HONE MA HEKE (also known as LEWIS REGINALD STANTON) v NELSON CITY COUNCIL [2019] NZHC 433

HONE MA HEKE (also known as LEWIS REGINALD STANTON) v NELSON CITY COUNCIL [2019]NZHC 433 [13 March 2019]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDNELSON REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROAWHAKATŪ ROHECIV-2017-442-43[2019] NZHC 433IN THE MATTER OF The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990BETWEEN HONE MA HEKE (also known as LEWISREGINALD STANTON)PlaintiffAND NELSON CITY COUNCILFirst DefendantTHE ATTORNEY-GENERALSecond DefendantNELSON BRANCH of the ROYAL NEWZEALAND SOCIETY FOR THEPREVENTION OF CRUELTY TOANIMALS INCThird DefendantHearing: 20 February 2019Appearances: Plaintiff in personJ C Ironside for the First DefendantJ M Webber for the Second DefendantM J Wallace for the Third DefendantJudgment: 13 March 2019JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE R M BELLThis judgment was delivered by me on 13 March 2019 at 3:30pmpursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.Deputy RegistrarSolicitors:Fiona McLeod, Nelson City CouncilO'Donoghue Webber, Nelson, for the Second DefendantDuncan Cotterill, Nelson, for the Third DefendantCopy for:J C Ironside, Nelson, for the First DefendantM J Wallace, Christchurch, for the Third Defendant[1] All defendants ask the court to strike out the plaintiff's claim. The thirddefendant says that if the claim is not struck out, it should have security for costs.[2] While the plaintiff had some legal assistance in the early stages of this case,his application for legal aid was rejected. He is bringing this proceedingunrepresented. He has many of the difficulties experienced by litigants in person. Hehas little understanding of the law or the rules and practice of this court. Procedurallyhe has little idea how to run a proceeding in this court. That is all the more challengingfor his case against the first and second defendants because he has chosen causes ofaction that are difficult to plead and prove.[3] I decline to strike out his proceeding at this stage. There are problems with hispleadings, but he should be given the opportunity to fix them up by providing moreparticulars. The RSPCA, the third defendant, has established a case for security forcosts and I order security.Background[4] The plaintiff was formerly known as Lewis Reginald Stanton but now goes bythe name of Hone Ma Heke. He said that I could call him 'Hone'. In the entituling,he is described as a freelance politician. He had an unconventional lifestyle.1 That ledto brushes with the authorities.[5] In 2012, he took to occupying a part of the footpath outside the Farmers storein Trafalgar Street, Nelson. Members of the public complained. The Police chargedhim with obstructing a public way contrary to s 22 of the Summary Offences Act 1981.He was given bail, subject to a condition that he stay outside the Nelson CBD. Heappealed successfully against that condition.2 Hone defended the obstruction chargebut was found guilty and fined. In their decision, the justices of the peace recorded1 See, for example, Goddard J's description in Stanton v Nelson City Council [2014] NZHC 3117at [3].2 Stanton v New Zealand Police [2012] NZHC 1878.that he occupied the footpath outside Farmers to display placards by way of mountinga protest. Hone was successful in his appeal against conviction.3[6] The Nelson branch of the RSCPA dealt with Hone in January 2015. Hone hada cart and a horse ("Barney"). An RSPCA animal welfare inspector saw Barneyattached to the cart standing in the hot sun in January 2015 in the Nelson CBD. Theinspector was concerned for Barney's welfare given the hot conditions. She gaveHone a notice under s 130 of the Animal Welfare Act 1999. That allows an animalwelfare inspector to give a notice to a person in charge of an animal to take steps toprevent the animal suffering if the inspector has reasonable grounds to believe that theanimal is suffering, or it might suffer unreasonable or unnecessary pain or distress.Later the same month the RSPCA arranged for a vet to assess Barney. The vet foundthat Barney was suffering heat stress and was showing signs of dehydration. Theinspector unharnessed Barney, walked him to a shaded area and later arranged forBarney to be collected and taken away to grazing. The vet billed the RSPCA for histime in examining Barney and reporting. The RSPCA asked the lawyers representingMr Stanton for reimbursement of the vet's fee. The lawyers advised that Hone couldnot pay. In the meantime, Barney was being agisted. In May 2015, Barney wasadopted under an animal adoption agreement. In disposing of Barney, the RSPCAsays that it was acting under s 141 of the Animal Welfare