PARRY FIELD LAWYERS LIMITED v DISPUTES TRIBUNAL AT CHRISTCHURCH [2023] NZHC 1829

PARRY FIELD LAWYERS LIMITED v DISPUTES TRIBUNAL AT CHRISTCHURCH [2023] NZHC 1829[13 July 2023]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDCHRISTCHURCH REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROAŌTAUTAHI ROHECIV-2022-409-000572[2023] NZHC 1829BETWEEN PARRY FIELD LAWYERS LIMITEDApplicantAND DISPUTES TRIBUNAL ATCHRISTCHURCHFirst RespondentAND DISTRICT COURT AT CHRISTCHURCHSecond RespondentAND GLORIA DIANNE NIELSENThird RespondentAND NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETYIntervenerHearing: 4 July 2023Appearances: A J Summerlee and G M Watson for the ApplicantJ M McGuigan as Amicus CuriaeC R Johnstone for the Intervener (excused at the outset)Judgment: 13 July 2023JUDGMENT OF GENDALL JIntroduction[1] The applicant, Parry Field Lawyers Ltd (PFL) has applied to judicially reviewa decision of the Second Respondent, the District Court, regarding the jurisdiction ofthe First Respondent, the Disputes Tribunal (the DT) to hear claims in relation to feesrendered by PFL that have been the subject of determination by a StandardsCommittee administered by the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS).[2] The first respondent, the DT at Christchurch, held it had jurisdiction to hear aclaim in relation to fees rendered by PFL. The District Court at Christchurchdismissed an appeal from the DT's decision that it had jurisdiction. The first andsecond respondents, the DT and the District Court, have in the usual way formallyadvised they abide the decision of the Court, although they reserve their rightspursuant to rr 5.50 and 5.51 of the High Court Rules 2016. Those parties were excusedfrom further attendance in relation to the matter.[3] The third respondent, Ms Gloria Nielsen, who is 79 years old, is self-represented, as she was before the District Court on the hearing of the appeal from theDT's decision. She has filed written submissions in opposition to PFL's applicationfor review but did not seek to be further heard and did not appear before me. Iunderstand this was the course adopted by Ms Nielsen in the District Court and thatan amicus curiae was appointed to act as a contradictor to PFL's argument. A similarcourse was adopted for the purposes of the proceeding before this Court, and theamicus Ms Guigan provided submissions and appeared before me.[4] The New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) has been joined to this proceeding asan intervener and as an interested party. Mr Johnstone, counsel for the NZLS, hasfiled written submissions but at his request he was excused at the outset of the hearingbefore me.[5] This judicial review application largely concerns the issue of whether theNZLS Standards Committee (Standards Committee) is "another/any other court ortribunal" for the purposes of s 17 of the Disputes Tribunal Act 1998 (the Act).[6] PFL maintains here that a Standards Committee is quasi-judicial in nature andis properly classified as a tribunal. If that is correct, then s 17 of the Act precludes theDT from hearing and determining any costs issues between a lawyer and her clientwhich have already been the subject of a complaint to the NZLS Lawyers ComplaintsService (complaints service) and a decision of the Standards Committee.[7] The position advanced before me, in submissions from Ms Nielsen and theamicus Ms McGuigan, is that the District Court was correct to hold that a StandardsCommittee is not "another/any other court or tribunal" for the purposes of s 17 of theAct and the DT correctly decided that it had jurisdiction to hear and determineMrs Nielsen's claim to be refunded a portion of the legal fees originally charged to herby PFL.[8] PFL disputes this and suggests first, the DT acted ultra vires in its jurisdictionwhen it purported to exercise a statutory power to hear Ms Nielsen's complaints,secondly, the District Court took into account irrelevant considerations and thirdly, theDistrict Court also failed to take into account relevant considerations when itcondoned/endorsed the DT's decision.Background Facts[9] In June 2018 Mrs Nielsen instructed PFL to act in regard to litigation againstthe insurer of one of her properties. Later in July 2018 Mrs Nielsen and her son,Christian Nielsen, instructed PFL to act in regard to litigation against the insurers ofthree more properties. Pleadings were issued.[10] PFL provided the Nielsens with advice on their claims, particularly regardingtheir entitlement to foundation replacement, with which it appears the Nielsensdisagreed, and the relationship deteriorated thereafter. On 12 December 2018 theNielsens terminated their retainers with PFL.[11] On 4 November 2019 the Nielsens complained to the NZLS. They allegedamongst other things that PFL had overcharged by billing for unknown actions andbilling when two lawyers were working at the same time. The NZLS convened itsStandards Committee to determine the various complaints from the Nielsens includingthe four fee complaints by Mrs Nielsen.