REEKIE v LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER [2023] NZHC 1832

REEKIE v LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER [2023] NZHC 1832 [13 July 2023]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDAUCKLAND REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHECIV-2021-404-15[2023] NZHC 1832UNDER the Legal Services Act 2011 and NewZealand Bill of Rights Act 1990IN THE MATTER of an appeal under the Legal Services Act2011BETWEEN NICHOLAS PAUL ALFRED REEKIEAppellantAND LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONERRespondentHearing: 21 June 2023Appearances: A Hart for the AppellantL Hansen for the RespondentJudgment: 13 July 2023JUDGMENT OF WOOLFORD JThis judgment was delivered by me on Thursday, 13 July 2023 at 2:30 pmpursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.Registrar/Deputy RegistrarSolicitors: Hart & Associates (A Hart), AucklandD Stephens for Legal Services Commissioner (Ministry of Justice), WellingtonCounsel: L Hansen, Wellington[1] Nicholas Paul Alfred Reekie is a serving prisoner. In 2017, he commencedproceedings against the Attorney-General arising out of a decision by the Departmentof Corrections (Corrections) to transfer him from one prison to another in July 2011.He sought declarations concerning alleged negligence and breaches of various rights,as well as damages. On 19 July 2019, the High Court dismissed his claim.1 Costswere later awarded against Mr Reekie in favour of the Attorney-General.2[2] Mr Reekie represented himself in the High Court claim. He then sought legalaid to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the High Court merit and costs judgments.The Legal Services Commissioner (Commissioner) granted interim aid to enableopinions to be obtained from two counsel about the prospects of success. Havingobtained their opinions, the Commissioner declined to grant further aid to Mr Reekieto enable him to retain counsel for the purpose of an appeal.[3] Mr Reekie then sought a review of the Commissioner's decision by the LegalAid Tribunal (Tribunal). In a decision dated 1 December 2020, the Tribunal confirmedthe decision of the Commissioner. 3 It concluded that Mr Reekie had not shown thatthe Commissioner's decision to decline aid on the ground that the appeal lackedsufficient merit, was manifestly unreasonable or wrong in law.[4] Mr Reekie now appeals against the decision of the Tribunal. He was initiallynot aided, and the appeal was adjourned a number of times to enable him to instructcounsel. He is now represented on legal aid by Ms A Hart.Right of appeal[5] A right of appeal against a decision of the Legal Tribunal is provided by s 59of the Legal Services Act 2011 (LSA), but only on a question of law. Section 59provides:59 Appeal on question of lawIf the Commissioner or an applicant considers that the Tribunal'sdetermination is wrong in law, the Commissioner or the applicant (as1 Reekie v Attorney-General [2019] NZHC 1679.2 Reekie v Attorney-General [2019] NZHC 2578.3 Reekie v Legal Services Commissioner [2020] NZLAT 024.the case may be) may appeal to the High Court on the question of law,and the appeal must be dealt with in accordance with the rules of court.BackgroundApplication for legal aid[6] On 18 September 2019, counsel D A Ewen filed an application by Mr Reekiefor legal aid. Mr Ewen sought an interim grant of legal aid to obtain and review thenotes of evidence from the High Court trial for the purpose of advising as to the meritsof an appeal against the High Court judgments. An interim grant of legal aid wasmade.[7] By letter dated 3 March 2020, Mr Ewen advised the Commissioner that furtherlegal aid was "not warranted, as there are insufficient prospects of success." At theoutset of his opinion, he reviewed the key findings of fact made by the High CourtJudge and determined that the prospects of the Court of Appeal reversing the findingswere remote.[8] Mr Ewen stated that the high watermark of the appeal would be a finding thatthe decision to transfer Mr Reekie was, in part, motivated by Mr Reekie's complaintsagainst his residential manager, Mr Sweet. This, he said, gave rise to a number ofquestions relevant to remedy. First, this was an area where the fundamental issues aredecisions of prison management. Second, the breakdown in the relationship betweenthe two can be seen in more ways than one. Third, Mr Reekie sought a discretionaryremedy.[9] Mr Ewen then reviewed the first two causes of action in the statement of claimdrafted by Mr Reekie. He said the third and fourth causes of action were misconceivedfrom the inception. The first two causes of action alleged a breach of the right offreedom of expression as contained in s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990(NZBORA) and a breach of the right to humane and respectful treatment as containedin s 23(5) of NZBORA.