MINISTER FOR LAND INFORMATION V SEATON COA CA360/2011

MINISTER FOR LAND INFORMATION V SEATON COA CA360/2011 [7 June 2012]IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALANDCA360/2011[2012] NZCA 234BETWEEN MINISTER FOR LAND INFORMATIONAppellantAND ANN MARY SEATONRespondentHearing: 9 February 2012Court: Arnold, Randerson and Stevens JJCounsel: H S Hancock and I C Smith for AppellantS P Rennie and J E Bayley for RespondentJudgment: 7 June 2012 at 12.30 pmJUDGMENT OF THE COURTA The appeal is allowed.B The declaration made by the High Court is quashed.C There is no order for costs.REASONS OF THE COURT(Given by Arnold J)Introduction[1] This case concerns the correct interpretation and application of various provisions in the Public Works Act 1981 (PWA) relating to the compulsory acquisition of land by the Minister of Land Information (the Minister). In particular, the question is whether the land in issue is required for a Government work. The question arises because the Minister considers that the land is required to relocateelectricity towers owned by Transpower New Zealand Ltd (Transpower) and Orion New Zealand Ltd (Orion) so as to permit the widening of a state highway.Factual background[2] The respondent, Ms Seaton, owns some land beside State Highway 1 (SH1) near Christchurch. The New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA), which is the Crown entity responsible for the improvement and maintenance of the state highway network, resolved to widen part of SH1, including the part running alongside Ms Seaton's land. So as to enable the road-widening:(a) NZTA needed to acquire a 13m² parcel of land from Ms Seaton.(b) Three electricity towers, two owned by Transpower and one by Orion, had to be moved from their present position on the verge of SH1 (one tower straddles the boundary of Ms Seaton's property). NZTA's planwas that Transpower and Orion would relocate the towers whollyonto Ms Seaton's land. NZTA needed to obtain easements from Ms Seaton to accommodate this.[3] NZTA (through The Property Group Ltd (TPG)) entered negotiations with Ms Seaton to acquire the necessary interests. Those negotiations broke down, however. Accordingly, the Minister issued a notice to acquire the parcel of land and the easements compulsorily under s 23 of the PWA. Ms Seaton did not object to the compulsory acquisition of the 13m² parcel of land, but did object to the compulsory acquisition of the easements for the towers. She filed judicial review proceedings in the High Court and an objection in the Environment Court. The proceedings in the Environment Court have been stayed pending the outcome of the judicial review proceedings.[4] Mrs Seaton's judicial review proceedings contained three causes of action:(a) The first alleged that the Minister was only empowered under the PWA to take easements directly required for road-widening, not landindirectly required, and these easements were not directly required for that purpose.(b) The second alleged that, even if the Minister was empowered to take easements indirectly required for the road-widening, the easements at issue were not indirectly required for that purpose.(c) The third alleged that, even if the Minister had the necessary power, he acted for an improper purpose because the easements were for the benefit of Transpower and Orion rather than NZTA.[5] In the High Court, Gendall J considered that he did not need to determine whether the PWA empowered the Minister to take land that was indirectly required for a Government work such as road-widening.1 Rather, he focussed on the question whether the easements were required, whether directly or indirectly. ApplyingBartrum v Manurewa Borough,2 the Judge held that the Minister had exercised his powers for an improper purpose because he acquired the easements not for the purposes of the NZTA but for the purposes of Transpower and Orion, that is, the easements were not required for the road-widening.3 Accordingly he granted a declaration that the s 23 notice was invalid to the extent that it related to the easements.[6] The Minister now appeals. Broadly, the question is whether in these circumstances the easements were required for a Government work.Legislative background[7] Under s 4A(a) of the PWA the Minster has the power to:Acquire any land, building, or structure required for any Government work, to settle the purchase price or compensation therefor, and to administer, develop, improve, transfer, or dispose of any such property:1 Seaton v Minister for Land Information HC Christchurch CIV-2010-409-1909, 13 May 2011at [34].2 Bartrum v Manurewa Borough [1962] NZLR 21 (SC).3 At [67]–[68].Similarly, s 16(1) provides:The Minister is hereby empowered to acquire under this Act any land required for a Government work.[8] There are two features of these provisions to note at this point:(a) First, they confer a power to acquire "land". That word is defined ins 2 of the PWA to include "any estate or interest in land".Accordingly, ss 4A(a) and 16(1) empower the Minister to acquire easements.