STROOBANT v R [2018] NZCA 10

STROOBANT v R [2018] NZCA 10 [12 February 2018]NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION ORIDENTIFYING PARTICULARS, OF COMPLAINANT PROHIBITED BYS 203 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011.IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALANDCA313/2017[2018] NZCA 10BETWEEN JADEN LEE STROOBANTAppellantAND THE QUEENRespondentHearing: 5 October 2017Court: Asher, Brown and Collins JJCounsel: E P Priest for AppellantJ E L Carruthers for RespondentJudgment: 12 February 2018 at 10.30 amJUDGMENT OF THE COURTThe appeal against sentence is dismissed.____________________________________________________________________REASONS OF THE COURT(Given by Brown J)[1] The appellant, Mr Stroobant, pleaded guilty to one charge of murder and twocharges of sexual violation by unlawful sexual connection. On 26 May 2017 he wassentenced by Lang J on the murder charge to life imprisonment with a minimumnon-parole period of 17 years.1 On each charge of sexual violation he was sentenced1 R v Stroobant [2017] NZHC 1122.to preventive detention with a minimum period of imprisonment of ten years. Heappeals against the sentence of preventive detention only, contending that it wasmanifestly excessive and that a finite term should have been imposed.Background[2] On the morning of 15 January 2016 Mr Stroobant, who was then 19 years old,entered the property of the 69 year old female victim. After encountering the victimoutside, he dragged her inside her house and punched her about the head and the face.She was knocked to the ground, where he struck and stomped on her face and head,causing extensive and ultimately fatal injuries. He then removed her trousers andunderwear, and inserted an object into her vagina and anus with sufficient force tocause significant internal injuries.[3] After the attack, Mr Stroobant went through the victim's belongings andcollected an iPad, some Chinese currency and a gold watch. It appears that using atowel and dishwashing liquid he attempted to remove traces he may have left at thescene.[4] When located the appellant denied any involvement in the offending. Hecontinued to deny involvement until the morning of his trial at which point he enteredguilty pleas to all three charges.The High Court judgment[5] It was accepted by Mr Stroobant that s 104 of the Sentencing Act 2002 wasengaged, mandating a minimum period of imprisonment of at least 17 years, as themurder involved both unlawful entry into a dwellinghouse and a vulnerable victim.Lang J considered that a minimum term starting point of 20 years' imprisonment waswarranted.2 A reduction of two years was allowed in consideration for Mr Stroobant'syouth and his very troubled upbringing. A further discount of one year was allowedfor the guilty plea, the Judge explaining:[30] The material before me also calls into question the extent to whichyou have accepted responsibility for your offending. In particular, you now2 At [20].deny or say you cannot remember anything about the sexual offending andyou do not want to discuss it. You have also said that you entered your pleaseffectively to ensure that you did not have to undertake the rigours of a longtrial. You have also said, I acknowledge, that you have entered guilty pleasbecause it was your fault. Nevertheless, I do not see a significant acceptanceof responsibility for your offending. For that reason I give your guilty pleasless weight than they might otherwise have.[6] On the sexual violation charges, the principal issue facing Lang J was whetherto sentence Mr Stroobant to a finite term of imprisonment or to preventive detention.[7] Before the Court can consider imposing preventive detention the statutorypreconditions in s 87(2) of the Sentencing Act must be satisfied. These are as follows:(a) a person is convicted of a qualifying sexual or violent offence (as thatterm is defined in subsection (5)); and(b) the person was 18 years of age or over at the time of committing theoffence; and(c) the court is satisfied that the person is likely to commit anotherqualifying sexual or violent offence if the person is released at thesentence expiry date (as specified in subpart 3 of Part 1 of the ParoleAct 2002) of any sentence, other than a sentence under this section,that the court is able to impose.[8] Once the preconditions are satisfied, the Court may impose a sentence ofpreventive detention.3 When deciding whether to impose a sentence of preventivedetention, s 87(4) of the Sentencing Act prescribes five matters that a judge must takeinto account:(4) When considering whether to impose a sentence of preventivedetention, the court must take into account—(a) any pattern of serious offending disclosed by the offender'shistory; and(b) the seriousness of the harm to the community caused by theoffending; and(c) information indicating a tendency to commit serious offencesin future; and(d) the absence of, or failure of, efforts by the offender to addressthe cause or causes of the offending; and3 Sentencing Act 2002, s 87(3).(e) the principle that a lengthy determinate sentence is preferableif this provides adequate protection for society.