ARPS v DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS [2020] NZHC 706

ARPS v DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS [2020] NZHC 706 [8 April 2020]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDCHRISTCHURCH REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROAŌTAUTAHI ROHECRI-2020-409-000011[2020] NZHC 706BETWEEN PHILLIP NEVILLE ARPSAppellantAND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONSRespondentHearing: 24 March 2020Appearances: A M S Williams for AppellantW S Taffs for RespondentJudgment: 8 April 2020JUDGMENT OF OSBORNE JThis judgment was delivered by me on 8 April 2020 at 2.10 pmRegistrar/Deputy RegistrarDate:[1] This is an appeal against special conditions imposed by the District Court uponthe appellant, Phillip Neville Arps, on his release from prison earlier this year.1 Theywere imposed under s 94 Sentencing Act 2002 ("the Act").Background[2] The appellant appears to have a deep-seated enmity towards people of theMuslim and Jewish faiths. The enmity has been manifested in vitriolic language andactivity. It seemingly occupies his mind both when he is awake and asleep. It has ledhim into offending on two occasions in recent years. The first involved offensivebehaviour when he filmed himself, with others, delivering dead animal heads to thedoor of a mosque in Christchurch. The second resulted in his pleading guilty to twocharges of distributing objectionable publications in 2019 in the form of edited videofootage of the shootings which occurred at the mosque in question and at anothermosque.2[3] As recorded by Judge O'Driscoll in the District Court:3Mr Arps was sent an electronic copy of the video on the day of the shooting.The following day he sent the video to another person and instructed them toinclude crosshairs and a "kill count". This would mimic a first-person shootervideo game, with the kill count increasing as people were killed. Mr Arps hadthe modifications completed so he could distribute the video. Mr Arps alsodistributed the unmodified video to approximately 30 of his associates, Hedeleted the video and did not send it to anyone after the Prime Minister madecomments about the possibility it was objectionable.[4] For the 2019 offences, the appellant was sentenced to 21 months'imprisonment, a sentence which he appealed unsuccessfully to the High Court and theCourt of Appeal.41 Department of Corrections v Arps [2020] NZDC 1409 ("District Court judgment").2 At the time the appellant was sentenced, the person who had filmed himself carrying out theshootings at the mosque had yet to be charged. He has since been charged with and was on26 March 2020 convicted of 51 acts of murder, 40 acts of attempted murder and one act ofterrorism.3 At [9].4 Arps v Police [2019] NZHC 2113; Arps v Police [2019] NZCA 592.[5] At the time of sentencing on the objectionable publication charges,Judge O'Driscoll imposed on the appellant standard and special conditions of release,the special conditions being:(a) Mr Arps is to attend a psychological assessment with a departmentalpsychologist;(b) Mr Arps is not to possess or use any electronic device capable ofaccessing the internet or capturing, storing or distributing images;(c) Mr Arps is to attend and complete any recommended intervention foralcohol and drug use to the satisfaction of his probation officer; and(d) Mr Arps is to make available any electronic device capable of accessingthe internet that is used by him or in his possession for inspection bya probation officer.The additional release conditions[6] Shortly before the appellant's release from prison in January 2020, theDepartment of Corrections applied for orders varying and adding further specialconditions to the appellant's sentence, pursuant to s 94 of the Act. The appellantopposed the application. Following the hearing, in which the Department's witnesseswere cross-examined, Judge O'Driscoll imposed a further five special conditions:5(a) not to enter or to loiter near any Mosque, prayer room or other areawhere the Muslim community congregate, unless he has the priorwritten approval of a probation officer, or unless an adult approved bythe probation officer in writing is present;(b) not to have contact with or otherwise associate with the victims of hisoffending, directly or indirectly, unless he has the prior written consent5 District Court judgment, above 1, at [129]–[151].of his probation officer. The victims of Mr Arps' offending areidentified as any member of the Muslim community;(c) to comply with the requirements of electronic monitoring, and toprovide access to the approved residence to the probation officer andthe representatives of the monitoring company, for the purpose ofmaintaining the electronic monitoring equipment, as directed by theprobation officer;(d) to submit to electronic monitoring in the form of GPS technology, asdirected by a probation officer, to monitor his compliance with anycondition as to his whereabouts; and(e) not to possess or use firearms or be involved in any activity involvingfirearms including Airsoft/BB gun style weapons without the priorwritten consent of his probation officer.