EPERE v POLICE [2022] NZHC 866

EPERE v POLICE [2022] NZHC 866 [29 April 2022]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDAUCKLAND REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHECRI-2021-404-175CRI-2021-404-177CRI-2021-404-178CRI-2021-404-179CRI-2021-404-180CRI-2021-404-181CRI-2021-404-182CRI-2021-404-202CRI-2021-404-203[2022] NZHC 866BETWEEN RAYMOND WILLIAM EPEREAppellantAND NEW ZEALAND POLICERespondentHearing: 21 March 2021Counsel: C G Wright for AppellantI L M Archibald for RespondentJudgment: 29 April 2022JUDGMENT OF BREWER JThis judgment was delivered by me on 29 April 2022 at 11.30 amRegistrar/Deputy RegistrarSolicitors:Public Defence Service (Auckland) for AppellantMeredith Connell (Auckland) for RespondentIntroduction[1] Mr Raymond Epere applies for leave to appeal his entire criminal history ofconvictions. Mr Epere has 16 convictions entered in the period between 2001 and2013. The appeal is brought on the basis that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.Mr Epere is diagnosed as having an intellectual disability. He has had this disabilitysince childhood. It now appears unlikely that he has ever been fit to stand trial or pleadin respect of any of his previous charges.[2] The appeal is filed out of time. Mr Epere therefore seeks an extension of timefor filing the notice of appeal. The respondent accepts that leave to appeal should begranted. It also agrees that the appeal against convictions should be allowed.[3] I will address the application for leave before turning to the substantive appeal.Background[4] Between 2001 and 2009, Mr Epere probably pleaded guilty to 10 charges, allfor relatively minor offending.1 This included offences such as consuming cannabis,failing to answer bail and unlawfully taking a motor vehicle. There is also one chargeof male assaults female.[5] In 2011, Mr Epere was found unfit to stand trial for the first time. This was inrespect of charges of theft, burglary, possession of a weapon, receiving property (under$500) and failing to answer bail.[6] Nevertheless, Mr Epere was convicted of further offences in 2012 and 2013.The further offending involved charges of trespassing, disorderly behaviour, breachesof a local liquor ban, failing to answer bail and possession of instruments for the useof cannabis. It appears that the issue of fitness to stand trial was not raised. Mr Eperepleaded guilty to all the charges.1 Due to a lack of documentation it is not possible to determine conclusively if Mr Epere in factentered guilty pleas to all charges or was convicted after a defended hearing. However, the smallspace of time between the offence and sentence date for some of Mr Epere's convictions indicatesthat he likely entered guilty pleas. Mr Epere also told one expert that he always pleaded guilty tocharges.[7] In 2020, Mr Epere was found unfit to stand trial for a second time. On thisoccasion his offending was more serious. It involved a charge of assault with intentto injure.[8] Following the finding in 2020 that Mr Epere was again unfit to stand trial,counsel for Mr Epere became aware that it was highly unlikely he had ever been fit tostand trial in respect of any of his previous criminal charges.Leave to appeal[9] The notice of appeal was filed on 14 April 2021.[10] The appeal is advanced under s 115 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957, inrespect of proceedings commenced before 1 July 2013, and under s 229 of theCriminal Procedure Act 2011, in respect of proceedings commenced after 1 July 2013.The former Act required a notice of appeal to be filed within 28 days after the date ofsentencing. The latter Act requires a notice of appeal against conviction to be filedwithin 20 working days after the date of sentence for the conviction appealed against.[11] The Court may extend the time allowed for filing the notice of appeal.2 Thetouchstone will be the interests of justice in the particular case.3 This involvesbalancing a range of factors including:4 the wider interests of society in the finality of decisions, the strength of theproposed appeal, whether the liberty of the subject is involved, the practicalutility of any remedy sought, the extent of the impact on others affected andon the administration of justice, and any prejudice to the Crown.[12] As noted above, the respondent accepts that an extension of time to file thenotice of appeal is appropriate. Extensions of time have been granted in similar cases.52 Summary Proceedings Act 1957, s 123(1); and Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 231(3).3 See R v Knight [1998] 1 NZLR 583 (CA) at 587; and R v Lee [2006] 3 NZLR 42 (CA) at [96]–[99].4 Lee, above n 3, at [99].5 See Christie v Police [2018] NZHC 2149; and Lawler v R [2013] NZCA 308.