Act 1999.This proceeding[7] Hone began this proceeding in January 2017. He had legal assistance with hispleadings. The amended statement of claim of 26 July 2018 has these causes of action:(a) The first, against the Nelson City Council, alleges breaches of his rightsunder the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: freedom of thoughtand conscience under s 13, freedom of expression under s 14, freedomof manifestation of belief under s 15, freedom of assembly under s 16,freedom of association under s 17 and freedom of movement unders 18. In 2011 the city council issued him with a notice under theTrespass Act barring him from 216 places owned, occupied or3 Stanton v New Zealand Police [2012] NZHC 3223.administered by the council. He pleads that the Trespass Act notice wasquashed in a District Court decision on 7 September 2011. He wasarrested on 6 February 2012 for breaching the trespass notice, and hishorse, cart and possessions were taken and not returned until mid-2012.The city council is alleged to have converted Barney, the cart andpossessions. Hone seeks damages for breaches of his rights, plusdamages for conversion of Barney, his cart and possessions.(b) The second cause of action is for misfeasance in public office by certainnamed council officers but relies on the much the same facts as the firstcause of action.(c) The third cause of action is against the city council and the police. Itrelates to events in 2012 when Hone kept his vigil outside Farmers.Hone alleges that the city council caused the police to act. When hewas charged with obstruction, he refused to accept the bail conditionthat he not enter the Nelson CBD and as a result he remained in custodyuntil his appeal against the condition was overturned. He alleges thathis rights under ss 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the New Zealand Bill ofRights Act were infringed. The Nelson City Council is said to havebeen implicated in his being warned, charged and arrested in July andAugust of 2012.(d) The fourth cause of action, also against the city council and the police,relies on the same matters as the third cause of action but allegesmisfeasance in public office or malicious prosecution.(e) The fifth cause of action is against the city council only. After Honestationed himself on Lower Bridge Street in 2014 with his horse andcart, the Nelson City Council issued parking and other tickets and heincurred fines of $159,000. Hone says this was part of a targetedcampaign to make him move outside the Nelson business district. Hewas regularly summonsed to court for non-payment of fines, ordered todo community work which he refused to do, and was sentenced toimprisonment for non-performance of community work. The NelsonCity Council sought an injunction in the Nelson District Court torestrain him from parking. Hone successfully appealed that decision.4The Nelson City Council's actions are said to have breached Hone'srights under ss 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the New Zealand Bill ofRights Act.(f) The sixth cause of action, also against the Nelson City Council, is thatthe actions of officers in the Nelson City Council amounted tomalicious prosecution of civil proceedings as they had an ulteriorpurpose of removing him from the Nelson CBD.(g) The seventh cause of action, again against the Nelson City Council, isthat the actions of the Nelson City Council officials amounted tomisfeasance in public office. He appears to allege the knowinginvalidity limb of the tort.(h) The eighth cause of action, against the RSPCA, is a claim in conversionfor the seizure of Barney in January 2015. While the RSPCA says thatit acted with statutory authority, Hone says that it had no grounds torefuse to return Barney free of charge once it became apparent thatBarney was not suffering and Hone could not pay the costs demandedby the RSPCA.[8] In short, the Nelson City Council is sued in the first to seventh causes of action;the Police are sued in third and fourth causes of action; and the RSPCA is sued in theeighth cause of action. The first four causes of action deal with events in 2012; thefifth, sixth and seventh with events in 2014; and the eighth with events in 2015.[9] The defendants filed statements of defence in March 2017. At the same time,the first and second defendants wrote to Hone requesting particulars. In May 2017, alawyer assisting Hone sent a draft amended statement of claim to the first and seconddefendants. That pleading was not filed at that stage. The first and second defendants4 Stanton v Nelson City Council [2014] NZHC 3117.considered that it did not meet their requirements. At the first case managementconference on 21 June 2017 Associate Judge Matthews stayed the proceeding to awaitthe outcome of Hone's application for legal aid. In January 2018, the defendants wereadvised that Hone's application for legal aid had been declined by the Legal AidTribunal. The defendants say that at the end of February 2018, Hone offered towithdraw the proceeding if no costs were sought. All defendants agreed to that, butHone did not discontinue the proceeding.