R v TARAPATA [2017] NZHC 3209

R v TARAPATA [2017] NZHC 3209 [19 December 2017]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDAUCKLAND REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHECRI-2014-055-001496[2017] NZHC 3209THE QUEENvZARN TARAPATAHearing: 30 October 2017Appearances: Richard Marchant and Kristy Li for the CrownJonathan Krebs and Julia Spelman for the ApplicantTania Goatley and Kristin Wilson for the Respondent Media(Fairfax, MediaWorks, TVNZ, NZME, Radio New Zealand,AAP)Ben Upton and Kent Teague for Google New Zealand LimitedJudgment: 19 December 2017[REASONS] JUDGMENT OF MOORE J[Take-down orders]This judgment was delivered by me on 19 December 2017 at 10:00 ampursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.Registrar/ Deputy RegistrarDate:Introduction[1] In 2015 Mr Tarapata was tried on two charges of murder. His conviction wasoverturned by the Court of Appeal and a new trial ordered.[2] The first trial was reported in the media, relatively extensively, and thosereports published and retained on the internet.[3] Shortly before Mr Tarapata's re-trial his counsel, Mr Krebs, applied forextensive suppression orders, including orders requiring nominated mediaorganisations to forthwith remove from their websites references to Mr Tarapata's firsttrial, including all content and electronic links.[4] He did so on the grounds that if any members of the jury at Mr Tarapata'ssecond trial undertook an internet search they would discover detail regarding his firsttrial which was highly prejudicial and would compromise his common law andstatutory rights to a fair trial.[5] Given the imminence of the start of the trial I made without notice interimorders but granted leave to those media organisations which were served ("therespondent media") to apply to revoke the orders.[6] The respondent media filed notices of opposition and affidavit evidence.[7] In the course of the trial I heard oral submissions from all parties. I determinedthe interim orders should not be continued and rescinded them. My reasons follow.BackgroundFacts and issues[8] Mr Tarapata was charged with the murder of Mr Fanning and Mr Matthews on19 July 2014.[9] The essential facts were not in contest. On 19 July 2014 Tarapata entered apawn shop on Great South Road, Takanini where his partner worked. He attacked hisvictims using at least one knife and stabbed both men to death. He then left the addresswith his partner and drove to the Avondale Race Course where he buried one of themurder weapons and, it is likely, discarded some of his clothing.[10] After continuing northwest he turned south, driving with his partner to herparents' home in Papakura where they picked up the couple's two children beforecontinuing south to Mr Tarapata's parents' home in Huntly. Shortly after arriving thereMr Tarapata drove to the Police station where he gave himself up.[11] At both trials it was accepted Mr Tarapata's motive for killing the two men wasthat he believed they were having a sexual relationship with his partner. It was alsocommon ground at both trials that this belief was wholly unfounded and driven by anintense paranoia and jealousy caused by psychosis. Also at both trials Mr Tarapataadvanced a defence of insanity under s 23 of the Crimes Act 1961. It was accepted byall that at the time of the killings Mr Tarapata was delusional and psychotic.First trial[12] At the first trial the contest between the defence and Crown experts wastwofold; first whether he had a disease of the mind and secondly, whether by reasonof that disease he did not know that what he was doing was morally wrong. TheCrown's case was that Mr Tarapata's psychosis was caused by an external influence,his chronic use of methamphetamine. The defence position was somewhat morenuanced; that Mr Tarapata's use of methamphetamine exacerbated an underlyingorganic psychiatric illness (schizophrenia) so that at the time of the killings he wassuffering from a disease of the mind.[13] On the question of moral wrongfulness the defence claimed that Mr Tarapatawas driven by religiose delusions such that he believed God, as a higher moralauthority, had directed him to kill the two men. In contrast, the Crown said thatalthough Mr Tarapata was psychotic and delusional, he knew exactly what he wasdoing and intended the consequences. The Crown's case was that he was simply anangry and jealous man, albeit psychotic and delusional.[14] Mr Tarapata's first trial was extensively covered in the media with a good dealof emphasis on the evidence relating to his use of methamphetamine.