[7] This appeal is against all but condition (a) (the "whereabouts condition"). Inrelation to both conditions (b) and (e) the appeal is pursued upon the basis thata reframed condition may be appropriate.The statutory regime[8] Section 93 of the Act provides for the imposition of conditions on the releaseof an offender sentenced to imprisonment for a short term (not more than 24 months)as the appellant was.[9] The required purpose of a s 93 special condition is established in s 93(3) whichprovides:(3) A special condition must not be imposed unless it is designed to—(a) reduce the risk of reoffending by the offender; or(b) facilitate or promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of theoffender; or(c) provide for the reasonable concerns of victims of the offender.(3A) The court must not impose an electronic monitoring conditiondescribed in section 15(3)(f) of the Parole Act 2002 unless it has hadregard to the opinion of the chief executive of the Department ofCorrections in a pre-sentence report provided under section 26.[10] In Patterson v R, the Court of Appeal explained that the power to imposespecial conditions is subject to implicit limits.6[11] First, the Court of Appeal observed that any such condition must be tailored tothe offender's circumstances, addressing their particular risk of reoffending orprospects of rehabilitation, or victims. The Court quoted its earlier decision inR v Jannsen:7[15] The discretion must also be exercised consistently with the principlesin s 8 of the Sentencing Act, the first five of which (those in paragraphs (a) –(e)) require that any condition imposed relate explicably to what has beendescribed succinctly as "the precise criminality": R v Meroiti CA392/99 26October 1999 at [6], quoting R v Duffy (1994) 15 Cr App (s) 667 at 681. Andthat must include an assessment of the effect of the offence on any victim: s8(f).[12] Secondly, in Patterson, the Court of Appeal also identified that the "leastrestrictive sentence" principle applies to special conditions under s 93.8[13] Finally, the Court of Appeal agreed with the observation of Williams J in theHigh Court judgment which was appealed that "any given condition must exhibita rational nexus to the s 93(3) purposes, and when considered with other conditionsto be imposed it must be reasonably necessary and proportional".9[14] Section 94 of the Act provides for applications for variation of releaseconditions where special conditions were previously imposed under s 93 of the Act.[15] On such an application, one of the courses open to the Court (under s 94(3)(a)of the Act) is to impose additional conditions. The facts in Chief Executive ofDepartment of Corrections v Palmer present an instance of this Court imposing (under6 Patterson v R [2017] NZCA 66 at [16].7 At [16], quoting R v Jannsen [2007] NZCA 450.8 Patterson v R, above n 6, at [17].9 At [18], citing Patterson v R [2017] NZHC 49 at [38].s 94) additional conditions of release in the light of the conduct of a defendant whileserving his sentence of imprisonment.10The District Court judgment[16] In his reserved judgment, Judge O'Driscoll identified the applicable legalprinciples.11 Those principles were not challenged either in the Court below or onappeal.[17] Judge O'Driscoll then referred to evidence given by Christina Wilson, theService Manager of Corrections Services at Christchurch. His Honour identified fourmatters constituting the grounds relied upon by Ms Wilson being:12(a) Her assessment of the appellant as posing a high risk of furtheroffending, and, in particular, a high risk of causing harm to othersthrough possible emotional abuse and victimisation of the Muslimcommunity.(b) Recordings of 10 telephone calls between the appellant and hisassociates during his imprisonment, providing evidence of hisanti-Muslim, anti-government and anti-police rhetoric, includingthreats to Department of Corrections staff and/or community safety.(c) Numerous letters written by the appellant from 7 October to22 December 2017 containing similar views.(d) Material within the phone calls and letters which indicates a willingnessby the appellant to circumvent or breach conditions already in place.[18] Judge O'Driscoll reviewed in detail the evidence relied upon by Corrections,first in the form of the appellant's letters and then in the course of his telephone calls.1310 Chief Executive of Department of Corrections v Palmer [2017] NZHC 1648.11 District Court judgment, above n 1, at [15]–[34].12 At [37].13 At [58]–[69] and at [70]–[74] respectively.