(b) Second, both provisions refer to land required for a "Governmentwork". The term "Government work" is defined to mean:4... a work or an intended work that is to be constructed, undertaken, established, managed, operated, or maintained by or under the control of the Crown or any Minister of the Crown for any public purpose; and includes land held or to be acquired for the purposes of the Conservation Act 1987 or any of the Acts specified in Schedule 1 of that Act (except the public foreshore and seabed), even where the purpose of holding or acquiring the land is to ensure that it remains in an undeveloped state.[9] The Minister may acquire land by way of agreement with the landowner(s) under s 17 or compulsorily under s 23. The operative words of s 23(1) are important. That subsection provides:When land (other than land owned by the Crown) is required to be taken for any public work, the Minister in the case of a Government work, and the local authority in the case of a local work, shall–...(c) serve a notice on the owner of, and persons with a registered interest in, the land of the intention to take the land in the form set out in Schedule 1 to this Act.[10] A noteworthy feature of s 23(1) is that it refers to land "required to be taken for any public work". Section 2 provides that "public work" and "work" mean:4 Section 2 (as it was at the relevant time).(a) Every Government work or local work that the Crown or any local authority is authorised to construct, undertake, establish, manage, operate, or maintain, and every use of land for any Government work or local work which the Crown or any local authority is authorised to construct, undertake, establish, manage, operate, or maintain by or under this or any other Act; and include anything required directly or indirectly for any such Government work or local work or use:(b) Every Government work or local work constructed, undertaken, established, managed, operated, or maintained by any education authority within the meaning of the Education Act 1964 and every use of land for any Government work or local work which such education authority constructs, undertakes, establishes, manages, operates, or maintains, and include anything required directly or indirectly for any such Government work or local work or use:(c) Any Government work or local work that is, or is required, for any university within the meaning of the Education Act 1989.(Emphasis added.)The italicised words are important to the resolution of this case, in particular the reference to things required indirectly for any Government work.[11] Next, we come to s 186 of the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA). It provides:186 Compulsory acquisition powers(1) A network utility operator that is a requiring authority may apply to the Minister of Lands to have land required for a project or work acquired or taken under Part 2 of the Public Works Act 1981 as if the project or work were a Government work within the meaning of that Act and, if the Minister of Lands agrees, that land may be taken or acquired.(2) The effect of any Proclamation taking land for the purposes of subsection (1) shall be to vest the land in the network utility operator instead of the Crown.(3) ...(4) Any land held under any enactment or in any other manner by the Crown or a local authority may, with the consent of the Crown or that authority and on such terms and conditions (including price) as may be agreed, be set apart for a project or work of a network utility operator in the manner provided in sections 50 and 52 of the Public Works Act 1981 (with the necessary modifications), but the setting apart shall not be subject to sections 40 and 41 of that Act. Any land so set apart shall vest in the network utility operator.(5) Any claim for compensation under the Public Works Act 1981 in respect of land acquired or taken in accordance with this section shall be made against the Minister of Lands.(6) All costs and expenses incurred by the Minister of Lands in respect of the acquisition or taking of land in accordance with this section (including any compensation payable by the Minister) shall be recoverable from the network utility operator as a debt due to the Crown.(7) Sections 40 and 41 of the Public Works Act 1981 shall apply to land acquired or taken in accordance with this section as if the network utility operator concerned were the Crown.(8) For the purposes of this section, an interest in land, including a leasehold interest, may be acquired or taken as if references to land were references to an interest in land.[12] Both Transpower and Orion are "requiring authorities" within the meaning of s 186. At no stage was it asserted that the Minister was acting at the request of Transpower and Orion under s 186. However, it should be noted that once the Minister acquired the easements, he proposed to transfer them to Transpower and Orion utilising the provisions of s 186(4).