[13] The merits of this appeal weigh heavily in favour of granting leave. The ageand number of convictions do not materially alter the analysis.6 Nor do the otherfactors identified above.7 Despite the societal need for finality in litigation, I considerthat the interests of justice in a case where it is said that convictions should never havebeen entered because of lack of capacity favour granting an extension. I grant leave.The appeal[14] I must allow the appeal if I am satisfied that a miscarriage of justice hasoccurred for any reason. A miscarriage of justice is also an available ground forappealing a conviction entered prior to the commencement of the Criminal ProcedureAct.8 The same test will apply.9[15] Section 232(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act defines a "miscarriage of justice"as any error, irregularity, or occurrence that has created a real risk that the outcome ofthe trial was affected or has resulted in an unfair trial or a trial that was a nullity. A"trial" is defined to include a proceeding in which the appellant pleaded guilty.10However, the grounds for appealing a guilty plea must be exceptional.11 A convictioncannot be impugned where the appellant fully appreciated the merits of the positionand made an informed decision to plead guilty.[16] On the other hand, a miscarriage of justice will be found where it isdemonstrated that the appellant was unfit to stand trial at the time the convictions wereentered.12 This is because it is a fundamental feature of the criminal justice systemthat "only those who pass the threshold of being fit to stand trial are subjected to allthat is entailed in responding to criminal charges".136 I note that the convictions in this case are fewer in number, and more recent, than the convictionsin Christie, above n 5.7 Lee, above n 3, at [99].8 See, for example, Miller v Police [2017] NZHC 2183.9 CG v Police [2021] NZHC 645 at [17].10 Criminal Procedure Act, s 232(5).11 R v Le Page [2005] 2 NZLR 845 (CA) at [16] endorsed by the Supreme Court in Wilson v R [2015]NZSC 189, [2016] 1 NZLR 705 at [96] and [97].12 See Cumming v R [2008] NZSC 39, [2010] 2 NZLR 433.13 Nonu v R [2017] NZCA 170 at [24].[17] While an appellate court is not empowered to make a formal finding ofunfitness to plead or stand trial on a general appeal, that does not prevent the courtfrom determining whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred by reason of a mentaldisorder from which the appellant was suffering at the time of trial.14 That is thecentral question on this appeal.Fitness to stand trial[18] The assessment of whether a miscarriage of justice occurred when Mr Epere'sconvictions were entered must be determined in accordance with the law that was inforce at the relevant time.15 As his convictions span from 2001 to 2013, two separateregimes must be considered: the Criminal Justice Act 1985 (CJA) and the CriminalProcedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 (CPMIP Act).Pre-2004 convictions: the CJA[19] Prior to 1 September 2004, the CJA governed the requirements of fitness tostand trial. A person was considered unfit to stand trial if they were "under disability"which in turn required the person to be "mentally disordered".16 The definition of a"mental disorder" was the same as that under the Mental Health (CompulsoryAssessment and Treatment) Act 1992 which expressly excluded "intellectualdisability".17[20] It was therefore possible under the CJA for a person who was intellectuallydisabled, but did not meet the definition of being mentally disordered, to not meet thecriteria for being unfit to stand trial.[21] This raises a question about the Court's jurisdiction to consider an appealagainst convictions entered prior to the enactment of the CPMIP Act on the basis of amiscarriage of justice when that is said to arise as a consequence of the appellant'sintellectual disability. The approach adopted in other cases has been to proceed on the14 Cumming, above n 12, at [13].15 Lawler, above n 5, at [7].16 Criminal Justice Act 1985, ss 2 (definition of "mentally disordered") and 108.17 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, ss 2 (definition of "mentaldisorder" and "mentally disordered") and 4(e).basis that the Court has inherent jurisdiction to consider such appeals, notwithstandingthat intellectual disability was expressly excluded as a basis for considering adefendant unfit to stand trial under the statutory regime in force at the time thoseconvictions were entered.18 The respondent accepts that such a course remains opento the Court in this case.[22] I adopt that approach.Post-2004 convictions: the CPMIP Act[23] The CPMIP Act came into force on 1 September 2004. Parliament's intentionwith the CPMIP Act was to broaden the qualifying criteria for assessing whether ornot a defendant is unfit to stand trial by including persons who are mentally impairedthrough, for example, an intellectual disability.19[24] Section 4 of the Act defines "unfit to stand trial" in the following terms:unfit to stand trial, in relation to a defendant,—(a) means a defendant who is unable, due to mental impairment, toconduct a defence or to instruct counsel to do so; and(b) includes a defendant who, due to mental impairment, is unable—(i) to plead:(ii) to adequately understand the nature or purpose or possibleconsequences of the proceedings:(iii) to communicate adequately with counsel for the purposes ofconducting a defence.[25] While "mental impairment" is not defined in the CPMIP Act, a number ofcriteria have been held to inform the assessment of fitness to stand trial, includingwhether the defendant is capable of:20(a) understanding what it is that they have been charged with;18 See CG, above n 9, at [27]; Christie, above n 5, at [35]; and Lawler, above n 5, at [11].19 Nonu, above n 13, at [25].20 See M (CA 424/2019) v R [2019] NZCA 461 at [10]; and Nonu, above n 13, at [27]. This list offactors was originally drawn from R v Presser [1958] VR 45 (SC) at 48 and adopted byBaragwanath J in P v Police [2007] 2 NZLR 528 (HC) at [43].(b) pleading to the charge and exercising their right of challenge;(c) understanding that the proceedings would be an inquiry as to whetheror not they did what they were charged with;(d) following, in general terms, the course of the proceeding before theCourt;(e) understanding the substantial effect of any evidence given againstthem;(f) making a defence to, or answering, the charge;(g) deciding what defence they would rely on;(h) giving instructions to their legal representative (if any); and(i) making their version of the facts known to the Court and to their legalrepresentative, if any.[26] Evaluating a defendant's ability to take part in a trial by reference to thesefactors is not a mechanical exercise.21 The Court of Appeal in Nonu v R observedthat:22[29] An inquiry into a defendant's fitness to stand trial, however, involvesmore than an assessment of whether or not the defendant can participate in hisor her trial by simply performing relevant trial functions. A defendant mustalso have the capacity to participate effectively in his or her trial. This involvesan assessment of the defendant's intellectual capacity to carry out relevant trialfunctions. The reason for the need to inquire into the defendant's capacity toparticipate effectively in his or her trial is that the principles we have explainedabove are not honoured in cases where, for example, a defendant superficiallyappears to participate in his or her trial but in reality is, because of intellectualdisability, nothing more than a bystander.[27] The inquiry is a contextual one which recognises that:2321 M (CA 424/2019) v R, above n 20, at [11].22 Nonu, above n 13 (footnotes omitted).23 At [31] (footnotes omitted). a defendant may have the capacity to participate effectively in a simplecriminal proceeding in which, for example, they plead guilty to shoplifting,but cannot participate effectively in more complex proceedings in which theyneed to process information in real time and communicate effectively in orderto advance their defence.[28] I must determine whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred by evaluatingthe evidence of Mr Epere's longstanding intellectual disability against theseprinciples.The expert reports and medical evidence[29] Mr Epere is the subject of five psychological reports before the Court. I willbriefly describe the contents of each report before summarising what in my view arethe key conclusions to be drawn in respect of Mr Epere's intellectual disability andfitness to stand trial.Report by Dr Mhairi Duff dated 9 September 2010[30] Dr Duff's assessment indicated "quite a profound level of problems" includingthat Mr Epere had little understanding of his benefits, his financial affairs or how tomanage himself. It indicated that he was unlikely to be able to live independently.[31] With respect to factors indicating Mr Epere's fitness to stand trial, Dr Duff'sviews were:(a) Mr Epere could identify most of his charges but was unable to identifywhen the events allegedly occurred.(b) He seemed to have very little understanding of the pleas available andwhat they meant. He was unable to describe what a guilty plea meantand described a not guilty plea as meaning that he would not "get sentto jail". He had some understanding of right and wrong.(c) Mr Epere had very little understanding of the purpose of the courtproceedings and what sort of material might be brought in evidenceagainst him.(d) Mr Epere did not have a good understanding of the court process. Heunderstood that his lawyer was there to assist him but had littleunderstanding of the concept of instructions. He repeatedly stated thathe needed to do what his lawyer told him to do.(e) He had no idea of the possible defences that he may be able to pursueor how to choose between different defences.[32] Dr Duff found that Mr Epere appeared to have significant cognitive deficitslikely to place him in the moderate range of intellectual disability. This was said toaffect his long term memory, ability to gauge the passage of time and his ability torelay information.[33] Dr Duff was of the opinion that the court would be likely to find Mr Epere unfitto stand trial.Report by Ms Sabine Visser dated 24 June 2011[34] Ms Visser administered a full scale WAIS-IV test in order to assess Mr Epere'sintellectual functioning and overall cognitive ability. Mr Epere's overall cognitiveability was within the "extremely low" range of intellectual functioning and better thanonly 0.1 per cent of same-aged peers. His IQ was 49. This score was indicative ofmild to moderate intellectual disability. Mr Epere scored in the "extremely low" rangefor verbal comprehension, perceptual reasoning, working memory and processingspeed.[35] As to Mr Epere's fitness to stand trial, Ms Visser noted that Mr Eperedemonstrated a basic understanding of right and wrong but was not able to explainwhat guilty or not guilty meant. He indicated that he did have a lawyer but did notknow how to get in touch with her. He stated that he did what his lawyer told him todo. He stated that he would never tell his lawyer what to do. He did not understandthe nature or the purpose or the possible consequence of the court proceedings. Hisability to communicate with his counsel would be "severely limited".[36] Ms Visser was of the opinion that the court would be likely to find Mr Epereunfit to stand trial.Report by Mr Jim van Rensburg dated 29 July 2020[37] Mr van Rensburg described Mr Epere as "effectively illiterate andinnumerate". He was, for instance, not able to draw a clock face or to place the handsto indicate the time. Mr van Rensburg administered a test of nonverbal intelligence(TONI) and Mr Epere obtained a score which converted to an IQ of 73. Mr vanRensburg said this appeared to be an over-estimation of Mr Epere's cognitive ability.The report also notes that although this score was considerably higher than thatmeasured by Ms Visser, it was still in the category of mild to borderline intellectualdisability.[38] Mr van Rensburg said that Mr Epere had poor memory, a very poor conceptof time and poor adaptive functioning skills. It is unlikely that he would be able tolive independently. He relies upon housing New Zealand accommodation and saidthat buying food is too expensive, such that he typically eats with the City Mission.He struggles to use public transport other than to destinations he is familiar with.[39] Mr Epere indicated that he always pleaded guilty because "I never tell lies".Mr Epere appeared to have little understanding of the role of the judge, jury or thepolice prosecutor. Mr van Rensburg commented that he had great doubts as to whetherMr Epere would be able to fully instruct his lawyer as to his defence. The report notesthat:Although he has often submitted a plea of guilty in the past, it is clear that itwas often just to get the issue over and done with. He does not have anunderstanding of the full effect of a plea or the evidence to be led.[40] Mr van Rensburg was of the opinion that the court would be likely to findMr Epere unfit to stand trial.Report by Dr Joseph Sakdalan dated 10 August 2021[41] Counsel for Mr Epere instructed Dr Sakdalan to prepare a psychological reportfor the purpose of the present appeal. Dr Sakdalan was specifically asked to considerMr Epere's intellectual disability and whether he has ever been fit to stand trial for hischarges since 2001.[42] Dr Sakdalan's report states that Mr Epere has severe cognitive impairment. Hewas disoriented to person, day and date. He could not repeat the assessor's namedespite being reminded a few times. He has significant memory problems, poor senseof time, and tended to confabulate. Mr Epere's overall cognitive ability was assessedusing the WAIS-IV test and his full-scale IQ score was 50. His performance was betterthan only one out of 1000 same-age peers. This score is in the moderate intellectualdisability range and was consistent with the results of Ms Visser's earlier testing ofMr Epere in 2011 which yielded an IQ score of 49.[43] In commenting on the cognitive assessment findings, Dr Sakdalan noted:These areas of cognitive functioning are relevant to a defendant's ability toengage meaningfully in the court process. Impairment in these areas cannegatively impact on a defendant's fitness to stand trial (e.g. ability to plead,ability to understand the nature, purpose and possible consequences of theproceedings, ability to mount a defence and instruct counsel for the purposeof mounting a defence) within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure(Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003.[44] Dr Sakdalan concluded that Mr Epere meets the criteria for the diagnosis ofmoderate intellectual disability. It is likely that the impairment occurred within thedevelopment period (prior to the age of 18):Given the pervasive nature of his condition, Mr Epere's significant intellectualimpairment occurred during the developmental years and can be consideredpermanent. Mr Epere has had significant intellectual impairment throughouthis life; hence, issues around his diagnosis of intellectual disability and fitnessto stand trial can be considered relevant to all his previous and currentoffences.[45] While there were difficulties in assessing Mr Epere's fitness to stand trialretrospectively given his impaired memory functioning, which limited his ability torecall the circumstances of his previous offences, Dr Sakdalan stated that:Taking into consideration Mr Epere's psychological and cognitivevulnerabilities, I am of the opinion that there is an extremely high probabilitythat Mr Epere was unfit to stand trial to most if not all of the charges.Report by Dr Ian Goodwin dated 2021[46] The respondent instructed Dr Goodwin to provide a report with an opinion onMr Epere's historical fitness to stand trial. Dr Goodwin expressed the opinion thatMr Epere does suffer from an intellectual disability. That intellectual disabilityappears to have been present from an early age. Dr Goodwin notes that Mr Epereappears to have an extremely low IQ being less than 55 which, in his opinion, is"somewhat misleadingly" described as a moderate disability. Individuals with thatlevel of intellectual disability would usually struggle with normal daily tasks andrequire consistent assistance to live in the community.[47] With respect to Mr Epere's fitness to stand trial, Dr Goodwin commented thatthere is "significant consistency" with Mr Epere's presentation to the previousassessors and that presentation is consistent with his level of intellectual disabilitywhich appears to have been lifelong. Dr Goodwin stated that it seems unlikely thatMr Epere's capacity to interact with the court has significantly fluctuated over the lastdecade. There is no evidence in the materials available to Dr Goodwin that Mr Eperegained any level of knowledge through his previous interactions with the court thatassisted him in later interactions.[48] Dr Goodwin concluded:In considering the significant intellectual impairment that Mr Epere suffersfrom, combined with the consistent nature of his presentations in previousassessments of fitness to stand trial, I am of the opinion that it is more likelythan not that Mr Epere would be found unfit to stand trial by the Court on themajority (if not all) of the charges he has previously faced (and entered guiltypleas to), if enquiry into his fitness to stand trial had been made at that time.Summary of expert reports[49] The central theme across each of the five reports is that Mr Epere is identifiedas having a moderate intellectual disability. That term was described by Dr Goodwinas being somewhat misleading in conveying the true severity of Mr Epere'simpairment. His IQ scores were 49, 73 and 50 respectively. The score of 73 wasconsidered by the expert who administered the test to be an overestimation ofMr Epere's abilities. To give an illustration of Mr Epere's relative cognitive ability,his performance on the WAIS-IV test was better than only one out of 1000 same-agepeers. Mr Epere's adaptive functioning, an important component of any assessmentof intellectual disability, was also considered to be in the "extremely low" range. It isevident that Mr Epere experiences significant difficulties in many aspects of day-to-day life and he requires considerable assistance to live in the community.[50] Mr Epere consistently demonstrated a very limited understanding of courtprocesses, the role of the judge, jury, the prosecutor and his own lawyer. Although hehad a limited understanding of right and wrong, he was unable to describe the meaningof a guilty or not guilty plea. He indicated to one expert that he always pleaded guiltybecause he never tells lies. Mr Epere stated that he would never tell his lawyer whatto do and simply did what he was told.[51] Every expert was of the opinion that Mr Epere would likely be deemed unfitto stand trial. Dr Sakdalan and Dr Goodwin, both asked to consider Mr Epere'shistorical fitness to stand trial, were of the opinion that it is unlikely he was fit to standtrial on any of his previous charges.Discussion[52] The task of retrospectively assessing Mr Epere's fitness to stand trial is adifficult one. That difficulty was recognised by both Dr Sakdalan and Dr Goodwin intheir reports. The earliest report assessing Mr Epere's fitness to stand trial wasprepared in 2010. His earliest convictions predate that report by some years. Thisappeal concerns convictions entered in 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009,2012, and 2013.[53] The difficulty is further compounded by a lack of documentation in relation toMr Epere's earlier convictions. It is not possible to ascertain the circumstances inwhich his convictions were entered, including whether Mr Epere entered guilty pleasor was convicted following a defended hearing, and the extent to which he receivedlegal advice at the time.