[19] I will not repeat here the numerous passages quoted by Judge O'Driscoll whosejudgment was necessarily the subject of a suppression order in relation to the contentof the appellant's letters and telephone calls. The passages quoted by his Honoursupport the conclusions drawn by Ms Wilson. His Honour referred to the "recurrentthemes in the letters and phone calls".14 The matters which his Honour found on theevidence to be established included:(a) The letters and phone calls clearly demonstrated an extreme dislike ifnot hatred for the Jewish and Muslim community.15(b) The appellant's views and expressions on the Muslim community couldnot be said to amount to "joking" or "flippant" comments nor were they"one-off" comments designed to impress or exaggerate.16(c) There was clear evidence that the appellant was thinking about ways toget around his current release conditions which prohibited his contactto the internet and there was a demonstrated lack of respect for theCourt and by implication any orders made by the Court.17(d) There was a lack of remorse, which along with other material thatheightened the risk of reoffending, could be taken into account inconsidering the necessity to impose further release conditions.18[20] Judge O'Driscoll expressly recognised the entitlement of the appellant to holdviews about segments of the community which the majority do not hold. His Honourrecorded that it was not his intention to criticise the appellant's views nor suppress hisright to hold or convey those views to others (taking into account s 14 New ZealandBill of Rights Act 1990).19 His Honour then turned to consider each of the specialrelease conditions sought by the Department. In doing so, he summarised that he had14 At [100].15 At [101]–[103].16 At [104]–[105].17 At [122] and [124].18 At [125].19 At [126]–[127].to consider whether the proposed conditions were necessary and proportionate andhad a rational nexus for the purposes of s 93 and of the Sentencing Act generally.Considerations applying to all conditions[21] Judge O'Driscoll identified two particular aspects of the appellant's mind setand behaviour which caused him concern and led his Honour to conclude that theimposition of additional conditions was justified:[132] First, I take into account the evidence that reflects Mr Arps' currentmind set and his intentions when released from prison. His continuedreferences to violence, killing, weapons, revenge, vengeance, striking backand hatred of certain ethic groups in the time leading up to his release are bothconcerning and disturbing. This is a matter that clearly increases the risk ofre-offending when released from prison and demonstrates the need to providefor the interests of his victims.[133] Second, I also take into account the evidence that demonstrates themanipulative nature of Mr Arps' intention to attempt to get around the currentrelease conditions. His lack of remorse for anything he has done in the past isclearly evident.The whereabouts condition[22] Judge O'Driscoll found the whereabouts condition to be justified as providingfor the reasonable concerns of the victims under s 93(3)(c) of the Act and preventingre-offending against the Muslim community under s 93(3)(a) of the Act. His Honourreferred to the concern caused in the Muslim community by the appellant's currentoffending. His Honour noted (in contrast to the appellant's statement that he has nointention of going to a mosque) that he had gone to the steps of the mosque on theoccasion of his previous offending. His Honour noted the "firmly entrenched" natureof the appellant's views.20[23] Unsurprisingly, the appeal did not challenge the imposing of the whereaboutscondition. There was a rational connection to the two purposes identified by hisHonour. The condition was necessary and proportionate.20 At [134]–[136].Non-contact condition[24] Judge O'Driscoll held that the proposed non-contact and non-associationcondition (condition (b)) was appropriate, accepting that the victims of the appellant'soffending (to be protected under s 93(3)(c) of the Act) were the members of theMuslim community. The Judge recognised that both the previous and present sets ofoffending were against the Muslim community and that the prison letters and phonecalls showed that the appellant had no remorse but intended to continue to further hispolitical and social ideology. The expression of those ideological views (while withinthe appellant's entitlement) were matters the Court was entitled to take into accountin assessing the risk of reoffending against the Muslim community. Judge O'Driscollrejected the submission for the appellant that his views would be expressed to thosewho agree with his views and not to the Muslim community, noting that during hisprevious offending the appellant had expressed his views directly to the Muslimcommunity. The Judge noted that Corrections could manage a non-contact conditionin a reasonable way that would ensure inadvertent contact does not constitutea breach.21The two GPS conditions[25] I will refer to special conditions (c) and (d) collectively as the "GPSconditions". Condition (c) requires the appellant to submit to GPS monitoring asdirected. Condition (d) is an enforcement provision for the purpose of maintaining theGPS equipment. The Department proposed two exclusion zones in the areassurrounding the two mosques (in the areas of Linwood and Hagley Park). Ms Wilsongave evidence that she had designed the exclusion zones to enable the appellant torecognise the boundaries quickly and to enable, if needed, plenty of time for responseto intrusion. Ms Wilson explained that the condition was designed to prevent theappellant from contacting victims of his offending.