HENARE v R [2018] NZHC 900

HENARE v R [2018] NZHC 900 [1 May 2018]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDGISBORNE REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATŪRANGANUI-A-KIWA ROHECRI-2018-416-3[2018] NZHC 900KAREMOANA EMILIO HAAMI HORI TUNNY HENAREvTHE QUEENHearing: 1 May 2018Counsel: N Wright for AppellantC Gullidge for CrownOral Judgment: 1 May 2018ORAL JUDGMENT OF CHURCHMAN JIntroduction[1] Mr Henare pleaded guilty to seven separate charges which arose out of fiveseparate incidents. The charges included:(a) unlawfully taking a motor vehicle;1(b) theft (under $500);2(c) attempting to pervert the course of justice;31 Crimes Act 1961, s226(1). Maximum sentence of seven years' imprisonment. Offence occurredon 10 June 2017.2 Crimes Act 1961, s 219 and 223(d). Maximum sentence of three months' imprisonment. Offenceoccurred on 10 June 2017.3 Crimes Act 1961, s 117(e). Maximum sentence of seven years' imprisonment. Offence occurred(d) failure to answer district court bail;4(e) giving false details;5(f) resisting arrest;6 and(g) a second charge of giving false details (on a subsequent date).7[2] Mr Henare originally messaged his ex-partner asking her to drop the firstcharge of unlawfully taking a motor vehicle, and that resulted in the charge ofattempting to pervert the course of justice. He subsequently pleaded guilty to thatcharge. Although Ms Wright, for the appellant, has made the point that a lesser chargesuch as intimidation may have been laid, the Court is obliged to deal with the chargesas they were laid and pleaded to.[3] On 16 January 2018 in the Gisborne District Court, Judge Cathcart sentencedMr Henare to 14 months' imprisonment with leave to apply for home detention.8[4] On 26 March 2018, Mr Henare's sentence was cancelled and substituted witha five months and two weeks' sentence of home detention.9 This took into account theproportion of the sentence of imprisonment Mr Henare had already served. This hasrendered the final sentence appealed against effectively a sentence of seven months'home detention (what Mr Henare would have been sentenced with if he had originallyreceived a sentence of home detention). There appears to be no challenge to theavailability and suitability of home detention as sentence.on 29 June 2017.4 Bail Act 2000, s 38. Maximum sentence of one year imprisonment or a fine of $2,000. Offenceoccurred on 19 July 2017.5 Land Transport Act 1998, s 44. Maximum sentence of $10,000 fine. Offence occurred on 29 July2017.6 Summary Offences Act 1981, s 23(a). Maximum sentence of three months' imprisonment or afine of $2,000. Offence occurred on 25 August 2017.7 Land Transport Act 1998, s 44. Maximum sentence of $10,000 fine. Offence occurred on25 August 2017.8 R v Henare [2018] NZDC 636.9 R v Henare [2018] NZDC 6294 [Henare home detention].[5] Ms Wright, on behalf of Mr Henare, appeals the sentence on the basis that thesentence of imprisonment was manifestly excessive because the starting point adoptedfor the lead charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice was too high and inparticular it was too high in relation to a number of cases which she has taken theCourt through which she says involve similar factual backgrounds where the startingpoint has been lower than that applied by the Court here.[6] The Crown opposes the appeal and argues that the starting point adopted bysentencing Judge for the lead charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice waswell within the range available. The Crown also points to the fact that it is the totalityof the offending that is relevant to the ultimate sentence and not just the lead chargeitself. Mr Gullidge says that the end sentence was not substantially or significantlymore severe than it ought to have been having regard to the totality of the offendingand the overall circumstances.Factual background[7] There were five separate incidents from which the present charges arise and Iaddress each of them sequentially.10 June 2017: unlawful taking of a motor vehicle and theft (under $500)[8] The first of these incidents occurred on 10 June 2017 and resulted in thecharges of the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle and theft (under $500). Mr Henareand the complainant (who were in a relationship at the time) had begun driving in themorning from Gisborne to Whanganui. Mr Henare was meant to be dropped off inWhanganui with a relative, but once they arrived Mr Henare told the complainant thathis plans had fallen through. The complainant told Mr Henare she was not going backto Gisborne for a few days. Mr Henare then asked the complainant if he could bedropped off in Palmerston North at another relative's home. The complainant agreedto do this.[9] However, once arriving at Palmerston North, the complainant got out of thecar to go to the bathroom leaving the keys in the ignition. Mr Henare got into thedriver's seat and drove the car back towards Gisborne.[10] On his way back to Gisborne, Mr Henare stopped in Wairoa because he neededmore petrol. He pulled into a petrol station where he put $51.23 worth of petrol intohis car with no intention of paying. He then got back into the car and drove away.