[9] Because of the principle in s 87(4)(e), Lang J had to first determine theappropriate finite sentence for the sexual violation charges if preventive detention wasnot imposed. Noting that the sexual offending was accompanied by extreme violenceand involved a very vulnerable victim, the Judge considered the case would fall withinBand 3 of R v AM (CA27/2009),4 which carries a starting point of between 12 and18 years' imprisonment. The Judge would have selected a starting point of around16 years' imprisonment, reducing the sentence to approximately 14 years'imprisonment after taking into account the guilty plea.5 Lang J also considered that aminimum period of imprisonment of approximately 50 per cent would have beenwarranted.[10] Lang J then proceeded to address the question of preventive detention. Thefirst two prerequisites in s 87(2) were clearly satisfied, the only question was whetherthe Judge was satisfied Mr Stroobant was likely to commit another qualifying sexualor violent offence at the expiration of the finite term he would otherwise serve. Lang Jturned to consider the five s 87(4) considerations.[11] In respect of s 87(4)(a), while Mr Stroobant had several convictions forburglary, he had only one prior conviction for violent offending in relation to an assaultof a police officer. As the Judge recognised, this was not the usual pattern for a personwho was a candidate for preventive detention; in such circumstances the Court isconfronted with previous convictions for significant sexual offending or significantviolent offending.6[12] Given his prior description of the effects of the offending for the victim'sfamily and the wider community, the Judge considered that the s 87(4)(b) factor reallyspoke for itself. He described Mr Stroobant's offending as of the gravest seriousnessfor the community.74 R v AM (CA27/2009) [2010] NZCA 114, [2010] 2 NZLR 750.5 R v Stroobant, above n 1, at [33].6 At [41].7 At [42].[13] The Judge proceeded to address in some detail the third s 87(4) matter, whichinvolved consideration of psychiatric reports of Dr Brindley and Dr Goodwin,obtained pursuant to s 88 of the Sentencing Act, and Dr Immelmann, obtained byMr Stroobant's counsel.8 The Judge quoted extracts from each report, noting that allof the tests which they had undertaken indicated that Mr Stroobant had a high risk ofboth sexual and violent offending in the future. The Judge commented:[52] One of the most salient features that flows from all of the reports, andin this I include Dr Immelmann's, is that you appear to have no empathywhatsoever with any of your victims. You have no insight into what you havedone or the damage you have caused. You appear to have no interest inatoning for your conduct or rehabilitating yourself. It is clear that, during thetime you were at Waimokoia School, an extraordinary amount of time wasspent by experts in their field endeavouring to guide you back onto the socialpathway. This appears to have done no good at all.[14] Lang J unequivocally concluded that Mr Stroobant was at high risk of bothviolent and sexual offending on release from prison, and that the only way in whichhe would be able to deal with that was by intensive therapeutic intervention tacklingthe underlying causes his problems.9[15] In considering s 87(4)(d), Lang J noted that Mr Stroobant had never beenconvicted of sexual offending and was therefore unsurprised that he had never hadtreatment in relation to this. However, he was satisfied that there had a been a failureto engage with the degrees of help that had been offered to Mr Stroobant over the yearsby various agencies and institutions.10 Mr Stroobant's track record to date did notindicate a willingness to engage with health professionals or other forms ofrehabilitative assistance.[16] Ultimately, Lang J considered s 87(2)(c) was satisfied. In standing back toconsider whether to exercise the discretion to impose preventive detention, two factorsstood out. First, the purpose of preventive detention is to protect the community fromthose who pose an ongoing risk of serious offending; that purpose was engaged here.Second, a sentence of preventive detention can provide an incentive to offenders to8 The Judge also noted that a fourth report had been filed by Mr Stroobant's counsel from apsychiatrist who specialises in the effect of alcohol and drugs, Dr Menkes, but did not detail anyof the conclusions from this report.9 R v Stroobant, above n 1, at [59].10 At [60].engage in the rehabilitative process; this was a particularly important factor inMr Stroobant's case. The only way to avoid the risk Mr Stroobant posed was by himaccepting responsibility for what he had done and participating meaningfully inprogrammes whilst in prison.11 This made a sentence of preventive detentionappropriate.Grounds of appeal[17] In support of the contention that a sentence of preventive detention wasmanifestly excessive, several specific grounds of error were raised by reference to themandatory considerations in s 87(4), namely:(a) there was no pattern of serious offending disclosed by Mr Stroobant'shistory and the Court ought to have made a clear determination that thes 87(4)(a) factor was not established;(b) the Court's conclusion with reference to s 87(4)(c) that Mr Stroobanthad a high risk of reoffending in the future was erroneous having regardto several factors, including the Court's alleged failure to take intoaccount his rehabilitation prospects, the report of Dr Menkesconcerning the implications of drug use and Mr Stroobant's guilty plea;and(c) the Court erred in finding an absence or failure of efforts byMr Stroobant to address the cause or causes of his offending pers 87(4)(d).