MALCOM EDWARD RABSON AND RICHARD JOHN CRESER v TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (NEW ZEALAND) INCORPORATED [2015] NZSC 56
The application for leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court is dismissed because the applicants failed to demonstrate the exceptional circumstances required by s 14 of the Supreme Court Act 2003; public importance alone is insufficient and an oppressive security for costs regime does not justify bypassing the...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2015] NZSC 56
- Parties
- Applicant: Malcom Edward Rabson; Applicant: Richard John Creser; Respondent: Transparency International (New Zealand) Incorporated
- Court
- Supreme Court
- Jurisdiction
- New Zealand
- Judgment Date
- 8 May 2015
- Procedural Posture
- Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court Against Strike Out of Judicial Review Proceedings / Application for Leave to Appeal (direct to Supreme Court)
- Outcome
- Application for leave to appeal dismissed.
- Legal Topics
- Leave to Appeal, Direct (leapfrog) Appeal, Security for Costs, Strike Out, Judicial Review
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Malcom Edward Rabson
Applicant
Richard John Creser
Applicant
Transparency International (New Zealand) Incorporated
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court Against Strike Out of Judicial Review Proceedings / Application for Leave to Appeal (direct to Supreme Court)
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the Supreme Court should grant leave for a direct (leapfrog) appeal from the High Court
- 2 Whether exceptional circumstances exist under s 14 Supreme Court Act 2003 to justify a direct appeal
- 3 Whether public importance alone constitutes exceptional circumstances
Ratio Decidendi
The application for leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court is dismissed because the applicants failed to demonstrate the exceptional circumstances required by s 14 of the Supreme Court Act 2003; public importance alone is insufficient and an oppressive security for costs regime does not justify bypassing the Court of Appeal.
Court Disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed.
Orders
- Costs of NZD 2,500 payable to the respondent.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
MALCOM EDWARD RABSON AND RICHARD JOHN CRESER v TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (NEW ZEALAND) INCORPORATED [2015] NZSC 56 [8 May 2015]IN THE SUPREME COURTOF NEW ZEALANDSC 22/2015[2015] NZSC 56BETWEEN MALCOM EDWARD RABSON ANDRICHARD JOHN CRESERApplicantsAND TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL(NEW ZEALAND) INCORPORATEDRespondentCourt: Glazebrook, Arnold and O'Regan JJCounsel: Applicants in personD R Kalderimis and K E Yesberg for the RespondentJudgment: 8 May 2015JUDGMENT OF THE COURTA The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.B Costs of $2,500 are payable to the respondent.____________________________________________________________________REASONS[1] The applicants seek leave to appeal against a High Court judgment of Mallon J dated 3 March 2015.1 In that judgment, Mallon J struck out the applicants'statement of claim seeking judicial review of various decisions of Transparency International (New Zealand) Inc.[2] Under s 14 of the Supreme Court Act 2003, the Supreme Court must not give leave to appeal directly to it against a decision made in a court other than the Court of Appeal unless (in addition to being satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of1 Rabson v Transparency International (New Zealand) Inc [2015] NZHC 334.justice for the Court to hear and determine the proposed appeal) it is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances justifying taking the proposed appeal directly to this Court.[3] The applicants argue that the underlying appeal is of significant public importance and that the exceptional circumstances for a direct appeal are reinforcedby "an oppressive security for costs regime" which will prevent the applicantsappealing against the judgment to the New Zealand Court of Appeal.[4] The fact an appeal may be of public importance is not an exceptional circumstance justifying a direct appeal to this Court.2 As to security for costs, as this Court stated in Siemer v Brown, it "is not appropriate to allow a leapfrog appeal tothis Court to circumvent the application of the rules applying to appeals to the Court of Appeal, in particular, the requirement to pay security for costs".3[5] The application for leave to appeal is dismissed and costs of $2,500 are payable to the respondent.Solicitors:Chapman Tripp, Wellington for Respondent2 In any event, the respondent submits the underlying allegations that are the subject of the proceedings are trivial, moot and lack seriousness.3 Siemer v Brown [2015] NZSC 41 at [6].