[13] Finally, we mention ss 22 and 23 of the Electricity Act 1992 (EA). These sections protect the rights of electricity operators in respect of works existing prior to 1 January 1988. The towers at issue are covered by these provisions, so that Transpower and Orion had existing use rights in respect of them. As we understand it, those rights do not extend to relocating the towers in the way envisaged in this case.Basis for appeal[14] For the Minister, Mr Hancock argued that the easements were required indirectly for a Government work, namely the widening of SH1, and fell within theMinister's acquisition powers under the PWA. The easements were required to enable Transpower and Orion to relocate their electricity powers so as to permit the road-widening. Mr Hancock derived support for this argument from the decision ofPaterson J in Kett v Minister for Land Information on an appeal from the Environment Court.5[15] Mr Hancock submitted that Gendall J was wrong to find that the Minister had acted for an improper purpose. He argued that ss 4A and 21 of the PWA allow the Minister to acquire land in order to transfer it to another, thereby recognising that such transfers are a legitimate purpose of acquisition. Bartrum was distinguishable because in that case a local authority purported to use its compulsory acquisition powers to acquire land solely for the benefit of a private party. The acquisition did not serve any public purpose. Here, the acquisition did serve a public purpose — it permitted the widening of the road. Recognising that other services often run alongside roads, Mr Hancock submitted that this analysis would apply to any type of service that it was necessary to move in order to facilitate road-widening (water, gas, sewage and telecommunications/broadband, for example), whether the service was provided by a local authority, some form of state-owned enterprise or Crown entity, or a private sector company.[16] For Ms Seaton, Mr Rennie noted that Transpower and Orion were to be the grantees of the easements, not NZTA, and that the Minister had not attempted to argue that the easements were directly required for a Government work. Mr Rennie argued that there was a conflict between the language of ss 16 and 23, with only thelatter containing a reference to "indirectly". He submitted that the language of s 16 was "unequivocal". Introducing "indirectly" into s 16 would, he argued, significantly enlarge the power expressed in it. As the primary power-conferring provision, the language of s 16 should prevail over the language of s 23. He argued that this Court should hold that Kett was wrongly decided on this point.[17] Further, on the assumption that the Minister did have the requisite power, Mr Rennie submitted that he had exercised it for an improper purpose. Mr Rennie argued that the road-widening would not be prevented if the Minister did not acquire the easements. This was because the Minister had the power to take the towers compulsorily despite the existing use rights of Transpower and Orion, which could5 Kett v Minister for Land Information HC Auckland AP404/151/00, 28 June 2001.then utilise the procedures set out in s 186 of the RMA to acquire easements torelocate their towers. Mr Rennie submitted that the Minister was "attempting to have it both ways" by utilising s 23 of the PWA to acquire the land and then s 186(4)of the RMA to transfer it to the power companies. This, he said, amounted to the Minister asserting that the easements were required for a Government work, yet at the same time acknowledging that the easements were for a work of a network operator.Discussion[18] We will address the issues under three headings: is the Minister empowered to acquire land indirectly required for a Government work? Was the land "required"(whether directly or indirectly) for a Government work? If so, did the Minister exercise his power for an improper purpose in the present case?Is the Minister empowered to acquire land indirectly required for a Government work?[19] Section 16 empowers the Minister to acquire land "required for anyGovernment work". The definition of "Government work" refers to "a work orintended work" to be undertaken "for any public purpose". No reference is made in either s 16 or the definition of "Government work" to land indirectly required. That reference is found in the definition of "public work" (which also applies to "work"). As Paterson J recognised in Kett, this gives rise to an apparently anomalous position in that land required indirectly for a Government work is a public work but is not itself part of a Government work, which is what the Minister is authorised to acquire by s 16.6[20] The position in Kett was that, in conjunction with some roading work, the Crown wished to acquire a parcel of Mrs Kett's land. It did not wish to utilise the land for roading purposes. Rather, it wished to take the land because, once the roading work was completed, access to it would be cut off and it would be expensive6 At [72].to provide alternative access to it if it remained in Mrs Kett's hands, as required by s 76 of the Transit New Zealand Act 1989.[21] Paterson J described the factual situation as follows:[68] The [Environment] Court found that the realignment of the motorway will effectively cut off all access by road to the surplus land and if the surplus land is not acquired by the Crown, Transit will be obliged by s 76(l) to provide access to it in one or another of the ways stated in that sub- section. Further, the Court found the surplus land slopes very steeply down to the Waiwera River and contains no feasible area for building except near the southern edge by the river. There are two possible ways of providing access to that building site, one being an underpass under the motorway which will involve extensive physical work on the surplus land and remove all large areas of mature native bush at an estimated cost of several million dollars. The second alternative involves the construction of a retaining wall which would create a 5 metre wide road frontage to the surplus land. This would cost $200,000 but the Court also found this alternative would not be practical access to the only part of the surplus land where a building would be feasible. Providing practical vehicle access to that part was estimated to cost between $4 m. and $5 m. These were the factors underlying Transit'sdesire to acquire the surplus land and the finding the surplus land was indirectly required for the Government work. Another reason for wishing to acquire the surplus land was to facilitate the required amendment to the designation.