DAWSON V MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT HC WN CIV-2005-485-548

DAWSON V MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT HC WN CIV-2005-485-548 10 November 2006IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY CIV-2005-485-548UNDER the Human Rights Act 1993 BETWEEN NIGEL DAWSON Plaintiff AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT Defendant Hearing: 6 November 2006 Appearances: Plaintiff in person V Sim for Defendant Judgment: 10 November 2006 In accordance with r 540(4) I direct the Registrar to endorse this judgment with a delivery time of 10.00am on the 10 th day of November 2006.JUDGMENT OF CLIFFORD J Background[1] On 6 September 2006, Mallon J gave judgment in respect of an application by Mr Dawson filed on 10 March 2006 to review a decision of Associate Judge Gendall dated 8 November 2005. In that judgment, Mallon J also commented on Mr Dawson's application, recorded in the same papers, to review a decision of Mackenzie J dated 6 December 2004.[2] Mallon J's judgment sets out the background to the matter before her and I do not need to repeat that in any great detail. [3] Suffice to say that, in her judgment, Mallon J: a) dismissed Mr Dawson's application to review Associate Judge Gendall's judgment; and b) noted that Mr Dawson had no legal right to review Mackenzie J's decision, commenting further that, even if there had been such a legal right, there would be no legal basis for doing so because no error of law was made by Mackenzie J. [4] In this application, which was heard by me in the Judge's Chambers List on Monday 6 November 2006, Mr Dawson has – with reference to various High Court Rules – sought to challenge that decision of Mallon J. In essence, Mr Dawson's application appears to be one for leave to appeal Mallon J's judgment to the Court of Appeal. I heard, relatively brief, oral submissions from each of Mr Dawson on his own behalf and Ms Sim for the defendant. Both Mr Dawson and Ms Sim confirmed that the papers they had filed fully set out their positions. In the materials he filed, Mr Dawson recorded his objection to various aspects of Mallon J's decision, in particular her upholding Associate Judge Gendall's finding that Mr Dawson's proceedings disclose no reasonable cause of action and were an abuse of the process of the Court. [5] The High Court does have power under s 124 of the Human Rights Act 1993 to grant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against any determination of the High Court on a question of law. Mr Dawson relied on s 124. [6] For leave to be granted, the appeal must raise some question of law capable of bona fide and serious argument (Waller v Hyde [1998] 1 NZLR 412). The case must involve some interest, public or private, of sufficient importance to outweigh the cost and delay of a further appeal.[7] In my view, approaching this matter as an application for leave to appeal pursuant to s 124 of the Human Rights Act 1993, Mr Dawson's application clearly fails. [8] In his decision of 8 November 2005, Associate Judge Gendall found that the matters which appeared to be at the heart of the plaintiff's concerns, namely the form of words used for medical certificates provided in support of applications by potential beneficiaries for disability payments, and the payment to the plaintiff of a disability allowance from 1998 to 2001, did not disclose any reasonable cause of action against the defendant. [9] In her judgment of 6 September 2006, Mallon J carefully reviewed the decision of Associate Judge Gendall, and upheld that decision. In doing so, she commented as follows:[16] Having reviewed the papers Mr Dawson has filed in the High Court and having listened to Mr Dawson's submissions, I consider that Mr Dawson's review applications must be dismissed. [17] Mr Dawson has no legal right to review McKenzie J's decision. Even if there was a legal right to review that decision, there is no legal basis for doing so because no error of law was made by McKenzie J. The High Court did not have jurisdiction to grant an extension of time to Mr Dawson. The Human Rights Act 1993 specified the time period within which an appeal was to be made and there was no power under r 704 of the High Court Rules to extend that. Accordingly the application to review the judgment of McKenzie J is dismissed. [18] The application to review Gendall AJ's judgment is also dismissed. Mr Dawson's amended statement of claim is very difficult to follow. It does not disclose any tenable cause of action. Nor, having heard Mr Dawson's explanation of his claim in Court, could it. [19] Mr Dawson stated at the hearing before me that his claim is the same as it has been in the earlier proceedings but he now has new evidence to support his claim. Mr Dawson's concern, reiterated before me in this hearing, is that the Sickness Benefit and/or the Disability Allowance mean that he has been certified as insane. He is also concerned that the words "psychiatric illness" were omitted from certain forms for benefits and also from question 16 of the 2006 census form. It is the census form that Mr Dawson relies on as new evidence. [20] His concern has reached the stage where he says that he represents all New Zealanders from attack from non-New Zealanders. By way of illustration, Mr Dawson referred to a pamphlet which explains that pregnant women may be able to seek a Sickness Benefit. Mr Dawson said that if apregnant woman receives a Sickness Benefit then insanity will follow her to her death. He says that Sickness Benefits amount to being certified as insane and this is unfair to pregnant women who may be unemployed but are not insane. He seeks to uphold the statutes from which he described as foreign attack. As illustrative of this attack, Mr Dawson referred to having seen the Prime Minister of Australia telling off the Prime Minister of New Zealand. [21] Mr Dawson considers that when forms refer to disability, New Zealanders are being misled or tricked into being certified or otherwise counted as insane. He considers this gives rise to illegal contracts and/or other legal grounds for his claim. I do not agree with Mr Dawson's line of reasoning from a legal perspective. As a matter of law: (a) the forms Mr Dawson referred me to are not contracts (and therefore cannot be illegal contracts); (b) completion of the forms and/or receipt of the Sickness Benefit or Disability Allowance does not amount to a certification or insanity or otherwise being categorised as insane; and (c) there is no legal basis for the monetary sum that Mr Dawson seeks to claim. [22] Because I find that there is no legal basis for reaching a different view from that of McKenzie J and D I Gendall AJ the other orders that Mr Dawson seeks in his memorandum (damages, the dismissal and striking out of the defendant's defence and a stay of the proceedings) are not granted.[10] Having considered the decision of Mallon J, the submissions made by Mr Dawson and the defendant, and having reviewed a range of other documents filed in this matter, I have concluded that this case clearly does not satisfy the requirements for a grant of leave, and leave is declined accordingly. [11] I also note that, in his application, Mr Dawson referred to a number of other High Court Rules, including – in the order in which they were referred to in the papers he filed – rules 724B (Notice of Appeal – cases stated), 61C(2) (Review of decision of Associate Judge), 710 (Stay pending appeal), 626 (Criteria on applications to review determinations) and 418 (Orders for decision). Without undertaking an exhaustive analysis of each of those rules, I am satisfied that none of them, nor any other of the various legislative provisions referred to by Mr Dawson, provide a basis for his application.Conclusion[12] Accordingly, Mr Dawson's appeal for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, as he styled it, is dismissed. [13] The defendant sought costs of $214 (being costs calculated on a category 1 basis for attendance at the hearing of Mr Dawson's application). Mr Dawson's application having failed, I order costs against him accordingly. _________________Clifford JSolicitors: Crown Law Office, Wellington, for Defendant