MAO v GREEN LAND INVESTMENT LIMITED [2018] NZHC 1348

MAO v GREEN LAND INVESTMENT LIMITED [2018] NZHC 1348 [8 June 2018]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDAUCKLAND REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHECIV-2016-404-1241[2018] NZHC 1348BETWEEN LIANSEN MAOPlaintiffAND GREEN LAND INVESTMENT LIMITEDDefendantCIV-2018-404-911BETWEEN LIANSEN MAOPlaintiffAND GREEN LAND INVESTMENT LIMITEDDefendantHearing: 25 and 29 May 2018Appearances: D Zhang for the PlaintiffG M Illingworth QC for the DefendantJudgment: 8 June 2018JUDGMENT OF POWELL JThis judgment was delivered by me on 8 June 2018 at 3.30 pm pursuant toR 11.5 of the High Court RulesRegistrar/Deputy RegistrarDate:Solicitors:R Zhao, Amicus Law, AucklandDavid Liu, Dominion Road, AucklandCounsel:G M Illingworth QC, AucklandDaniel Zhang, Auckland[1] The defendant, Green Land Investment Ltd ("Green Land") seeks thefollowing orders:(a) That the plaintiff, Liansen Mao, be disbarred from further participationin CIV-2016-404-1241 ("the 2016 proceedings"). In particular GreenLand seeks that Mr Mao's claim and his defence to Greenland'scounter-claim be struck out for want of prosecution pursuant to r15.2(a) of the High Court Rules 2016 ("the Rules") as a result of MrMao's ongoing failure to provide an affidavit of documents.(b) If Mr Mao is not debarred from the 2016 proceedings he is ordered topay security for costs, pursuant to r 5.45 of the Rules, on the groundsthat Mr Mao is resident overseas and there is evidence filed on hisbehalf that indicates he would not be able to pay any costs ordered inthe event that his claim was unsuccessful.(c) An order that Mr Mao's proceedings in CIV-2018-404-911 ("the 2018proceedings") are struck out as an abuse of process pursuant tor 15.1(1)(d) of the Rules on the grounds that they are a duplicate of the2016 proceedings.[2] The applications are opposed by Mr Mao. Mr Zhang, on behalf of Mr Mao,submits that any failure to provide discovery has been overstated, and while concedingMr Mao lives in China, Mr Zhang submits that there is evidence before the Court thatMr Mao owns substantial property in New Zealand and is therefore able to pay costsordered in the event his claim is unsuccessful. With regard to the 2018 proceedingsMr Zhang submits that these disclose a new cause of action and, rather than strikingout the proceedings, seeks consolidation of the 2016 and 2018 proceedings.[3] There are therefore three issues to be determined:(a) Should Mr Mao's claim and defence to counter-claim in the 2016proceedings be struck out for want of prosecution?(b) If not, should Mr Mao be ordered to pay security for costs?(c) Should the 2018 proceedings be struck out as an abuse of process?Should Mr Mao's Claim and Defence to Counter-Claim in the 2016 proceedingsbe struck out for want of prosecution?[4] In support of the application Mr Illingworth QC, on behalf of Green Land,submitted that Mr Mao's claim should be disbarred for want of prosecution.Mr Illingworth noted that after the proceedings were commenced in June 2016,discovery was ordered by Associate Judge Bell in December 2016. Associate JudgeBell's timetabling order was designed to get the proceedings to a three-day hearingscheduled for October 2017, and required both sides "to file and serve affidavits ofdocuments following the standard protocol by 31 March 2017". As Mr Mao took nosteps to file an affidavit of documents, Green Land applied for an order adjourning theOctober fixture and seeking that Mr Mao's claim in defence be disbarred.[5] Mr Illingworth noted that following the adjournment of the October fixtureMr Mao had remained in breach of his obligation to file an affidavit of documents,despite subsequent timetabling orders made by Gordon J in October 2017 and Palmer Jin November 2017, and notwithstanding the filing of documents purporting to beaffidavits of documents on behalf of Mr Mao; by Mr Mao's daughter, Jiawen Mao, on6 November 2017 and 24 May 2018 and by Mr Mao's "agent" Augustine Lau on 6December 2017. Mr Illingworth noted that none of the purported affidavits ofdocuments were sworn by Mr Mao as required by r 8.24(2)(a) of the Rules, that thedocuments filed are otherwise not consistent with rr 8.15 and 8.16 of the Rules to thepoint where even Ms Mao's most recent document, filed the evening before the presenthearing, is "bland and unintelligible" and fails to identify with any precision thedocuments purportedly listed. In Mr Illingworth's submission the conduct of Mr Maois "outrageous" and "reeks of game playing". He submits the time has come for theCourt to say "enough is enough" and not let Mr Mao proceed further with his claim.In the event Mr Mao's claim and defence to counter-claim is struck out, Mr Illingworthseeks Green Land's counter-claim to be set down for formal proof.Discussion and Analysis[6] Having reviewed the proceedings carefully I do not consider it is appropriatefor Mr Mao's claim and defence to counter-claim to be struck out or otherwisedisbarred at this time.