Inglewood Metal v Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Corporation

IN THE DISTRICT COURT HELD AT WELLINGTON Decision No. 10 /99 IN THE MATTER of The Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 AND IN THE MATTER of an Appeal pursuant to Section 91 of the Act BETWEEN INGLEWOOD METAL DCA 227/97 Appellant AND ACCIDENT REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION INSURANCE CORPORATION a body corporate duly constituted under the provisions of the said Act Respondent DECISION OF JUDGE M J BEATTIE ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO HIGH COURT The appellant has applied for leave to appeal to the High Court against the decision of this Court issued on the 27" day of July 1998 under No. 164/98. In that decision His Honour Judge Middleton ruled that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the provisions of section 90(9) of the Act as the matter in issue 2 between the appellant and the respondent had not reached the stage of having a decision made that was capable of being the subject of a review. In the alternative, His Honour ruled that even if the IRD assessment of employer premiums as notified to the appellant could be considered a decision of the respondent, then he found that the appellant had acquiesced in any delay by agreeing to delay further negotiations in relation to premium assessments until the return from overseas of the person in the IRD who was dealing with the matter. Counsel for the appellant, in support of the application for leave, submitted that the finding by the Learned Judge that the letter of 17 July 1996 from the appellant's accountant to IRD could not be regarded as an application for review, is one that ought not to have been made in view of a concession made by counsel for the respondent in its written submissions. The second submission made by counsel for the appellant was that the finding that the appellant had acquiesced or contributed to delay was a question of law which ought to be open to appeal to the High Court. Counsel for the respondent, in opposition to the application for leave, submitted that the appellant has not identified any question of law which requires to be determined. Counsel submits that the only findings by the Learned Judge were findings of fact and further, that it was open to the Learned Judge to reach a different view on the status of the letter of 17 July 1996 by the appellant to the IRD than that conceded by the respondent. Counsel further submitted that on the second issue of whether there was any contribution to the delay by the respondent, and the finding so made, was purely one of fact and again no question of law arose. 3 I agree with counsel for the respondent's submissions that the findings and decision of His Honour were wholly findings of fact and no questions of law arose. There was nothing in the decision which would bring the interpretation of section 90(9) of the Act into the decision as a ruling of law and the decision simply applies the provisions of that statutory provision to the facts as they were found by the Learned Judge. Accordingly then, leave to appeal to the High Court is declined. DATED at Wellington this 27" day of January 1999. cleathe M J Beattie' District Court Judge Inglewood.doc(gm)