,995.00 being part of the purchase price of the property which had been advanced to it. This of course remained an asset in Mr Heenan's estate and the Official Assignee made formal demand for payment. Certain negotiations ensued and a settlement was reached with Mrs Heenan and Mr Fagerlund as remaining trustees of the Heenan Family Trust Number Two for payment of the sum of $57,000 and this was made to the Official Assignee. [39] In order to pay this amount, the trustees of the Heenan Family Trust Number Two borrowed funds from HFK Trustees Limited, the ninth defendant, which took a mortgage over the property. Subsequently there was default under this mortgage and HFK Trustees sold the property by way of a mortgagee sale. This was a tortuous process. The mortgagee sale had been thwarted by Mr Heenan's attempts to prevent it, including a purported ex-parte application for an injunction to prevent the mortgagee sale which was dismissed by Panckhurst J on 9 December 2004. A further application was made for an interlocutory injunction in which Mr Heenanwanted to reverse the sale of the property but this application was refused by Chisholm J on 28 June 2005. [40] Further difficulties which had arisen at the time of the mortgagee sale need mention. On 7 December 2004 Mr Heenan notified the real estate agent who was overseeing the mortgagee sale of the property of an alleged lifetime lease he held over the property. On 8 December 2004, as I have noted, Mr Heenan applied for an interim injunction to restrain the sale of the property. [41] On 13 December 2004 HFK Trustees Limited wrote to potential purchasers of the property including the fourteenth defendant, Vasili Enterprises Limited, denying knowledge of the alleged lifetime lease and stating that it had not consented to any alleged lease. Mrs Heenan also wrote to HFK Trustees Limited denying knowledge of any lifetime lease or any other arrangement that would provide Mr Heenan with occupational rights over the property. On 15 February 2005 HFK Trustees Limited exercised its mortgagee's power of sale and sold the property to the fourteenth defendant. Settlement occurred on 10 March 2005.Mr Heenan's eviction from the property and storage of chattels[42] On 6 April 2005 Vasili Enterprises Limited, the fourteenth defendant, informed Mr Heenan that vacant possession of the property was required by 14 May 2005. [43] Mr Heenan did not vacate the property and on 2 June 2005 he was served with a trespass notice and removed from the property under the supervision of a Queenstown solicitor Mr Oxnevad. Mr Heenan's chattels were placed in storage in Alexandra under the control of Mr Oxnevad and Mr Heenan was given permission to collect these. [44] On 19 September 2005 Mr Heenan was permitted an extra six weeks to collect his chattels from storage.[45] On 2 November 2005 Mr Heenan did collect some of his chattels. On 7 November 2005 Mr Heenan was informed that he was required to collect his remaining chattels by 3 December 2005. On 28 November 2005 Mrs Heenan collected some of the chattels and on 4 December 2005 Mr Heenan collected some further chattels. [46] On 9 December 2005 Mr Heenan was given further time, on this occasion until 8 February 2006 to collect his remaining chattels. He was told that they would otherwise be sold or disposed of. [47] Certain chattels remained and on 21 March 2006 Vasili Enterprises Limited instructed Warwick Grimmer Limited (rather than the twenty-sixth defendant Warwick Grimmer as Mr Heenan contends) to auction the remaining chattels. On 9 April 2006 this auction occurred and those chattels were sold, realising proceeds after expenses of $2,722.78.Inter-pleader proceedings[48] Following the mortgagee sale of the property, the ninth defendant, HFK Trustees Limited as mortgagee brought an inter-pleader proceeding for directions in relation to the property sale proceeds. In a judgment dated 7 September 2006 John Hansen J declared that the Heenan Family Trust Number Two as the owner and registered proprietor of the property had a right to the funds inter-pleaded by HFK Trustees Limited. This judgment was given after three days of hearing time in which Mr Heenan endeavoured to argue unsuccessfully that the sale proceeds belonged to the Heenan Family Trust 1960 which he claimed was the true owner of the property. [49] Mr Heenan then got himself out of time in his wish to appeal this decision of John Hansen J. He applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal out of time and this application was rejected, the Court of Appeal finding that there were no merits in the substantive appeal. At para [22] of that Court of Appeal decision dated 23 March 2007, the Court found:The Judge (John Hansen J) was entitled to proceed on the basis that the titles to the property and the various documents before him meant exactly whatthey said (save for the forged, purported 1960 Deed of Trust). The August 1999 transfer from Mr and Mrs Heenan to the trustees of the Heenan Family Trust Number Two was signed by both Mr and Mrs Heenan and the explanation which Mr Heenan gave for Mrs Heenan being on the title is inconsistent with the property being held by him as a trustee for the Heenan Family Trust 1960. There is no arguable case for the position taken by Mr Heenan. John Hansen J's decision that the only valid trust which existed here was the Heenan Family Trust Number Two which was the owner and registered proprietor of the property and therefore had a right to receive the sale proceeds from the mortgagee sale of the property remained undisturbed.[50] As I have noted, Mr Heenan's application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal the John Hansen J decision was rejected. Mr Heenan has not appealed this Court of Appeal decision and is now out of time to do so.Motor vehicles[51] Reference at this stage also needs to be made to litigation in the Invercargill High Court concerning two Buick motor cars owned by Mr Heenan. One of these vintage motor vehicles was a 1939 model and the second a disassembled Buick also from the 1930s. [52] In the course of administering Mr Heenan's bankrupt estate, the Official Assignee discovered the existence of these two vehicles. Mr Heenan refused to deliver them to the Official Assignee. [53] The Official Assignee issued proceedings and after a defended hearing on 9 May 2002 the Official Assignee was granted an interim injunction ordering Mr Heenan to deliver up the 1939 Buick to the Official Assignee. Mr Heenan refused to deliver up the vehicles although the Official Assignee later seized the disassembled Buick. [54] On 20 December 2006 the Official Assignee obtained declarations that Mr Heenan's bankrupt estate was the true owner of both the 1939 Buick and thedisassembled Buick and this Court granted an order that Mr Heenan was to forthwith deliver up the 1939 Buick. He continues however, to refuse to do so.Heenan Family Trust 1960[55] Turning now to the Heenan Family Trust 1960, it is this trust which Mr