[7] While it is clear that Mr Mao has not complied with, and indeed remains inbreach of, his obligation to provide an affidavit of documents, the position is in factconsiderably less clear than submitted on behalf of Green Land, and there are in facta number of relevant factors that make it inappropriate to strike out Mr Mao's claimand defence to counter-claim:(a) While Associate Judge Bell made a timetabling order in December2016, Mr Zhang was correct in submitting the requirement for bothparties to file affidavits of documents by 31 March 2017 was in facteffectively overtaken by events. This occurred as a result of additionaltime granted by Woolford J on 29 March 2017 for both parties to fileamended pleadings in respect of the counter-claim, a process that wasnot ultimately completed until 18 May 2017.(b) As a result, neither party filed an affidavit of documents in accordancewith Associate Judge Bell's timetabling order.(c) Despite this, it is clear that Mr Mao, rather than attempting to delaymatters, was in fact working towards the scheduled October 2017hearing. In particular in June 2017 he filed a brief of evidence byMr Lau in support of his claim, in accordance with Associate JudgeBell's timetabling order. At the time the brief of evidence was filed noissue appears to have been taken with that filing by Green Land,although no briefs of evidence on behalf of Green Land weresubsequently filed.(d) While Green Land filed its application on 25 August 2017 seeking todisbar Mr Mao for failure to provide an affidavit of documents,Green Land had itself been in breach of the same timetabling order untilthe day of the application, when its own affidavit of documents wasbelatedly filed.(e) Rather than focusing on Green Land's application to disbar Mr Mao,the Court's response was to focus on the application to adjourn theOctober fixture. As a result, while Heath J vacated the October 2017fixture, no further orders were made in relation to completion ofdiscovery by Mr Mao. Instead the proceedings were set down for acomprehensive case management conference to get the proceedingback on track.(f) The case management conference took place on 11 October 2017before Gordon J. Far from attempting to delay proceedings Mr Zhangin fact sought comprehensive timetabling orders to get the proceedingthrough to trial. As Mr Illingworth submitted and Gordon J agreedhowever, the focus by this time was on the completion of Mr Mao'sdiscovery and as a result the orders made by Gordon J related entirelyto the issue of discovery, and in particular directed Mr Mao to file andserve an affidavit of documents following the standard protocol by 8November 2017.(g) It is at this point that the first "affidavit discoveries of documents" byMs Mao was filed. While this document was clearly inadequate on itsface, clarification of the position did not occur as it was purportedlyfiled at the same time as Mr Zhang sought leave to withdraw as counsel,an application subsequently granted by Palmer J when the proceedingscame before him on 27 November 2017. Palmer J clearly did not acceptthat a compliant affidavit of documents had been filed by Mr Mao ashe directed "Mr Mao must file in the Court and serve on [Green Land]an affidavit of discovery that complies with his obligations by 5.00 pmWednesday 6 December 2017". In the event that the affidavit was notfiled as directed, Palmer J also directed that the proceedings be listedin the Duty Judge list of the week of 11 December 2017 whereuponGreen Land's application to dismiss Mr Mao's claims for want ofprosecution could be considered. At the same time however Palmer Jrecorded that Mr Lau indicated that he had been assigned Mr Mao'sinterest in the proceedings. At that stage Palmer J noted "Mr Lau is nota party to this proceeding and cannot represent Mr Mao". Nevertheless,it was this issue rather than discovery which then dominated theproceeding for the next few months.(h) In the meantime, and prior to the next call of the proceedings inDecember 2017, Mr Lau filed his own "affidavit discoveries ofdocuments" on 6 December 2017. If anything this document was evenless compliant than that filed by Ms Mao. When the proceedings werecalled before Lang J however the focus was, as noted, on the standingof the plaintiff rather than compliance with discovery, with Mr Laucontinuing to assert he was entitled to be substituted as plaintiff. As aresult Lang J directed that if Mr Lau wished to be substituted as aplaintiff he had to file an appropriate application, and allocated a two-hour fixture on 22 March 2018 for that application to be heard. Lang Jmade it clear that it was only after the application for substitution hadbeen dealt with that the issue of discovery could be addressed, andnoted in particular:Provided Mr Lau is substituted as plaintiff he will need to bein a position on 22 March to advise the court how the newlysubstituted plaintiff proposes to deal with discoveryobligations in a timely and cost effective manner.