[10] Mr Ewen thought it was reasonably clear that Mr Reekie's complaints were notdealt with in a timely and adequate manner. However, he thought it unlikely the Courtof Appeal would interfere with the result for two main reasons. First, the appropriateremedy for a failure to investigate is for a proper investigation to be held. This wasnot a pleaded remedy. Secondly, the passage of time could not be ignored.[11] Mr Ewen concluded:In summary I do not believe there is sufficient prospect of Mr Reekie obtainingmeaningful relief as a result of his appeal to the Court of Appeal. On that basisI cannot recommend the appeal ought to be the subject of a grant of legal aid.[12] On 17 March 2020, the Commissioner advised Mr Reekie:We have closed this file as your lawyer has indicated that there may be nothingto be gained in taking this matter to the Court of Appeal. We are prepared torelook at this however, if we are given a compelling argument that would meanlegal aid should continue.[13] By letter dated 26 March 2020, Mr Reekie wrote to the Commissionerexpressing disappointment at Mr Ewen's opinion and seeking a reconsideration of theCommissioner's decision.[14] On 23 April 2020, the Commissioner replied stating that without a lawyer, shewas unable to consider re-opening the interim grant. Mr Reekie was invited to seek areconsideration once he had a new lawyer. The Commissioner also noted Mr Reekiecould resubmit a fresh application with a civil lawyer with their justification as to whythe proceeding had a prospect of success.[15] Whether it was a reconsideration or a fresh application, on 18 June 2020counsel Ms Nicolette Levy KC applied on Mr Reekie's behalf for an interim grant oflegal aid to provide a second opinion on the likely prospects of success of an appeal.Another interim grant of legal aid was made.[16] By letter dated 17 September 2020, Ms Levy advised the Commissioner:In my opinion the real difficulty with the application for legal aid in this matteris not that there are no issues with the evidence and the judgment – there are.The real difficulty is that this is an application for damages where the allegeddamage (a) cannot be quantified; and (b) would be minimal in any event, andso much time has passed as to make any other remedy pointless.[17] Ms Levy referred to ss 10(3) and (4) of the LSA, noting that the Commissionerhad an unrestrained power to refuse legal aid. However, in her opinion the groundsfor refusing legal aid for original proceedings in s 10(3) provided a starting point forconsideration of Mr Reekie's application. The leading case was JMM v Legal ServicesAgency.4 Ms Levy noted that in JMM, the Court of Appeal said that one considerationwas the cost of bringing the claim compared with the potential benefits. Wherefinancial benefits were sought, it would be necessary to assess the prospects ofachieving a successful financial outcome. A reassessment of the costs and benefitswould ordinarily be essential, including the likelihood of settlement. Non-monetaryoutcomes may also need to be assessed, the novelty of the claim, its precedent effects,and whether it was a new or developing area of the law may need to be considered.[18] Ms Levy said that applying these matters to Mr Reekie's appeal, it could beseen that the prospect of achieving a successful financial outcome were very slim. Insaying so, Ms Levy said she did not ignore the argument that the Supreme Court hadpreviously refused to order significant costs against Mr Reekie because he had littleor no means. Ms Levy contrasted Mr Reekie's case to that of Mr Taylor in Taylor vNorth Shore District Court (No 2),5 where Mr Taylor was successful in establishingthe issue raised as one of substantial public importance and was not required to paycosts even though he was unsuccessful in obtaining a declaration in that particularcase.[19] Ms Levy also said that in respect of non-monetary outcomes there were no realremedies available, beyond vindication of Mr Reekie's position. Ms Levy concluded:For the above reasons, my opinion is that Mr Reekie's appeal has poorprospects of success, giving that phrase its broadest interpretation.[20] On 21 September 2020, the Commissioner wrote to Mr Reekie noting thatMs Levy had now advised that his "prospects of success" were too low. TheCommissioner said that "prospects of success" meant the chances of getting what hewanted from his case. The Commissioner then advised Mr Reekie he would no longerreceive legal aid from 25 September 2020.4 JMM v Legal Services Agency [2012] NZCA 573, [2013] 1 NZLR 517.5 Taylor v North Shore District Court (No 2), HC Auckland, CIV-2009-404-2350, 13 October 2010.