[11] On 14 June 2017, some four days later, Mr Henare arrived at a mutual friend'shome in Gisborne where he left the car.[12] On 21 June 2017, he was located, arrested and interviewed. He admitted hetook the car without permission to drive to Gisborne, and further admitted he stole thepetrol. He explained his behaviour by saying he wanted to get home and didn't haveany other way to do so.29 June 2017: attempting to pervert the course of justice[13] On 28 June 2017, Mr Henare appeared before the Gisborne District Court onthe two charges mentioned above. One of the conditions of Mr Henare's bail was thathe was not to contact the complainant in relation to the theft and motor vehicleoffending.[14] On the evening of 29 June 2017 which was the day after Mr Henare had beenbailed with the non-association provision, Mr Henare sent a Facebook message to thecomplainant which said, "Drop those charges bro". About 40 minutes later he sentanother message which said, "Bae did you hear me". The complainant did not respondto any of these messages but said she was afraid because Mr Henare knew where shelived and worked.19 July 2017: failure to answer District Court bail[15] On 19 July 2017, Mr Henare failed to appear at court for the offences that hehad been bailed on. He therefore failed to answer his District Court bail.29 July 2017: giving false details[16] On 29 July 2017, Mr Henare was driving a car in Gisborne. He was pulledover and asked to provide his details. He gave the details of a first cousin who wasdisqualified from driving. The car was therefore impounded because of his cousin'sdisqualified status, and he was issued with a summons to appear on 23 August 2017.Mr Henare did not appear in court on 23 August 2017 because he had given hiscousin's details. The Gisborne District Court issued an arrest warrant for Mr Henare'scousin because of this.25 August 2017: giving false details and resisting arrest[17] On 25 August 2017, Mr Henare was observed acting suspiciously on CCTV bythe police in Gisborne. A constable located and spoke to him, when asked for hisdetails, he again gave his first cousin's details. These details were checked, and theconstable was alerted to the fact that there was an active arrest warrant out ofMr Henare's cousin (arising from Mr Henare previously using his cousin's name).[18] When Mr Henare was told he was under arrest and his rights were read to him,he took a small bag he was wearing and threw it away from where he was standing.The constable went to retrieve the bag, and Mr Henare ran away. He ran intoMcDonalds, entered a staff only area and tried to lock the door. This did not work,and he was taken into custody. He continued to use his cousin's name until his DNA,fingerprints and photograph were taken. He finally admitted who he was.[19] His explanation for giving false details was that he knew there was an arrestwarrant out for him under his own name.Details about Mr Henare[20] Mr Henare is 21 years of age. He had six previous convictions, coming to atotal of 13 including the convictions presently at issue. He committed his first offencein 2013. The only relevant offending for the present matter are three convictions forbreaching his standard or special release conditions.District Court decision[21] The sentencing Judge made it very clear from the outset that attempting topervert the course of justice is a serious offence because it "strikes at the heart of theadministration of justice when offenders try dissuade complainants and witnesses fromcoming forward to Court."10 The Judge did, however, recognise that Mr Henare'soffending was not of the most serious kind.11 Indeed in his oral submissions today,Mr Gullidge acknowledged that as an example of this type of offending, this casewould fall toward the lower end of the spectrum.[22] I note that the messages sent were in breach of the bail conditions as to non-association, but also note that beyond the two messages sent by Facebook some40 minutes apart, there was no other contact with the complainant.[23] The sentencing Judge agreed with the Crown that the charge of attempting topervert the course of justice was the lead offence,12 and there is no challenge to that inthis appeal. He began with a starting point of 16 months' imprisonment in relation tothe lead offence.13 In doing so the sentencing Judge expressly rejected both thestarting point of two years' imprisonment put forward by the Crown, and six to ninemonths' imprisonment put forward by Ms Wright for Mr Henare. The Judge statedthe Crown's starting position was too high and it did not consider the core facts. Healso said he felt the defence's position in terms of starting point was too lenient anddid not consider the serious nature of the offence, or the principles that governsentencing.