[22] Mrs Kett argued that the Environment Court had wrongly determined that the parcel of land was indirectly required. She submitted that the land was not required for a Government work but was being acquired in order to enable Transit to avoid its obligations under s 76. The expense and difficulty of complying with s 76 was not a proper basis on which the Minister could invoke his compulsory acquisition powers.[23] Paterson J said:[74] While the matter is not completely free of doubt, I am of the view that the purpose of the Act allows it to be construed to empower the Minister to take land for a public work notwithstanding the reference to "Government work" in s 16(l) of the Act. There are two ways of doing this without straining the provisions of the Act. First, s 16(l) is not the only empowering section in the Act. The other sections referred to also confer power on the Minister to take land. Secondly, "required", as it appears in s 16(l) does not mean "directly required." The purpose of the Act and the other statutoryprovisions allow the word to be interpreted as either "directly or indirectly"required. It is therefore my view that the Minister does have power to takeland "indirectly required for a Government work." The existence of a second reason for acquiring the surplus land does not alter that power.[24] As Paterson J suggested, the drafting of the PWA is not as precise as it might be. Despite that, we consider that the intent is clear. In our view, the Minister is permitted to acquire land where it is indirectly required for a Government work. We see no reason to limit the word "required" in s 16 to land that is directly required. "Require" means to need or to want.7 Arguably there is a subtle difference between"need" and "want", with "need" implying something more than simply desire. As a matter of dictionary definition, something which is "needed" is required because it is essential or very important, rather than simply desirable.8 For reasons which weexplain below, we consider that "required" in s 16 means essential or reasonably necessary. But whether the narrower or broader definition of "required" is adopted,we see no linguistic reason why it cannot cover land indirectly required. We consider that two features of the PWA provide support for this view.[25] First, it is difficult to see any explanation for the inclusion of the words "andinclude anything required directly or indirectly for any such Government work orlocal work or use" in paragraph (a) of the definition of "public work" and "work" in s 2 if "Government work" in s 16 is not interpreted to include land indirectly required. In our view, the structure of Part 2 of the PWA Act is as follows:(a) Section 16 contains the basic empowering provision. In particular, s 16(1) confers a power on the Minister to acquire any land required for a Government work under the PWA; s 16(2) confers a similar power on a local authority in respect of any land required for a local work in respect of which it has financial responsibility.(b) Part 2 then deals with the principal methods of acquisition. The first is acquisition by agreement with the landowner. That is dealt with in ss 17–21. The second is by compulsory acquisition. That is dealt with in ss 23–27. Both sets of provisions cover land that is required for a public work, that is, anything directly or indirectly required for a Government work or a local work.7 Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11th ed, Oxford University Press, 2004).8 Concise Oxford English Dictionary, above n 7.[26] The scope of the provisions relating to the methods of acquisition (that is, ss 17–21 and 23–27) must be the same as, or fall within, the scope of the basic empowering provision (s 16). Accordingly, given the absence of any compelling contextual material to suggest otherwise, the concepts of "Government work" and "local work" in s 16 must, taken together, cover the same ground as "public work".We agree with Mr Hancock's submission that "indirectly" would serve no purpose if the interpretation advocated by Mr Rennie were to be adopted. We think it likelythat Parliament included this language in the definition of "public work" deliberately,in order to make it clear that the Minister could acquire land indirectly required for a Government work.[27] The second (and related) point is that the use of the term "public work" ins 23 is not an isolated feature of the PWA. Rather, it is one of several provisions. In particular:(a) Section 17(1) authorises the Minister to "enter into an agreement topurchase any land for any public work ...".