Heenan conveniently contends now is the rightful owner of the property and the vehicles. Before me, he argued strongly that the Heenan Family Trust 1960 had financed the original acquisition of the property as this trust had first owned a farm property known as Willow Bank Farm, then once this was sold a property in Bainfield Road near Invercargill which was subdivided and sold and finally the revenue from this used to purchase the property. His contention is that neither he nor Mrs Heenan provided any money towards the purchase of the property and this evidences ownership of the property by and the existence of the Heenan Family Trust 1960. [56] These aspects have been considered by various Courts on many earlier occasions. I can do little better at this stage than to refer to the words of the Court of Appeal in its 23 March 2007 judgment as follows:[16] On this application, Mr Heenan submitted that John Hansen J failed – he goes so far as to say deliberately failed – to take into account certain evidence. He emphasised Mrs Heenan's "admission" that she did not personally contribute any money to the property at Brunswick Road. From there, Mr Heenan reasons that the Judge "did know" of the existence of the Heenan Family Trust 1960. That is of course an entirely illogical leap. Indeed the Judge felt compelled to come to the view – he said he would have come to this view on the criminal standard of proof – that the Heenan Family Trust 1960 does not in fact exist. [17] The Judge raised grievous matters of concern. A purported trust deed (a copy, no original was ever produced) was produced to the Judge, and the Judge came to the view that it is a forgery. This for the following reasons:• Versions of the trust deed attempted to oust the jurisdiction of the New Zealand District or High Courts. At the time when the deed was purportedly created, those Courts did not in fact exist.• The attesting solicitor's signature exhibited irregularities throughout the document (both as to position and appearance).• The document appeared to be a pastiche of various documents, all in different fonts.• The deed contained, quite unnecessarily, the seal of the District Land Registrar for Southland which the Judge thought might have come from another document, to give it an appearance of authenticity. [18] Quite apart from the dubious authenticity of this document, which deeply troubled the Judge, Mr Heenan was unable to produce banking records from the relevant bank. [19] The Judge concluded at (43): Regrettably, I have reached the inevitable conclusion that the Deed of the Heenan Family Trust 1960 produced to the Court is a forgery. Further, I am satisfied, to even a criminal standard of proof, that it was created by Mr Heenan to further his own ends. If that was not abundantly clear from the first seven pages of the document it is made clear by the crudely created composite document, which on its face is made up of at least three, but probably four or five different documents. The method, which Mr Heenan has used in another document in this case, appears to be to use parts of various documents to create what he wants and then to photocopy the whole and present that as a purported copy of an original document. [20] The Judge was so concerned about this that he directed the Registrar at the High Court at Invercargill to refer his judgment to the New Zealand Police. We do not know what, if any, steps the police have taken to date.[57] The position concerning Mr Heenan's claims with regard to the Heenan Family Trust 1960 were also considered by Judge G S MacAskill in the District Court at Alexandra in a Minute he issued on 6 th August 2002. In that Minute he considered whether there was evidence before the Court to prove that this trust existed. He set out the full text of the trust deed and then went on in his Minute at para (5) to state:[5] I do not accept that the hand-written copy of the deed [of the Heenan Family Trust 1960] is evidence of the alleged deed of trust. Insofar as it purports to be a copy of an original deed of trust executed in 1960, it appears to be a forgery or to contain forged elements. At the very least it is plainly unreliable. I reject it as evidence of the existence of the Trust at this time. If the Trust exists then I am not presently persuaded that this is the best evidence of it. If the Trust exists and if it has owned farm property since 1960, as the exhibit suggests, then official records of it ought to be plentiful. For example, if the Inland Revenue Department has recognised the Trust for tax purposes, it will have the tax returns filed and is likely to have a copy of the original trust deed.[58] Following that 6 August 2002 Minute, Judge MacAskill on 4 February 2003 stated:Mr Heenan has taken no steps since the issue of the Minute, six months ago, to provide any reliable evidence of the existence of the plaintiff trusts (including Heenan Family Trust 1960). In the absence of any such evidence, I conclude that neither of the Trusts exists.[59] An order followed that the claims which Mr Heenan was endeavouring to advance in the District Court on behalf of the Heenan Family Trust 1960 and another Trust were struck out.Amended Heenan Family Trust 1960 and Amended Heenan Family Trust Number Two[60] Turning now to consider the status of all three of the plaintiffs in the present case, it is important to note that John Hansen J in the High Court in the inter-pleader proceedings made distinct findings that: a) There is no such legal entity as the "Heenan Family Trust 1960". b) The purported trust deed for the "Heenan Family Trust 1960" is a forgery created by Mr Heenan to further his own ends. c) The purported "Amended Heenan Family Trust 1960" deed is self- evidently invalid, either as a new deed of trust or as an amendment to the original deed of trust. d) The "Amended Heenan Family Trust Number Two" deed is similarly invalid for the same reasons. e) At the time of the mortgagee sale, the property at 11 Brunswick Street, Queenstown was held by trustees for the Heenan Family Trust Number Two.The plaintiffs' position[61] In general terms, as best I can tell Mr Heenan's arguments, he contends there is a direct chain of events dating back to the judgment against him in the Invercargill District Court on 3 April 2000 which has caused him loss here. How that loss might relate to the plaintiffs in this proceeding remains to be seen however. [62] As I see it, Mr Heenan's broad contention is that the first defendant, Ms Gore's judgment in the District Court was secured on the basis of what he says was the fraudulently altered cheque for $20,000 which he acknowledged that he issued to her in mid 1998. He stopped payment on this cheque on 23 July 1998. The cheque appeared initially to be post-dated to 27 July 1998 but this date was altered to read 27 August 1998. [63] As I understand Mr Heenan's position, he contends that either Ms Gore herself or her son the second defendant forged the alteration to the