[21] Mr Reekie then sought further time to respond to Ms Levy's opinion by letterdated 22 September 2020. On 29 September 2020, the Commissioner declinedMr Reekie's request for more time and confirmed that legal aid had been ceased.Tribunal decision[22] Mr Reekie then sought a review by the Tribunal of the Commissioner'sdecision to cease legal aid. As noted, the Tribunal confirmed the Commissioner'sdecision in a written decision dated 1 December 2020.[23] After setting out the background, the Tribunal noted the appellate aid soughtand the opinions of both Mr Ewen and Ms Levy as to the appeal's prospects of success.The Tribunal then summarised the submissions of both Mr Reekie and theCommissioner.[24] Before arriving at its assessment, the Tribunal noted the jurisdiction and criteriaof the Tribunal as follows:6[27] The grounds for reviewing a decision of the Commissioner are set outin s 52(1) of the Legal Services Act 2011 (the Act):An aided person or an applicant for legal aid may apply to the Tribunal for areview of the Commissioner's reconsideration of a decision on thegrounds that it is—(a) manifestly unreasonable; or(b) wrong in law.[28] A decision is manifestly unreasonable where "it is shown, clearly andunmistakably, that the decision made by the [Commissioner] went beyondwhat was reasonable or was irrational or logically flawed". Manifestlyunreasonable requires "not only that the decision be found to be unreasonable,but that [the Tribunal] forms the view that the decision is so clearlyunreasonable that the intervention of the [Tribunal] is called for". Thethreshold for intervention is a high one and it is necessary for the Tribunal toexercise restraint.[29] A decision may be wrong in law "if it derives from an incorrectapplication or interpretation of the statute; or if it is wrong in principle; or ifthe decision-maker has failed to take into account some relevant matter; or hastaken account of an irrelevant matter; or if it depends upon findings which areunsupported by the evidence", approved by the Court of Appeal in Meredith.[30] The Tribunal is required to conduct reviews on the papers and toprovide a brief summary of the reasons.6 Above n 3.[footnotes omitted][25] In its assessment, the Tribunal noted that the Commissioner may refuse to grantappellate legal aid in civil proceedings where the Commissioner considers that for anyreason the grant of legal aid or further legal aid is not justified.7 In assessing whetheraid is justified, the Commissioner is entitled to review the merits of the appeal.8[26] The Tribunal further noted that the Commissioner's decision also relied ons 10(4)(d)(i) of the Act in declining legal aid, which permits aid to be refused if theprospects of success are not sufficient to justify a grant. The Tribunal stated:[33] This provision is not strictly relevant as it is applicable to originalproceedings only. Nonetheless, the general principle of granting civil aid onlywhere the merits or prospects of success outweigh the cost of aid is acceptedas applicable to appeal proceedings.[27] The Tribunal noted Mr Reekie's passionate belief that he had been wronged byCorrections, but that his complaints were considered at length by the High Court in acareful and thorough decision. Mr Reekie's criticism of the two judgments was thenconsidered by two experienced counsel who both concluded that there wereinsufficient or even poor prospects of success on appeal. The Tribunal said it hadreviewed Mr Reekie's argument on review in full, but concluded he had not shownthat either counsel erred. As to Ms Levy, the Tribunal stated:[35] Ms Levy QC points out that on the basis of Meredith, theCommissioner makes an overall assessment by looking at the prospects in theround, one consideration being the cost of bringing the claim compared to thepotential benefits. On that basis, the applicant's prospects of a successfulfinancial outcome are very slim according to Ms Levy QC. His non-financialremedies are, in senior counsel's view, pointless.[36] The applicant is critical of Ms Levy QC as she did not seek the fileand did not discuss the case with him. Neither criticism affects the validity ofher conclusion. She is an experienced counsel, particularly in criminalappeals, and can assess whether she needs the primary evidence (which, it isnoted, Mr Ewen had reviewed). Similarly, she can assess whether she needsany discussion with him, in addition to his submissions to her of 16 pages inlength.7 Legal Services Act 2011, s 10(4)(e).8 Legal Services Agency v A (2008) 19 PRNZ 1 (HC) at [42]–[43].