[26] The GPS monitoring would occur through the appellant's wearing anelectronic anklet which would send an alert to the monitoring team only if he intrudedbeyond the perimeter of either exclusion zone.21 At [145]–[148].[27] Counsel for the Department invoked the conclusion reached by Edwards J inArmstrong v Nicholas (when imposing special conditions requiring GPS monitoring)that an exclusion zone of itself did not eliminate the risk of reoffending and that GPSmonitoring, in the circumstances of that case, was the minimum required to mitigatethe risk.22[28] Judge O'Driscoll was satisfied that the Department had made out the case forelectronic monitoring in order to monitor the appellant's compliance with hiswhereabouts condition.23 His Honour found that the GPS conditions were necessaryto deal with the risk that Mr Arps would seek to circumvent (other) imposedconditions.24The firearms condition[29] Judge O'Driscoll was satisfied that condition (e) (preventing the possession oruse of firearms) was appropriate because of two matters in particular:25(a) the appellant's offending had involved turning the video of the shootingof the Muslim victims into a shooting game with crosshairs anda kill-count, with the consequence that it would be highly distressing tothe victims of his offending if he were to be seen (by them) witha weapon; and(b) the Department's evidence included an incident where the appellant issaid to have shouted "Allāhu akbar" in the content of an Airsoft game.[30] The Judge noted that the appellant would be able to ask his Probation Officerfor permission to play with Airsoft weapons at a particular time and place.2622 Armstrong v Nicholas [2018] NZHC 5 at [31] and [34].23 District Court judgment, above n 1, at [137].24 At [143].25 At [149]–[150].26 At [151].The appealGrounds of appeal[31] The ground of appeal which the appellant stated in his notice of appeal, inrelation to all conditions, was that they are neither necessary nor proportionate toreduce the risk of reoffending, to facilitate the rehabilitation or reintegration of theappellant, or to provide for the reasonable concerns of the victims. The second ofthose purposes (rehabilitation or reintegration) does not require further consideration– it was neither part of the reasoning of Judge O'Driscoll nor a matter relied upon byMr Taffs, for the Department, in support of the conditions.Non-contact condition[32] In relation to the non-contact condition Mr Williams, in his written synopsis,recorded that the condition is not in general terms opposed but that it is a very difficultcondition to enforce and to comply with.[33] Mr Williams referred to New Zealand's multi-cultural society and the manyroles which members of the Muslim community play within it. He submitted that it isdifficult to impose a condition which could be breached simply by the appellant'sgoing about his daily business, such as dealing with a cashier at the supermarket.Mr Williams submitted that the appellant could (unwittingly) commit countlessbreaches of the non-contact condition in such daily situations. He therefore concludedthat the condition is unnecessary, with the whereabouts condition being sufficient torestrict him from going to certain places, mitigating against any risk and providing forthe reasonable concerns of the victims of his offending.[34] Mr Williams submitted that Judge O'Driscoll's observation as to theDepartment's ability to manage the condition in a reasonable way to deal withinadvertent contact did not represent an appropriate approach.27[35] For the Department, Mr Taffs submitted that the risks relating to the appellant'sbehaviour had to be assessed in light of the fact that the offending for which he is27 District Court judgment, above n 1, at [148].serving his sentence is his second against the Muslim community. Mr Taffs submittedthat the material relating to the appellant's conduct while in prison demonstrateda palpable risk that he intended to instigate further offending (or at least causesignificant distress) to members of the Muslim community.[36] When regard is had to the contents of the appellant's prison conversations andwritings (both in relation to his attitudes and intentions towards the Muslimcommunity and his willingness to disrespect and circumvent the decisions of those inauthority), the Judge's dual finding of risk of reoffending and provision for thereasonable concerns of the victims was justified.[37] The emphasis of the appellant's case on appeal was not so much on theappropriateness of a condition designed to meet those purposes but rather on whetherthe whereabouts condition alone was appropriate to meet those purposes.[38] Again, the Judge's conclusion that the additional non-contact condition wasrequired was justified having regard to the appellant's conversations and writings. Thewhereabouts condition is designed to protect the Muslim community in particularlocalities. The non-contact condition is designed to protect members of the Muslimcommunity wherever they happen to be. The two conditions are in that waycomplementary. They may overlap but they do not duplicate one another.