ROE v NEW ZEALAND VICE-CHANCELLORS COMMITTEE [2021] NZHC 1293

ROE v NEW ZEALAND VICE-CHANCELLORS COMMITTEE [2021] NZHC 1293 [3 June 2021]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDWELLINGTON REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHECIV-2020-485-574[2021] NZHC 1293UNDER The Judicial review Procedure Act 2016BETWEEN KELLY ALEXANDRA ROEApplicantAND NEW ZEALAND VICE-CHANCELLORSCOMMITTEERespondentHearing: On the papersCounsel: Applicant in PersonT Smith and H Kerry for RespondentJudgment: 3 June 2021JUDGMENT OF ISAC J[On costs]Introduction[1] In a judgment of 1 April 2021 I dismissed Ms Roe's application for judicialreview.1 I noted that costs would ordinarily follow the event, and if costs were soughtby the respondent I would be minded to grant them on a 2B basis.2[2] The respondent has now sought costs on a 2B basis in the sum of $17,686together with disbursements of $95.65. It does not seek certification for secondcounsel.1 Roe v New Zealand Vice-Chancellors Committee [2021] NZHC 719.2 At [104].[3] Ms Roe in turn seeks costs against the successful respondent of $21,749 anddisbursements of $1,600.3[4] Ms Roe denies that the proceeding was a challenge to the non-conferral of adegree. Rather, she contends the proceeding centred on a bribe payment, fraud andextortion. She maintains her position that the correct procedures for investigatingcomplaints were not followed, and that the proceeding is properly characterised as oneinvolving whether Universities New Zealand is performing its statutory function touphold the quality and integrity of university qualifications.[5] She submits that her belief in fraud and corruption ought to be established bya public prosecution of the Chief Executive of the respondent. Her claim for costs isbased on the submission that bringing her complaint to court came at a considerablepersonal cost, and that "you might say [Ms Roe] was forced to slave for the courts."She also asserts that the sum she seeks is less than her actual costs.Discussion[6] All matters relating to costs are discretionary.4 The discretion must beexercised on a principled basis. And the determination of costs, so far as possible,should be both predictable and expeditious.5[7] In this case, I see no reason to depart from the usual course that the party whofails with respect to a proceeding should pay costs to the party who succeeds.6[8] I do not accept Ms Roe's characterisation of the proceeding, and nor do I acceptthat it would meet the requirements under r 14.7(e) — that the proceeding concerneda matter of public interest — to justify no order for costs or a reduction in costs. Thetest for determining whether a proceeding is in the public interest, and therefore3 Ms Roe seeks filing fees as a disbursement but notes in her memorandum she was granted a feewaiver. In the event disbursements are granted to her she proposes to pay the filing fee to theMinistry of Justice.4 High Court Rules, r 14.1.5 Rule 14.2(1)(g).6 Rule 14.2(1)(a).justifies a departure from the usual rule that costs follow the event, was summarisedin Taylor v District Court at North Shore (No 2):7 the proceeding must concern a matter of genuine public interest, have meritand be of general public importance beyond the interests of the particularunsuccessful litigant. To obtain the benefit of the exception in rule [14.7(e)],the unsuccessful litigant must also have acted reasonably in the conduct of theproceeding.[9] This proceeding does not fit into the category of cases that have engaged thepublic interest exception to costs.8 Nor is there any proper foundation to supportMs Roe's claim for costs.Result[10] Costs are awarded to the respondent on a 2B basis as claimed.Isac JSolicitors:Chapman Tripp, Wellington7 Taylor v District Court at North Shore (No 2) HC Auckland CIV-2009-404-2350, 13 October 2010at [9].8 See for example West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd (Costs) [2013] NZSC 133; New ZealandMaori Council v Attorney-General [1994] 1 NZLR 513 (PC); EDS v New Zealand King Salmon[2014] NZSC 167.