[24] A four-month uplift was applied for the balance of the offending, expresslyexcluding the charges of giving false details which are only punishable by a fine.14The sentencing Judge stated that Ms Wright, for Mr Henare, recognised that an upliftshould be given to reflect the other charges.15[25] Indeed, in response to a question from me, Ms Wright confirmed that no issuewas taken with any of the uplifts or reductions applied by the sentencing Judge andthe only matter in issue in this appeal was whether or not the starting point for theindex offence was appropriate.10 R v Henare, above n 8, at [1].11 At [6].12 At [10].13 At [13].14 At [15].15 At [10].[26] An uplift of one month was given to recognise that some of the offending hadoccurred while Mr Henare was on bail, and this ultimately lead to a sentence of21 months' imprisonment.[27] A discount of two months and two weeks' imprisonment was applied as arecognition of Mr Henare's youth, and I agree with Mr Gullidge's submission that thiswas a generous discount. In giving this discount, the Judge also recognised that it wasa discount that was reduced slightly because of Mr Henare's conviction history andthat no uplift had been given for this matter. The Judge did stress the impact thatprison can have on young offenders, and express his concern that Mr Henare hadalready served a prison sentence when he was 17 years of age.16[28] A further discount of one month was applied to recognise Mr Henare'sremorse. The Judge noted that although he thought Mr Henare's remorse was genuine,this discount was reduced because there was little objective evidence to show that hewas truly remorseful.17[29] Finally, a 20 per cent (or three months and two weeks' imprisonment) discountwas applied to recognise Mr Henare's guilty plea. This brought a final end sentenceto 14 months' imprisonment.[30] The Crown submitted that home detention was not sufficient in this casebecause of the need for deterrence and denunciation. The Crown further stressed thatMr Henare had previously been convicted for non-compliance with release conditions.The Judge noted that it was well established that home detention could meet theprinciples of deterrence and denunciation, depending on circumstances. The Judgestated that no address had formally been advanced for the purposes of a homedetention sentence, so that further inquiries were needed. Mr Henare was given leaveto apply for home detention which he did and which was subsequently granted.18[31] Mr Henare was sentenced on all of the offending concurrently and thesentences were effectively:16 At [17].17 At [20].18 At [27].(a) one months' imprisonment for theft (under $500) and reparation of$51.23;(b) four months' imprisonment for unlawfully taking a vehicle;(c) one months' imprisonment for resisting a constable;(d) conviction and discharge for both charges of giving false details; and(e) one month imprisonment for failure to answer district court bail.[32] This produced a final sentence of 14 months' imprisonment and $51.23 inreparation.Home detention decision[33] On 26 March 2018, Mr Henare had his sentence of imprisonment cancelled,and a sentence of home detention substituted for it. This sentence was five monthsand two weeks recognising the portion of the sentence that Mr Henare had alreadyserved in prison. Therefore, this appeal is effectively against the seven months ofhome detention that Mr Henare would have been sentenced to.Approach to appeal[34] The appeal is under s 250 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. It is an appealagainst sentence and an appeal against a discretion. An appeal against sentence mustbe allowed if the Court is satisfied for any reason, there is an intrinsic error in thesentence imposed and a different sentence should be imposed.19 The focus is on thefinal sentence and whether that was in the available range, rather than the exact processby which it was reached.2019 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279; [2014] 3 NZLR 482.20 Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].Mr Henare's position[35] Ms Wright, for Mr Henare, submits that the sentence was manifestly excessivebecause the starting point of 16 months' imprisonment adopted for the lead charge wastoo high. She stressed that the starting point should have been nine to 11 months at itsabsolute maximum in light of other similar authorities.[36] Ms Wright began by canvasing the cases that she had cited at the originalsentencing including the R v Churchward21 and stating that there had been no referenceto this case by the sentencing Judge. She argued that this case was factually similar tothe present case in that it involved text messaging. It also provided useful guidanceas to what factors should be considered in establishing the seriousness of theoffending. A starting point of 12 months was adopted in that case, which Ms Wrightargues is more serious than the present case. In Churchward, the defendant sent a textrequesting the complainant sign a statement saying he didn't assault them, called themrepeatedly, and threatened that he would a grudge forever if the complainant did notcomply.