[12] On 20 December 2019 PFL responded to the Nielsens' allegations in a letter tothe Standards Committee.[13] On 10 July 2020 the Standards Committee released its decision it seems,concluding that the fees rendered were fair and reasonable for the services provided.The Committee determined that further action on the complaint was unnecessary.Initially, it appears, the decision apparently may not have been sent to the Nielsens.But they did receive it at some point.[14] The Nielsens, obviously disappointed with their result from theStandards Committee, had the option to have that decision reviewed by theLegal Complaints Review Officer (LCRO). This review application was to be filedwithin 30 working days after eventually being served with the decision, but it seemsthe Nielsens chose not to.1[15] Instead, on 5 August 2021 Ms Nielsen lodged a claim in the DT regarding thefees charged under one of the retainers which were the subject of the StandardsCommittee decision.[16] On 1 September 2021 PFL filed its position statement in the DT protesting thatthe DT lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter as it was determined by another tribunal,the Standards Committee.[17] On 18 October 2021, it appears the referee in the DT in question verballyadvised that she would assume jurisdiction to hear the claim, so the hearing proceeded.No written decision on jurisdiction at that point was issued, however.[18] On 16 November 2021 the DT issued its final written decision in which it held:(a) It had jurisdiction to hear the dispute (because, it held, theStandards Committee was not "another Court or Tribunal" within themeaning of s 17 of the Act); and(b) Ms Nielsen's claim failed on the merits, that is, the DT agreed with theStandards Committee decision.1 Section 198 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006. Time starts running from the date of serviceof the decision. The Nielsens previously sought to explain their decision not to review the decisionbefore the LCRO on the grounds that they were provided with the decision more than 30 daysafter the date of the decision. But that does not seem relevant here. No review application to theLCRO was ever advanced.[19] On 29 October 201 the Nielsens then commenced another proceeding in theDT disputing PFL's fees arising under the other three retainers, which had also beendetermined by the Standards Committee. That proceeding, as I understand it, is stayedpending the outcome of this present review application.[20] On 13 December 2021 Ms Nielsen filed in the District Court an appeal againstthe DT's 16 November 2021 decision.[21] On 21 December 2021, PFL filed a cross-appeal against the decision of the DTto assume jurisdiction. Ms Nielsen then abandoned her appeal. This left PFL'scross-appeal on jurisdiction as the sole issue to be determined.[22] On 20 September 2022, the District Court dismissed the cross-appeal. Itfound that the Standards Committee was not a tribunal, and therefore the DT wascorrect to allow Ms Nielsen to re-litigate the fee complaint determined by theStandards Committee.[23] The present application for judicial review before me challenges thosejurisdictional questions. It is useful at this point to repeat what I noted at [5] and [6]above that this application concerns an important issue of whether the StandardsCommittee of the NZLS is "another/any other court or tribunal" in terms of s 17 of theAct, such that this provision precludes the DT from hearing costs issues disputesbetween lawyer and client which have already been the subject of an NZLS complaintservice matter and Standards Committee decision.[24] According to Mr Summerlee for PFL, a question of public importance alsoraised here, namely: when a specialist body is established by Parliament to resolveprofession-specific fee disputes, did Parliament intend to oust the jurisdiction of theDisputes Tribunal to re-litigate the same dispute?PFL's first ground of review: the DT acted ultra vires in its jurisdiction[25] Judicial review is available when a decisionmaker acts beyond its powers.[26] PFL's first and main ground of review is that the DT acted ultra vires when itpurported to exercise a statutory power to hear the Nielsens' complaints and feedispute.[27] Clearly, the DT only has the power to hear cases of a kind falling within thejurisdiction given to it by its empowering statute.[28] Section 17 of the Act is designed both to stop claims determined in the DTfrom being re-litigated elsewhere and of relevance here to stop claims alreadydetermined elsewhere being re-litigated before the DT. The present judicial reviewapplication concerns the limiting provision in section 17(1)(b) of the Act which isfurther explained in section 17(2).