[18] With reference to the proposition that a finite sentence should have beenpreferred in line with s 87(4)(e) of the Sentencing Act, Ms Priest also invited this Courtto revisit the decision of R v Mackrell,12 in which the ability to impose a sentence ofpreventive detention concurrently with a sentence of life imprisonment wasconfirmed. It was submitted that Mackrell should be reconsidered because it:11 At [71].12 R v Mackrell (1998) 16 CRNZ 1 (CA).(a) predates the enactment of the Sentencing Act, which widened the ageof eligibility for preventive detention significantly;(b) predates the creation of extended supervision orders and publicprotection orders, which are other means of protecting the communityfrom those who may commit serious sexual or violent crimes; and(c) predates the decision of R v Churchward,13 which established therelevance of youth to criminal offending and rehabilitation.[19] It was also submitted that, in exercising his discretion, Lang J should haveconsidered the totality principle in the fact the sexual violation charges were alreadytaken into account when setting the minimum non-parole period for murder, and takeninto account the concurrent sentence of life imprisonment when assessing the need toimpose a sentence of preventive detention[20] We address each of Ms Priest's submissions in turn.DiscussionSection 87(4)(a) — a pattern of serious offending disclosed by the offender's history[21] Accepting that an offender's entire offending history should be taken intoaccount in the context of s 87(4)(a), Ms Priest submitted that the Courts look for apattern of offending, a propensity to act in a particular way, which clearly identifies arisk to the community going forward. Reliance was placed on observations in R vChristy14 and Wilson v R,15 in neither of which was a sentence of preventive detentionimposed. Here, Mr Stroobant is a young man with only minor previous convictions,the most serious being burglary. Ms Priest submitted that the existence of someviolence in his youth does not constitute serious offending, and the weight to be placedon that history must be limited given the lack of actual convictions. It is submitted13 R v Churchward [2011] NZCA 531, (2011) 25 CRNZ 446.14 R v Christy [2016] NZHC 2520.15 Wilson v R [2010] NZCA 360.that the Court ought to have made a clear finding that s 87(4)(a) was not establishedhere.[22] Mr Carruthers for the Crown agreed that Mr Stroobant does not have previousconvictions for serious sexual or violent offending, but submitted there are numerousrecords of his having allegedly engaged in behaviour that would fit that description,citing instances referred to in the report of Dr Brindley. It is clear that the Court cantake into account conduct beyond that for which an offender has been convicted.16[23] We accept the point made by Mr Carruthers that the factors listed in s 87(4) aremandatory considerations, but they are not prerequisites. The prerequisites arecontained in s 87(2) and significantly do not include prior commission of a serioussexual or violent offence. The lack of a clear pattern of the type of criminal offendingengaged in does not preclude the imposition of a sentence of preventive detention; apropensity mix of dangerous behaviours may justify a protective sentencingresponse.17 We consider that such a propensity for violent behaviour was establishedhere for the reasons given by Lang J. We therefore reject the contention that there waserror in not making an explicit determination of an absence of a pattern of seriousoffending.Section 87(4)(c) — information indicating a tendency to commit serious offences infuture(a) Failure to consider Mr Stroobant's age[24] Noting the minimum age of eligibility for preventive detention of 18 years,Ms Priest submitted that the Courts have expressed reluctance to impose a sentenceon offenders just over the age threshold.18 Citing this Court's decision in R vChurchward,19 she submitted that when considering preventive detention, the impactof youth, both in lowering culpability in serious offending committed when theoffender was young and on a greater capacity for rehabilitation, is relevant. Byreference to a table of all cases where preventive detention had been considered by the16 Lepper v R [2016] NZCA 209 at [34].17 R v Wilson (2002) 19 CRNZ 555 (CA) at [23].18 Citing R v Kale (1993) 9 CRNZ 575 (CA) at 577.19 R v Churchward, above n 13, at [77]–[78].Courts for sexual violation over the past five years, it was submitted that youth wasoften a key factor where preventive detention was considered and declined. InMr Stroobant's case, it is submitted the fact he was only 19 years old at the time of theoffending meant his youth ought to have been taken into account by the Court inassessing his risk of reoffending, particularly in terms of his greater potential formaturity, insight and rehabilitation.