[37] Ms Wright then referred to other additional authorities including, R v Bishopand argued that this case provided a useful analysis of the relevant authorities.22 Itheld that a starting point of 10 months' imprisonment was appropriate for aspontaneous outburst by the defendant. She then moved on to R v McIlroy which shecharacterised as more serious and therefore distinguishable.23 The starting pointadopted in this case was 12 months' imprisonment. It was aggravated by the fact thatthe offending occurred in a domestic violence context, and began immediately afterthe defendant's release from Court against a bail condition not to associate. A numberof requests were made to drop the charges.[38] Ms Wright put forward her case, based on the above authorities, that in thecontext of these three cases the starting point of 16 months' imprisonment is too high.She submits that when an analysis of analogous authorities is undertaken, the Court21 R v Churchward CA 439/05, 1 March 2006.22 R v Bishop HC Gisborne CRI 2010-016-2882, 29 July 2011.23 R v McIlroy [2017] NZDC 2858.should intervene to adjust the starting point adopted by the sentencing Judge andcorrect Mr Henare's sentence to avoid an unjust and manifestly excessive end result.[39] Ms Wright contends that at most, Mr Henare should have faced a starting pointof nine to 11 months' imprisonment.Crown's position[40] During the course of the hearing, Mr Gullidge referred to the decision inLedgerwood v R.24 This is a decision in April of last year of Dunningham J in Dunedin.He also referred to the facts of that case which do not appear from the High Court'sjudgment but Mr Gullidge had available to him a copy of the decision of Judge Crosbieand he read extracts from that decision. The facts appear to include swearing, abuse,the use of the term "nark" and a challenge to a fight. That case involved a startingpoint of three years, substantially in excess of the starting point used in the presentcase, and to that extent appears to be out of the standard range of starting points usedin all of the other cases that the parties have referred to me. It is, on its own, a troublingcase because it does appear to be so inconsistent with the other relevant authoritiesthat the parties had relied on, particularly when it was acknowledged as only being a'moderately' serious example of that type of offending. I am bound to say that astarting of three years does not seem to be consistent with any of the authorities that Iam aware of in relation to an instance where there has not been any actual violence,any sustained attempt at interference, or an actual impact on the willingness orotherwise of a witness to give evidence.[41] The Crown submits that the appeal ought to be dismissed. Mr Gullidge saidthat the starting point of 16 months' imprisonment was well within the range that wasavailable, and that the end sentence was not substantially more severe than it shouldhave been.24 Ledgerwood v R [2017] NZHC 822.Relevant law[42] Mr Gullidge again listed the relevant law on sentencing in cases of attemptedto pervert the course of justice. He highlighted that the cases indicated that there wasno tariff case for attempting to pervert the course of justice, and drew my attention tothe fact that the Court in the case of R v Churchward recognised that all but the mostexceptional cases will be met with moderately lengthy terms of imprisonment.25 I notethat these comments have been reinforced in the more recent Court of Appealdecisions such that of McQuilkin v R26 where the Court said:27[14] The maximum penalty for attempting to pervert the course of justiceis seven years' imprisonment. There is no tariff judgment, it being well settledthat the circumstances in which such offending occurs vary so widely thatthere would be insufficient utility in attempting to grade appropriate sentencesinto definable categories of such offending. Given the grave seriousness ofdisruption to criminal court proceedings, the sentencing considerations ofdenunciation and deterrence are routinely important ones.[43] The Crown referred to the earlier 2013 decision of the Court of Appeal in M vR.28 That case criticised R v Hillman, which appeared to set a benchmark of threeyears' imprisonment for serious offending "of this kind".29 Rather, the Court arguedthat an approach that was more consistent with the Sentencing Act 2002 was tosentence defendants committing crimes of a more serious kind close to the maximumsentence that could be imposed. Therefore, in the case of attempting to pervert thecourse of justice, where the maximum sentence is seven years' imprisonment, therewas no reason to view three years' imprisonment as the starting point for seriousoffending.30[44] Finally, Mr Gullidge turned to the Court of Appeal decision in Miller v R.31That case noted that the real focus in each case must be the intention behind theattempt, and its potential effect.3225 R v Churchward, above n 21, at [14].26 McQuilkin v R [2017] NZCA 283.27 At [14] (footnotes omitted).28 M v R [2013] NZCA 385.29 R v Hillman [2005] 2 NZLR 681.30 M v R, above n 28, at [11].31 Miller v R [2014] NZCA 382.32 At [11].Relevant authorities[45] The Crown identified three cases that it was felt to be relevant.