DAWSON V CEO MIN OF SOCIAL DEV & ANOR CA CA28/07

DAWSON V CEO MIN OF SOCIAL DEV & ANOR CA CA28/07 23 March 2007IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND CA28/07 [2007] NZCA 94BETWEEN NIGEL PAUL DAWSON Applicant AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT & ANOR Respondents Hearing: 12 March 2007 Court: Hammond, Arnold and Wilson JJ Counsel: Applicant in Person V Sim for Crown Judgment: 23 March 2007 at 11 amJUDGMENT OF THE COURT 1. The application for special leave to appeal to this Court is dismissed. 2. No order for costs. 3. The application for a suppression order is dismissed. REASONS OF THE COURT(Given by Hammond J)Table of ContentsPara NoIntroduction [1]Background [2]The basis of the application for special leave [9]The application fails in several respects [11]This decision concludes Mr Dawson's ability to have recourse to the courts [16]Introduction[1] Mr Dawson applies for special leave to appeal to this Court against several decisions of the High Court in Wellington: CIV 2004-485-2440 6 December 2004, and three subsequent decisions on file CIV 2005-485-548 dated 8 November 2005, 6 September 2006, and 10 November 2006.Background[2] This unfortunate series of litigation arises out of a context in which Mr Dawson objected to being paid a Sickness Benefit and Disability Allowance in 2001. He was concerned that the effect of the wording of the relevant documentation (as to his disability or otherwise) amounted to him being certified insane. [3] Mr Dawson first complained to the Social Security Appeal Authority about what had occurred, and sought compensation. That Tribunal dismissed his appeal, and the claim for compensation. [4] Mr Dawson then endeavoured to advance his case to the Human Rights Review Tribunal. He sought compensation in an amount of $US13 million and 5 cents. That Tribunal struck out the claim on the basis that there was nothing that gave rise to a tenable claim for a breach of the Human Rights Act 1993. [5] Mr Dawson thereupon sought to appeal the decision of the Human Rights Tribunal. But he found himself out of time. On 6 December 2004 MacKenzie J dismissed his application for an extension of time for lodging an appeal against thedecision of the Tribunal. His Honour held that there was no jurisdiction under the Human Rights Act for the High Court to grant such an extension. [6] Mr Dawson thereupon filed proceedings, this time in the High Court, again seeking compensation of $US13 million and 5 cents. By this time, Mr Dawson seems to have been concerned that the words "psychiatric illness" had been omitted from the requisite forms. On 8 November 2005 Associate Judge Gendall dismissed that claim under r 477 of the High Court Rules. He held that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and that it was an abuse of the process of the Court. This on the footing that what the High Court proceeding was seeking to do was advance proceedings which had already been dismissed in the Tribunal hearings. [7] Undeterred, Mr Dawson then sought review of the decisions of MacKenzie J and Associate Judge Gendall. On 6 September 2006 Mallon J held that there was no right in law to review MacKenzie J's decision. If there had been, there was no legal basis for doing so, as no error of law was made by His Honour. Mallon J also dismissed the application to review Associate Judge Gendall's judgment striking out Mr Dawson's claim. [8] Mr Dawson thereupon sought leave to appeal to this Court. We add here that the High Court does have power, under s 124 of the Human Rights Act 1993, to grant leave to appeal to this Court against any determination of the High Court on a question of law. Clifford J recorded that it was that section, as he understood it, that Mr Dawson was relying upon. On 10 November 2006 Clifford J dismissed Mr Dawson's application for leave to appeal to this Court. He awarded costs against him.The basis of the application for special leave[9] Section 124(3) of the Human Rights Act 1993 provides that this Court may grant leave if, in the opinion of the Court, the question of law involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason, ought to be submitted to this Court for its decision.[10] This section follows a well-known formula in New Zealand law. The question of law or fact that is sought to be raised must be capable of bona fide and serious argument in a case involving some interest, public or private, of sufficient importance to out-weigh the cost and delay of a further appeal (Snee v Snee [1999] 13 PRNZ 609 (CA) and Waller v Hider [1998] 1 NZLR 412 at 413 (CA)).The application fails in several respects[11] This application must fail on the merits. Mr Dawson sees himself as being certified "insane" as a result of the steps which were required to be followed when assessing the application for a Social Security Benefit. He sees himself as having been impugned or "labelled" by an application which was being considered for his own benefit. That he should have taken that view is simply indicative of the difficulties which Mr Dawson faces. Merely because he had to be assessed for a particular purpose does not mean that a general finding was made against him for all purposes, and of the character he attributes to it. Later he seems to have changed tack, and complained about the way departmental forms had been changed. [12] At the procedural level, Mr Dawson seeks to challenge MacKenzie J's dismissal of his application for an extension of time for lodging an appeal against the decision of the Human Rights Tribunal. But there is nothing in the Human Rights Act that authorises an extension of time beyond that fixed by s 123(4). That is the view that has been taken on the existing authorities, Inglis Enterprises Ltd v Race Relations Conciliator (1994) 7 PRNZ 404 (HC), and Ta'ase v Victoria University of Wellington (1999) 14 PRNZ 406 (HC). We were not invited to overrule those authorities, and that point is fatal to his application. [13] It follows that there is no issue before us which is capable of serious, or bona fide argument, and the application for special leave is dismissed. [14] There will be no order for costs.[15] Mr Dawson sought suppression of his name. We can discern no proper basis on which the usual principle – that the proceedings of the Court are open to the public – should not obtain here. That application is declined.This decision concludes Mr Dawson's ability to have recourse to the courts[16] We draw the attention of Mr Dawson to s 124(6) of the Human Rights Act 1993. This makes the decision of this Court on any application for leave to appeal "final". He has therefore no ability to endeavour to advance this matter to the Supreme Court of New Zealand, as he suggested he would do, if leave was refused on this application. [17] We make this point because that institution should no more be burdened with applications which are utterly doomed to failure, than this one has been.Solicitors: Crown Law Office, Wellington