[39] That leaves only the remaining concern raised by Mr Williams, namely thepossibility of the appellant's unwittingly contacting a member of the Muslimcommunity, such as in the context of a supermarket transaction. Again, the Judgecorrectly rejected that as a reason for not imposing such a condition. In relation to thelevel of risk posed by the appellant, the need for a strict condition that precluded theappellant finding wriggle room was a valid consideration. Judge O'Driscoll was alsoentitled to take into account the probability that the Department would manage such acondition in a reasonable way to guard against viewing inadvertent contact as a breach.Unmentioned by the Judge, but also relevant, is the fact that the terms "contact" and"associate" within condition (b) are to be construed pursuant to the associated wordsrule.28 In short, the terms "contact" and "associate" derive their colour from eachother. Therefore condition (b) does not cover an unwitting contact with a member ofthe Muslim community. This judgment of itself will serve to confirm thatinterpretation in relation to the condition imposed upon the appellant.The GPS conditions[40] Mr Williams characterised the GPS conditions as an unnecessary restrictionwhich places a significant burden on the appellant. He submitted that the whereaboutsrestriction is sufficient to mitigate any limited risk that the appellant may reoffend andto address the reasonable concerns of the victims. In this context, Mr Williams notedthat the appellant has no history of non-compliance with conditions imposed on him.He submitted that the appellant's deletion of the objectionable material "as soon as hediscovered that it was objectionable" serves to confirm his ability to comply witha condition.[41] Mr Williams submitted that the GPS conditions are unlikely to deal with anyrisk of reoffending as police response time to a GPS-detected breach would likely seethe offence committed by the time police arrived. Mr Williams therefore suggestedthat the most significant purpose of GPS monitoring would be to provide evidence ofany breach. Given the appellant's well-known appearance and the monitoring of thesites by way of CCTV, Mr Williams suggested that the appellant would inevitably beidentified promptly and held to account (regardless of GPS monitoring).[42] Mr Williams submitted also that the relevant risk of reoffending here lies in thedistribution of further objectionable material rather than the commission of an offencein the vicinity of one of the mosques.[43] Finally, Mr Williams noted that any breach of the other conditions imposedwould place the appellant at risk of a further term of imprisonment, which Mr Williamscharacterised as a "significant protective factor".28 Also known by the Latin maxim noscitur a sociis. See J F Burrows (ed) Statute Law inNew Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) at pp [232]–[237].[44] For the Department, Mr Taffs submitted that the GPS conditions serve the dualpurpose of lessening the likelihood of further offending and providing a layer ofprotection to the victims.[45] Mr Taffs noted that the exclusion zones are around the two mosques inChristchurch, and that the appellant's exclusion from the area around the Hagley Parkmosque should not inconvenience him at all given that he does not reside in that area.Mr Taffs notes in any event the reservation whereby the probation officer may approvetrips within the exclusion zones in appropriate circumstances.[46] Mr Taffs placed reliance on the approach adopted by this Court inArmstrong v Nicholas where, in relation to a similar exclusion zone approach to GPSmonitoring, the Court found the restraint on Mr Nicholas to be the minimum requiredto mitigate the risk he posed.29[47] Mr Taffs submitted that Judge O'Driscoll correctly found that the GPSmonitoring was a "necessary and proportionate response to the risk" given that it bothallowed police time to respond to any breaches of the exclusion zone and respondedto the prospect that the appellant might seek to circumvent imposed conditions.[48] Mr Taffs responded to a theme in the submissions of Mr Williams which hadsuggested that the risk of the appellant reoffending might be regarded as low. Mr Taffssubmitted that, even if the risk of occurrence were to be regarded as low, this is a casewhere the impact on the group of victims to be protected would be high.[49] Judge O'Driscoll correctly identified the GPS conditions as providing a meansfor prompt police response in time to prevent offending when the whereaboutscondition of itself is insufficient for that purpose.30 In other words, the Judge correctlyfound that the GPS conditions were a necessary part of a suite of conditions that aimedto prevent further offending and to protect the Muslim community. This took intoaccount the prospect that the appellant would seek to circumvent any restrictions29 Armstrong v Nicholas, above n 22, at [34].30 District Court judgment, above n 1, at [141].imposed. The Judge correctly took the same view of condition (d) which is the meansby which the Department can ensure the monitoring equipment remains operational.