date on this $20,000 cheque and then Ms Gore committed perjury when questioned about it in evidence. It seems he is also of the view that were it not for these illegal actions he would have successfully resisted the claim and thereby avoided bankruptcy, the sale of his Queenstown home, the seizure and sale of his chattels, and all subsequent events. [64] Mr Heenan appears to link these claims he has in the present proceeding against all 31 defendants through a belief he expresses that "fraud unravels everything".Legal position on strike out applications[65] The present applications for strike out are brought pursuant to r 186 High Court Rules. This rule provides:186 Striking out pleadingWithout prejudice to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court in that regard, where a pleading—(a) Discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence or other case appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or (b) Is likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment, or delay in the proceeding; or (c) Is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court,— the Court may at any stage of the proceeding, on such terms as it thinks fit, order that the whole or any part of the pleading be struck out.[66] Strike out applications are to proceed on the assumption that the facts pleaded in the statement of claim are true and that to strike out the proceeding the Court must be satisfied the causes of action are so untenable that they could not possibly succeed: Attorney-General v Prince and Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA). [67] In addition, Attorney-General v Prince and Gardner made clear that the strike out jurisdiction is one to be exercised sparingly and only in a clear case where the Court is satisfied it has the requisite material: Gartside v Sheffield, Young & Ellis[1983] NZLR 37, 45, and Electricity Corporation Ltd v Geotherm Energy Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 641. The fact, however, that applications to strike out raise difficult questions of law and require extensive argument does not exclude jurisdiction:Gartside v Sheffield, Young & Ellis. [68] The category identified in r 186(b) where a pleading is likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay, is potentially very wide and defies exact definition. McGechan on Procedure at para HR186.03, however, provides the following examples as being included under r 186(b):(a) Unnecessarily prolix pleading: Hill v Hunt Davis (1884) 26 Ch D 470. (b) Proceedings which are both scandalous and irrelevant: In Van der Kaap v A-G (1996) 10 PRNZ 162, Hammond J, dealing sensitively with a lay litigant's diatribe, stayed the proceedings to afford an opportunity for claims to be repleaded on terms. This was despite his Honour's findings that striking out the irrelevant and scandalous material would have been appropriate and that striking out the whole proceeding would have been justified. (c) The pleading of purely evidentiary material: Meikle v NZ Times Co(1904) 23 NZLR 893; Public Trustee v McArley [1942] NZLR 13.(d) Unintelligible pleadings: Hoffnung v Fletcher (1887) 4 WN (NSW) 68; Philips v Philips (1878) 4 QBD 127. (e) Pleadings containing irrelevant material: Cowles v Prudential Assurance Co [1957] NZLR 124. In Davis v Russell McVeagh McKenzie Bartleet & Co [1994] 2 NZLR 175, Henry J found that allegations of improper conduct in the defence of proceedings against solicitors could not constitute an element of claims to exemplary damages, and were accordingly struck out. (f) Proceedings to set aside judgment on the grounds of fraud forming in reality a much delayed application for a new trial: Ongley v Brdjanovic [1975] 2 NZLR 242.[69] As to the category noted in r 186(c) identified as abuse of the process of the Court, this extends the grounds outlined in rr 186(a) and (b) and also defies precise definition. It does, however, appear to subsume various instances of misuse of the Court's process. [70] Examples of this include proceedings brought for an improper motive (Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd [1977] 2 All ER 566 (CA)), attempts to relitigate matters already determined (Hardy v Elphick [1973] 2 All ER 914 (CA) and Collier v Butterworths of New Zealand Ltd (1997) 11 PRNZ 581), and situations where a plaintiff continues proceedings without any intention of bringing them to trial (Grovit v Doctor [1997] 2 All ER 417). [71] The present strike out applications brought by the various defendants effectively rely on the grounds set out in rr 186(a), (b), and (c). [72] A first and fundamental point of opposition arises, however. This concerns the identity of the three plaintiffs. In each case the defendants contend that these parties are not legal persons. They say the plaintiff trusts alleged to exist have been held in other legal proceedings not to exist. In addition, they contend that effectively it is Mr Heenan who is endeavouring to bring this proceeding and he is a bankrupt and lacks capacity to do so. I turn now to consider these aspects.Identity of the alleged plaintiff trusts[73] The plaintiffs in this matter are described in the pleadings as "Heenan Family Trust 1960 first plaintiffs, Amended Heenan Family Trust 1960 second plaintiffs, and Amended Heenan Family Trust Number Two third plaintiffs". [74] As I have noted, Mr Heenan, who is an undischarged bankrupt, appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. There was no objection from counsel for the various defendants to his appearance in this capacity. Mr Heenan claimed to have authority from the other trustees of each of the first second and third plaintiff trusts to appear on their behalf. These matters were not contested by counsel for any of the defendants and the hearing before me proceeded on this basis. [75] The position advanced for each of the defendants, however, is that there are no such legal entities as the three plaintiffs. They say that they simply do not exist. [76] The starting point adopted by the defendants is that this issue has already been decided against Mr Heenan and the plaintiffs, notably in the inter-pleader case by John Hansen J: HFK Trustees Limited v Heenan (HC INV, CIV 2005-425-223, John Hansen J, 7 September 2006). [77] So far as the Heenan Family Trust 1960 (the first plaintiff) is concerned, as I have noted at para [19] above, the Court in the inter-pleader proceeding stated at para [43]:Regrettably, I have reached the inevitable conclusion that the Deed of the Heenan Family Trust 1960 produced to the Court is a forgery. Further, I am satisfied, to even a criminal standard of proof, that it was created by Mr Heenan to further his own ends.And also, at para [48], John Hansen J held:I am satisfied there is no such legal entity as the Heenan Family Trust 1960. The documents are a later creation of Mr Heenan for the purpose of furthering his own interests.