(b) Section 18(1) requires the Minister to notify the landowner where heor she wishes to acquire land for "any public work" and to make "every endeavour to negotiate with the owner in an attempt to reachan agreement for the acquisition of the land". If this does not producea result, the Minister may then take the land compulsorily.9(c) Section 60 imposes an obligation on the Crown to pay "full compensation" in relation to land "acquired or taken for any publicwork" where there is no other provision for compensation.Like s 23, ss 17 and 18 are procedural or ancillary, in the sense that they identify the processes by which the Minister is able to acquire land. Section 60 imposes an obligation to pay compensation. We consider it implausible that these provisions are9 Section 18(2).inconsistent with (in the sense of being wider than) the fundamental empowering provision, namely s 16.[28] There is one further interpretation point that we should mention. Theextended definition of "public work" also applies to "work". It could be argued that this extended definition applies even where "work" is used in conjunction with "Government", so that "Government work" is thereby extended to include landindirectly required. However, there are two difficulties with this approach. First,the term "Government work" is specifically defined and does not include a reference to land that is indirectly required. Second, the extension to the definition of "public work" and "work" refers to "Government work" and then extends that term. As a consequence there is some degree of circularity in the approach under discussion. Despite this linguistic infelicity, however, we consider that the fact that the definition applies to "work" as well as "public work" provides some limited support for interpreting s 16 to include land indirectly acquired for a Government work.[29] We conclude that, as a matter of interpretation, the Minister is empowered by the PWA to acquire land required directly or indirectly for a Government work. In our view, the restrictive interpretation advanced by Mr Rennie would thwart rather than advance Parliament's intention, as demonstrated by the extended definition of "public work". We consider that this view is supported not simply by the linguistic and contextual features of the PWA that we have mentioned but also by policy considerations. It is not difficult to conceive of situations where land would be required indirectly for a Government work. It seems improbable that Parliament would have denied the Minister the power to acquire land compulsorily where it could be shown that the land was required, even though indirectly. Any such limitation would significantly reduce the PWA's effectiveness and workability, particualrly in circumstances such as the present.[30] We turn now to the question whether the land was directly or indirectly"required" for a Government work.Was the land "required" (whether directly or indirectly) for a Government work?[31] As we have said, arguably "required" has a narrower or a broader meaning,equating with needed and desired. We consider that the appropriate meaning is thenarrower: "required" refers to land whose acquisition is, viewed objectively, essential or reasonably necessary rather than simply in some general sense desired.(The words "reasonably necessary" are taken from s 24(7)(d), a provision which we consider offers some guidance as to the proper scope of the Minister's power ofacquisition.)10 This approach reflects the fact that the PWA ultimately authorises compulsory acquisition of privately-owned land in the public interest — there mustbe a clear justification for such an acquisition. Thus interpreted, "required" imposes some limit on the Minster's power of acquisition. We note that Mr Hancock accepted this approach. He submitted orally that "required" meant something like "necessary to enable" the work to happen.[32] The existence or otherwise of an alternative course of action that would not require the acquisition to be made is relevant in this context, as it goes to whether theland was "required". It may also, in some cases at least, cast light on the Minister'spurpose in making the acquisition.11 We accept Mr Hancock's point that to berelevant an alternative must be viable (in a practical sense). For example, a very expensive or difficult to achieve option is unlikely to be regarded as viable. Ultimately, whether an option is properly treated as viable in this context will depend on the particular circumstances of the case.[33] In the present case, Mr Hancock accepted that there were, theoretically at least, alternative options for removing the towers that would not require theacquisitions of easements over Mrs Seaton's land. However, he submitted that the course followed by the Minster was the only reasonable option in the circumstances. In making this submission, Mr Hancock relied on work done within Transpower in10 See [51]–[53] below.11 For example, in this case the Judge saw the Minister's choice to acquire the easements as beingdriven by Transpower's requirements, which tended to indicate that the acquisition was forTranspower's purposes rather than for a public purpose. We address this point further at [37]–[45] below.connection with six possible options to accommodate the road-widening, including the present proposal. That analysis described the present proposal as:... the "cleanest" option from an engineering (and maintenance) perspectiveas the new design will most closely reflect the existing case. This will result in the minimum amount of time and costs for design and construction for both projects.It concluded that the present proposal was the "most feasible" of the options.