HINDMAN v THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPT OF CORRECTIONS HC AK CIV-2013-404-000092

HINDMAN v THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPT OF CORRECTIONS HC AK CIV-2013-404-000092 [14 January 2013]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDAUCKLAND REGISTRYCIV-2013-404-000092[2013] NZHC 6UNDER the Habeas Corpus Act 2001BETWEEN MICHAEL JOHN HINDMANApplicantAND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THEDEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONSDefendantHearing: 14 January 2013Appearances: M J Hindman (Self-represented Applicant) in PersonA R Longdill for the DefendantJudgment: 14 January 2013JUDGMENT OF COURTNEY JThis judgment was delivered by Justice Courtneyon 14 January 2013 at 4.00 pm, pursuant tor 11.5 of the High Court RulesRegistrar/Deputy RegistrarDate:.Counsel: Meredith Connell, P O Box 221,3 Auckland 1140(DX CP24063Copy To: M J Hindman, Mt Eden Correctional Facility (MECF), Private Bag 92625 Symonds Street, Auckland 1150[1] In May 2000, the applicant, Michael John Hindman, was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment for murder. He was released on life parole on 9 May 2011. On 24 December 2012, the Panel Convenor of the New Zealand Parole Board, the Hon. M A Frater, made an interim recall order under s 62(1) of the Parole Act 2002 on the ground that Mr Hindman posed an undue risk to the safety of the community or any person or class of persons. She then issued a warrant to arrest and detain Mr Hindman under s 63(1).[2] Mr Hindman has applied for a writ of habeas corpus. He asserts that the evidence on which the interim order was made, contained in the affirmation of Matthew Kean, was incorrect in material respects and did not justify the conclusion that he was an undue risk to the safety of the community. Mr Hindman did not file an affidavit in support of his application.[3] In general, it is not for this Court, in determining an application for habeas corpus, to go behind any apparently valid warrant which forms the basis for theapplicant's detention. The position was explained by the Court of Appeal in Manuel v Superintendent of Hawkes Bay Regional Prison:1[49] A person who detains another can fairly be expected to establish, effectively on demand, the legal justification for the detention. In cases involving imprisonment or other statutory confinements, this will involve the production of a relevant warrant or warrants or other documents which provide the basis for the detention. We accept that apparently regular warrants (or other similar documents) will not always be a decisive answer to a habeas corpus application. But it will be a rare case, we think, where the habeas corpus procedures will permit the Court to enquire into challenges on administrative law grounds to decisions which lie upstream of apparently regular warrants. This is particularly likely to be the case where the decision-maker is not the detaining party. There may not be a bright line which distinguishes between those arguments which are available on habeas corpus applications and those which can only be deployed (if deployed at all) in judicial review proceedings. Nonetheless we see the test as coming down to whether the arguments in issue are properly susceptible to fair and sensible summary determination. If they are, they can be addressed in habeas corpus proceedings. If not, they must be held over for evaluation in judicial review proceedings.[4] A copy of the warrant signed and the interim recall order were both produced. It is evident that the Panel Convenor had turned her mind to the specific concerns1 Superintendent of Hawkes Bay Regional Prison [2005] 1 NZLR 161raised by Mr Kean, namely the lack of any suitable residence for Mr Hindman and has failure to attend scheduled appointments for drug and alcohol counselling.[5] In the usual course, there would be no justification for going behind the warrant and considering a challenge to the factual assertions made by Mr Kean in support of the application for the interim recall order. However, Mr Hindman, whoappeared in person, relied on Harrison J's decision in Kurariki v Singh2 in which Harrison J was prepared to go behind the apparently valid decision of the Parole Board and the apparently lawful warrant to arrest Mr Kurariki. The Judge regarded the Panel Convenor's decision as properly susceptible to fair and summary determination, particularly given that it had acted ex parte. As a result, the Judge was prepared to consider the factual basis for the decision, ultimately disagreeing with the Panel Convenor's decision that there was a basis on which to conclude that Mr Kurariki posed a risk to the safety of the community.[6] Mr Hindman submitted that his case was very similar to that of Mr Kurariki. However, I respectfully decline to follow the course taken by Harrison J. There does not appear to me to be any basis for viewing Mr Hindman's position as falling intothe category of rare cases that would justify an enquiry an apparently valid decision to issue an interim recall order and warrant. There is no suggestion that the authority to make such an order and issue the warrant did not exist. There was affidavit evidence provided to the Panel Convenor which, on its face, would justify the decision.[7] I note, in any event, that, even if I had been prepared to go behind the Panel Convenor's decision, there was no evidence to support Mr Hindman'sassertion that the evidence contained in Mr Kean's affirmation was incorrect.[8] I note that Mr Hindman has a final recall hearing scheduled for this coming Friday, 18 January 2013. That will be the appropriate forum in which to raise the matters that he has sought to canvass in this application.2 Kurariki v Singh HC Auckland CIV 2008-404-4873, 4 August 2008[9] The application is dismissed.Courtney J