[50] In concluding that these were necessary and proportionate responses to the riskinvolved, his Honour appropriately had regard to the fact that the appellant does notlive in either of the exclusion zones and that, if he is required to enter them forlegitimate purposes, he can seek approval. His Honour also correctly took into accountthe fact that the GPS regime proposed by the Department does not serve to monitorthe appellant's whereabouts continuously (but rather operates in the event of entry intoan exclusion zone).[51] Judge O'Driscoll correctly found the GPS conditions to be appropriate.Firearms condition[52] Relevantly to the firearms condition, it is common ground that the appellantpossesses an Airsoft gun constructed so as to be similar to a weapon used and seen onthe day of the shooting in March 2019.[53] Mr Williams submitted that the firearms condition represents an unwarrantedcondition when the appellant is not a holder of a firearms licence, has no reason topossess or use firearms, and would be subject to a criminal charge under theArms Act 1983 were he to be unlawfully in possession of a firearm.[54] Mr Williams submitted that the real import of the firearms condition is toprevent the appellant from engaging in the sport of Airsoft, a sport in which he hasbeen involved for a significant number of years. Mr Williams suggested that it isdifficult to see what risk the firearms condition is designed to prevent when there areprovisions in the Arms Act which would prevent its use in an inappropriate way.31[55] Mr Williams referred to Judge O'Driscoll's observation that it would be highlydistressing to the Muslim community to see the appellant with weaponry even if itwere for the purposes of Airsoft. Mr Williams submitted that such a situation is31 Mr Williams referred, by way of example, to s 46 Arms Act 1983.unlikely to come about given that the only place where the appellant is likely to beseen with Airsoft equipment is at his home or on an Airsoft course.[56] For the Department, Mr Taffs referred to the appearance of a rifle used on theday of the 15 March shooting, of which the appellant's Airsoft gun appears to bea replica. Mr Taffs refers also to the way in which the appellant's index offendinginvolved the veneration of footage showing persons being shot as a result of theirMuslim faith, with the appellant arranging for the modification of the video to includecrosshairs and a kill-count, both trivialising and glorifying the shooting.[57] Mr Taffs referred also to the telephone conversation which refers to theappellant yelling "Allāhu akbar" while having previously played Airsoft.[58] All these matters, in Mr Taffs' submission, point to a relationship between theappellant's engaging in Airsoft and an intentional causing of distress to the Muslimcommunity. The likelihood of the appellant's seeking in such a way to cause distressto a particular community which he dislikes is reinforced, in Mr Taffs' submission, byexcerpts in the prison recordings of conversations in which the appellant, afterreference to Corrections or other personnel, refers to shooting, "up against the wall"and target practice.[59] Mr Taffs emphasised that, as with other conditions, there is the reservation tothe appellant of the right to seek approval from a probation officer.[60] The way in which the appellant's thinking focusses on the involvement offirearms against those he dislikes, and his acting upon those attitudes specifically inrelation to the 15 March 2019 events, made a firearms condition appropriate.Combined with the evidence of the appellant's willingness to circumvent restrictions,it was also necessary that any firearms condition be comprehensive.[61] I explored with counsel in the course of submissions whether, having regard tothe potential to carve out an express right to possess an Airsoft rifle only on an Airsoftrange, such a carve out might have been contemplated.[62] For his part, Mr Williams responsibly accepted that were there to be a specificreservation for the appellant to engage in Airsoft specifically at a range, the appellant'sobjection to the condition would fall away. Mr Taffs observed, however, that themanner in which the appellant has used video footage would leave open the significantrisk that, no matter what restriction applied to the appellant's location when playingAirsoft, objectionable footage would emerge (quite possibly through others) toretraumatise members of the Muslim community.[63] I accept Mr Taffs' submission in that regard. The appellant found a way, verysoon after the murders and other crimes of 15 March 2019, both to trivialise and toglorify horrific crimes against a particular community. The fact that the killer's actsare now, by virtue of his guilty pleas, able to be formally characterised as crimes,serves to reinforce conclusions earlier reached in regard to the avoidance of furthertrauma to members of Christchurch's Muslim community.[64] In the circumstances, Judge O'Driscoll correctly found the comprehensivenature of condition (e) to be appropriate.Outcome[65] The appellant has not demonstrated any error in the District Court's impositionof special conditions.Order[66] I dismiss the appeal.Osborne JSolicitors:A M S Williams, Barrister, ChristchurchRaymond Donnelly, Christchurch