[28] The Tribunal concluded that the Commissioner's officers were entitled to relyon the opinions of two experienced counsel. Mr Reekie had not shown that theCommissioner's decision to decline aid, on the ground that the appeal lacks sufficientmerit, was manifestly unreasonable or wrong in law.Mr Reekie's submissions[29] Counsel for Mr Reekie filed comprehensive submissions on his behalf. Theywere, however, too broad in their scope. At the outset, counsel stated that the presentproceeding comprised of an appeal against the decisions of the "Legal AidCommissioner" and Tribunal declining legal aid. The appeal is, however, just againstthe Legal Aid Tribunal's decision to confirm the decision of the Legal ServicesCommissioner declining legal aid.[30] Furthermore, counsel directs a large part of her submissions to alleged factualerrors in the High Court judgment, which are said to "go to the heart of the merits ofMr Reekie's proposed appeal". The present proceeding is, however, an appeal on aquestion of law only. It is not the function of this Court on an appeal on a question oflaw to undertake a detailed analysis of the evidence given in the High Court trial overthree days (20 – 23 May 2019, with further submissions received 28 June, 12 and17 July 2019) to ascertain whether "a completely different narrative emerges", ascounsel submits.[31] Counsel also addresses the merits of the proposed substantive appeal in somedetail. This appeal is, however, not a general appeal on the basis that, notwithstandingtwo opinions from experienced counsel, Mr Reekie's proposed substantive appeal hassufficient merit to warrant a grant of legal aid.Grounds of appeal[32] The grounds of appeal listed in Mr Reekie's written submissions and confirmedin counsel's oral submissions are directed at both the Commissioner and the Tribunal.Counsel submits that they both erred by:(a) Holding that "The Commissioner's officers are entitled to rely (solely)on the opinions of two experienced counsel." The Commissionershould have come to his/her own decision;(b) Interpreting the opinion of Mr Ewen as concluding that the proposedappeal lacked sufficient prospects of success;(c) Adopting the opinion of Ms Levy KC that "the alleged damage(a) cannot be quantified; and (b) would be minimal in any event; andso much time has passed as to make any other remedy pointless."(d) Relying on opinions that were incorrect and contrary to the interests ofthe appellant, without his knowledge or consent, and without invitingfurther submissions from the appellant before making its decision;(e) Not coming to its own view regarding legal aid by applying the'ordinary person privately funded' test;(f) Failing to make a decision on the appellant's application for legal aidto appeal the adverse costs decision, or failing to distinguish betweenthe two issues;(g) Failing to recognise that the appeal raises issues of public importance,including the interests of the public in being assured that theCorrections system operates within the law, and that it operates fairlyand humanely;(h) Failing to recognise that Mr Ewen's opinion was incorrect in respectof:(i) The Limitation Act and whether the actions were statute-barred(Mr Reekie appears to have lodged his claim within six years);(ii) The lack of a pleading seeking an investigation as a remedy;(iii) Opining that "present conduct is going to be far greater adeterminant than events that occurred over eight years ago".Discussion[33] The starting point is s 10 of the LSA, which sets out when legal aid may begranted for civil matters. Section 10(4)(e) provides that the Commissioner may refuseto grant legal aid to an applicant in the case of an appeal if the Commissionerconsiders that for any reason the grant of legal aid is not justified.[34] In Legal Services Agency v MA,9 Wylie J stated with regard to s 9(4)(e) of theLegal Services Act 2000, an earlier version of s 10(4)(e):In my view s 9(4)(e) is quite clear. In the case of an appeal, the Agency may,in exercise of its discretion, refuse to grant legal aid if it considers that "forany reason" a grant of legal aid is not justified. It is difficult to see that thegrounds for the exercise of the discretion could have been expressed morewidely. The expression "for any reason" is open ended. Obviously theexercise of the discretion must be confined by its statutory context and itshould not result in a decision which is manifestly unreasonable or wrong inlaw. Subject to these restrictions, the discretion can be exercised "for anyreason" and this could embrace any of the factors identified in s 9(4)(a) to (d),or indeed other factors. In my view, the words permit consideration ofwhether the applicant's prospects of success are sufficient to justify the grantof legal aid. That will require that some account be taken of the merits of thedecision it is so sought to challenge with a grant of legal aid. It could beappropriate in appropriate cases to consider whether the arguments theapplicant wishes to advance on appeal are technical and devoid of substantivemerit.