[10] On 28 March 2018, Judge Matthews gave these directions:(a) If Hone intends to discontinue the proceeding, he must file and serve awritten notice of discontinuance within five working days.(b) If Hone intends to pursue the proceeding, he must file and serve within15 working days an amended statement of claim answering thedefendant' notices requiring particulars.(c) If Hone files and serves an amended statement of claim, anyinterlocutory applications by the defendants for security for costs or tostrike out his pleadings are to be filed and served within a further15 working days.(d) Tailored discovery is to be agreed between the parties within15 working days of the pleadings being finalised, or directions will besought from the court if necessary.(e) If Hone fails to comply in time with the directions to file and serve anamended statement of claim, the proceeding will be stayed and leave isreserved to the defendants to apply to strike out on notice.[11] Hone did not comply with either of the first two directions. On 6 July 2018,the second defendant applied under r 15.1 of the High Court Rules for an order strikingout the statement of claim on the ground of Hone's non-compliance with JudgeMatthews' directions. Hone did not file any documents in opposition. The applicationwas called on 26 July 2018. Associate Judge Osborne directed Hone to file and servea draft notice of opposition and affidavit. In a minute of 27 July 2018, Judge Osborneindicated that he would defer consideration of the papers until 1 August 2018.[12] Judge Osborne gave a decision on 13 August 2018. I will refer to that decisionin more detail later. He declined to strike out the statement of claim but adjourned itwith leave to the second defendant to have the application brought on for furtherargument on 10 working days' notice. He reserved costs. In a minute also issued on13 August 2018, Judge Osborne recorded that Hone had submitted a draft amendedstatement of claim on 27 July 2018. I have referred to that in this decision.Judge Osborne gave Hone leave to file and serve a pleading in terms of the draftsubmitted. That was without prejudice to any resumed or fresh application by anydefendant in relation to the new pleading. He reserved leave to the other parties toapply.[13] On 24 August 2018, the RSPCA filed its application to strike out and forsecurity for costs. Directions for hearing were given on 6 September 2018. Hone wasdirected to file and serve any notice of opposition to the RSPCA's application within15 working days, but he did not comply with that.The second defendant's strike-out application[14] The second defendant relies on two matters: Hone has failed to comply withprocedural directions and he is pursuing the proceeding for an improper purpose.Accordingly, the proceeding is an abuse of process.[15] The second defendant can no longer pursue those matters in the light ofJudge Osborne's decision of 13 August 2018.5 Considering the application underr 15.1 of the High Court Rules, he found:(a) The defendants did not suggest that Hone's pleadings did not disclosearguable causes of action. The issue was rather that they had not beenproperly particularised, and there had been delays in giving particulars.5 Heke v Nelson City Council [2018] NZHC 2062.Hone had now submitted a draft amended statement of claim showinga serious effort at providing particulars.6(b) While Hone had delayed in providing particulars, the claim should notbe struck out when there was no challenge to the causes of action.7(c) The email exchange as to withdrawal/discontinuance in February-March 2018 did not in the circumstances warrant strike-out.8(d) While there were suggestions that Hone was pursuing the proceedingfor an ulterior purpose, and there had been delays, he appeared to bepursuing the proceeding if other outcomes do not fall in place. It wasinappropriate to strike out the proceeding as involving an abuse ofprocess.9(e) There was no justification for Hone not now having his litigation inorder and moving to resolution (subject to any interlocutoryapplications by the defendants as to security for costs).10[16] While Judge Osborne dealt with all matters that the second defendant hadraised, he did not find for the second defendant on any of them. He adjourned theapplication, rather