(i) In the event no documents were filed in relation to the application tosubstitute Mr Lau as plaintiff until 4.49 pm on 21 March 2018, with theresult that the application could not proceed as scheduled. At theconference in front of Lang J on 22 March 2018 Mr Zhang re-enteredthe fray on behalf of Mr Mao. The application for substitution wasadjourned until 25 May 2018, with Lang J also directing that GreenLand's 25 August 2017 application for disbarment be adjourned to thesame date. As a result of the delays caused with regard to thesubstitution application Lang J ordered costs in favour of Green Land,and also ordered that those costs, together with costs awarded againstMr Mao earlier in the proceedings, be paid in any event otherwise MrMao's claim would be struck out. Those costs were subsequently paid.(j) In the event Mr Lau subsequently abandoned his application to besubstituted as plaintiff. The focus of the 25 May hearing was thereforeGreen Land's 25 August 2017 application, together with Green Land'sapplication for security for costs which had been made in the interim.[8] As can be seen the changing focus of the proceedings, aggravated by the factthat Mr Mao was unrepresented for a considerable period, while clearly frustrating forGreen Land, does not fit comfortably within the type of scenario envisaged byr 15.2(a) and in particular the necessity for "inordinate delay" as discussed in Lovie vMedical Assurance Society NZ Ltd:1[T]he applicant must show that the plaintiff has been guilty of inordinate delay,that such delay is inexcusable, and that it has seriously prejudiced thedefendant. Although these considerations are not necessarily exclusive, andat the end one must always stand back and have regard to the interests ofjustice, in this country, ever since New Zealand Industrial Gases Ltd vAndersons Ltd [1970] NZLR 58 it has been accepted that if the application isto be successful, the applicant must commence by proving the three factorslisted.[9] The chronology set out in [7] above does not disclose such a delay. As a resultI am satisfied the sequence does not disclose a want of prosecution on the part of MrMao. On the contrary it is clear that Mr Mao has tried to advance matters, includingfiling Mr Lau's brief of evidence as well as seeking comprehensive timetabling ordersin October 2017, albeit without apparently realising the need to first comply with hisdiscovery obligations.[10] At the same time it is clear that the application by Green Land to strike outMr Mao's claim and defence to counter-claim was filed Green Land itself had only thesame day remedied its own breach of Associate Judge Bell's directions (to the extentthat it was indeed a breach, given that the pleadings had not in fact been finalised priorto the filing date for affidavits of documents). As a result it is apparent that at the timeit was filed Green Land's application was both opportunistic and premature. Had it1 Lovie v Medical Assurance Society NZ Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 244 (HC) at 248.been considered by the Court at the time it was filed there would have been no prospectof the application succeeding; at most the Court would have ordered some sort oftimetable extension to enable the filing of an affidavit of documents on behalf ofMr Mao, as subsequently ordered when the proceeding came before Gordon J. TheRules do not envisage a situation where an application filed prematurely could over aprolonged period of time build enough momentum to enable the other party's claim tobe struck out.[11] Finally I note that a considerable part of the delay can be attributed to the issueof Mr Lau's abortive attempt to be substituted or added as a plaintiff, a matter forwhich Mr Mao has already had to pay Green Land substantial costs, on the basis itwas made with Mr Mao's consent.[12] Ultimately I accept Mr Zhang's submission that far from Mr Mao being inpersistent breach of timetabling orders for an inordinate period, a more complexpicture emerges which has meant that the discovery process has not been casemanaged as closely as it should have been, and which has resulted in discovery stillnot being completed, notwithstanding Ms Mao's latest affidavit, which as Mr Zhangconfirms still fails to comply with the relevant Rules.[13] Taken together, and notwithstanding Mr Mao has not yet been able to completediscovery, I do not consider that it is appropriate to strike out his claim and defence tocounter-claim for want of prosecution.[14] Green Land's application to disbar Mr Mao is accordingly dismissed. Thesteps that will need to be taken as a result of this conclusion are addressed in the finalsection of this judgment.Should Mr Mao be Ordered to Pay Security for Costs?