[78] With regard to the amended Heenan Family Trust 1960 (the second plaintiff), again John Hansen J held in the inter-pleader proceeding at para [68]-[69] that thecrude document put forward by Mr Heenan to show the establishment of this trust was invalid as either a new trust or in any event it would also be invalid as an amendment to the original trust which he found did not exist. [79] So far as the amended Heenan Family Trust Number Two (the third plaintiff) is concerned, again John Hansen J held in the inter-pleader proceeding, at para [72], that the alleged amending document was invalid. He went on to observe, at para [73], that he suspected Mr Heenan had again invented the amended trusts for an improper purpose. [80] This decision of John Hansen J in the inter-pleader proceedings was upheld by the Court of Appeal on appeal: (2007) NZCA 93. [81] And as I have noted at para [57], [58] and [59] above, the authenticity of the Deed said to create the alleged Heenan Family Trust 1960 was the subject of the earlier Alexandra District Court proceedings before Judge MacAskill. Again, the validity of the trust was rejected there. [82] These earlier decisions have not been the subject of any successful appeal by the plaintiffs or by Mr Heenan and I accept the contention from counsel for the defendants that it is not possible here for the plaintiffs or Mr Heenan on their behalf to endeavour to reargue this same issue. [83] Notwithstanding these conclusions, at the hearing before me, substantial argument was put by Mr Heenan regarding his contention that the trusts were valid. For the sake of completeness I now turn to deal with these issues, although at the outset I need to say that none of the points raised by Mr Heenan during the hearing before me in any way advanced the case that any of the plaintiff trusts exist. In fact, in my view the reverse is true. [84] At the hearing before me, Mr Heenan confirmed that it was he in 1960 who had prepared the handwritten trust deed for the Heenan Family Trust 1960 and the photocopy of this deed put before the Court as the Heenan Family Trust 1960 trust deed was genuine and authentic in all respects.[85] Notwithstanding these claims, like many other Judges before me who have had an opportunity to consider this photocopied trust deed document, I have absolutely no hesitation in expressing the view that it is not a genuine document. It has been suggested in earlier decisions that in fact it is simply a crudely attempted copy and a "cut and paste" document lacking any degree of authenticity, and I share this view. [86] Leaving aside the direct reference in the document itself to the District Court and the High Court (both of which did not exist in 1960), to which Mr Heenan was singularly unable to provide any proper explanation before me, the document in my view suffers from a number of problems in addition to those identified in earlier Court decisions. These are: a) The document purports to be handwritten (by Mr Heenan himself) in 1960 with all signatures witnessed by a solicitor Mr McDonald. Mr McDonald is no longer alive. At the time in 1960 Mr Heenan was 21 years of age. In my view it simply belies belief that a solicitor as an officer of the Court would witness an important legal document such as a trust deed in this form. A trust deed is a highly significant legal document and in this case would last for the length of the trust which could be for a period of 80 years. The trust deed is a handwritten document and the provisions in the trust deed are confused, inconsistent, garbled, and in a number of areas they are quite nonsensical. I simply do not accept that what purports to be a signature by Mr McDonald as a solicitor witness to the document was properly attested to the trust deed. In addition, I note that the document purporting to be handwritten in 1960 by Mr Heenan as a 21 year old, on its face appears to be completed in remarkably similar handwriting to that exhibited by Mr Heenan today, some 47 years later. b) The deed is muddled, inconsistent and in major part lacks credibility. By way of example, recital "A" of the deed records that the settlor wishes to make provision for the beneficiaries being the children andgrandchildren of Mr Heenan. But then in paragraph 5C of the deed dealing with payments to beneficiaries, it is stated that:Other beneficiaries may possibly be the Salvation Army, Cancer Society, the Heart Foundation, but will be at the complete discretion of the trustees at date of distribution.A real confusion and lack of certainty with provisions such as these is quite apparent. c) Confusing expressions abound throughout the deed. As a further example, on page 2 the "convenantor" [sp] is noted as Stanley Heenan. The trust deed rather confusingly seems to include an acknowledgement of a loan owing to Mr Stanley Heenan but then to describe him as a "convenator" when in reality he is at best a lender or mortgagee. Further, the muddling up of what purports to be a transfer of the Willowbank Farm to the new trust in the deed which creates the trust, itself together with the debt and mortgage to Mr Stanley Heenan is highly unusual and surprising. Finally, provisions such as the words in recital C on page 1 "with the execution of those present, the settlor has paid the trustees the sum of   hthv vyyˆ†‡ h‡r ‡urerror-ridden and amateurish nature of the trust deed. d) The last page of the alleged trust deed which includes a reference to the letterhead from Mr McDonald's legal firm at the time, the inclusion of the seal of the District Land Registrar at Southland (which has absolutely no relevance to the purported trust deed), and the reference to what is probably a certificate taken from a chattels security instrument at the time, all reinforce in my view the clear conclusion that this document is a shabby photocopied concoction and it is likely, at least in part, to be a forgery. e) Before me Mr Heenan was still quite unable to produce any other evidence or document to support the existence of this alleged trust. Again, he claims this was because the purchaser of the property had "stolen all of his records". This does not provide any explanation,however, as to why bank or land transfer records, tax records, financial statements, annual accounts and returns from the trust's bank, the Inland Revenue Department, or accountants or lawyers were not made available for the alleged trust. One would have thought records of this type ought to have been plentiful given Mr Heenan's claim that the 1960 trust owned the property and a series of earlier properties. That the absence of this documentary evidence reinforces a conclusion that the 1960 trust simply ceased to exist at the operative time is difficult to escape. [87] And in my view the documents proffered by Mr Heenan in an endeavour to substantiate the existence of the second and third plaintiffs, the Amended Heenan Family Trust 1960 and the Amended Heenan Family Trust Number Two, also suffer from similar problems. [88] As I have noted, there have already been several findings of fact in a range