than dismiss it.11 Because Judge Osborne dealt with the matters thesecond defendant relied on for its strike-out application, it is not open to the seconddefendant to argue those matters afresh. His decision still stands. The seconddefendant says that Judge Osborne did not hear full argument. If that is the case, thesecond defendant should have taken steps to have the decision set aside. There hasbeen no application to review his decision under former r 2.3 of the High CourtRules.12 Nor has there been any application to order or vary his decision under r 7.49,or to rescind it as having been improperly obtained under r 7.51. Because his decision6 At [26].7 At [27].8 At [29]-[31].9 At [32]-[35].10 At [36].11 At [40].12 The right of review of an Associate Judge's chambers decision in proceedings started before1 March 2017 is saved under the Senior Courts Act 2016, Schedule 5, cl 11(3)(b).stands, it is not open to me to enquire again into the matters raised by the seconddefendant to strike out Hone's third and fourth causes of action.[17] The second defendant relied on Hone's breaches of Judge Matthews' directionsof March 2018. With hindsight, that matter would have been better raised under r 7.48of the High Court Rules which gives the court powers to enforce interlocutory orders.But that aspect has been overtaken by Judge Osborne's decision. While not condoningHone's breaches of Judge Matthews' directions, Judge Osborne indicated that the waywas clear for Hone to proceed with his claim, notwithstanding his earlier breach.I would be undermining Judge Osborne's decision if I were now to strike out Hone'sclaim against the second defendant for those breaches.[18] Admittedly, Judge Osborne left the application pending with leave to thesecond defendant to bring it on again. That did not mean that he left it open to thesecond defendant to re-argue its application. If Judge Osborne had dismissed theapplication, the second defendant would need leave for a fresh strike-out applicationwhich would be granted only in special circumstances.13 By leaving the strike-outapplication pending, Judge Osborne allowed the second defendant to seek a freshstrike-out, based on new circumstances, without having to deal with a leaveapplication under r 7.52.[19] The second defendant also took the point that Hone was in ongoing breach ofa court direction, because while Judge Osborne had granted him leave to file and servea statement of claim in terms of the draft he had submitted, Hone had not in fact fileda new amended pleading. The document that Hone submitted as a draft has beenregistered on the court file as an amended statement of claim. After seeing it counselfor the first and second defendants confirmed that it was in the same terms as the draftsent to them earlier. In the circumstances, the point is pedantic quibbling. Thedocument on the court file registered as Hone's amended statement of claim is hiscurrent pleading, which the defendants have already received.13 High Court Rules 2016, r 7.52.The first defendant[20] While the first defendant appeared, it had not filed any application. Itsupported the second defendant's application and seemed to expect that orders on thesecond defendant's application would result in the claims against it being struck out.The second defendant could only apply for the claims against it to be struck out. Ifthe first defendant seeks strike-out, it needs to make its own application. In theabsence of any application by the first defendant, I make no order.The first and second defendants' requests for particulars[21] The first and second defendants say that Hone's amended statement of claimdoes not give adequate particulars. In March 2017 they wrote to Hone, c/o his lawyer,setting out matters on which they required him to give particulars of his claim. WhileJudge Matthews gave directions in March 2018 for Hone to give a better particularisedstatement of claim, he did not specify which particulars Hone was required to give.Now that Hone has filed an amended statement of claim, it is necessary to work outwhich part of his new pleading requires further particulars.