[25] In response, Mr Carruthers first made the point that this Court has said onnumerous occasions that citation of the substantial volume of High Court sentencingdecisions is generally of little assistance.20 The table of cases put forward by Ms Priestwas therefore submitted to be unhelpful.[26] Second, Mr Carruthers submitted that youth is not invariably a mitigatingfeature. Indeed, it may fade into irrelevance in cases involving particularly graveoffending and in which the protection of the public is a primary consideration.21Mr Stroobant's case was said to be such an example.[27] We agree with the Crown submission. Although we agree that youth must beconsidered in assessing culpability, future risk of reoffending and prospects forsuccessful rehabilitation, that is but one piece of information relevant to theassessment of a tendency to commit serious offences in the future. Lang J was plainlyaware of Mr Stroobant's age,22 as were the psychiatrists who assessed him, but allconsidered he was at high risk of reoffending and expressed little optimism as to thelikelihood of this changing, without Mr Stroobant's active engagement, by virtue ofthe maturation process alone.20 See Harrison v R [2011] NZCA 80 at [10]; August v R [2011] NZCA 91 at [29]; and Maulolo v R[2014] NZCA 439 at [15].21 R v Churchward, above n 13, at [84] and [90].22 R v Stroobant, above n 1, at [22]–[24], [43]–[51] and [64].(b) Failure to consider the evidence of methamphetamine use[28] While Lang J referenced the reports of three psychiatrists, Ms Priest submittedthat there was a failure to consider the report of Dr Menkes, whose report stated thatthere is a link between methamphetamine use and risk taking, and a strong linkbetween methamphetamine use and increased sexual interest, sexual risk taking andreckless or unsafe sexual behaviour.[29] Noting that one of the key factors identified by Lang J was Mr Stroobant'sfailure to acknowledge his part in the sexual offending,23 Ms Priest submitted that theCourt failed to take into account the link between drug use, sleep deprivation andmemory loss and taking responsibility for offending. She emphasised that the Courtfailed to consider Dr Menkes' report which was the only one to directly address thispoint.[30] Mr Carruthers response was that the account of the offending whichMr Stroobant gave to Dr Menkes appears to have been considerably less extensivethan the account he gave to the other health assessors. Indeed the accountMr Stroobant gave to the other health assessors strongly suggests that he remembershis offending but simply chooses not to acknowledge it. As Lang J observed in thecourse of the sentencing on the murder charge:[26] Furthermore, it is difficult to know whether your version of whatoccurred here can be believed. The reports that I have received show that youprovide varying accounts of different events in your life. You are apt toembellish matters, to fabricate events and to tell straight out lies. It is difficultto know whether your description of the last three days before this offendingoccurred is in fact accurate.[31] In these circumstances, we agree that it is unsurprising that the report preparedby Dr Menkes features sparingly in the Judge's sentencing notes.24 We therefore donot consider that, despite a failure to explicitly consider Mr Stroobant's young age orhis substance abuse, Lang J erred in concluding that Mr Stroobant exhibited a tendencyto commit serious offences in the future.23 At [30].24 It is mentioned at [43] of Lang J's judgment, but no reliance was placed on its conclusions.Section 87(4)(d) — the absence of, or failure of, efforts by the offender to address thecause or causes of the offending[32] Dr Brindley expressed the view that Mr Stroobant had been afforded theopportunity to attend programmes to address his offending behaviour, but had beenconsistently non-compliant with remediation attempts and had failed to engage in ameaningful way. That view was attacked by Ms Priest as being both inaccurate andsimplistic. She contended that Mr Stroobant had willingly completed rehabilitationprogrammes when living in a stable environment, referencing his periods at aresidential boarding school when nine years old, a Youth Justice facility, and later inprison.[33] Further, Ms Priest submitted that the guilty plea ought to be considered, in part,as an acceptance of his responsibility for the sexual violations and that he ought to begiven the benefit of the doubt in his assertion that he has no recall of the sexualoffending.[34] The Crown's rejoinder was that there was ample material suggestingMr Stroobant had either not engaged with or not benefitted from attempts made overthe years to address the issues underlying his conduct.