of past proceedings involving Mr Heenan that the documents he claims as foundation documents for the Heenan Family Trust 1960 and also for the Amended Heenan Family Trust 1960 and the Amended Heenan Family Trust Number Two (the plaintiffs in this proceeding) are sham documents fraudulently created by Mr Heenan. There is nothing before the Court to establish that any of these three trusts exist. The only reasonable conclusion which can be reached is that the naming of those trusts as plaintiffs by Mr Heenan has occurred simply as a device in the attempt he has made as an undischarged bankrupt to avoid his incapacity to sue in his own name. [89] I also conclude therefore that the Heenan Family Trust 1960, the Amended Heenan Family Trust 1960 and the Amended Heenan Family Trust Number Two as the named plaintiffs do not exist and further that Mr Heenan as an undischarged bankrupt without the authority of the Official Assignee lacks capacity to bring these proceedings. [90] The claims brought by these three plaintiffs are therefore without merit and must be struck out. The trusts do not exist and could not have any reasonablyarguable cause of action against any of the defendants with respect to the matters pleaded in the statement of claim. And, in any event, even if the trusts or any of them did exist (and I have found otherwise) it is quite unclear from the statement of claim as to how the alleged wrongs were committed against the trusts or how they could possibly have suffered any of the losses which are alleged. [91] For those reasons alone, in terms of r 186 I find that the plaintiffs' statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action against any defendant, and further that the proceeding is an abuse of process of this Court. An order striking out the proceeding is to follow. [92] These findings are sufficient to dispose of the strike out application before me. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, I will go on to briefly consider the other grounds advanced by the defendants in their respective strike out applications.This proceeding is an abuse of process in that the proceedings are a collateral challenge to binding judgments against Mr Heenan[93] This represents the second ground for the current strike-out application. [94] As I have canvassed earlier, essentially the entire case for the plaintiffs against the defendants depends on the assertion by Mr Heenan that judgment should not have been entered against him in favour of Ms Gore and therefore he should not have been made bankrupt. [95] It is clear however that those issues have already been decided against him and that this has occurred on a number of occasions. As an aside, there seems little argument that when Ms Gore wished to resile from her investment in the prime bank investment scam that had been arranged through the instrumentality of Mr Heenan as an "introducer" for the scheme, Mr Heenan initially facilitated this by writing the $20,000 cheque for her on his own bank account. This account was apparently overdrawn in July 1998 by about $17,000. Mr Heenan then stopped payment on the cheque on 23 July 1998. As Panckhurst J noted at para [8] of his judgment inHeenan Family Trust v Da Vella June Gore (HC INV, CIV 2003-425-105, 9 December 2004) Mr Heenan's evidence originally in the Alexandra District Court: was to the effect that a credit which he expected to the account had not eventuated and, hence, there were not sufficient funds for the cheque drawn in favour of Mrs Gore to be met.[96] That said, for Mr Heenan to now suggest as he has done in recent times that he should not have been made bankrupt as he owed nothing to Ms Gore is somewhat wide of the mark in any event. [97] The present proceeding again constitutes an attempt by Mr Heenan to relitigate the matters pertaining to the judgment entered against him on the dishonoured cheque, his bankruptcy, the judicial findings that none of the alleged plaintiff trusts exist, and the various related matters. [98] Further, in this proceeding once again Mr Heenan and the plaintiffs maintain also that the Heenan Family Trust Number Two did not own the property but that the alleged Heenan Family Trust 1960 did. But this is a point which has also been decided against Mr Heenan on a number of occasions in the past. [99] In addition, the plaintiffs and Mr Heenan endeavour to argue here that the Official Assignee should not have administered Mr Heenan's bankrupt estate. This of course ignores the fact that it was the Court that adjudicated Mr Heenan bankrupt. The Official Assignee then had certain obligations at law to carry out the administration of the estate and undertook those. [100] Further, a number of decisions of this Court and other Courts concerning aspects arising from the mortgagee sale of the property, the purchase of that property by the fourteenth defendant Vasili Enterprises Limited, the removal of chattels from the property, and the recovery of vehicles by the Official Assignee have also been the subject of earlier decisions against Mr Heenan. [101] Finally, the inter-pleader proceedings decided by John Hansen J dealt with the issues over the proper ownership of the property sale proceeds following the mortgagee sale.[102] I conclude that the plaintiffs' pleadings in their present statement of claim are a collateral challenge and in some cases a direct challenge to binding judicial decisions. As such I am satisfied that they are an abuse of process. [103] These pleadings challenge factual findings adverse to Mr Heenan in a large number of previous proceedings, involving many of the same parties, and in which Mr Heenan had a full opportunity to be heard. As against those parties, the doctrine of res judicata means these factual findings are conclusive. [104] Even against the parties who have not been involved in all prior proceedings, the findings need to bind. To do otherwise as I see it would be to allow a collateral challenge to the previous proceedings. [105] In Chamberlains v Lai [2006] NZSC 70 the Supreme Court has recently considered the law relating to collateral challenge. At page 71 of that decision the Court stated:The restrictions upon res judicata should not be swept away by an expansive approach that collateral challenges to civil proceedings are always abusive. Whether the proceedings are abusive can be assessed as appropriate against the principles of finality developed in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; 67 ER 313 to protect litigants from vexation or against the principles developed in Hunter [1982] AC529(HL) to protect public confidence in the administration of justice.[106] In Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC529(HL) Lord Diplock described:The abuse of process which the instant case exemplifies as the initiation of proceedings in a Court of justice for the purpose of mounting a collateral attack on a final decision against the intending plaintiff which has been made by another Court of competent jurisdiction in previous proceedings in which the intending plaintiff had a full opportunity of contesting the decision in the Court by which it was made.