[15] Rule 5.45 of the Rules relevantly provides:5.45 Order for security of costs(1) Subclause (2) applies if a Judge is satisfied, on the application of adefendant,—(a) that a plaintiff—(i) is resident out of New Zealand; or(ii) is a corporation incorporated outside New Zealand; or(iii) is a subsidiary (within the meaning of section 5 of theCompanies Act 1993) of a corporation incorporatedoutside New Zealand; or(b) that there is reason to believe that a plaintiff will be unable topay the costs of the defendant if the plaintiff is unsuccessfulin the plaintiff's proceeding.(2) A Judge may, if the Judge thinks it is just in all the circumstances,order the giving of security for costs.[16] There is no dispute that Green Land's application for security for costs wasbrought relatively late in the history of this proceeding. It was not in fact until 13 April2018 that the application was made, having been precipitated by an affidavit filed byMr Lau in support of his application for substitution as plaintiff, which was sworn on21 March 2018. In that affidavit Mr Lau set out in some detail his relationship withMr Mao and volunteered considerable information about Mr Mao's financial position.Of relevance to the application subsequently filed by Green Land Mr Lau advised:5. Mr Mao is a business man who lives in China. While his businessinterests and investments are spread widely, he is quite traditional inthe sense that he does everything himself.6. I have known Mr Mao since 2005. In 2012, Mr Mao bought 423 (now387) Ormiston Road, for which he had plans to develop.7. At the beginning of 2015, I was engaged by Mr Mao as his propertymanager. He wanted me to manage his property by renting them outand looking for development opportunities. Mr Mao was supposed topay me about $100,000 per annum as my salary.8. In March 2015, I was then involved, on Mr Mao's behalf, in theagreement with Green Land which is the subject of this proceeding.9. Between May and June 2017, Mr Mao had trouble collecting debtsowed to him and as such he had significant cash flow problems. Assuch he was in default of mortgage payments for his New Zealandproperties. As such he received property law notices from themortgagees. I attach as "A" these notices. Some details on this noticehas been redacted as they are not relevant to this proceeding.10. Mr Mao then had to borrow money from his own family to pay for themortgage defaults. In July 2017, Mr Mao was able to barely getenough money and was able to placate the mortgagee. These lendershowever have also mortgaged Mr Mao's property. I attach as "B" thecurrent title of Mr Mao's property.11. Then in July 2017, China experienced large-scale floods. I attach as"C" Wikipedia's record of this flood. Mr Mao and his domesticpartner had properties in Hubei province, which were badly damagedby the flood. That further put strain on Mr Mao's finances.12. As such Mr Mao had no more funds and was unable to giveinstructions to his lawyers, Amicus Law, in the last quarter of 2017.As a result, Amicus Law withdrew representation.13. Since June 2016, Mr Mao has suffered high blood pressure whichrequired him to go to the hospital several times. His doctor's advicewas that he needed to avoid stress and cannot fly. His conditionworsened in 2017. Because this case is highly stressful, at the adviceof his doctor he has been limiting his involvement in this proceeding.14. It was never envisaged that the subdivision project under the GreenLand agreement would not take this long, nor that it would turn into adispute of this scale. Mr Mao and I never intended for me to beinvolved for this long. Furthermore, Mr Mao has not paid me anysalary since he engaged me due to these financial issues. Therefore,on 7 September 2017, Mr Mao agreed to give me 33% of theremaining interest of the Green Land agreement. I attach thisassignment, titled as Deed of Settlement, as "D".[17] As a result and in specific reliance upon Mr Lau's affidavit, Green Landapplied for security for costs against Mr Mao.[18] Mr Mao opposes the application for security for costs. While acknowledgingthe "cashflow" issues raised by Mr Lau in his affidavit, Mr Mao disputes anysuggestion that he cannot meet any costs award that may be ordered. In particularMr Mao relies upon an affidavit by Ms Mao to the effect that Mr Mao owns threesignificant properties in New Zealand:(a) 387 Ormiston Road, with a capital value of $7,250,000;(b) 41 Candia Road, Swanson, with a capital value of $2,160,000; and(c) a further property "owed" by Green Land to Mr Mao under a contractdated 20 December 2015, which Ms Mao estimates would be worth$550,000-$650,000.[19] In addition to relying upon Ms Mao's affidavit Mr Zhang also relied upon thedecision of Kós J in Highgate on Broadway Ltd v Devine where he noted:2Security for costs is relatively exceptional. Where it is likely to result in thedenial of access to justice, it is entirely exceptional.