[22] While Judge Osborne held that Hone had pleaded recognisable causes ofaction, Hone has made general assertions with only some supporting particulars.General allegations are not adequate. Defendants may require a plaintiff to provideenough detail for the defendants to understand the case against them. That appliesespecially to the causes of action for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in publicoffice. The requirements for pleading fraud also apply to those causes of action.14 InSchmidt v Pepper New Zealand (Custodians) Ltd, the Court of Appeal set out therequirements for pleading and proving fraud:15[15] Allegations of fraud or dishonesty are very serious. They must bepleaded with care and particularity. As the authors of Bullen & Leake &Jacobs in Precedents of Pleadings16 emphasise, counsel must not draft anyoriginating process or pleading containing an allegation of fraud unless theyhave reasonably credible material which, as it stands, establishes a prima facie14 See, for example, Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No.3) [2003] 2 AC 1 (HL),the judgment of 22 March 2001, especially Lord Millett at [184]-[189] and Lord Hope at [55].15 Schmidt v Pepper New Zealand (Custodians) Ltd [2012] NZCA 565.16 Bullen & Leake & Jacobs Precedents of Pleadings (16th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008)vol 2 at [49-02].case of fraud – that is, material of such a character which would lead to theconclusion that serious allegations could properly be based upon it. Fraudcannot be left to be inferred from the facts – fraudulent conduct must bedistinctly alleged and as distinctly proved.17 General allegations, howeverstrong the words may appear to be, are insufficient to amount to a properallegation of fraud.18[16] While these principles have been articulated in authoritativediscussions of duties imposed upon counsel, they apply with equal rigour tothose who represent themselves. Those who seek to portray themselves aswell acquainted with the law and its processes cannot shelter behind the barrierof unfamiliarity when it suits. They must satisfy the same exacting standardwhen preparing their own pleadings. The obligation exists for the benefit ofdefendants – to allow them to be fully aware of, and able to address, the seriousallegation – and for the Court which will be called upon to decide it.[23] I add that the requirement to give proper particulars has another purpose. Itrequires a plaintiff to articulate their case. If a plaintiff can do no more than makegeneral allegations, without giving details to show fraudulent conduct, maliciousprosecution or misfeasance in public office, the court may infer that they do not havea case, and if they do not have a case, it may be struck out.[24] Hone needs to appreciate that under the Court of Appeal's decision in Schmidtv Pepper New Zealand (Custodians) Ltd, he is required to provide particulars in justthe same way as a party represented by a lawyer. His lack of representation does notexempt him. At the same time, the particulars sought by the first and seconddefendants should specify matters of fact to be given by Hone. It is outside the scopeof the particulars to require him to address matters of law.[25] In my minute of 20 February 2019, I gave directions for the first and seconddefendants to give notices requiring particulars by 1 March 2019 and for Hone to replyby 15 March 2019.The third defendant's application[26] The RSPCA applies for strike-out. It filed a separate application on 24 August2018. The grounds are:17 Davy v Garrett (1878) 7 Ch D 473 (CA) at 489.18 Wallingford v Mutual Society (1880) 5 App Cas 685 (HL) at 697(a) The statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action againstit.(b) The claim is frivolous or vexatious.(c) Continuation of the proceeding is an abuse of process as it is being runfor a collateral or improper purpose.[27] Hone's cause of action against the RSPCA is for conversion of Barney on29 January 2015 in Lower Bridge Street, Nelson. The RSPCA had given Hone aninstruction to prevent and mitigate suffering by Barney earlier in January, but Honepleads that he had complied, and Barney was in as good or better state than mostanimals were at that time of the year. He also pleads that the RSPCA took the horseaway when Hone was not able to pay the SPCA's costs and the RSPCA knew that.The RSPCA disposed of the horse to an unknown person.[28] That appears to be a sound pleading of a cause of action in conversion. Anyassertion by the RSPCA that it was acting within its statutory powers is an affirmativedefence which it will be required to plead and prove. Hone's pleading of conversiondoes not fail because there may be a viable affirmative defence available to thedefendant. Hone disputes the seizure by pleading that he complied with the earlierinstruction and that the horse was in as good a condition as most animals at that timeof the year. It will, of course, be a matter of evidence whether that is the case. Thepleading discloses an arguable cause of action in conversion. It cannot be struck outon that ground.