[29] Those sections provide that:(a) (1)(b) – [Where] "proceedings before [an]other court or tribunal werecommenced before the claim was lodged withthe Tribunal"; then(b) (2) – "the issues in dispute in the claim to which those proceedingsrelateshall not be the subject of proceedings between the same partiesin the Tribunal unless the proceedings are transferred to the Tribunalunder s 37 or the claim before the other court or tribunal is withdrawn,abandoned, or struck out."[30] Usefully, the explanatory note to the Bill relating to the Act, and creation ofDisputes Tribunals generally states that the purpose of s 17 is: "[t]o prevent the sameclaim from being the subject of adjudication in more than one judicial forum."2[31] By using the wording "judicial forum", I am satisfied that Parliament turnedits mind to the hazard of duplicated litigation and expressly enacted s 17 to both avoidsuch duplication and to free up the DT to speedily deal with first instance disputeswithin the lower end value jurisdiction for which it was targeted.2 Explanatory note, Disputes Tribunal Bill, no. 169-1.[32] I must therefore determine whether the NZLS Standards Committeedetermining the present fee dispute is a "court or tribunal" for the purposes of s 17(2).If so, then the DT is barred from hearing that same dispute.[33] Before me, in its submissions, PFL maintained that the following qualitiesdemonstrate that a Standards Committee is exercising a judicial function whendetermining a fee dispute and is thus a "court or tribunal" within the meaning ofs 17(2):(a) The authority of a Standards Committee emanates from an Act ofParliament;3(b) Its members are not employees of the NZLS; rather, they areindependent. Nor are Standards Committees or their members underthe control of the NZLS in the conduct of their functions.(c) Its members are excluded from civil or criminal liability in respect ofany decisions or acts, unless made in bad faith;4(d) The Evidence Act 2006 applies to a Standards Committee in the samemanner as if it was a court, including the right to take evidence underoath, and administering oaths, compelling witnesses and receivingevidence;5(e) Every witness before it has the same privileges and responsibilities aswitnesses have in a court of law;6 and3 Section 126, Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006; and Regulation 12, Lawyers andConveyancers Act (Lawyers: Complaints Service and Standards Committees) Regulations 2008,4 Section 185 of the Act.5 Section 151, Evidence Act 2006; and McGuire v NZLS [2020] NZHC 3053.6 Section 187, Evidence Act; and see Trapp v Mackie [1979] 1 All ER 489 at 491, in which theHouse of Lords stated that "[t]he kind of tribunal in which the evidence of witnesses is entitled toabsolute privilege [has been described] as a tribunal "which has similar attributes to a court ofjustice or acts in a manner similar to that in which such courts act."(f) It is subject to a form of review (like an appeal) process, namely to theLCRO, established under s 190 of the Act.7[34] In turn, the opposing position advanced before me by Ms McGuigan ascontradictor amicus was essentially:(a) Consistent with s 10 of the Legislation Act 2019 the meaning of thephrase "another court or tribunal" in s 17 of the Act must be ascertainedfrom the text in light of its purpose and context.(b) The purpose of s 17 is to prevent a party bringing the same claim inmore than one court or tribunal. The section is consistent with theprinciple of finality in litigation and avoids issue estoppel. DisputesTribunals provide prompt, efficient and comparatively cheapdetermination of low-value contract and tort disputes. Referees areoften not lawyers, lawyers are prohibited from attending hearings,(although they can assist parties in lead-up advice and often do), anddeterminations need not be strictly consistent with legal principles. TheTribunal's decision is binding on the parties and there are limitedappeal/review rights.(c) The use of the words "another", "any other", "claim" and "proceeding"in s 17, Ms McGuigan maintains, all suggest that the section isconcerned with excluding jurisdiction where a tribunal of similar natureis seized of the same issue.(d) And she contends that Standards Committees are not akin to the DT.They play an important role in fulfilling the purposes of the Lawyersand Conveyancers Act 2006 (LACA), which is itself consumer-drivenlegislation. In addition to promoting resolution of consumercomplaints, Standards Committees investigate, intervene in the affairsof, and lay charges against, lawyers. The process is voluntary and theCommittee has a limited damages jurisdiction. The NZLS has7 McGuire v NZLS [2020] NZHC 3053 at [49].previously accepted that a Standards Committee does not possess "thejurisdiction of a civil court to make binding rulings on parties aboutnegligence, breach of contract or the like."8(e) Ms McGuigan notes too that ss 193 and 198 of the LACA provide aright of review of decisions of the Standards Committee to the LCRO,rather than a right of appeal.