[20] In Mr Zhang's submission Green Land is only raising security for costs as anissue to prevent Mr Mao from pursuing his case or to delay progressing the case. Hesubmits its effect would be punitive, noting that if costs were ordered and Mr Mao wasunable to pay them his claim would be stayed, but the case would in any event needto be heard given Green Land's counter-claim relies on the same contract andcircumstances as Mr Mao's claims.Discussion and Analysis[21] Mr Lau's affidavit paints a compelling picture of the weakness of Mr Mao'sfinancial position and that picture is not assuaged by the assertions in Ms Mao'saffidavit. As Mr Illingworth noted Ms Mao provided no information with regard tothe amount of equity Mr Mao may have in either the Ormiston Road or Candia Roadproperties. Instead Hao Yuan Lu, in an affidavit on behalf of Green Land in responseto Ms Mao, noted that a wide range of interests have been registered against bothproperties. First, in relation to Ormiston Road, Mr Lu noted two mortgages registeredagainst the property, with priority amounts of $5,000,000 and $10,000,000respectively. There is also a caveat purporting to protect the interests of a fourthmortgagee pursuant to term loan agreements. At the same time there is a caveatregistered by Dongfeng Lin claiming an interest as purchaser pursuant to an agreementfor sale and purchase dated 8 August 2013. Finally, there is a statutory land charge foran unpaid costs order in sum of $59,057.07 owed to the Auckland Council under s 315of the Resource Management Act 1991.[22] The position is similar in relation to Candia Road with a registered mortgagein favour of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (New Zealand) Limited with apriority amount of $5,928,450 plus interest, and a caveat by Chengjiang Wu claiming2 Highgate on Broadway Ltd v Devine [2012] NZHC 2288, [2013] NZAR 1017 at [22](e).an interest as purchaser, pursuant to an agreement for sale and purchase dated 30September 2015 and a deed of assignment dated 30 October 2015.[23] The interests that have been disclosed by Mr Lu are in fact entirely consistentwith the description provided by Mr Lau when he described how Mr Mao had beenforced to mortgage his properties as a result of his "significant cash flow problems".3Given this evidence, the lack of any information regarding the equity held by Mr Maoin the Ormiston Road and Candia Road properties raises serious questions as towhether Mr Mao will be able to meet the costs of the proceeding in the event that heis unsuccessful in his claims. At the same time the property said to be owed by GreenLand to Mr Mao also provides no assistance given his ownership of that property isdirectly at issue in the present proceedings.[24] Mr Zhang's reliance upon Highgate on Broadway and the consequences ofordering security on Mr Mao's claim also lacks any substance. The essence of MrZhang's submissions is that Mr Mao has sufficient means to be able to meet costsordered in the proceeding, and not that Mr Mao is impecunious and that his claim willnot be able to proceed if security is ordered.[25] In those circumstances, there is reason to believe that Mr Mao will be unableto pay the costs of Green Land if Mr Mao is unsuccessful in his proceeding. Giventhat, the extremely chequered history of this proceeding to date, and the fact Mr Maoresides out of New Zealand it is just in all the circumstances to order security for costsagainst Mr Mao.[26] I am fortified in that view because of the lack of obvious involvement byMr Mao in the proceeding in recent months and the corresponding ongoinginvolvement by Mr Lau. I note in particular that Mr Zhang confirmed he withdrew ascounsel in November 2017 because he was not receiving instructions from Mr Mao(apparently because Mr Mao could not afford to pay) and resumed acting on the basisof instructions received from Mr Lau and Ms Mao rather than Mr Mao. Mr Lau'sinvolvement has led to significant delays so far, first at the outset of proceedings whenMr Lau attempted to participate in the proceedings as a second plaintiff without any3 See [ ] above.interest in the subject matter, and again, as noted, between December 2017 and April2018 when Mr Lau sought to be substituted in Mr Mao's place. In the event thatMr Mao is not able to meet costs it is unlikely that Mr Lau will be able to do so, givenhe was declared bankrupt on 10 May 2018.[27] Having determined that security is appropriate the question then turns to theamount that should be ordered. Mr Illingworth indicated that the likely costs on a 2Bbasis for Mr Mao's claims from this point would amount to $39,000, a figure notdisputed by Mr Zhang. In the circumstances that surround the ongoing prosecution ofMr Mao's claims I consider that it is appropriate for this full amount to be ordered byway of security.Should the 2018 Proceedings be Struck Out as an Abuse of Process?[28] The third application before the Court arose after Mr Mao filed the 2018proceeding on 14 May 2018, which arises out of the same contract as the 2016proceedings. Although couched as separate proceedings, at the same time as the 2018proceedings were filed there was a simultaneous application for consolidation with the2016 proceedings.