[29] The RSPCA submits that Hone has no realistic prospect of success on his claimin conversion, but in an application to strike out for no reasonable cause of action, itis assumed that what a plaintiff has pleaded is capable of proof. The court is concernedwith the quality of the pleading, not the quality of proof. On such a strike-outapplication, the plaintiff is not required to give any evidence at all.[30] The RSPCA also says that the proceeding is an abuse of process because Honeis pursuing the claim for a collateral purpose. The abuse of process claim tends tomerge with the allegation that the claim is frivolous or vexatious. The RSPCA refersto paragraph 34 of the statement of claim:The actions of the third defendant constituted conversion of Barney and havebeen a major obstacle to settling the underlying dispute, with the thirddefendant refusing to comply with requests for information that Barney'swhereabouts and the circumstances of his disposal.The RSPCA says that this refers to the dispute with the city council and the police.Apparently Hone sees some connection between the RSPCA and the actions of theother defendants.[31] That does not, however, make the claim for conversion an abuse of process.The claim is properly a claim for conversion of a horse, a recognised cause of action.Hone is taking that cause of action because he wants the court to decide that theRSPCA did wrong in taking the horse. It is beside the point that Hone may hope toachieve some incidental object as well as establishing that his horse was wronglytaken. That becomes apparent from the decision of the High Court of Australia inWilliams v Spautz:19The boundaries of abuse of process34. The observations of the Privy Council in King v Henderson . andthose of Isaacs J in Dowling, to which we referred earlier, represent anattempt to achieve a formulation which keeps the concept of abuse of processwithin reasonable bounds. To say that a purpose of a litigant in bringingproceedings which is not within the scope of the proceeding, constitutes,without more, an abuse of process might unduly expand the concept. Thepurpose of a litigant may be to bring proceedings to a successful conclusionso as to take advantage of an entitlement or benefit which the law gives thelitigant in that event.[35] Thus, to take an example mentioned in argument, an aldermanprosecutes another alderman who is a political opponent for failure to disclosea relevant pecuniary interest when voting to approve a contract, intending tosecure the opponent's conviction so that he or she will then be disqualifiedfrom office as an alderman by reason of that conviction, pursuant to localgovernment legislation regulating the holding of such offices. The ultimatepurpose of bringing about disqualification is not within the scope of thecriminal process instituted by the prosecutor. But the immediate purpose ofthe prosecutor is within that scope. And the existence of the ultimate purposecannot constitute an abuse of process when that purpose is to bring about a19 Williams v Spautz (1992) 274 CLR 509 at 507.result for which the law provides in the event that the proceedings terminatein the prosecutor's favour.[36] It is otherwise when the purpose of bringing the proceedings is not toprosecute them to a conclusion but to use them as a means of obtaining someadvantage for which they are not designed or some collateral advantagebeyond what the law offers. So in Dowling, Isaacs J pointed out:If, for instance, it had been shown that the Society had simplythreatened Dowling that unless he did what they had no right todemand from him, namely, give up certain names, they would proceedto sequestration, and they had proceeded accordingly, there wouldhave been in law an abuse of process.(Citations omitted)[32] In this case, it appears that Hone is pursuing a claim in conversion for the verypurpose for which it was designed. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that there is anabuse of process requiring striking-out.Reply by Hone[33] In its statement of defence, the RSPCA says that it acted in accordance with itsstatutory powers. That affirmative defence needs to be answered. Hone ought to filea reply under r 5.62 of the High Court Rules. He is to file and serve a reply by22 March 2019. He should and set out in his reply those matters he relies on to saythat the RSPCA cannot rely on its statutory powers under the Animal Welfare Act1999.The security for costs application[34] The RSPCA seeks security for costs against Hone because there is reason tobelieve that Hone will be unable to pay its costs if he is unsuccessful. Hone acceptsthat he could not pay any order for costs. While he receives a benefit to meet his day-to-day living expenses, he has no other significant income or assets to meet anyadditional liabilities. He has consistently held himself out as leading a non-materialistic life. The