(f) She says that the approach suggested by PFL here to decisions ofStandards Committees would cut across the purpose of the LACA,which is to ensure that lawyers are held to account. Prohibiting accessto the court, or an independent tribunal like the DT, is inconsistent withthat purpose. Here, Ms McGuigan maintains, Mrs Nielsen had not hadher claim reviewed by a court or tribunal, prior to the DT decision.(g) Similarly, any "floodgates" argument that might be raised,Ms McGuigan contends, is inapt. In almost all cases (and as happenedhere), a DT referee, she suggests, is likely to place significant weighton the Standards Committee's (expert) complaints decision.(h) Court decisions too, according to Ms McGuigan, are consistent with,and do not detract from, this approach. Finally, she notes that, whilethe High Court is likely not to revisit quantum following aStandards Committee decision on costs (as opposed to liability), thatCourt retains its residual discretion to supervise lawyers' conduct(including in relation to fees) and would, no doubt, exercise thatdiscretion if it took the view that the Standards Committee had plainlygot it wrong.[35] Turning now to the judgment of Judge Neave in the District Court the subjectof this review application, the upshot of his decision is that the DT is not estoppedfrom hearing and determining complaints against lawyers, particularly relating to feeseven where those complaints have already been considered by a Standards Committee.8 Simpson Grierson v Gilmour (2009) 19 PRNZ 865 at [45].[36] In making this finding, Judge Neave in the District Court held that a StandardsCommittee is not a "Court or tribunal" for the purposes of s 17 of the DTA. Accordingto Judge Neave:(a) As a matter of statutory interpretation, "tribunal" must be of the samenature and character as "court"; and(b) Unlike the NZLS Disciplinary Tribunal or the LCRO,Standards Committees are not independent and fulfil other functionsnot typically characteristic of tribunals, including administrative andinvestigative functions. As a result, Standards Committees are akin tooperational or administrative bodies, rather than tribunals.Analysis[37] I start first with the statutory functions of an NZLS Standards Committee9 setout in s 130 of the LACA which are prescribed as:(a) To inquire into and investigate complaints made under s 132;(b) To promote in appropriate cases the resolution of complaints bynegotiation, conciliation, or mediation;(c) To investigate of its own motion any act, omission, allegation, practice,or other matter that appears to indicate that there may have beenmisconduct or unsatisfactory conduct;(d) To intervene, in the circumstances prescribed by this Act, in the affairsof lawyers or firms;(e) To make final determinations in relation to complaints;9 Section 126 of the LACA requires the NZLS to establish individual Standards Committees as partof its complaints service operating under s 121.(f) To lay, and prosecute, charges before the NZ Lawyers andConveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal.[38] Section 132 of the LACA describes the persons who may complain about theconduct of or the standard of service provided by lawyers. In s 132(2) there is aspecific provision in relation to complaints about legal fees:Any person who is chargeable with a bill of costs, whether it has been paid ornot, may complain to the appropriate complaints service about the amount ofany bill of costs rendered by a practitioner or former practitioner or anincorporated firm or former incorporated firm (being a bill of costs that meetsthe criteria specified in the rules governing the operation of the StandardsCommittee that has the function of dealing with the complaint).(my emphasis)[39] Standards Committees must exercise and perform their duties, powers andfunctions in a way that is consistent with the rules of natural justice: s 142(1).[40] S 152 provides that a Standards Committee may, after inquiring and conductingits hearing, make one or more of the determinations set out in subsection (2):(2) The determinations that the Standards Committee may make are asfollows:(a) A determination that the complaint or matter, or any issue involvedin the complaint or matter be considered by the Disciplinary Tribunal;(b) A determination that there has been unsatisfactory conduct on thepart of –(i) a practitioner or former practitioner; or(ii) an incorporated firm or former incorporated firm; or(iii) an employee or former employee of a practitioner orincorporated firm:(c) A determination that the Standards committee take no furtheraction with regard to the complaint or matter or any issue involved inthe complaint or matter.[41] Subject to the right to apply for a review to the LCRO [s 193], and excludingthe right to seek recovery of damages independent of the Legal Complaints Service [s156(4)], every determination made under s 152(1) and certain other orders made arefinal: s 152(4).