[46] First, the Court of Appeal decision in R v Kingi.33 The appellant in that casewas sentenced on domestic violence charges, one charge of forgery, and one charge ofattempting to pervert the course of justice. The appellant had written from prison tothe complainant (his partner) to persuade her not to give evidence. The letterscontained an undercurrent of violence. A starting point of two years' imprisonmentwas adopted for the charge of attempting to prevent the course of justice.[47] Secondly, R v Hillman.34 In this case, a sentence of 18 months' imprisonmentwas imposed for a charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice. No startingpoint was indicated in this case. Here, Mr Hillman had attempted to persuade thecomplainant (his partner) to withdraw her complaint about another offender in a gang.He visited her two other times the same day to ask her to drop the charges. No expressthreats were made, and he left when asked. This case, however, as highlighted, hasbeen superseded by M v R.35[48] Finally, the Crown turned to the High Court decision in Mita v Police.36 In thiscase the appellant was sentenced on domestic violence charges and one charge ofattempting to pervert the course of justice. A starting point of two to three years'imprisonment was held available for a charge of attempting to pervert the course ofjustice. There were 52 phone calls to the complainant (who was his partner) while thedefendant was remanded in custody, and most of these calls were amicable. Duringsome of these 52 calls, the appellant pressured the victim to provide him withassistance. Through persistence and threats the appellant, in that case, persuaded thevictim to file a false affidavit and retract her statement.33 R v Kingi CA360/01, 1 May 2002.34 Hillman v R, above n 29.35 M v R, above n 28.36 Mita v Police [2017] NZHC 2573.Relevant factors[49] The Crown identified a number of factors that it said were relevant in thepresent case.[50] It said there was direct pressure by the defendant on victim in the sense thatMr Henare directly texted the complainant to try to get her to drop the charge.[51] It says there was premeditation and that the messages were not spontaneous asthey were 40 minutes apart. In this case, on the issue of premeditation, I am preparedto accept the two text messages were relatively close in time and do not believe that itcan be said that premeditation is an aggravating feature.[52] Mr Gullidge also referred to the fact that there was a breach of the non-association order which was a Court order. That is, in this case, an aggravating feature.[53] Mr Gullidge referred to the potential effect and, obviously, the potential effectof this offending was that the complainant may have felt sufficiently concerned toamend her evidence. The actual effect appears to have been frightening for the victim.[54] Gang intimidation was mentioned by Mr Gullidge as a relevant factor althoughMs Wright took issue with this. The reality is there is no particular evidence relatingto a gang association, and I set that issue in terms of an aggravating feature to one side.[55] Finally, Mr Gullidge referred to intention behind the attempt and here theintention appears to have been to have the unlawful taking of a vehicle, and the theftof petrol charges withdrawn.The Crown's analysis[56] The Crown viewed the present offending as more serious than that in Bishop,McIlroy and Churchward. This was because it said Bishop and Churchward involveda third party pressuring the victim, rather than the offender as we have here. It saidthat the direct pressure was inherently more intimidating than an indirect approach.That is a proposition that will often be true, although is not always an absoluteproposition and there will be occasions when an indirect approach can be equally asintimidating as a direct approach.[57] I agree with the Crown that contravention of a non-association condition is amatter which would distinguish this from the truly spontaneous outburst such as inBishop.[58] I note that McIlroy did not involve a non-association order and direct pressureby the defendant, but it was an unusual case. The victim in that case was a willingparticipant in the sequence of communication and the pressure applied was differentas the victim did not initially take the defendant seriously. In the present case, thevictim was unwilling to communicate and took the appellant seriously.[59] The Crown argued that Hillman is the case that bore the most similarity to thepresent factual circumstances although there was also reliance as an indicator of theappropriate starting point on Ledgerwood.[60] Kingi and Mita were identified as being more serious than the present case,especially in light of the two and three years starting point adopted in those cases andthe involvement of domestic violence. The absence of domestic violence in thepresent case is a matter that Ms Wright put some emphasis on in her oral submissions.It is also noted that in those cases, the defendants were more persistent and threateningthan in the present case. Although there were non-association orders also in thosecases.