[15] The jury rejected Mr Tarapata's defence and found him guilty on both charges.He appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal andordered a re-trial. Relevant for present purposes were the Court's criticisms of theway the psychiatric evidence had been adduced and, in particular, the fact that muchof the psychiatric opinion had not been based on primary evidence adduced during thetrial and tested by cross-examination. There were also criticisms made in relation towhat the Court determined was the unfounded opinion of the Crown's psychiatricexpert on the role and influence of methamphetamine on the question of disease of themind.Second trial[16] In order to avoid repeating the errors of the first trial, counsel for the Crownand the defence (who were not counsel at Mr Tarapata's first trial) consultedextensively and apparently co-operatively. The Crown instructed a new forensicexpert who examined Mr Tarapata and determined, contrary to his predecessor andconsistent with the defence experts, that Mr Tarapata was suffering from schizophreniaat the time of the offending. For this reason, and for others which do not need to betraversed for present purposes, the Crown agreed not to lead any evidence relating toMr Tarapata's methamphetamine use. Thus both the defence and the Crown agreedthat Mr Tarapata was suffering from a disease of the mind at the time of the killings.[17] For this reason Mr Tarapata's second trial proceeded on a much narrower basis.The only issue was whether the defence had proved on the balance of probabilities thatat the time of the killings Mr Tarapata did not know his acts were morally wronghaving regard to the commonly accepted standards of right and wrong.The procedural background and the present application[18] Mr Tarapata's trial was scheduled to commence on 24 October 2017.[19] Following a pre-trial telephone conference on 13 October 2017 Mr Krebs fileda detailed memorandum in which he drew the Court's attention to a considerable bodyof material available online from Mr Tarapata's first trial including a transcript of theJudge's full sentencing decision. Mr Krebs submitted it would be in the interests ofjustice for the online material to be removed to reduce the risk of jury membersundertaking internet searches of their own and thereby discovering not only that therehad been a previous trial but that Mr Tarapata had been convicted. Mr Krebs sought"take-down" orders for the duration of trial.[20] On the eve of the trial Mr Krebs filed a further memorandum observing thatsince the previous telephone conference further investigations had been undertaken bythe defence in relation to the media coverage of the first trial. Mr Krebs attached anumber of screen shots taken from what he described as a quick and simple search ofthe internet using Mr Tarapata's name.[21] He suggested it would be appropriate for the orders to be made on a withoutnotice basis with directions for service on nominated media organisations and leavereserved for any respondents to oppose their continuation.[22] The trial commenced the following day. I empanelled the jury after which Icommenced my preliminary remarks to them. In the course of those remarks Iemphasised the importance of bringing an open mind to the task of judging anddirected the jury, in stronger terms than is my usual practice, not to undertake anyinquiries of their own. I made special mention of the prohibition on undertakinginternet and social media searches. A summary of my directions, which broadlyfollowed the recommendations of the Law Commission ("the Commission") in itsdiscussion paper, "Reforming the Law of Contempt of Law"1 is set out below:(a) under no circumstances was any member of the jury to undertake theirown inquiries about the case;1 Law Commission Reforming the Law of Contempt of Court: A Modern Statute (NZLC R140,2017) at [4.52].(b) this meant they were not to search the internet or correspond onFacebook, Twitter or any other social medium about the case;(c) to do so would be a breach of a Court order and would likely requirethe trial to be aborted, the jury discharged and a new trial scheduledwith all the cost, inconvenience and unfairness such a course wouldnecessarily attract;(d) to disobey or breach such an order would be a contempt of Court whichis punishable by penalties including imprisonment;(e) the reason for the direction was that Mr Tarapata was entitled to a fairtrial and a jury verdict based solely on the evidence presented in theCourt at his trial. If inquiries were made by jurors behind closed doorswithout other participants in the trial knowing that would be unfair; and(f) if any juror discovered any other juror made their own inquiries orundertaken their own research it was the duty of every juror to bringthat fact to the attention of the Court which would have to decide whatto do with the trial and the juror.[23] I then excused the jury for the rest of the day in order to deal with Mr Krebs'application and other unrelated issues.