[42] Certain other specific provisions in the LACA (some of which are referred toin [33] above from PFL's submissions to me) are also important to note here:(a) Members of Standards Committees and an investigator(s) appointedhave personal immunity from civil or criminal liability in respect of anyact done or omitted to be done in the course of their role unless badfaith applies: s 185.(b) Every person who gives information to a Standards Committee oranswers questions put by a Committee has the same protection andprivileges of a witness before a court: s 186.(c) Counsel appearing before a Standards Committee have the sameprivileges and immunities as counsel before a court: s 187.(d) A Standards Committee may receive in evidence any statement,document, information or matter that may in its opinion assist, whetheror not that information would be admissible in a court, and may takeevidence on oath or permit a witness to give evidence by tendering awritten statement with or without verification by oath: s 151. Subjectto those three specific instances, the Evidence Act 2006 applies to aStandards Committee in the same manner as if it were a court: s 151(4).(e) No member of a Standards Committee, investigator or Legal StandardsOfficer or other person involved with the Standards Committee process,may communicate information that came to their knowledge in that roleand capacity to any other person except for specific express purposes:s 188(2).[43] It is also instructive here to consider s 161 of the LACA which specificallyaddresses complaints like the present about a solicitor's bill of costs. Section 161(1)provides that if notice is given to a practitioner or incorporated firm of a complaintunder s 132(2) about the amount of a bill of costs, then no proceedings for recovery ofthose costs may be commenced or prosecuted until the complaint has finally beendisposed of.[44] Section 161 goes on to provide specifically:(2) Where a Standards Committee makes a final determination on acomplaint made under section 132(2), it must certify the amount that is foundby it to be due to or from the practitioner or former practitioner or incorporatedfirm or former incorporated firm in respect of the bill and under thedetermination.(3) The certificate of the Standards Committee or, as the case may be, thedecision of the Legal Complaints Review Officer on a review of thedetermination is final and conclusive as to the amount due.(4) For the purposes of this section, a complaint is finally disposed of—(a) if—(i) the Standards Committee has made a final determination on thecomplaint or has, under section 138, decided to take no action, or, asthe case may require, no further action on the complaint; and(ii) the complainant has not, within the time allowed, applied to theLegal Complaints Review Officer for a review of the determinationor decision; or(b) if the Legal Complaints Review Officer has conducted a review of thedetermination or decision made by the Standards Committee on the complaintand has reported the outcome of the review to—(i) the complainant; and(ii) the practitioner or former practitioner or incorporated firm orformer incorporated firm; and(iii) the Standards Committee.[45] If dissatisfied with a Standards Committee's decision, or any aspect of it, thecomplainant, the lawyer or the NZLS may apply for a review to the LCRO – ss 193,194(1) and 197.[46] Usefully in my view, Mr Johnstone, counsel for the NZLS as intervener, in hissubmissions before me at [31] to [34] states:31. As Counsel, I can record from experience as a former convenor of aStandards Committee (2009-2018), and more recent anecdotal information,that it is not uncommon for courts (usually the District Court) to refer litigationparties to the NZLS cost revision process, to resolve disputed legal fees.Those instances are dealt with confidentially, so I cannot give an indication oftypes or numbers of cases.32. As noted earlier, a determination of a complaint or a decision to take noaction will finally dispose of a complaint in relation to a bill of costs under s132(2), unless an application for review is made in which case it will be theLCRO's decision: s161(3) and (4). The Committee's certificate, or LCRO'sdecision, as the case may be, is final and conclusive as to the amount due.33. I note that His Honour Judge Neave took the view that a finaldetermination was not made by the subject Standards Committee on MsNielsen's complaint; see in particular [93] and [102] of the judgment. Thiswas a key factor in His Honour's reasoning, refer [94]. With respect, it appearsHis Honour did not fully consider the whole of s161, in particular sub-section(4), by which a decision under s138(1) to take no action or s138(2) to take nofurther action will finally dispose of the complaint if the complainant does notapply for review the decision to the office of the LCRO.34. Subsection (4)(a) also addresses the apparent gap identified by the amicusin her submissions at [47], in the circumstance of a person not applying forreview with the Office of the LCRO. If no review is sought, then theCommittee's decision finally disposes of the complaint, even in the absenceof a s161(2) certificate.