[107] Mr Heenan has expressed the view that all previous decisions adverse to him are wrong. Regardless of this, it is clearly an abuse of process for him now to contest previous binding judicial decisions and for him to make claims that necessarily challenge those decisions.[108] In my view that is clearly what in many respects he is endeavouring to do here. That is inappropriate and cannot be countenanced. [109] I am satisfied it is a clear abuse of process on the part of Mr Heenan and the three trusts who are the plaintiffs here to contest earlier judicial findings to the following effect: a) Mr Heenan was adjudged bankrupt on a valid debt and the first and second defendants did not forge the $20,000 cheque in question. b) The alleged trustees of Heenan Family Trust 1960 did not own the property and the second mortgage over the property to HFK Trustees Limited and subsequent mortgagee sale were valid. c) The property was owned by the Heenan Family Trust Number Two and Mr Heenan had no lifetime lease or interest in the property. [110] All other claims in this proceeding (primarily that property was stolen, that certain defendants trespassed on the property, and that counsel and other officers of the Court have been guilty of lying or improper conduct) as I see it depend on Mr Heenan being able to successfully overturn one or more of the findings made in other Court decisions as outlined in paras [109]a) to c) above. [111] In my view there can be little doubt that the present proceeding which is essentially brought by Mr Heenan has the significant purpose of endeavouring to overturn those earlier decisions other than through the normal appeal processes. This proceeding accordingly is clearly an abuse of process. [112] For these reasons, an order would also be made striking out the proceeding.The pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action[113] The plaintiffs' statement of claim purports to plead multiple causes of action which are in many respects generally unrelated against numerous defendants. Thesepleadings concern allegations which broadly speaking do not arise out of the same transaction, matter or event. [114] In large measure the pleadings make serious allegations of deliberate impropriety by the defendants without pleading any evidence in support of those allegations. That is potentially in breach of r 181(2) High Court Rules. [115] In addition, as I understand it, the pleadings seek to bring criminal charges by way of private prosecution in civil proceedings which is inappropriate. They also claim relief such as a Royal pardon which is simply not available. [116] The statement of claim purports to bring claims by the three alleged trusts, trusts which have been found on a number of occasions in the past not to exist. For the reasons outlined above, I too am satisfied that the plaintiff trusts do not exist. [117] That said and in summary, for the further reasons outlined at paras [19] to [72] and [93] to [108] of this judgment, I am of the view that the plaintiffs' pleadings do not disclose any reasonable cause of action, and on this basis also an order would be made striking out this proceeding.The pleadings are unnecessarily prolix, unintelligible, scandalous, frivolous and vexatious[118] In my view here there is no doubt that the plaintiffs' statement of claim contains unnecessarily prolix pleadings, it is littered with scandalous and irrelevant allegations, and must be regarded as generally frivolous and vexatious. Throughout, the statement of claim pleads assertions that defendants and others have lied, have forged documents and been guilty of corruption rather than pleading facts which might give some foundation to conclusions of the kind which the plaintiffs are asserting. These pleadings are very hard to comprehend – they are intemperate, convoluted and unintelligible in large measure. [119] There are many examples in the plaintiffs' amended statement of claim to support these conclusions. By way of illustration, I now provide a few of these:a) Page 5, preamble: "These plaintiffs will move the High Court at Dunedin for the following judgment orders for relief to be able to sue and/or comttals [sp] and/or both in these new private civil/criminal proceedings which are based on forgery, perjuries, property fraud, stealing, theft, illegal seizuries [sp] and unlawful acts, and of selling stolen goods, assets, chattels, personal belongings and documents and for being in possession of these stolen goods etc." b) Page 5, paragraph 1: " and Da Vella June Gore has never ever been charged for these offences, or stood trial, by this corrupt justice and police systems, is a fact." c) Page 6, paragraph 2: "Also D J Gore has never ever been charged, or stood trial for these serious offences, by this corrupt justice and police systems, are facts." d) Page 6, paragraph 3: "W R Gore has never ever been charged, or stood trial for these serious offences, by this corrupt justice and police systems, are facts." e) Page 6, paragraph 4: "Wayne Richard Gore has been repeatedly served details of these stated claims and has never ever been charged or stood trial by these corrupt justice and police systems, are facts." f) Page 7, paragraph 3: "Wherefore the plaintiffs seek judgment orders to sue the third, fourth and fifth defendants for a further $100,000 each for conspiring to defeat justice plus gross negligence and defamation of character in other letters to the Court and for conspiring to bring false accusations thereby did again breach and flout their very own legal moral ethical and statutory duties as senior NZ Police staff. Also claims of torts." g) Page 7, paragraph 1(a): " seek judgment orders to sue the twenty- ninth, thirty-first, fifteenth and sixteenth defendants for the sum of$250,000 each and/or committals and/or both also in claims of torts refusing to take this case to quash and annul the fraudulently obtained bankruptcy based on forgery for and on behalf of D S Heenan at the beginning of these malicious civil/criminal offences that D S Heenan is not liable and for the millions of dollars of losses caused by defendants twenty-nine, fifteen, sixteen and thirty- one for actively opposing and keeping D S Heenan the judgment debtor in that fraudulently obtained bankruptcy for over those "six bloody minded years" all based on that forged cheque 162793. D S Heenan has been deliberately made the victim of this corrupt justice, police and Official Assignee system." h) Page 8, paragraph D: "Evidences clearly show that so are all defendants as herein stated that D S Heenan is the "victim of this bloody minded mess". i) Page 9, paragraph 4: "Wherefore the plaintiffs hereby seek further judgment orders to sue the twenty-ninth, fifteenth, sixteenth and thirty-first defendants for the further sum of $100,000 each and/or committals