[35] Lang J recognised the fact that Mr Stroobant had never been convictedpreviously of a sexual offence meant it was not surprising that treatment had not beenoffered to him in relation to sexual offending. However, his overwhelming impressionfrom the evidence was that Mr Stroobant had not been properly willing to engage withoffers of help from various agencies and institutions.25[36] We do not consider that that conclusion was erroneous in the context of theevidence. While preventive detention is concerned with the offending the subject ofthe sentences, this factor focusses on any prior effort to address the cause(s) of thatoffending, a broader concept. All of the evidence before Lang J, and us, suggestedthat Mr Stroobant had failed to meaningfully engage with various attempts to addresshis antisocial behaviour and remains unmotivated to do so.25 R v Stroobant, above n 1, at [60].[37] Further, we do not consider that the guilty plea was pertinent under this head,particularly in circumstances where Mr Stroobant expressly disavowed anyknowledge of the sexual offending.26 Nor, given his assessment of Mr Stroobant'sveracity, was the Judge obliged to give him the benefit of the doubt so far as his degreeof recollection was concerned.Section 87(4)(e) — the principle that a lengthy determinate sentence is preferable[38] In reliance on the reasons set out at [18] above, Ms Priest invited areconsideration of Mackrell. She submitted that those factors — particularly theextension of preventive detention to more offences and more offenders — have"changed the landscape".[39] In Mackrell this Court held that the imposition of a sentence of preventivedetention was not wrong in principle simply because the offender is also convicted ofmurder and is therefore subject to a mandatory life sentence.27 Reliance was firstplaced on the fact that the then applicable legislation, the Criminal Justice Act 1985,contemplated a combination of sentences:28Section 13(6) of the Act provides that, where a Court imposes on an offendera sentence of preventive detention or a sentence of imprisonment, it may atthe same time also impose on him or her any other kind of full-time custodialsentence (other than a sentence of corrective training) for any other offence.Much of Mr Hall's argument would apply with equal force to any concurrentsentence, including a concurrent sentence of preventive detention. Further, ifMr Hall were correct, it could also be argued that, where concurrent sentencesof imprisonment are imposed in respect of multiple offences, only the longestterm of imprisonment serves any effective purpose. Nonetheless, the Courtsregularly sentence offenders upon each offence. Each offence requires theappropriate response even though the sentence may have no practical effectwhere it is of a lesser duration than the leading sentence.[40] The Court also recognised that a sentencing Judge cannot know what theoutcome of an appeal lodged against conviction will be, stating:29It is always possible that an offender who has been convicted of both murderand sexual offences, as in this case, may successfully appeal against hisconviction for murder. In such a case, the mandatory life sentence will26 At [30].27 R v Mackrell, above n 12, at 8.28 At 8.29 At 8.disappear. It would be clearly inappropriate in such circumstances for theoffender to have been sentenced for the sexual offences on the basis that hewas required to serve a life sentence for murder.[41] We consider those considerations retain their force in the context of theSentencing Act 2002. We also note that neither the absence of an indeterminatesentence, nor the practical futility in imposing a sentence of preventive detention areincluded in the statutory pre-requisites and mandatory considerations specified ins 87(2) and (4).[42] While we acknowledge that Mackrell predated both the reduction in theeligible age for preventive detention and this Court's decision in Churchward in whichthe importance of considering the offender's age was discussed, the overriding dutyon courts remains to fix the appropriate sentence for the particular offence at issue,irrespective of any other sentence (albeit subject to totality principles).30 In the caseof qualifying sexual or violent offences, that may be preventive detention where sucha sentence is required to protect the safety of the community. Moreover, there isnothing in s 87 or the rest of the Sentencing Act that prohibits the imposition of twoconcurrent indeterminate sentences.[43] We consider that none of factors advanced by Ms Priest detract from therationale of the conclusion in Mackrell. Consistent with that view, on severaloccasions since the commencement of the Sentencing Act this Court has upheld anindeterminate sentence imposed concurrently with another indeterminate sentence.31[44] Nor was there any error by Lang J in not taking into account the possibility ofan extended supervision order (ESO) or a public protection order (PPO). AsMr Carruthers pointed out, an ESO can only be made in respect of a defendant who isnot subject to an indeterminate sentence.32 For the same reason, Mr Stroobant would30 T (CA43/2013) v R [2013] NZCA 497 at [26].31 Baker v R [2017] NZCA 404; and Cameron v R [2010] NZCA 411. See also Wilson v R [2010]NZCA 360 and T (CA43/2013) v R, above n 30, where, although preventive detention was notimposed, the jurisdiction to do so concurrently with another indeterminate sentence