[47] Of use also in my view here are Mr Johnstone's later comments in his writtensubmissions before the Court on whether a Standards Committee is "a tribunal" withinthe meaning of "another court or tribunal" appearing in s 17(2) of the Act where hesays:43. From my analysis of the statutory scheme of Part 7 of the Act, fairly, theStandards Committee has both an investigative function and a quasi-judicialdecision-making role. It is the first stage of the Lawyers Complaints Scheme,a specialist jurisdiction to deal with and resolve complaints against lawyersabout professional conduct and fees. The Standards Committee has expresspowers to make final determinations of complaints, specifically of cost disputeand review matters, and utilises hearing and evidence-taking procedures akinto a civil court of law.44. Some guidance can be taken from the 2008 High Court decision on a casestated by the Human Rights Review Tribunal in The Director of Human RightsProceedings, v The Catholic Church for New Zealand10, addressing whetherthe word "tribunal" in s2(1) of the Privacy Act 1993 is capable of applying toa non-statutory tribunal, specifically the Catholic Tribunal of the CatholicChurch for New Zealand.45. Justice Cooper ultimately held at [57] – [60] that the meaning of agencywas not capable of applying to a non-statutory tribunal and that tribunal (asused in a number of provisions in the Privacy Act including the Information10 The Director of Human Rights Proceedings v The Catholic Church for New Zealand High Court,Auckland CIV-2006-404-6162, 19 February 2008.Privacy Principles in s11) referred to bodies with a judicial function which arerecognised by law and likely to be created either directly by statute or pursuantto a statute. Perhaps relevantly, His Honour, in rejecting policy argumentsadvanced by counsel for the Church, also at [63] expressed the view that it islikely that Parliament intended disciplinary committees or tribunals ofprofessional bodies to be subject to the Privacy Act and thereby should betreated as a tribunal within the meaning of the definition of agency unders2(1).[48] The Standards Committee clearly in my view cannot be regarded as a "court"in terms of s 17 of the Act. On the critical question here however as to whether a bodylike the Standards Committee ought to be classified as a "tribunal" in New Zealand,Ms McGuigan properly noted before me that, according to the Law Commission, thisis often a "difficult question" and "much will depend on the context in which thequestion is asked."11[49] In its 2004 review of the structure and operation of courts and tribunals, theLaw Commission defined tribunals in its glossary as "a variety of state-supportedagencies that deal in a less formal way with particular sorts of disputes". In its laterreport into a unified tribunals framework in New Zealand, the Law Commissionconsidered that, in order to be classified as tribunals, decision-making bodies had toexercise an adjudicative function and be independent.12[50] I turn next to dictionary definitions of the word "tribunal" which are of someassistance here. "Tribunal" is relevantly defined in part:(a) in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Fourth Edition, as "acourt of justice, a place of judgment or decision, a judicial authority, aboard appointed to adjudicate in some matter";(b) in the Collins English Dictionary, 30th Anniversary Edition, as "a courtof justice or any place where justice is administered"; and11 Law Commission, Tribunals in New Zealand (NZLC, IP6, 2008) at 2.3., p.32.12 Above n11 at 2.26, p.40.(c) in the Chambers Dictionary, 11th Edition, as "a court of justice orarbitration, a body appointed to adjudicate in some matter or to enquireinto some disputed question."[51] The Standard Committee when functioning to determine a legal fees complaintas here, in my view is a tribunal in terms of s 17 of the Act. Although not a court, asa specialist tribunal it is clearly acting in a quasi-judicial manner in that determination.It has statutory standing, is clearly appointed to adjudicate in matters and enquire intodisputed questions, and to give decisions and it is to administer justice withrequirements in many ways similar to a court. From well-settled authority,13 by s 161of the Act it is the quantum of a disputed fee payable that is finally determined by aStandards Committee decision, although neither a s 161 certificate nor a LCROdecision preclude subsequent court proceedings challenging a client's liability for alawyer's bill of costs. Nevertheless, as I see the position, in that s 161 of the LACA,which addresses a stay of proceedings for recovery from a client of a lawyer's costs,subs (4) could not be more clear when it provides the circumstances (as I outline at[44] above) in which a costs quantum complaint is to be regarded as "finally disposedof". As I see it, those are the particular circumstances that do prevail in this case.