[24] After hearing from Mr Krebs and in the absence of any submissions inopposition2 I made interim orders and directed these were to continue until furtherorder of the Court. I also directed that the respondent media organisations whosewebsites contained references to Mr Tarapata's 2015 trial, were to remove all contentand electronic links relating to Mr Tarapata and his trial. My interim orders are set outin full below:"[14] I am prepared to make the interim orders sought on a without noticebasis. I direct that they are to continue until further order of the Court.Accordingly, I direct as follows:(a) the listed media outlets below and any other media outletserved with this order forthwith remove from all websiteswithin their direct and indirect control all references to the2015 trial of the defendant Zarn Tarapata in this matter,including all content and electronic links to related material:(i) Television New Zealand;(ii) TV3;(iii) Radio NZ;(iv) Maori Television;(v) Fairfax Media;(vi) NZME;(vii) NZ Newswire;(b) the operators of the search engines known as Google, Yahooand Bing and any other operator of a search engine servedwith this order forthwith disable any and every link betweena search term using the words "Zarn Tarapata" (individuallyor in combination) and a website to the effect that users willnot be directed to any websites that report any aspect of thedefendant's trial in 2015 in this matter including subsequentsentencing; and(c) these orders will continue until the conclusion of the trial orsuch other time as the Court may direct.[15] If any party wishes to oppose the continuation of the orders it is to fileand serve a notice of opposition setting out, in full, the grounds of suchopposition. That notice is to be filed and served within 48 hours of the makingof these orders.[16] In the event of opposition it will be necessary to convene a hearingand, if necessary, hear evidence. I emphasise that the present interim orders2 The Crown adopted a neutral position.are in order to preserve Mr Tarapata's fair trial rights in the context of myassessment of the prejudicial material contained in the media reports I havebeen referred to. Given the limited time within which I have been obliged todeal with this matter, that assessment has not been as full or as considered asI might have wished. It is possible that following any hearing my provisionalview may change.[17] I direct that the orders be served electronically to the email addressesset out above."[25] Following service of the orders Mr Krebs advised that references toMr Tarapata and his first trial had been removed from the websites. Google searchesusing Mr Tarapata's name led to no links which could be downloaded. This state ofaffairs reflects the positive view I have formed of the media's responsible approach tothis matter. I am conscious that to comply with orders of this sort requires theapplication of considerable time and resources.[26] Notices of opposition were received from each of the media organisationsdirected. The grounds may be summarised as follows:(a) there is a high threshold for a defendant to establish that fair trial rightsare prejudiced. A defendant needs to show specific prejudice orextreme circumstances from which the Court should infer prejudice;(b) the jury can, and should, be expected to follow judicial directions;(c) no real risk of prejudice to a fair trial has been created or demonstratedby the continued availability of the historical articles online;(d) the take-down orders are not necessary to ensure fair trial rights arepreserved;(e) the defendant is not subject to name suppression;(f) the media are prejudicially affected by the take-down orders;(g) the take-down orders were made before the media were given anopportunity to be heard;(h) the take-down orders are an unreasonable limitation on the media'sright to freedom of expression;(i) it is not practical, or possible in some circumstances, for the media tocomply with the take-down orders;(j) in the rare occasions when a Court has issued take-down orders such anorder has identified specific articles or articles in their original uniformresource locator ("URL"). Without reference to a specific URL it islikely that inadvertent publications may continue;(k) compliance with the Court's order is a costly and time consumingexercise for the media requiring key staff to be removed from othertasks in order to assist with compliance;(l) published articles may have been copied, scraped, shared orcommented on by third parties on other websites and on social media;and(m) various media organisations served have no control over the resultswhich Google, or other search engines, display in response to aparticular search.[27] The notices of opposition were supported by affidavit evidence.