[34] The Judge appears to have accepted that the alternative of acquiringeasements over Mrs Seaton's land to accommodate the shifting of the towers was appropriate. We agree. It was open to the Minister on the material before him toconclude that acquisition of easements over Mrs Seaton's land was reasonablynecessary to enable the road-widening to proceed. Accordingly, the land was"required" (albeit indirectly) in the sense intended by the PWA.[35] This leaves the question whether the Minister exercised his power for a proper purpose in the present case, given that (a) the easements were required for Transpower and Orion rather than NZTA and (b) there was an alternative mechanism available to those entities to acquire the easements compulsorily, namely s 186 of theRMA. That in turn raises the question of limits on the Minister's acquisition power.Did the Minister exercise his power for an improper purpose?[36] As courts have repeatedly said, statutory powers must be exercised for purposes within the contemplation of the enabling statute.12 The question is whether the Minister exercised his power of compulsory acquisition for a proper purpose in the present case.[37] Applying Bartrum, Gendall J held that the Minister had exercised his power for an improper purpose because he acquired the easements for Transpower and12 See the extensive citations in Matthew Smith New Zealand Judicial Review Handbook(Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2011) at [52.1.1]. See also GDS Taylor Judicial Review: ANew Zealand Perspective (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2010) at [15.62] and following.Orion, not for NZTA. Having examined underlying documentation the Judge concluded:[61] What is abundantly clear is that NZTA pursued its path because it considered this best suited that required by Transpower in order to secure its agreement to relocation or removal of the towers. The easements, and their extent, was because of requirement of Transpower (i.e. extending to the lines, as well as the towers). NZTA did not need those easements itself; it was not compulsorily acquiring the towers, such that it would be required to relocate or replace them. Transpower and Orion could have obtained and negotiated any easements, if such be necessary, with Mrs Seaton privately or through the RMA procedures. As I understand her argument, that is all that Mrs Seaton seeks, namely the ability to negotiate directly with the power companies, or the transparent acquisition of her land under s 186 of the RMA.[38] Later the Judge said:[66] ... In the present case it is the antecedent agreement or bargain reached by NZTA with Transpower (and no doubt Orion also) which provided the driving force for the particulars and details of the interests in property, namely the extent of the easements that were being compulsorily acquired. They were not for the purpose or use of NZTA but designed and intended for the use and benefit of the power companies. In my view that was not a permissible use of the power vested in the Minister, which in its exercise on behalf not only of NZTA but the power companies, affected the property and other rights of the private land owner, who would have been entitled to negotiate the terms and conditions of any easement, and compensation for it, with the party who was in truth to obtain the benefit of such easement or the transparent acquisition of their land under s 186 of the RMA.[67] Accordingly, in purporting to act under the PWA by reference to the requirements of a Government work, to secure an interest in land to enablethe transfer of the power companies' assets onto Mrs Seaton's land,accompanied by easements in gross in favour of and required by those power companies, in my view are actions of the Minister outside the permitted purposes of the PWA. ...[39] Mr Hancock contended that, unlike the position in Bartrum where the local authority acquired the land for no public purpose but simply for the benefit of a private individual, here the easements were acquired for the benefit of the Crown, in particular because they provided the "only reasonable option" for enabling the road- widening to take place. As we have said, Mr Hancock confirmed in his oral submissions that this analysis would apply to other services such as water, sewage and telecommunications services that were required to be relocated to enable road-widening, whether those services were provided by governmental or private sector entities.[40] We make two points:(a) First, we do not consider that, simply because the NZTA did not itself intend to use the easements, the Minister necessarily acted for an improper purpose in acquiring them. As Mr Hancock said, other provisions in the PWA contemplate the acquisition of land for the purpose of transferring it to others, so that concept is, to some extent at least, recognised in the legislation.(b) Second, we accept, as indeed did Mr Hancock, that there must be some limit on the Minister's power to acquire land under the PWA, given that ultimately the PWA contemplates compulsory acquisition. The question is where that limit is to be drawn.