[61] The Crown submits that, although in the present case the victim was notexpressly threatened, she felt threatened. As noted in Miller, the real focus needs tobe on the intention behind the attempt and on its potential effect.37 Here, the twomessages did show an intent to pervert the course of justice and had the potential todo so.37 Miller v R, above n 31, at [11].[62] The Crown submits that given the similarities with Hillman, the final startingpoint of 16 months' imprisonment was well within the available range, and indeedwhen compared to Ledgerwood may be seen as lenient.Analysis[63] This case has caused me some anxious consideration and one of the reasonsfor that is the range of cases including the Ledgerwood case which Mr Gullidge drewthe Court's attention to this morning.[64] It is important that there is consistency in sentencing for offences where thefacts are broadly similar. It is also obviously important that in any particular localitythere be a consistency in sentencing for similar offences committed in that area insimilar circumstances.[65] As identified in McQuilkin v R, there is no tariff case because the factualcircumstances are infinitely variable.[66] On balance, it is my view that the authorities relied upon by the appellantappear to be more closely analogous than the authorities relied upon by the Crown. Iagree with the sentencing Judge that the index offence is not of the most serious kinddue to the lack of expressed threats, lack of violence, and the fact that only two briefmessages (relatively close together) were sent.[67] I have come to the conclusion that the Judge, in his final starting point, did notappropriately recognise that this was an example, at the lower end, in terms ofseriousness of an offence of this nature.[68] It is my view that of all the cases identified by both parties Churchward is themost similar.38 That case involved a man called Mr Peacock who hit the complainantin the face with a bottle causing a nasty wound. He was charged with wounding withintent to injure. Ms Churchward sent a text message to the partner of the complainant,followed by a call asking if the complainant would sign a statement saying Mr Peacock38 R v Churchward, above n 21.didn't do it. Ms Churchward wanted to speak to Mr Forrest. A text message was sentthe next day requesting the same thing, and then phone calls followed with noresponse. Mr Peacock threatened to hold a grudge forever against the complainant ifhe wouldn't comply. A starting point of 12 months' imprisonment was adopted by theCourt of Appeal.[69] As Ms Wright conceded in response to a question from me, there were factorsboth of an aggravating and mitigating nature present in Churchward that are notpresent in the present case. These include:(a) the existence of a non-association order;(b) the fact that Mr Henare is facing six other charges – four of which canbe punished with imprisonment;(c) fewer text conversations in the present case;(d) no phone calls occurred in the present case;(e) the defendant had been pressuring the victim directly in the present caseand it was indirect in Churchward; and(f) no threats were actually made.[70] I think the Crown is right in identifying that the Facebook messages sent hadthe ability to intimidate the complainant and were done with that intention.[71] However, overall, I think that this case is slightly more serious thanChurchward and the particular aggravating features are that the defendant inChurchward was only before the Court on one charge. She was not subject to a non-association provision as a condition of bail, and the pressure she exerted that was viaa third party rather than direct.[72] Overall and after reflecting on the matter, I think that the appropriate startingpoint in this case in relation to the index charge should have been 13 months ratherthan 16 months.[73] If one applies the same uplifts and discounts used by the sentencing Judge, andthere has been no challenge to that, an uplift for four months for the balance of theoffending except for the offences for which imprisonment was not an availablepenalty, give the subtotal of 17 months; an uplift of one month to recognise that twoof the charges of resisting police occurred while on bail gives the subtotal of18 months; a reduction of two and a half months to recognise the appellant's youthreduces that to 15½ months; a reduction for one month for remorse takes it down14½ months; and a reduction of 20 per cent for a guilty plea gives a sum of11.6 months.[74] There has been no challenge to the fact that the sentence of imprisonment wasconverted to a sentence of home detention and, in my view, that was appropriate andbased on the re-worked sentencing, I believe a period of six months' home detentionis an appropriate sentence.Conclusion[75] Accordingly, I allow the appeal and what was effectively a seven monthssentence of home detention, which was adjusted to allow for the time that Mr Henarehad spent in prison, now becomes effectively a six months sentence of home detention.So, the time that Mr Henare will spend undertaking the sentence of home detention isreduced by one month.Churchman JSolicitors:N Wright, Barrister & Solicitor, Gisborne for AppellantCrown Solicitor's Office, Gisborne for Crown