[54] Notwithstanding these difficulties, I am satisfied that the appeal should beallowed. The experts are unanimous that Mr Epere suffers from a moderateintellectual disability. I agree with Dr Goodwin that use of the term "moderate" doesnot accurately convey the extent of Mr Epere's impairment. He has a very limitedunderstanding of the nature and purpose of court processes. He does not appreciatebeyond a rudimentary level the meaning or consequence of a guilty or not guilty plea.He is unable to instruct counsel. His long term memory is significantly impaired, asis his ability to gauge the passage of time and accurately relay information. Theseprofound difficulties render Mr Epere unable to make informed decisions at any stageof the criminal process.[55] The evidence shows that Mr Epere's significant intellectual impairment likelyoccurred during his developmental years. His disability can be considered permanent.There is no evidence to suggest that Mr Epere gained any level of knowledge throughhis earlier interactions with the court that may have assisted him in later interactions.To the contrary, the expert evidence is that Mr Epere's capacity to interact with thecourt is unlikely to have fluctuated significantly over the last decade.24 On the twooccasions when his fitness to stand trial was examined, in 2011 and in 2020, he wasdeemed unfit to stand trial. Both experts asked to consider Mr Epere's historicalfitness to stand trial were of the opinion that it is unlikely he has ever been fit to standtrial on any of his previous charges.[56] I consider that because of his intellectual disability it is unlikely that Mr Epereever "fully appreciated the merits of his position" or "made an informed decision toplead guilty".25 The immutable characteristics of his disability are such that he waslikely never fit to plead or stand trial at any point in his criminal history. Thisconclusion aligns with the unanimous expert evidence and the respondent does notcontend otherwise. A miscarriage of justice has therefore occurred.[57] I will allow the appeal against all of Mr Epere's previous convictions.24 This stands in contrast to similar cases like CG, above n 9, where the appellant had been deemedfit to stand trial on a number of occasions and data suggested that the appellant's ability to followcourt processes deteriorated over time.25 Le Page, above n 11, at [16].Disposition[58] I indicated to counsel at the hearing that I was minded to grant the relief assought. However, I adjourned the hearing to enable the parties to file supplementarysubmissions on whether there should be a disposition order made under the CPMIPAct. They have now done so. They are in agreement that Mr Epere's convictionsought simply to be set aside and judgment of acquittals entered. I agree that is theappropriate course.[59] The parties submit that there is no jurisdiction to make a disposition order onappeal. The prescriptive regime of inquiry set out in the CPMIP Act must be followed.There appears to be only one previous case where the Court has touched on whetherdisposition orders are appropriate in circumstances like the present. In that case,Leapai v Police, it appears that the jurisdiction to make an order was simplyassumed.26 With respect, I do not accept that jurisdiction exists. The CPMIP Act isprescriptive.[60] Even if there were jurisdiction to make such an order, I am satisfied that itwould not be appropriate to do so. A number of factors support the convictions beingset aside without further orders:27(a) Three of Mr Epere's convictions pre-date the CPMIP Act so the regimein the CPMIP Act could not be followed for those.(b) The police files for most of Mr Epere's convictions appear to have beendestroyed, meaning it would not now be possible to properly convenean involvement hearing.(c) The expert evidence is unanimous and the likely result is that Mr Eperewould be found unfit to plead.26 See Leapai v Police [2012] NZHC 708.27 At [18].(d) While Mr Epere is not presently the subject of an order under theCPMIP Act, the District Court recently considered whether it wasappropriate to make such an order and declined to do so.(e) The only sentences imposed on Mr Epere have been fines, reparationsand orders to come up for sentence if called upon.[61] I note also that by and large Mr Epere's convictions are not for particularlyserious offending and over a decade has elapsed since most of those convictions wereentered.28 This is not a case where it would be appropriate to order retrials or remitthe proceedings to the District Court in order for inquiries to be made under the CPMIPAct. Both parties submit, and I agree, that the appropriate course is for Mr Epere'sconvictions to be set aside and judgment of acquittals entered. No further orders arerequired.[62] Of course, if Mr Epere continues to offend there might have to be a dispositionhearing.Result[63] An extension of time to bring the appeal is granted.[64] The appeal is allowed. Mr Epere's convictions are quashed. I enter verdictsof acquittal.________________________________Brewer J28 See Reid v The Queen [1980] AC 343 (PC) at 350.