[41] We now explain our conclusion on the first point. Mr Hancock relied on ss 4A(a) and 21 as demonstrating that the PWA contemplates that the Minister will acquire land for the purpose of transferring it to a third party. Section 4A(a) provides that the Minister has the power to "transfer" any land acquired; under s 21 anotifying authority (which does not include the Crown) may acquire land through the s 17 process for the purpose of granting it to a person entitled to compensation for land taken for a public work.[42] We accept that s 4A(a) provides some support for Mr Hancock's argument, although the paragraph may also be interpreted (less plausibly perhaps) as recognising simply that the Minister, having acquired land for a Government work, may find that it is no longer required (or is required in a different way) and so may transfer or dispose of it. In principle, it is difficult to see why the Minister would not be permitted to acquire land in circumstances where it was to be transferred to another party, provided the Minister could show that the land was required for a Government work. For example, where a number of service providers have been permitted to locate their infrastructure assets alongside a highway, and those assetsmust be moved to permit the widening of the highway, there is an obvious benefit in having one party acquire the rights necessary to facilitate the relocation rather than having a number of different processes underway. Even in the present case it would be somewhat cumbersome if the Minister had to acquire the electricity towers compulsorily from Transpower and Orion so as to extinguish their existing use rights and then Transpower and Orion had each to negotiate with Mrs Seaton concerning whatever arrangements might be necessary to enable their towers to be relocated.[43] The importance of control of the process was highlighted in the affidavit evidence of Mr Cottrell, the NZTA's Principal Property Manager for theChristchurch region. He said:Acquisition of the tower and line easements under the PWA was ... seen as consistent with the [s 186] RMA process, the only difference being the body or utility operator sponsoring the taking. In constructing any public works it is necessary that control of the process remains firmly with the NZTA. Were a utility operator to take responsibility for the relocation of pylons and power lines in circumstances such as this, the construction of a public work to schedule would be compromised altogether. In practice, therefore, where it is necessary for the Crown to extinguish any rights held by utility operators, negotiations are conducted with such utility operators in much the same way as they are with landowners and NZTA retains overall control of the works. The easement can then be set apart to vest in the utility operator pursuant to section 184(4) RMA.[44] Accordingly, in situations of this type NZTA is not simply acting in the interests of service providers such as Transpower and Orion as the Judge suggests. While NZTA clearly does have regard to the interests of service providers, it acts in the public interest in attempting to ensure a timely, orderly and comprehensive process for the relocation of affected services generally. This entails negotiating with the service providers to extinguish any existing rights and to obtain their views on alternative arrangements and with the landowners to provide alternative arrangements. But the relocation is not for the benefit of the service providers — it is for the benefit of NZTA. In the present case, it was NZTA's desire to widen SH1 that gave rise to the need for relocation, not any work that Transpower or Orion wished to carry out.[45] The record in this case reveals considerable discussion between representatives of NZTA and (mainly) Transpower about the extent of the easementsneeded. That is understandable, however, as NZTA must understand the issues raised by the need to relocate from the service provider's perspective (including anytechnical issues). Moreover, the record indicates that NZTA was conscious throughout the process that it would have to justify its position should Mrs Seaton take an objection to the Environment Court.[46] As is apparent from the extracts cited above, Gendall J considered that theMinister's use of his power of acquisition deprived Mrs Seaton of the opportunity tonegotiate directly with Transpower and Orion, thus implying that she had suffered prejudice as a result of the process adopted. The Judge had in mind that the Minister could compulsorily acquire the towers, thus extinguishing the existing use rights held by Transpower and Orion; Transpower and Orion could then negotiate with Mrs Seaton for easements to allow them to relocate their towers; if agreement could not be reached, Transpower and Orion could utilise the s 186 process.[47] We make two comments about this. First, as we have already said, it seems to us to be an overly cumbersome way of proceeding, and would become even more cumbersome the more service providers were involved. Second, the s 186 process is intended to facilitate works proposed by service providers, as is illustrated by the fact that the section requires that they reimburse the Minister for the costs involved.13 Here, the need for relocation had nothing to do with the service providers but resulted from the need to widen SH1.