RSPCA has established the threshold under r 5.45(1)(b) of theHigh Court Rules. Next comes exercising a discretion. The court must weigh on theone hand a plaintiff's right of access to the court to have his case heard and determinedagainst the defendant's desire to be protected against obtaining no more than a barrenorder for costs against an impecunious plaintiff. In considering the exercise of thediscretion, the court considers the merits of the case, although that is often no morethan a provisional assessment. Whereas the RSPCA filed evidence in support of itsapplication, Hone did not give any evidence himself. At this stage, the RSPCA hasshown a persuasive case that it acted in accordance with its powers under the AnimalWelfare Act 1999. It seems to have good prospects of defending the case against it.In the hearing, Hone was unable to explain why the defence would not succeed.[35] The courts are normally reluctant to bar a plaintiff with a worthy claim fromthe court. Their interests are often ranked ahead of the interests of a defendant whomay not recover costs even if they succeed. But in this case, Hone's interests areoutweighed by the RSPCA's. Hone's case appears weak. The RSPCA is a charitableorganisation that relies on donations to carry out its activities, as opposed to moresubstantial organisations such as government agencies, banks and large corporations.The inability to recover costs is likely to hit it harder. Accordingly, even thoughordering security may bar Hone from continuing his claim against the RSPCA,security should be ordered.[36] The RSPCA estimated that the costs of trial will be about $50,000. It suggestedsecurity of $30,000. In the hearing, I suggested that there may be room for reducingcosts. Hone's claim against the RSPCA is distinct from his claim against the otherdefendants. It relies on different events at different times. The relief he is seeking iswithin the civil jurisdiction of the District Court. There seems no reason why the causeof action against Hone could not be transferred to the District Court, to be heardseparately from Hone's claims against the city council and the police. Even if that partof the proceeding were to remain in this court, it could be heard separately.[37] The amount at which security is set is not critical, because whatever amountI set, Hone is unlikely to be able to pay it. Accordingly, I fix security payable by Honeat $15,000, appreciating that that may be insurmountable for him. There will be a stayof the proceeding against the RSPCA until the security is paid. The security willoperate with effect from 29 March 2019, giving Hone time in which to file his reply.The $15,000 is to be paid into court, to be held in an interest-bearing account. If Honedoes not pay the sum of $15,000 by 30 September 2019, the RSPCA may apply tostrike his claim out.Result[38] Hone has largely succeeded against the second defendant on its application tostrike out his claim. As he is a litigant in person, he cannot recover costs. However,if the second defendant seeks costs against Hone at a later hearing in this proceeding,his success on this application may count in reducing costs that might otherwise beawarded against him.[39] There are no orders in respect of the first defendant. It has neither succeedednor failed.[40] The RSPCA is entitled to costs on its security for costs application.[41] I make these orders:(a) By 1 March 2019, the first and second defendants are to file and servememoranda setting out further particulars they require the plaintiff togive. I encourage them to specify factual matters which the plaintiffought to be able to address.(b) By 15 March 2019, the plaintiff is to file and serve his response to therequest for particulars.(c) The file is to be referred to me to rule what particulars Hone shouldgive.(d) By 15 March 2019, the plaintiff is to file and serve his reply to theRSPCA's statement of defence.(e) The second defendant's strike out application remains adjourned.(f) The plaintiff is to provide security for costs of $15,000 for the thirddefendant to be held in an interest-bearing account in court, pendingfurther order of the court. If the payment is not made by 29 March2019, the plaintiff's claim against the RSPCA is stayed. If the plaintiffdoes not provide the security by 30 September 2019, the RSPCA mayapply to strike out the claim against it.(g) The RSPCA has costs on its security for costs application. If costscannot be agreed, memoranda may be filed. The plaintiff should fileand serve his costs submission within five working days of theRSPCA's(h) The RSPCA's strike-out application is dismissed.(i) Leave is reserved to apply for further directions..Associate Judge R M Bell