[29] Mr Illingworth submits the proceedings are substantially identical and shouldbe struck out pursuant to r 15.1(1)(d), as an abuse of process.[30] Mr Zhang submitted the proceedings were in fact separate, and in particularthe 2018 proceedings raised a separate cause of action, although he did admit that partof the reason the 2018 proceedings were filed was because of the attacks on the 2016proceeding and the possibility that the 2016 proceedings would be struck out or stayed.In any event Mr Zhang submitted that as consolidation was sought there was in factno prejudice to Green Land if the proceedings were allowed to remain on foot.Discussion and Analysis[31] It is quite clear that the 2018 proceedings are misconceived and simply purportto add a further layer of confusion over the current proceedings.[32] Having looked carefully at the two statements of claim it is difficult to see onwhat basis Mr Zhang's submission that the proceedings are substantially different canbe made out. The first six pages of each plead a contract between the parties inidentical terms, and both appear to allege an ongoing breach of that contract by GreenLand which entitles Mr Mao to $3,000 per day from Green Land, until the breach isrectified.[33] In such circumstances Mr Zhang's suggestion that the proceedings aresubstantively different cannot be sustained, and is indeed belied by Mr Mao's ownapplication for immediate consolidation.[34] The law is clear that duplication of proceedings is an abuse of process. AsMaster Williams (as he was) observed in Otis Elevator Co Ltd v Linnel Builders Ltd:4If two actions are commenced the second asking for relief which may havebeen obtained in the first, the second is prima facie vexatious and may bestayed (Earl Poulett v Viscount Hill [1893] 1 Ch 277 followed in Williams vHunt [1905] 1 KB 512). Where an action founded on a certain cause of actionis in existence, albeit stayed, it is an abuse of process to bring new proceedingsfounded upon that same cause of action; the second action will be struck outand the proper course would be to apply for the stay to be removed in respectof the first action (Buckland v Palmer [1984] 3 All ER 554).[35] Quite clearly any attempt to dodge any perceived likelihood that the 2016proceeding would be struck out or stayed would make the second proceeding an abuseof process, and even if the 2016 proceedings are not stayed the mere level ofduplication also constitutes an abuse. The abuse is not ameliorated by thesimultaneous application to consolidate, given there will remain separate statementsof claim before the Court, together with separate responses with significant potentialfor consequent confusion.[36] I therefore have no hesitation in striking out the 2018 proceedings. To theextent that there are any matters from the 2018 proceedings that need to be picked upin the 2016 proceedings, the appropriate course will be to apply to amend the claim inthe 2016 proceedings.4 Otis Elevator Co Ltd v Linnel Builders Ltd (1991) 5 PRNZ 72 (HC) at 74, citing Supreme CourtPractice (1998, vol 2) at 1416.Next steps[37] As a result of the orders I have made Mr Mao's proceedings remain on footsubject to the payment of security for costs as directed. To this end Mr Mao will have14 days after the date of this judgment to pay the security ordered. Whether securityis paid or not a judicial conference is to be convened before me for the purpose ofdirecting a timetable for the hearing of the proceedings (if security has been paid) orcompleting the hearing of the defendant's cross-claim (in the event that security hasnot been paid). Obviously in the event that Mr Mao's claims continue the immediatecompletion of full discovery by Mr Mao himself swearing an affidavit of documentswill be a priority, as will confirmation by Mr Zhang that he is authorised to act onbehalf of Mr Mao as the plaintiff, rather than Ms Mao or Mr Lau.Decision[38] For the reasons set out above I therefore order:(a) Green Land's application to strike out Mr Mao's claim and defence tocounter-claim is dismissed.(b) Mr Mao is to pay security for costs in the sum of $39,000. In the eventthat this sum is not paid within 14 days of the date of this judgmentMr Mao's claim against Green Land will be stayed.(c) The 2018 proceedings are struck out as an abuse of process.(d) A judicial conference is to be convened as soon as possible after theexpiry of 14 days to determine an appropriate timetable for thecompletion of the 2016 proceedings.(e) Costs on the application to strike out the 2016 proceedings for want ofprosecution are to lie where they fall.(f) Green Land is entitled to costs on the application for security for costson a 2B basis.(g) Green Land is entitled to costs on the application to strike out the 2018proceedings on a 2B basis._______________________________Powell J