[48] That said, we accept that prejudice to the landowner resulting from an acquisition by the Minister rather than through some other process may be relevant to the question of improper purpose. However, in this case, while the opportunity to negotiate directly with the power companies or their representatives may have been lost, such negotiations would have been conducted against the background that the power companies could bring about a compulsory acquisition through the s 186 process. There was some suggestion in the evidence that Transpower has been prepared on occasions to pay in excess of market valuation for land in order to avoid13 Section 186(6).utilising the compulsory acquisition process. But we do not see that as a relevant prejudice given that Mrs Seaton's entitlement is to fair compensation.[49] In the result, then, we see no reason why the Minister cannot acquire land for transfer to another party in a case such as the present, provided that the land canproperly be said to be "required for a Government work".14[50] This brings us to the question of limits on the Minister's power, to which some submissions were addressed and about which we will make some brief comments.[51] In considering this aspect, we have derived some assistance from s 24 of the PWA. It deals with objections to the Environment Court in respect of compulsory acquisitions under s 23. In determining such objections the Environment Court is required to:15(a) ascertain the objectives of the Minister ...:(b) enquire into the adequacy of the consideration given to alternative sites, routes, or other methods of achieving those objectives:...(d) decide whether in its opinion, it would be fair, sound, and reasonably necessary for achieving the objectives of the Minister ... for the land of the objector to be taken:...[52] Accordingly, in the objection process the Minister can be required to disclose his or her objectives in making the acquisition and explain what alternatives have been considered for achieving those objectives. The Environment Court must decidewhether the acquisition is "fair, sound and reasonably necessary" in order to achievethe objectives.14 For the sake of completeness, we note that we have not derived assistance on this point froms 21 given that it applies to "any notifying authority", which does not include the Crown, and itapplies only to voluntary acquisitions of land.15 Section 24(7).[53] The interpretation of "required" that we have adopted reflects the idea of reasonable necessity. Accordingly, it places some limit on the Minister's power. Moreover, as Hammond J said in Deane v Attorney-General:16The power of the Crown to compulsorily acquire land derives from the ancient notion of eminent domain. It is today a draconian – but necessary power – in a complex, and collective society. But to the extent that theCrown's powers are a direct interference with individual property rights, ourCourts – in company with Courts elsewhere in the British Commonwealth –have insisted that, always bearing in mind the purpose of any given powers ..., powers of this kind are strictly construed; must be exercised in good faith ...; and even-handedly.These are real constraints and are enforceable through judicial review or through the objection process.[54] To summarise, then, we do not agree that the Minister used his power for an improper purpose when acquiring the easements at issue. We are satisfied that the easements were required for a Government work and that the Minister was entitled to exercise his compulsory power of acquisition in relation to the easements even though he intended to transfer them to Transpower and Orion.[55] There is one final point. Mr Rennie pointed out that once the Crown had acquired the land, it proposed to transfer it to Transpower and Orion under s 186(4)of the RMA. He submitted that the Minister was "seeking to have it both ways", in the sense that the Minister was acquiring the easements on the basis that they were required for a Government work but then transferring them to Transpower and Orion on the basis that they were required for their works.[56] We see some force in this point. The process contemplated by s 186(4) does not have a ready fit with the present proposal and in some situations (although possibly not this one because it involves easements over, rather than ownership of, land) it would deprive landowners of a right that they would otherwise have, namely the right of offer back under s 40 of the PWA. Thus it may be necessary to qualify Mr Cottrell's observation in his affidavit that the outcome under the PWA and RMA processes is essentially the same.16 Deane v Attorney-General [1997] 2 NZLR 180 (HC) at 191 (footnotes omitted).[57] While there may be an issue about the use of s 186(4), we cannot take the matter further at this stage as it is unclear whether the Minister will carry through on his intention to utilise s 186(4). We simply repeat that it is by no means clear that the use of s 186(4) is appropriate in this context, particularly as s 4A(a) of the PWA appears to authorise a transfer by the Minister to Transpower and Orion.Decision[58] The appeal is allowed. The declaration made by the High Court is quashed. As Mr Hancock indicated that the Minister did not seek costs if he succeeded, there is no order for costs.Solicitors:Crown Law Office, Wellington for AppellantRhodes & Co, Christchurch for Respondent