[28] On 30 October 2017, at the beginning of the second week of the trial, I heardfull argument from all parties. I rescinded the interim orders, adding I would give myreasons in writing later. My reasons now follow.Legal principles[29] The first question is one of jurisdiction. It is well settled that this Court has aninherent jurisdiction to make the orders Mr Krebs seeks. No party attempted to submitotherwise.3[30] The next question is: what are the principles which govern applications of thiskind? This was discussed by the Court of Appeal in R v Lyttleton. Before discussingthe principles it is necessary to summarise the factual setting in Lyttleton because thatcase has some parallels with the present.[31] Mr Lyttleton pleaded guilty to a number of violent offences. His case attractedconsiderable media attention. News stories were published in the print media and oncorresponding online platforms. Mr Lyttleton successfully appealed his convictionsand a re-trial was ordered. Prior to the re-trial Mr Lyttleton, supported by the Crown,applied for orders removing the historic online articles about his case. He did so onthe basis that if these articles were available to the jury there would be a real risk ofprejudice, particularly prejudice arising from the publication of the fact he originallypleaded guilty. Lang J granted the orders and directed that some 20 specifiedreferences be taken down from their respective websites.4 After receiving the orderthe affected media organisations applied to rescind the orders and sought to be heard.Lang J directed a hearing following which he revoked the orders.5 Mr Lyttletonappealed the revocation.[32] In confirming that an application of this sort is civil in nature the Court ofAppeal commented:6"The application required a balancing of the right of the media to freedom ofexpression (including the right to impart and receive information) and the rightof Mr Lyttleton to a fair trial. The latter right is fundamental to a defendantfacing a criminal trial but it is also part of the proper administration of justicegenerally." [Footnotes omitted]3 Lyttleton v R [2015] NZCA 279, [2016] 2 NZLR 21; Siemer v Solicitor-General [2013] NZSC 68,[2013] 3 NZLR 441.4 R v Lyttleton HC Auckland CRI-2008-044-9465, 11 March 2015 (Minute of Lang J relating totake-down order).5 R v Lyttleton [2015] NZHC 763.6 Lyttleton v R, above n 3, at [36](d).[33] The Court of Appeal upheld Lang J's decision. The reasons which led to thatconclusion were:(a) Mr Lyttleton had not shown any real prejudice caused by the onlinearticles remaining accessible because:(i) the articles were old;(ii) Mr Lyttleton's case was not in the public consciousness;(iii) to access the articles a potential juror needed to actively searchhis name or that of his victims (a circumstance considered bythe Court to be a remote possibility);(b) it was not a notorious case in the sense that pre-trial publicity wasinevitable and simply irredeemable in terms of jury exposure to publishmaterial; and(c) once the re-trial started if there was any significant media interest theprotection of Mr Lyttleton's fair trial rights could be achieved by thetrial Judge giving appropriate directions about not undertaking internetsearches and, if such directions were given, jurors could be expected tocomply.[34] I now turn to consider Mr Tarapata's case and the submissions made on hisbehalf.Mr Tarapata's submissions[35] Mr Krebs' submission was that the interim orders should continue untilMr Tarapata's guilt or otherwise had been determined. He submitted thatMr Tarapata's trial was truly exceptional and was readily distinguishable from othercases where there had been extensive pre-trial reporting. He claimed that what set thecase apart from others was that on Mr Tarapata's re-trial the "evidential landscape[was] so totally different" when compared to the first trial.[36] The two primary points of difference Mr Krebs relied on were:(a) the Crown now accepted that at the relevant time Mr Tarapata wassuffering from a disease of the mind; and(b) there would be no reference in the course of the trial tomethamphetamine consumption by Mr Tarapata.[37] Mr Krebs submitted that if a juror was to undertake a search of the internetthey would encounter numerous, detailed accounts of Mr Tarapata's first trialincluding extensive reports covering not only his use of methamphetamine but alsothe defence's failure to persuade the jury that Mr Tarapata's psychiatric condition wasorganic in origin. Mr Krebs also pointed to the fact that the Judge's sentencing noteswere available on the internet in full. These included references by the Judge to thejury plainly not believing the defence.[38] Mr Krebs thus submitted that because the whole focus of the trial had changedand the highly prejudicial references to methamphetamine would no longer be beforethe jury, it was essential for fair trial reasons to quarantine the jury from this highlyprejudicial, extra-curial evidence.