[35] The applicant's prospects of success are referred to in s 10(4)(d)(i), whichprovides that the Commissioner may refuse to grant legal aid to an applicant in thecase of original proceedings if the applicant's prospects of success are not sufficientto justify the grant of legal aid.[36] The meaning of the phrase "prospects of success" was considered by Wild J inTimmins v Legal Aid Review Panel:10"Prospects of success", in my view, refers to the prospects of achieving asuccessful outcome. Those prospects need to be assessed in a pragmatic way9 Legal Services Agency v MA, HC Auckland, CIV-2008-404-001838, 4 July 2008, (2008) PRNZ 1at [42].10 Timmins v Legal Aid Review Panel [2004] 1 NZLR 708 (HC), at [33] – [35].and, somewhat obviously, in the circumstances of the particular case. Afterall, no two cases are the same. The assessment invited by the words ins 9(4)(d)(i) "sufficient to justify the grant of aid", involves weighing the likelybenefits against the likely costs. Whilst the benefits in some cases will bemeasurable mainly, and perhaps even wholly, in dollar terms, in othersituations that will not be so. Examples might include obtaining an injunctionrestraining the destruction of an area of native bush, or the closing of a roador access track or some other facility, or a judgment upholding the reputationof a person or a product (even if unaccompanied by significant damages), orvindicating some important point of principle.Because assessing "prospects of success" may involve assessing non-pecuniary benefits, the assessment for a particular plaintiff or claimant canobviously be difficult.I agree with Mr Taylor's suggestion that inquiring what a person funding himor herself would do may be helpful. The question might be framed thus: What,if any, legal action would the applicant (assuming they were a reasonableindividual) take in the circumstances if paying their own legal costs?[37] The Court of Appeal further discussed the relevant principles in JMM v LegalServices Agency:11We consider that the words "prospects of success" should speak forthemselves. As we will discuss later, various considerations may be relevantto the evaluation of the phrase in a particular case. The reasonable privatelitigant approach may assist in this evaluative exercise but it is really part ofthe policy rationale and not a test. It is certainly not a test to be applied in arigid manner....Furthermore, we see force in Mr Cooke's argument that Parliament providedfor the Agency to make these decisions – and on an evaluative basis. This isclear from the use of the word "sufficient" in s 9(4)(d)(i). Legal aid may bewithdrawn if the aided person's "prospects of success are not sufficient tojustify the grant of legal aid". The word "sufficient" must be given somemeaning in this context. We consider that it underscores the need for theAgency to make an overall assessment by standing back and looking at thelitigation prospects in the round.[38] The Court further stated:12One consideration is likely to be the cost of bringing the claim compared withthe potential benefits. Where damages and/or other financial benefits aresought, it will be necessary to assess the prospects of achieving a successfulfinancial outcome in order to determine whether they are sufficient to justifyproceeding. A re-assessment of the costs and benefits, including the costsincurred to date and those likely to be incurred in the future, will ordinarily be11 JMM v Legal Services Agency [2012] NZCA 573, [2013] 1 NZLR 517, at [51] and [53].12 At [64] – [65].essential. Part of the analysis could include an assessment of the likelihoodor otherwise of an out-of-court settlement rather than proceeding to trial. Inthat respect, any settlement offers will be relevant.Non-monetary outcomes, and similar types of relief sought, may also need tobe assessed as a relevant consideration depending on the nature of the case.In this context, we agree that the novelty of the claim, its precedent effects andwhether it is a new or developing area of the law may need to be considered.[39] The Commissioner's decision to decline legal aid for the appeal by Mr Reekiewas made utilising the test that Mr Reekie's prospects of success were not sufficientto justify the grant of legal aid:Legal aid approved 10 hours for your lawyer, Ms Levy to advise on theprospects of success of your appeal succeeding.Ms Levy has now advised that your prospects of success are too low.Prospects of success means the chance of getting what you want from yourcase.Therefore you will no longer get legal aid for 25/09/2020.[40] Although the phrase "prospects of success" is not used in s 10(4)(e), theexpression "for any reason", which is used in s 10(4)(e), must embrace any of thefactors identified in s 10(4)(a) to (d). I agree with Wylie J in Legal Services Agency vMA that the expression "for any reason" permits consideration of whether anapplicant's prospects of success are sufficient to justify the grant of legal aid.