[52] I agree entirely too with the comments of Mr Johnstone for the NZLS that theStandards Committee has a dual investigative and a quasi-judicial decision-makingrole. It is an entirely specialist jurisdiction and especially with its importantdecision-making role, as he notes at [47] above:The Standards Committee has express powers to make final determinations ofcomplaints, specifically of cost dispute and review matters, and utiliseshearing and evidence-taking procedures akin to a civil court of law.[53] In considering the purpose and context of s 17 of the Act, as Ms McGuiganherself has noted, which I outline above at [34], that provision is entirely consistentwith the important principle of finality in litigation and is designed to prevent a partybringing the same claim in more than one court or tribunal. Arguably, that is just whatMrs Nielsen had endeavoured to do here. Duplication of litigation unreasonably does13 WynnWilliams v Kain [2011] 2 NZLR 709; Norris Ward McKinnon v Skelton [2020] NZHC 1445;Simpson Grierson v Gilmour [2009] 19 PRNZ 865; and Pratley v Courteney [2020] NZHC 1636potentially clog up courts and the overall dispute resolution system. It is to be avoidedand is no doubt what Parliament had in mind in its explanatory note to the DisputesTribunal Bill I note at [30] above.[54] The s 161 provisions relating to the finality of a Standards Committeedetermination of a complaint, and particularly its "final and conclusive" certificationof a quantum amount on costs due to a practitioner, also in my view lend support tothe conclusions I have reached here.[55] For all the reasons I have outlined above, I accept that theStandards Committee, in functioning to determine Mrs Nielsen's fee complaint, is a"tribunal" in terms of s 17 of the Act, which applies here. It follows that the DT clearlyacted ultra vires in assuming jurisdiction in this case. This is because the complaintagainst PFL's fee brought by Mrs Nielsen to the Standards Committee on 4 November2019 was both:(a) in terms of s 17(1)(b) of the Act, commenced before another tribunal(the Standards committee) at that earlier time, whereas the DT claimabout the fee dispute was not commenced until 1 August 2021; and(b) in terms of s 17(2) of the Act, that Standards Committee complaint andclaim was not withdrawn, abandoned or struck out, prior to Mrs Nielsenbringing the same claim to the DT. In particular, on 10 July 2020 theStandards Committee had given its determination on the claim asfollows:The Standards Committee has resolved to take no furtheraction on the complaint pursuant to s138(2) of the Act, ashaving regard to all the circumstances of the case, any furtheraction is unnecessary or inappropriate"This was over a year prior to when Ms Nielsen brought the claim beforethe DT.[56] Section 17(2) of the Act therefore excludes the claim from the DT'sjurisdiction. I find the DT acted ultra vires by assuming jurisdiction to hearMs Nielsen's claim.PFL's second and third grounds of review – the District Court took into accountirrelevant considerations and failed to take into account relevant considerationswhen it condoned/endorsed the Disputes Tribunal decision.[57] Given my decision on PFL's first ground of review on which it has succeeded,I need say nothing on these second and third grounds. Suffice to say, however, thatgiven the outcome here, it necessarily follows in my view that PFL would also havesucceeded against the District Court on these second and third review grounds as well.Result[58] This judicial review application succeeds.[59] Declarations are now made under s 16 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act2016 as follows:(a) A declaration that the decision of the Disputes Tribunal of 16 November2021 relating to Ms Nielsen's claim against PFL is ultra vires.(b) A declaration that the District Court in its decision dated 20 September2022 erred by failing to find that the Disputes Tribunal lackedjurisdiction to hear Mrs Nielsen's lawyers' fee complaint.(c) A declaration that, where a lawyers' fee complaint has been consideredby a New Zealand Law Society Standards Committee, s 17 of theDisputes Tribunal Act 1988 excludes the Disputes Tribunal fromseizing jurisdiction over that fee complaint.[60] As to costs in this matter, before me the parties appeared to agree that generallythis proceeding involved substantive matters of public interest and that no order forcosts should be made. That said, there will be no order made for costs here. Costs areto lie where they fall.Gendall JSolicitors:Parry Field Lawyers for the ApplicantJanna McGuigan Barrister Limited for the Third RespondentCopy to Richard Johnstone Barrister for the Intervener