wasrecognised.32 Parole Act 2002, ss 107C(1)(a).not fall within any of the categories of person in respect of whom a PPO could bemade.33The exercise of discretion[45] In submitting Lang J erred in exercising his discretion to impose preventivedetention, Ms Priest contended that Lang J had failed to consider the totality of thesentence under s 85 of the Sentencing Act. She submitted the sentence of lifeimprisonment with a minimum period of imprisonment of 17 years was significantand a discrete uplift was given to reflect the sexual violations, meaning the sexualoffending had been considered twice — both in setting the 17 year non-parole periodfor the murder charge and in the stand-alone assessment of preventive detention.Further, she submitted that the sentence of life imprisonment should have been takeninto account when assessing the need for preventive detention in order to protect thecommunity from Mr Stroobant's risk of reoffending.[46] In our view, that submission misconceives the nature and function of a sentenceof preventive detention, which is not to punish an offender but to safeguard thecommunity from that offender. In sentencing on the lead charge of murder, the Courtwas required to take into account the associated offending because the sentence for theassociated offending will be served concurrently. In doing so, however, the Court doesnot foreclose the power to impose a sentence of preventive detention for the associatedoffending in an appropriate case; rather, there remains an obligation to fix theappropriate sentence for each offence committed.34 For that same reason, we rejectthe submission that Lang J ought to have taken into account the sentence of lifeimprisonment in considering the necessity of a sentence of preventive detention.[47] In oral argument, Ms Priest renewed the submission advanced in theHigh Court that a sentence of preventive detention would have a crushing effect on aperson of Mr Stroobant's age. While such a submission might carry weight were thatthe only sentence (although we do not necessarily consider it would tip the balance infavour of a finite sentence), it struggles to gain traction where an offender is also33 Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Act 2014, s 7.34 As discussed at [42] above.sentenced to life imprisonment and will not be eligible for parole in any event for 17years.[48] A variation on this theme is the proposition that in practical terms a sentenceof preventive detention will be of little moment given the fact that Mr Stroobant isalready serving the indeterminate sentence of life imprisonment. The counter to thatproposition was carefully explained by Lang J, whose view we endorse:35[66] That is true in one sense, but it overlooks two factors. The first is this.A minimum term of imprisonment on a charge of murder is imposed, in thepresent context at least, to recognise the seriously aggravating features of themurder. A sentence of preventive detention is not imposed for that purpose.It is imposed to protect the community from persons who pose an ongoing riskof serious offending. Secondly, it is now well established, or well accepted,that a sentence of preventive detention can provide an incentive to offendersto engage in rehabilitative processes. I consider this to be a particularlyimportant factor in the present case.[67] If I was to impose a sentence of 14 years imprisonment on the sexualviolation charges, that sentence would be served by you and would be overlong before the minimum term I will impose in relation to the charge ofmurder. Your reaction thus far to the sexual charges has been to ignore themand push them to one side. You say you cannot remember it, and it is clearthat you do not wish to talk about that aspect of your offending.[68] If you were to receive a finite sentence, I have no doubt that you wouldnever think about that aspect of your offending again. Instead, you wouldsimply concentrate on completing the life sentence for murder. I consider youneed an incentive to ensure you engage with the fact that this was serioussexual offending that could occur again in the future. If a sentence ofpreventive detention remains in effect beyond the minimum term imposed, itwill be a constant reminder to you and to the parole authorities that this is anaspect of your offending that needs to be addressed.[49] We consider that the present case has parallels with both Antonievic v R36 andCameron v R,37 in which preventive detention was considered appropriate to ensurethe offender accepted responsibility for, and gain insight into, their actions and tofoster cooperation with treatment and rehabilitative efforts. Here, we note in particularthe absence of insight on the part of Mr Stroobant into his sexual offending and hislack of empathy with his victims. We therefore consider that the sentence of35 R v Stroobant, above n 1.36 Antonievic v R [2017] NZCA 87.37 Cameron v R, above n 31.preventive detention imposed by Lang J was the appropriate course in thesecircumstances.Result[50] The appeal against sentence is dismissed.Solicitors:Blackstone Chambers, Auckland for AppellantCrown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent