BRACEY v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2022] NZHC 476

BRACEY v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2022] NZHC 476 [16 March 2022]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDWHANGAREI REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROAWHANGĀREI-TERENGA-PARĀOA ROHECRI-2021-488-000060[2022] NZHC 476BETWEEN JACOB CARL BRACEYAppellantAND NEW ZEALAND POLICERespondentHearing: 9 March 2022Appearances: S J Ross for the AppellantS-L Litt for the RespondentJudgment: 16 March 2022JUDGMENT OF GORDON JThis judgment is delivered by me on 16 March 2022 at 11ampursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules......................................................Registrar / Deputy RegistrarCounsel/Solicitors:Stephen Ross, Barrister, WhangareiCrown Solicitor, WhangareiIntroduction[1] The appellant Jacob Bracey pleaded guilty in the District Court at Whangareito a range of property offences, the most serious being two burglary charges.Judge Orchard sentenced him to 10 months' home detention, six-months' suspensionof his driver's licence, and monetary reparations for the fuel he stole.1[2] He appeals this sentence on the basis that:(a) the starting point was too high;(b) the discount for his youth was insufficient; and(c) the sentencing Judge did not have full information regarding hisbackground, particularly in relation to a Psychological Assessmentpreviously undertaken when he appeared in the Youth Court.Factual Background[3] Mr Bracey's offences were committed between February and August 2021.[4] The first was a burglary of a residential property on 22 February 2021.2 Theowner of the property and the appellant are known to each other. The appellant stolea BMW from the garage under the house and after visiting two premises in Whangarei,travelled south to Auckland. The car was later recovered. Mr Bracey had just turned18 at this time.[5] The second and third charges of theft were in relation to fuel drive-offs.3Mr Bracey went to a petrol station, filled up his car, and left without paying on twooccasions. The first fuel drive-off was committed on 6 May 2021 while he was drivingwhen his licence was suspended.4 The second, on 27 June 2021, was while he was onbail.1 New Zealand Police v Bracey [2021] NZDC 22504.2 Crimes Act 1961, s 231(1)(a).3 Crimes Act 1961, ss 219 and 223(d).4 Land Transport Act 1998, ss 32(1)(c) and 32(3).[6] The fourth and fifth offences occurred in relation to one incident on 4 August2021. Mr Bracey's vehicle had been repaired by a vehicle mechanic and was on themechanic's premises. Mr Bracey broke in by cutting the fence and stole the vehicle.He was charged with being unlawfully in an enclosed yard5 and intentional damage,6both of which carry a maximum penalty of three months' imprisonment.[7] Two days later, on 6 August 2021, Mr Bracey committed the second burglary.7He broke into a company's premises in West Auckland and stole a boat, fishing gearand other equipment as well as some containers of petrol and diesel, which he hadfilled from pumps on the company's property. The police stopped Mr Bracey nearWhangarei as he was towing the boat and recovered all the property.District Court decision[8] At sentencing, the District Court Judge calculated the starting point by addingtogether:(a) 12 months for the first burglary,(b) 1 month for the two thefts of diesel and driving while suspended,(c) 1 month for the charges of being unlawfully in an enclosed yard andintentional damage, and(d) 18 months for the second burglary.[9] This brought the Judge to a starting point of two years and eight months.[10] She then gave two discounts: 20 per cent for Mr Bracey's guilty pleas and15 per cent for his youth and "a number of other factors". The Judge took into accounthis youth offending, his appearances at the Youth Court, and his determination not torepeat his prison experience.5 Summary Offences Act 1981, s 29(1)(b).6 Summary Offences Act 1981, s 11(1)(a).7 Crimes Act 1961, s 231(1)(a).[11] Applying the 35 per cent discount the resulting sentence was 20 months'imprisonment. The Judge converted that to 10 months' home detention.[12] The Judge constructed the sentence as follows:(a) four months' home detention for the first burglary;(b) reparation to the petrol station in the sum of $60.48 for the first petroltheft;(c) disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for sixmonths from the date of sentencing;(d) reparation to the vehicle mechanic in the sum of $537.05 in relation tothe offending on 4 August 2021; and(e) 10 months' home detention for the second burglary.[13] The Judge ordered that the two terms of home detention be servedconcurrently.Approach on Appeal[14] An appeal against sentence can be brought as of right.8 The appeal court canonly allow the appeal if there is an error in the sentence imposed and a differentsentence should be imposed.9 However, the Court "will not intervene where thesentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencingprinciples".10 The sentence must be "manifestly excessive" for the appeal court tosubstitute its own views. Whether the sentence is manifestly excessive is to beassessed in terms of the sentence given, rather than the process by which it is reached.118 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 244.9 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250.10 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [36].11 Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].SubmissionsAppellant's submissions[15] The submission made by counsel for Mr Bracey in the District Court, was thatthe appropriate starting point was two years and seven months' imprisonment. TheJudge noted that was roughly similar to her starting point of two years and eightmonths' imprisonment.12 Notwithstanding the submission made in the District Court,Mr Ross (who was not counsel in the District Court) submits on behalf of Mr Bracey,that the starting points for the two burglaries were too high.[16] In relation to the first burglary which also involved the theft of the BMW, MrRoss submits that there were no aggravating features. In the statement made by MrBracey's brother to the Police, he says the BMW was in the garage in his house. MrBracey did not have permission to enter the house or take the BMW. However, hesaid Mr Bracey had previously stayed with him. He surmised (given there was nodamage to any of the doors) that Mr Bracey must have used keys from when he hadstayed there.[17] Mr Ross submits rather than a starting point of 12 months adopted by theJudge, in a "family" situation the appropriate starting point is six months.[18] Mr Ross describes the second burglary of the boat as "bizarre" and submits itindicates Mr Bracey "had some cognitive difficulties that should be explored".Mr Ross's instructions are that there was no plan for the boat other than to go fishing.[19] Mr Ross submits the appropriate starting point for the second burglary is12 months rather than the 18 months adopted by the Judge.[20] Mr Ross further submits that the two uplifts of one month for theft, drivingwhile his licence was suspended, unlawfully being in an enclosed space, andintentional damage were wrong in principle because a first offender would notordinarily be sentenced to imprisonment on those charges. He submits that theseoffences should have been dealt with by way of concurrent sentences.12 New Zealand Police v Bracey, above n 1, at [11].[21] On the second ground of appeal, Mr Ross submits that there should have beena higher discount for youth. He refers to R v Slade which notes that adolescents donot possess the same level of mental development or psychological maturity as adultsand, as a result, are often more impulsive and vulnerable to peer pressure.13Churchward also highlights that neurological difference, as well as the effect ofimprisonment on young people and young people's greater capacity for rehabilitationare relevant to sentencing.14 Pouwhare v R and R v Chankau again make thesepoints.15[22] On the third, and main ground of appeal, Mr Ross refers to a psychologicalassessment dated February 2018 undertaken when Mr Bracey was 14 years old (he isnow 19 years old). Its purpose was to identify his mental health needs and to informa treatment care plan.[23] The position on behalf of Mr Bracey is that the assessment sets out significantissues with Mr Bracey in his mother's care up until July 2016 when he and his sisterwere taken into custody of Oranga Tamariki, after his mother was imprisoned. Fromthere he went into the care of his father. His difficulties continued, including criminaloffending, resulting in regular appearances in the Youth Court. Mr Ross says theassessment clearly refers to personal factors in terms of the treatment of Mr Bracey byhis mother over a lengthy period of time.[24] Mr Ross submits that a 20 to 25 per cent discount is warranted given thehistorical psychological issues and cultural factors identified in the report.[25] Further, in relation to the report, Mr Ross submits that had the sentencing Judgeseen the report, serious consideration would have been given to the sentence option ofintensive supervision combined with community detention. Mr Ross refers to twocases where sentences of intensive supervision were imposed on appeal for what hesubmits was similar offending.1613 R v Slade [2005] 2 NZLR 526 (CA) at [43].14 Churchward v R [2011] NZCA 531 at [77].15 Pouwhare v R [2010] NZCA 268 at [69]; and R v Chankau [2007] NZCA 587 at [26].16 Vaeau v New Zealand Police [2015] NZHC 1972; and Marsters v Police [2014] NZHC 3273.[26] He says in this case a 12-month intensive supervision sentence coupled withcommunity detention should be imposed, instead of the sentence of home detention,given Mr Bracey is a first offender in the District Court, his rehabilitative needs, andthe time he has spent on home detention.Respondent's submissions[27] Ms Litt for the respondent, submits that the starting point was appropriate andwithin range. The end sentence was not manifestly excessive, and it appropriatelyreflects the culpability of the offending. The appropriate discounts for mitigatingfeatures were properly applied.[28] In relation to the burglary in which the boat was stolen, the Crown does notaccept that there was no plan, or that it was an opportunistic attempt to go fishing. TheDistrict Court Judge had found it was premeditated. The burglary and accompanyingtheft occurred in West Auckland, and Mr Bracey was located the next day in theWhangārei area. The pre-sentence report had recorded that, "In regards to the burglaryof the boat, fishing equipment and petrol/diesel [Mr Bracey] states it was planned andthought out".[29] Ms Litt submits that the District Court Judge considered Mr Bracey's youthand appropriate deductions were made. The Judge allowed a significant reductiondespite being well aware of the appellant's Youth Court history.[30] In relation to the psychological report that Mr Bracey now seeks to rely on,Ms Litt submits that the youth factors of impulsivity and rehabilitative needs areidentified in the pre-sentence report and were applied in this case in any event.AnalysisStarting point[31] There is no tariff case for burglary. However, the following cases provide someassistance.[32] In R v Columbus, the Court of Appeal, after referring to inconsistencies inapproaches to starting points between burglary and other offending, offered guidancein relation to setting the starting point:17 As a Full Court of this Court has emphasised, the starting point identifiesthe culpability inherent in the offending by reference to its circumstances:R v Taueki [2005] 3 NZLR 372 at [42]-[44] (CA). The same principle appliesin burglary sentencing, where "the intrinsic nature and gravity of the offencecharged" is the primary consideration: R v Power [1973] 2 NZLR 617 at 618(CA). The dual purposes of transparency and of providing a basis forassessing consistency between cases are served by this approach.[33] In Columbus, the appellant appealed against a sentence of two years and threemonths' imprisonment imposed on him in the District Court following his pleas ofguilty to one charge of burglary, two charges of theft, one charge of possession ofcannabis and one charge of possession of a pipe. The appellant had forced open thevehicle access door of a garage of a residential property causing damage which cost$672 to repair. He stole a mountain bike together with gardening tools and a tool box.He pawned the bike later that day but it was recovered by the police. The appellantthen stole a lawnmower from the rear of a residential property a few days later. Thecost of its replacement was $479.[34] While on bail the appellant drove to a service station, put $68 worth of petrolinto his vehicle but departed without paying. When his property was searched underwarrant some days later, he acknowledged that a cannabis pipe and some loosecannabis leaf found there belonged to him.[35] After initially pleading not guilty to all the charges the appellant later changedhis pleas to guilty on the charges of burglary, theft of a lawnmower together with thetheft of petrol and the cannabis offences. The sentencing Judge treated the burglarycharge as the lead offence. He acknowledged that it was at the minor end of the scalebut took into account the totality of the appellant's offending and his history ofdishonest offending in fixing a global starting point of three and a half years'imprisonment.17 R v Columbus [2008] NZCA 192 at [13].[36] The Court of Appeal considered an adjusted starting point of one a half years'imprisonment was appropriate and that the appellant's previous history justified afurther increase of one year. The appropriate end adjusted starting point for thesentence of burglary was thus two and a half years' imprisonment. It followed that thestarting point adopted by the Judge of three and a half years was excessive.18[37] In Rarere v Police, after a defended hearing, the appellant was convicted oncharges of burglary, unlawfully taking a motorcycle and dangerous driving.19 He hadbeen sentenced in the District Court to two and a half years' imprisonment on each ofthe burglary and unlawful taking charges with a cumulative sentence of three months'imprisonment on the dangerous driving charge, resulting in a total effective sentenceof two years and nine months' imprisonment.[38] The facts in Rarere were that the complainant had parked his brand new$37,000 Harley Davidson motorcycle immediately outside his work premises in theparking area at the front of the property. It was parked close to the door of the property.The appellant and others manhandled the motorcycle onto a trailer attached to a carthey were using and made off with the motorcycle. The alarm on the motorcycleactivated. The appellant who was driving the car towing the trailer was laterapprehended, but not before a collision which derailed the trailer causing themotorcycle to fly through the air. It was thus seriously damaged.[39] In the High Court the appellant submitted that the totality of the offendingjustified a starting point of only eighteen months to two years' imprisonment. In ahelpful discussion Toogood J referred to previous cases as follows:[25] Although dated, Bell v Police provides a good point of comparisonwith the current case. There, Gendall J upheld an appeal against sentence oncharges of unlawful taking of motor vehicle, theft and reckless driving whiledisqualified. He replaced the end sentence of four years' imprisonment with astarting point of four years less a 25 per cent discount to reflect a guilty pleaand the age of the offender. The 18-year old offender in that case had a historyof 40 dishonesty convictions.[26] The approach in Bell was followed by Randerson J in Graham. In thatcase, there had been three unlawful conversions and a burglary together witha dangerous driving charge. A starting point of four years was presumed on18 At [20].19 Rarere v Police [2012] NZHC 779.appeal by Randerson J and, allowing a 25 per cent discount for youth andguilty plea, the three-year end sentence was upheld.[27] In Taki, Joseph Williams J held that the totality of the offending(which involved unlawful taking of motor vehicle, theft and being in anenclosed yard) had similar elements to Bell and Graham, both of whichinvolved a combination of car conversion and theft. Nonetheless, the overalloffending was less serious than that in Bell and Graham. He declined tointerfere with the sentence imposed, holding that the difference in culpabilitywas reflected in the starting point of three years (compared with four years inthose cases).[40] Having regard to the cases referred to above, Toogood J considered that therecould be no complaint about the District Court's two and a half year starting point.[41] In Tito v Police the appellant pleaded guilty to one charge of burglary, drivingwith excess breath alcohol (third and subsequent), failing to stop when followed byred and blue flashing lights, being an unlicenced driver failed to comply and recklessdriving. 20[42] The facts of the burglary were that some time between 9 pm and 7 am theappellant went on to a residential property. He walked down the driveway, entered anopen garage and stole a Ford Ranger Utility vehicle that had been left unlocked withthe keys in it. The value of the vehicle, said to be fairly late-model, was uncertain.[43] The sentencing Judge adopted a four year starting point for all the offendingon a totality basis. He reduced the starting point by 25 per cent as credit for an earlyguilty plea and then imposed an end sentence of three years on the burglary chargewith concurrent sentences on all the other charges. There is a helpful discussion in thejudgment on appeal of previous cases as follows:[22] Ms Chandra [for the appellant] submitted that this case wascomparable to R v Columbus, which involved the forcible entry to a garageand the theft of property worth $672. The Court of Appeal accepted that theoffending was opportunistic and spontaneous and reduced the original startingpoint to one year of imprisonment for the burglary charge (before uplifting forother offending). Ms Chandra noted that, although the value of the vehicleMr Tito stole was higher than the value of the property taken in Columbus, hehad not forced entry as the defendant in Columbus had; the garage was openand the vehicle unlocked with the keys inside it.20 Tito v Police [2018] NZHC 3370.[23] Ms Vaili [for the respondent] drew a different comparison. Shepointed out that the offending in Columbus occurred during the day whereasthe present offending occurred at night, with the inevitable risk ofconfrontation with occupants. She suggested that Poole v R21 and Knock vPolice22 were more comparable to the present offending. I agree.[24] In Poole, the appellant forced entry to a residential address, takingitems to a value of about $2,500 before embarking on other driving-relatedoffending. The initial starting point of three years for the burglary taken in theDistrict Court was reduced to 18 months on appeal.[25] In Knock, the appellant stole a vehicle parked in a driveway, reversingat speed and causing damage to a fence and letterbox before continuing tocommit other driving offences. The sentencing Judge took a 20-monthstarting point and Ellis J declined to interfere with that on appeal.[44] The Judge on appeal considered an appropriate starting point for the burglarywould have been 18 months.[45] In this case the second burglary was of commercial premises, not a residentialaddress. There was therefore less of a risk that there would be people on the premisesand consequential harm to them. On the other hand, it was a pre-meditated andplanned offence, and property of significant value was stolen. The boat was valued atapproximately $55,000 and the items loaded into the boat were valued atapproximately $10,000. Mr Bracey was located with the stolen property somedistance away. In all those circumstances a starting point of 18 months was notmanifestly excessive.[46] The 12 months' imprisonment for the burglary of his brother's home is alsowithin range. Although the BMW was taken from a residential address, the unlawfulaccess was during the daytime. Mr Bracey, having lived with his brother around 4-5months earlier, might be taken to have known his brother would be at work at the time.There was no damage to the property as it appears Mr Bracey used keys in hispossession from when he had lived with his brother. On the other hand, the BMW wasnot located until almost one month later. Taking into account the circumstances of theburglary and by reference to the cases discussed, the starting point of 12 months wasnot manifestly excessive.21 Poole v R [2014] NZHC 1226.22 Knock v Police [2017] NZHC 910.[47] I accept Mr Ross's submission that the additional two one-month uplifts for themore minor offences are unprincipled.[48] As a result, the starting point would be two years and six months' imprisonment(rather than two years and eight months).Youth Discount[49] The District Court did take the appellant's young age into account atsentencing. She stated that:23[12] there should be an extra 15 per cent given to you for a number offactors, including that you are young (you are only 18). That is somewhatundercut by the fact that you have an offending history in the Youth Court andalso came to attention of the authorities from the sound of things before thatas well, but nonetheless you are still only 18 and a half years old. In additionto that, you have spent 14 days in prison and you have been on a 24-hourcurfew for about three months.[50] But she also added:[14] I have to say, looking at the scale of your offending, the premeditationof some of it, the sense of entitlement you seem to have and the lack ofconscience about stealing from other people, I am very concerned that yourcharacter is such that if you do not do some very serious work on yourself youare going to be back before the courts. The fact that you have been appearingin the Youth Court just increases my concern. You have the support of yourgrandparents and I hope that that will help you avoid a reappearance in thiscourt.[51] I am satisfied that the Judge appropriately considered Mr Bracey's youth atsentencing. In particular, she took his capacity for rehabilitation into account. Adiscount of 15 per cent as given by the Judge was appropriate.Psychological report[52] Mr Ross makes it clear that there is no criticism levelled at counsel whoappeared for Mr Bracey in the District Court in not putting the psychological reportbefore that Court. Mr Ross explains that the report was on the Youth Court file;sentencing occurred when the country was operating under Covid Alert Levels23 At [12].towards the end of last year; and Mr Bracey would not have had the "wherewithal" tolet counsel know of the existence of the report.[53] Although the evidence was available and could have been put before theDistrict Court Judge and is accordingly not fresh evidence, I admit the report on appealin the interests of justice.24[54] In 2010 when Mr Bracey was aged seven, a referral was made to Te RoopuKimiora: Community Mental Health and Addiction Services. At that time Mr Braceywas said to be showing a considerable escalation in problematic behaviour andemotional distress. The psychiatrist involved at the time noted the diagnosis ofADHD. He reported on-going problems with attention, hyperactivity and impulsivityalong with oppositional behaviour not amounting to ODD.25[55] The 2018 report records the appellant did not have an easy childhood. Hisparents split up when he was young, and he often felt his mother placed his needs afterhers and his sister's. After his mother was imprisoned in 2016, he and his sister wereplaced in their father and stepmother's care. They attempted to provide the appellantwith boundaries but did not always have the time. He had been suspended fromschools for stealing, lying, as well as some bullying behaviour.[56] In formulating the findings, the report states:There was instability in Jacob's family life from an early age (e.g. parentssplitting up, reported stress and well-being challenges for his single Mum). Itappears that this may have combined with his Neurodevelopmental problemsand caused escalated behaviour difficulties (e.g., hyperactivity, being seen as"uncontrollable"). This may have contributed further to escalated parentingstress and maladaptive responses. Jacob's emotional distress and behaviourdifficulties at school and home (aged about 7 years) appear to have beenpartially mitigated with medication and support for managing his behaviour.Jacob's behaviour problems continued and further developed (e.g. stealing) inthe context of his perception of poor family relationships. Jacob's conduct behaviour has escalated more recently in the context of aserious event in his family life (the imprisonment of his mother) and other24 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 335.25 Oppositional Defiant Disorder.significant changes including reduced emotional support (no contact withMum). In this context of stress and change Jacob's externalising behaviourhas been on-going and increased in seriousness.[57] While the report is now out of date and for that reason cannot be said to beoverly compelling, there is nevertheless a basis for reaching the view that personalfactors in Mr Bracey's early life have a causal connection to his offending. I give afive per cent discount for his personal factors.Sentencing calculation[58] In summary, my sentencing calculation is a starting point of two years and sixmonths' imprisonment with deductions of 20 per cent (guilty plea), 15 per cent (youth)and five per cent (personal factors). This results in a sentence of 18 months'imprisonment or nine months' home detention. While this is only one month less thanthe original sentence, I do not consider that to allow the appeal would be tinkeringwith the sentence. That is because the sentence is short, and the offender young. It istherefore significant enough to consider that the original sentence was manifestlyexcessive. Or, looked at it in another way, it could be said there was an error insentencing as the Judge (through no fault of hers) did not consider the psychologist'sreport.Intensive supervision and community detention[59] The above conclusion leads to a further consideration and that is whetherinstead of substituting a sentence of nine months' home detention, the Court shouldconsider a sentence of intensive supervision coupled with a sentence of communitydetention. Mr Ross urged the Court to do so.[60] Mr Ross submits that such a sentence would ensure the sentence has more of arehabilitative focus and would ensure that Mr Bracey is engaged in that process ofrehabilitation. Mr Ross says that at present Mr Bracey is serving his home detentionsentence at the home of his step-grandparents. While they are supportive, there is verylittle input from the Probation Service. Accordingly, there is little focus on MrBracey's rehabilitation. Mr Ross submits that a sentence of intensive supervisionwould give more of a focus on rehabilitation and community detention would mean acurfew at night.[61] In Vaeau v Police, the offender was charged with similar but more seriousoffences: attempted burglary, seven charges of unlawfully getting into a motor vehicleand one charge of possession instruments for conversion.26 However, prior tosentencing, he was in custody for over 10 months on remand and on 23-hour lockdownfor significant periods so that he would not come into contact with the adult inmates.Therefore, Thomas J considered the punitive aspect of the sentence already served andsentenced him to 14 months' intensive supervision.[62] In Marsters v Police, the offender was sentenced on charges of receiving, beingunlawfully in a closed yard, possession of an offensive weapon and burglary.27 Hisoffending related largely to burglary of people's homes. Whata J found that:Turning then to the purposes and principles of sentencing, I consider that aproper balance of deterrence, accountability, public protection andrehabilitation can be achieved through the imposition of a 10 month period ofintensive supervision for a first offence in the District Court jurisdiction by a17 year old, for a daylight burglary with no particularly aggravating features.[63] Having regard to the contents of the psychological report (although somewhatoutdated), I consider a sentence of intensive supervision coupled with a sentence ofcommunity detention, would be more appropriate than a sentence of home detention.As it is Mr Bracey's first offence in the District Court, and he is young, a better balanceof the purposes and principles of sentencing would have more of a focus onrehabilitation.[64] In the event that the Court was minded to allow the appeal, Mr Ross sought anorder that the psychological report be provided to the Probation Service. The purposeof doing so would be to inform the relevant probation officer as to Mr Bracey'sbackground issues. It will assist the Probation Office in determining the appropriatefurther assistance. The Crown did not oppose such an order.26 Vaeau v Police above n 16.27 Marsters v Police above n 16.Result[65] I allow the appeal. The two concurrent sentences of home detention(10 months and four months) are quashed. I substitute a sentence of 12 months'intensive supervision and six months' community detention on the burglary chargeinvolving the burglary of the commercial premises. I substitute a sentence of sixmonths' intensive supervision and six months' community detention on the burglaryof the residential premises, to be served concurrently. Community detention is to beserved at the existing home detention address with a curfew period from 7 pm until6 am seven days a week.[66] I impose a special condition of intensive supervision pursuant to s 54G of theSentencing Act 2002 that Mr Bracey attend any programme directed by a probationofficer to reduce the likelihood of further offending through his rehabilitation andreintegration.[67] I also direct that the psychological report referred to in this judgment beprovided to the Probation Service to assist in formulating the appropriate rehabilitativeprogramme for Mr Bracey._____________________________Gordon J