and/or both for deliberate and intentionally registering that caveat against the interests of D S Heenan personally when those arrogant and vindictive defendants had legal representation, sit through those four different hearings at Alexandra District Court representing the Gores and themselves and so they knew damned well and were fully aware that D S Heenan did not have any personal financial interests in that property at 11 Brunswick Street, Queenstown which no-one can now argue, but which are clear evidences of blackmail, tactics, fraud, extortion, also involving deceit to gain pecuniary advantage by demanding that $57,000 are criminal offences knowingly committed by these State employees, agents and servants." j) Page 10, paragraph (c): "That that property was originally purchased 100% by the Heenan Family Trust 1960 and was neverever transferred to any other trust(s) and/or person or person(s) as was properly found by the Alexandra District Court. See that judgment order made and dated the 20 th day of November 2001 in which absolutely no-one can now argue which includes Justice Hansen's dishonest non-truths." k) Page 10, paragraph (d): "That the seventh and eighth defendants did knowingly submit to the blackmail tactics being used by the Official Assignees and their agents and servants and clearly they are all parties to these civil/criminal offences we all now firmly believe." l) Page 12, paragraph (e): "Therefore Justice Hansen knew damned well of these facts and that is why (with respect) Justice Hansen's judgments are corrupt and he ought to be struck off the Justice list as being an unfit person to be a Justice, we all now firmly believe." m) Page 12A, paragraph G: "Therefore evidences clearly show that all of these solicitors as listed as defendants are also involved in these massive property frauds and crimes involving deceptions forgeries etc, we all now firmly believe, and just like Justice Hansen they ought to be struck off the solicitors lists as being unfit persons who have all breached and flouted their very own legal moral ethical and statutory duties, it appears we all firmly believe." n) Page 14, paragraph (c): "Please note almost 12 months before HFK's fraudulent second mortgage which was registered on the title on the 19.12.2002 which exposes the farce, sham and corruptions of this justice system and its administrators." o) Page 14, paragraph 1: " wherefore D S Heenan and these plaintiffs seek further judgment orders from this High Court in Dunedin to sue all 23 defendants agents and servants in their personal capacities by law as stated pursuant to sections 66(1) and (2) of the Crimes Act 1961, parties to every offences committed by any one of them withthe common purpose of theft and illegal seizuries [sp], unlawful acts of stealing, looting and hiding of stolen goods, chattels, assets, perishable and personal belongings and documents, using force to break and enter the property and stealing those three house lots valued at $322,304 from the owner of that property D S Heenan." p) Page 15, paragraph 6: "Which makes Judge MacAskill, Associate Judge Christiansen, Justice Panckhurst, Justice Hansen's deliberate and intentionally false statements and (with respect) lies directly against the Alexandra District Court's decisions on the ownership of that property by the Heenan Family Trust 1960 a sham and a farce, but which proves beyond a shadow of any doubt that the Heenan Family Trust 1960 deed of trust actually does exist and is authentic because that Judge and those solicitors for the opposition did actually sight that original Heenan Family Trust 1960 deed of trust and did accept it as being original and authentic." q) Page 16, paragraph 7: "The plaintiffs hereby reserve all rights to add other parties to these civil/criminal offences which may include Judges, Master, Justices (some 15 of them), plus other State employees, other solicitors and private persons who are also now involved we all now firmly believe. The losses to these plaintiffs now exceeds millions of dollars." r) Page 17, paragraph 2(a): "That if any of these defendants or multiples of defendants may wish to settle their claims out of Court, then this decision is 100% entirely up to that or those defendants." s) Page 18, paragraph (g): " as the Judge stated in the discharge related matters that he know of no rules, nor law to prohibit D S Heenan from acting in his capacity as a trustee. Which is contrary to Mr Curry, Judge MacAskill's and other Judges dishonest beliefs and lies."t) Page 18, paragraph (h): "All State employees of Judges, Police and Official Assignees executors and trustees are joined in their personal capacities and as being personally liable for their own malicious civil/criminal involvements in offences and if leave of this Court is necessary to be so joined, then leave is hereby applied for here and now against him or her personally for him or her personal involvements if offences, outside of the law. All defendants have been repeatedly warned both verbally and in writing and now have absolutely no excuses for their involvement s now. We all believe." u) Page 19, paragraph (l): " and are just further proof of these corrupt justice system, and its administrations, of mimicking other Judges and failing and refusing to examine the facts and laws of New Zealand, evidences very clear shows is in fact the truth." v) Page 19, paragraph (m): "These proceedings are not muddled and unintelligible, and if they are, then those reading them ought to go back to school in the junior classes and learn basic understandable facts, we believe." w) Page 19, paragraph (n): "These proceedings are not frivolous and vexatious but are in fact a lay person's statements of claim based on very serious civil/criminal offences which are not frivolous and vexatious, on the contrary they are totally real and factual and if any person disagrees then they are calious [sp] vindictive, liars " x) Page 19, paragraph (o): "These statements of claims are not an abuse of the process of the Court but on the contrary the only person and/or persons who have and are abusing this corrupt justice system are these 31 defendants and those 15 Judges (with respect) who are all now guilty of mimicking each other instead of dealing with the laws of New Zealand as stated repeatedly within. These are the abusers of this corrupt justice system "y) Page 19, paragraph (p): " and if Judge Somerville and/or any other Judges want to become involved in aiding and abetting these very serious civil/criminal offences then we shall not hesitate in joining them as parties and have those Judges struck off the lists as being unfit person(s) to hold those positions of power and authority and continue to abuse this now corrupt justice system." z) Page 20, part "L", paragraph 1: "Royal pardon – the new High Court Justice who is to hear these matters is to initiate and recommend the execution of a Royal pardon for David Stanley Heenan via the Governor-General of New Zealand which would vindicate, impugn and clear the slanderous defamations knowingly made by some 15 Judges, Masters and Justices, the New Zealand Police and the Official assignees who have all erred and made gross miscarriages of justice " aa) Page 21, paragraph 5: "D S Heenan has been made the "victim" which has also cost all of the following to have happened: 1. The end of their marriage, of some 40 years. 