[41] Counsel for Mr Reekie submits, however, that the prospects of success test isnot the correct test. Rather, the test was (and is) whether a privately funded person inthe position of the applicant would bring the proceeding. This was referred to byWild J in Timmins as possibly being useful, but discounted by the Court of Appeal inJMM v Legal Services Agency, in the following terms:The reasonable private litigant approach may assist in this evaluative exercisebut it is really part of the policy rationale and not a test. It is certainly not atest to be applied in a rigid manner.[42] Counsel for Mr Reekie also refers to Marteley v Legal ServicesCommissioner,13 a Supreme Court case in which comment was made that theCommissioner was not required to make a close examination of the merits of an appeal13 Marteley v Legal Services Commissioner [2015] NZSC 127, [2016] 1 NZLR 633.and, in particular, should recognise that it may be difficult to conclude that an appealis devoid of merit on the basis of the material available when the grant decision ismade. This comment was, however, made in relation to criminal appeals in respect ofwhich a quite different statutory scheme applies. In this context, counsel forMr Reekie also refers to the reasonable grounds test in s 10(3), which provides thatthe Commissioner must refuse to grant legal aid if the applicant has not shown that theapplicant has reasonable grounds for taking or defending the proceedings. Shesubmits that if that test was applied it would have been a relatively straightforwardmatter to conclude it was reasonable in the circumstances for Mr Reekie to be grantedlegal aid for an appeal. In the present case, however, the Commissioner had twoopinions from experienced counsel available for her consideration and so was in agood position to assess the merits of an appeal.[43] In short, I am not satisfied that the Commissioner applied the wrong test inrefusing Mr Reekie's application for legal aid.[44] Mr Reekie then sought a review of the Commissioner's decision by theTribunal. Section 52 of the LSA provides for a review on the grounds that the decisionwas manifestly unreasonable or wrong in law. This was the test applied by the Tribunalwhen it concluded that Mr Reekie had not shown that the Commissioner's decisionwas manifestly unreasonable or wrong in law. Thus, the Tribunal did not apply thewrong test either. There does not, in fact, appear to be a challenge to the test appliedby the Tribunal.[45] The focus of the grounds of appeal cited earlier (which generally are notquestions of law) appear to be a challenge to the correctness of the two opinions bycounsel, Mr Ewen and Ms Levy. Those opinions are, however, cogently arguedexercises of professional judgment. While Mr Reekie and his counsel may disagreewith them, they are not manifestly unreasonable or demonstrably wrong in law.Professional advisers' opinions can and do differ. That does not make one opinionright and another one wrong.[46] I am also of the view that the Tribunal (and the Commissioner) were entitledas a matter of law to rely on the opinions as informing its decision on review (and atfirst instance by the Commissioner). Counsels' opinions are often sought and providedto the Commissioner by applicants for legal aid.[47] The assertion in the listed grounds of appeal that the Tribunal relied on theopinions without Mr Reekie's knowledge or consent, and without inviting furthersubmissions from Mr Reekie before making its decision, is not correct. Mr Reekiefiled 14-page submissions, dated 19 November 2020, with the Tribunal in which hemade extensive reference to counsels' opinions. The Tribunal did not requireMr Reekie's consent for it to rely on the opinions.[48] Another of the grounds of appeal refers to the "ordinary person privatelyfunded" test, which I have determined is not necessarily the test to be applied.[49] As to the assertion that there was a failure to distinguish the adverse costsjudgment from the merits judgment, Ms Levy did refer separately to the costsjudgment and advised that Mr Reekie's proceeding did not display any public interestwhich may warrant a reduction in costs, which would otherwise normally be payable.[50] Finally, counsel submits as a ground of appeal that the Tribunal failed torecognise that Mr Reekie's appeal raised issues of public importance in that the publicneeded assurance that the Corrections system operated fairly and humanely. Even ifthere is some public interest, that does not make the Commissioner's decisionmanifestly unreasonable or wrong in law.Result[51] Mr Reekie's appeal is dismissed. The nominated grounds of appeal are largelynot points of law, but in any event are without merit.________________________________Woolford J