[39] Mr Krebs observed that despite the strong and "pointed" direction I gave thejury not to undertake researches of their own and, in particular, not to undertake anyinternet searches, there remained a real risk that an irresponsible and determined jurorwould ignore my judicial direction.[40] Mr Krebs placed considerable reliance on Ellis J's judgment in R v Lyttle.7There the Judge reviewed the authorities, including Lyttleton, and determined that thehistorical presumption that jurors obeyed judicial directions had been questioned bythe Commission in its Issues Paper Contempt in Modern in New Zealand.8 TheCommission referred to a United Kingdom study which found that in high profile cases26 per cent of jurors said they "saw" information on the internet and 12 per cent said7 R v Lyttle [2017] NZHC 2426.8 Law Commission Contempt in Modern New Zealand (NZLC IP36, 2014) at [5.26].they "looked". In standard cases 13 per cent said they "saw" information and 5 percent said they "looked".9 In each case this conduct followed judicial directions not toundertake internet inquiries. Commenting on the ubiquity of the internet Ellis Jgranted the take-down application until one week after verdict.[41] Mr Krebs submitted that a similar situation existed in the present case. He saidthere could be no confidence that this jury would be any more obedient than those inthe United Kingdom.AnalysisThreshold – real risk[42] I agree with Ms Goatley, for the respondent media, that the threshold questionin resolving this application requires an assessment of the risk Mr Tarapata's fair trialrights will be adversely affected in the event the interim orders are lifted. Shesubmitted the risk must be a real one. A fanciful or hypothetical risk is not sufficient.[43] I agree. I must be satisfied that a real risk exists despite the direction I gavethe jury that they were not to undertake any inquiries of their own including internetsearches.[44] This is not a notorious case such as Bain or Lundy. It is unlikely that anymembers of the jury would bring to their role a residual memory or knowledge ofMr Tarapata or the events in 2014 and the media coverage of his first trial. Thus theissue is whether I should make the orders solely to prevent jurors from undertaking acourse which I specifically directed them they must not.[45] In Lyttleton, had any member of the jury undertaken an internet search, theywould have discovered that Mr Lyttleton had pleaded guilty and yet the Court ofAppeal upheld Land J's decision to revoke the take-down orders. In terms ofcomparable potential prejudice the cases are similar. In fact, the potential for prejudicewas arguably greater in Lyttleton where the defendant initially acknowledged his own9 Cheryl Thomas Are Juries Fair? (Minister of Justice, UK), Research Series 1/10, February 2010at 43.guilt by pleading guilty. In the present case a jury found Mr Tarapata guilty. Ofcourse, Mr Krebs accepted that the mere fact that this is a re-trial would not, in itself,justify the orders sought. What he said distinguished the present case was the highlyprejudicial effect of methamphetamine use.[46] However, in my view, that submission is a secondary consideration. As withLyttleton the primary question here is whether there is a real risk a juror or jurors mayignore my direction. If risk to that level is made out I accept Mr Tarapata's fair trialrights would be adversely affected for the reasons identified by Mr Krebs.[47] Thus I return to the primary question which is whether I am satisfied there is areal or substantial risk a determined and irresponsible juror might undertake their owninternet inquiries.[48] On that point I agree with Lang J's reasoning. The posted stories and articlesin question would not be in the public consciousness. To access articles on the interneta juror would have to actively search Mr Tarapata's name or those of his victims.Given my firm direction I regard that as a remote possibility.[49] Other factors raised by Ms Goatley support my conclusion that orders of thissort should not be lightly made and had the evidence of the media respondents beenbefore me on the original application I would not have made the orders. These are thelikelihood of innocent non-compliance, the oppressive effect of compliance, thealteration of the historical record and the difficulties of securing compliance by searchengine providers. I shall discuss each of these in turn.Likelihood of innocent non-compliance[50] My orders were broadly expressed. They required the media respondents toremove from all websites within their direct and indirect control all references to the2015 trial of Zarn Tarapata including all content and electronic links to relatedmaterial.[51] As the affidavits filed in opposition revealed, while the media organisationsare able to search their content management systems for key terms, such asMr Tarapata's name, this would not necessarily identify every piece of publishedcontent which might fall within the scope of the take-down order. For example, TVNZsearched its own website and systems, including its One News Facebook page, usingthe term "Tarapata". It also undertook a Google search using the terms "Tarapata andTVNZ". All links discovered were taken down. While it may be assumed that thesesearches would have identified most relevant content, Mr Tarapata had namesuppression for a period during the earlier proceedings and, as a result, not all articlesor stories may have been identified.[52] Furthermore, TVNZ has no control over the results which Google or othersearch engines display in response to a particular search. Even when content has beentaken down the headline and a sentence or two from that piece may still display withinthe search engine results due to the way the engine search function operates.[53] Additionally, there may be situations where a third party has shared TVNZ'scontent in a way which means TVNZ no longer has control over that piece. Forexample, a screen grab or scraped content which is re-posted on another website suchas Facebook, will not be independently affected by TVNZ's take-down command. Inthose circumstances, even if TVNZ was to take-down all relevant content within itscontrol, the shared content would still be visible on the third party's page.[54] And so, while TVNZ and the other media organisations have responsibly donetheir best to comply they are concerned there is a very real likelihood that materialcovered by my order will, nonetheless, remain accessible via other search avenues.Deleting the historical record[55] Another unintended but unsatisfactory consequence of my order is that eventhough it is expressed as interim, its practical effect is likely to be permanent. Forexample, MediaWorks deposed that once historical content of this sort is removed anddeleted it would not normally be reinstated unless there was some identifiable valuein republishing the content. This is because the time and expense required to deletecontent and then reverse that process to republish is regarded as outweighing thebenefit of reinstatement. Such a consequence is not in the public interest because itremoves from the accessible electronic historical record information which wouldotherwise be available to the public.[56] As already discussed, where material ordered to be taken down forms part of alarger news bulletin it is not possible to delete the subject material without deletingthe entire news bulletin with the likelihood it will not be reinstated. In other words,not only is it likely that the particular news item would not be restored but all of theother news items included within that news bulletin would not be restored.[57] Thus the effect of the interim take-down order is not, in a practical sense, likelyto be interim. As was earlier observed, if this material is not reinstated there will be apermanent change in the historical record. Mr Tarapata's first trial is likely to be lostexcept for the formal Court record. To search the latter is a cumbersome and timeconsuming process which requires formal applications to be made to the Court.10Oppression[58] In order to comply with my orders several media respondents explained thatconsiderable resources were required to be redirected from core business functions.[59] For example NZME deposed that between three and four key staff members,duty editors and analytical/product manager specialists, are required to be taken offother work, usually urgent given the nature of newsrooms, to undertake the searches,attempt to identify the offending material and delete it. Not only is this timeconsuming but it is a substantial imposition of cost and inconvenience (which is nodoubt why there was evidence from a number of media organisations that the materialwould probably not be reinstated).[60] Another example cited by MediaWorks is that there will be stories relating tothe 2015 trial which were incorporated in 6pm news bulletins from the time of theoriginal trial. These bulletins cannot be electronically searched to locate particularcontent because they were posted online as a single piece. To search for any parts ofa news bulletin which might breach the order would require a search of all 6pm10 Senior Courts (Access to Court Documents) Rules 2017.bulletins, from the first time the case may have been mentioned (possibly at the timeof arrest) until the end of the trial and even the appeal. This requires a manual reviewwith the reviewer being required to physically watch each bulletin.Search engines and URLs[61] There is a further related point which also persuades me that the orders shouldnot continue. As Mr Upton, for Google New Zealand ("GNZL"), submitted thepresent interim orders do not identify the content of concern with sufficient specificityto enable a search engine provider, such as Google, to determine what content isrequired to be removed. A search engine provider requires a full and complete URLin order to prevent the webpages at those URLs from being returned as search results.Without URLs being specified a search engine provider can only speculate as to whichparticular webpages may be covered by the orders. As they were expressed, theinterim orders appeared to require a perpetual review by the search engine providernot only of what was described to me as "the trillions of webpages currently existingon the web" but also those which are subsequently created.[62] Thus, again, unless the particular URLs are specified it is likely that materialintended to be captured by the orders will not be identified or located by search engineproviders. In Lyttleton Lang J identified some 20 specific URLs which made themedia's ability to comply somewhat easier and also provided a level of reassurancethat the offending material had been captured. That is not the case here.Compliance issues for GNZL[63] The final point is that I directed my order be served on GNZL. Evidence filedby GNZL reveals it is a private company incorporated in New Zealand as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Google International LLC ("Google LLC"). GNZL's business isto provide sales and marketing services to Google LLC which is a separate legal entityincorporated in the United States. GNZL is neither an agent nor an address for servicefor Google LLC. It does not provide the internet search engine services that areaccessible at the domain's "google.com" and "google.co.nz". Thus GNZL has noability to comply with the interim orders.[64] Furthermore, GNZL has helpfully filed evidence. This supports the earlierobservation that in order to ensure the precise content at issue is identified for removal,an internet search engine provider needs to be able to identify the complete URL ofthe webpages where the content in question is located. Only once a complete URLhas been identified will a search engine provider be able to prevent the webpage atthat URL from being returned as a search result. The evidence from GNZL was thatthe interim orders, as expressed, would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, tocomply with.Conclusion[65] For these reasons I am satisfied that my interim orders should not continue. Insummary I do not accept there is a real risk a juror would breach the very firmdirections I gave at the beginning of the trial. To accept otherwise is to acknowledgejurors do not comply with judicial directions. And yet the criminal jury trial processis founded on the fundamental principle that juries do follow judicial directions.[66] I am conscious my decision contrasts with the careful and thoughtful analysisof Ellis J in Lyttle. However, unlike Ellis J, I have had the considerable advantage,which she did not, of receiving evidence and extensive submissions from the mediarespondents.[67] I am reassured in my conclusion by a question asked by the jury during thetrial. The jury sought my permission to undertake a Google inquiry as to what theKing's James Version ("KVJ") of the Bible was.11 I told the jury they were notpermitted to make this inquiry although I did commend them for seeking mypermission. Plainly this question reveals the jury's understanding of and adherence tomy orders.11 The KJV assumed some prominence in the trial. The religiose aspects of the defendant'spresentation revealed that he carried the KVJ with him at most times. It was agreed, followingconsultation with counsel, that I would tell the jury it was a particular edition of the Bible,sometimes to referred to as the "authorised version" because it was authorised by King James forthe Church of England.Result[68] The interim orders are revoked.Costs[69] Ms Goatley advised the media respondents wish to be heard on the question ofcosts. She submitted there is precedent for an award notwithstanding that Mr Tarapatais legally aided. She observed that the media had been brought into these proceedingsas non-parties.[70] I direct that if the media respondents seek costs they are to file and serve (onLegal Services or any other entity or person who may be liable for costs) amemorandum not exceeding five pages no later than 60 clear working days from thedate of this judgment.[71] Any other party which seeks to be heard on costs is to file and serve amemorandum not exceeding five pages no later than 30 clear working daysthereafter.Moore JCounsel/Solicitors:Mr Marchant, AucklandCrown Solicitor, ManukauMr Krebs, NapierMs Spelman, WellingtonCopy to:Bell Gully, AucklandSimpson Grierson, Auckland