2. D S Heenan has been totally rejected from his immediate family 3. The total and entire loss of his and the trust(s) life time savings which is now compelled with the absolute inability to recover the same. 4. Loss of health including stress related. 5. The total loss of reputation " [120] From the above it will be clear that the pleadings make serious allegations against all defendants together with specific allegations of judicial corruption without any evidence in support. The allegations scandalise prior Courts and theirofficers, make personal attacks and fail to identify any basis for the allegations beyond Mr Heenan's disagreement with those earlier Court decisions. [121] In addition, the plaintiffs' pleadings are thoroughly muddled. They clearly contain scandalous and irrelevant allegations in the terms referred to in Van der Kaap v Attorney-General (1996) 10 PRNZ 162. [122] As I have already noted, the pleadings claim relief that is not available, for example a Royal pardon, and they fail to indicate distinctively the causes of action alleged against each defendant. Further, they do not plead the necessary particulars of fraud, conspiracy, and perjury which are alleged. [123] Given its present form, in my view the plaintiffs' amended statement of claim is not capable of remedy by repleading. In the words of Tipping J in Marshall's Futures Ltd v Marshall [1992] 1 NZLR 316 the pleading here is "a total right off" rather than "one which is capable of effective repair". [124] These reasons also would support an order being made here to strike out the plaintiffs' proceeding.Strike out of the appeal proceeding CIV 2006-412-1031[125] It is clear that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to strike out an appeal where the appeal is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process of the Court: McFall Enterprises Ltd v Mutual Leasing Ltd (HC HAM, AP 47/99, 12 August 1999, Penlington J) and Natural Gas Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission (1995) 8 PRNZ 507. [126] From these authorities it is clear that in exercising its inherent jurisdiction the Court should strike out appeals only in obvious and exceptional cases. [127] For all the reasons outlined above, I repeat that in this case I am satisfied that the three named appellant trusts do not exist. Those trusts are the appellants in this appeal. For that reason, and for the other reasons outlined earlier in this judgment, Iam satisfied that the appeal from the District Court decision here has absolutely no prospect of success. This appeal is clearly frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the Court. I leave aside also at this point the fact that although the appeal by the appellants names all 31 of the present defendants in the substantive proceeding, the District Court proceeding itself as I understand it involved only 29 of those defendants. [128] It will be apparent therefore that the defendants' application to strike out the appeal in proceeding CIV 2006-412-1031 also succeeds.Strike out – first, second, nineteenth, and twentieth defendants[129] One final matter needs mention. This is the fact that, as I noted at para [7] of this judgment, the first, second, nineteenth, and twentieth defendants have not joined in bringing the present strike out applications. [130] Although that is the case, the submissions which were made to me on behalf of the other defendants, my comments on all those arguments and my decisions in this judgment apply equally to all defendants.Joinder application[131] Before me Mr Heenan endeavoured to make an oral application first, to join himself as a fourth plaintiff to this proceeding and secondly, to join Michaela Ryan, who was counsel for the third to eleventh, seventeenth, eighteenth, twenty-third, and thirtieth defendants, as a thirty-second defendant to this proceeding. No proper reasons were provided, however, to support the contention that Ms Ryan should be joined to this proceeding nor to explain why she could not have been joined earlier. In addition, no reasonable cause of action against Ms Ryan was shown. [132] Further, Mr Heenan clearly lacks any authority to be joined as a plaintiff. And, as an undischarged bankrupt Mr Heenan does not have the consent of the Official Assignee to commence or participate in legal proceedings.[133] This joinder application illustrated to me that, although, in the past Mr Heenan certainly has had his day in Court over and over again, he simply will not let go. The joinder application is entirely misconceived. It is dismissed.Conclusion[134] As I signalled at the outset in this judgment, these proceedings bear all the hallmarks of vexatious litigation. They are pursued by an almost compulsive litigant against a widening circle of defendants and involve extravagant and unfounded claims and attacks upon those defendants. I have no doubt they are designed to cause the defendants unnecessary trouble and expense and to tie up a group of defendants in litigation which can only be described as frivolous and vexatious. They are a misuse of the judicial process. I am fully satisfied that it would be an injustice and an abuse of the process of the Court to allow the proceedings to continue. [135] The applications before me succeed. Orders are made therefore striking out the substantive proceedings CIV 2006-412-1023 and the appeal proceedings CIV 2006-412-1031 in their entirety against all defendants. In addition, all outstanding interlocutory applications lodged by the plaintiffs (if any) are similarly struck out.Costs[136] As to costs, the defendants having succeeded with their strike out applications, they are entitled to an award of costs. No submissions were put to me as to the quantum of costs to be awarded or as to who should bear responsibility for these costs. [137] That said the following directions with regard to this issue of costs are now made:a) within 20 working days of the date of this judgment counsel for the defendants are to file and serve any memoranda they may wish to regarding the issue of costs; b) within a further 20 working days of receiving those memoranda from counsel for the defendants, the plaintiff trusts, Mr Heenan, and the other persons said to be trustees of the plaintiff trusts, Pamela Joan Wadsworth and Trevor Allen Lee, shall have an opportunity to provide memoranda in response on the issue of costs; c) all those memoranda are then to be forwarded to me and I will then decide the issue of costs based upon the material before the Court.____________________________ Associate Judge D I Gendall