LINCOLN v NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY [2019] NZCA 442

LINCOLN v NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY [2019] NZCA 442 [19 September 2019]IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALANDI TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROACA796/2018[2019] NZCA 442BETWEEN RICHARD LINCOLNAppellantAND NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETYRespondentHearing: 3 September 2019Court: Collins, Wylie and Ellis JJCounsel: A J McKenzie for AppellantP N Collins for RespondentJudgment: 19 September 2019 at 4.00 pmJUDGMENT OF THE COURTA The respondent's application to adduce further evidence is granted.B The appeal is dismissed.C The respondent is entitled to costs in this Court for a standard appeal ona band A basis plus any disbursements.____________________________________________________________________REASONS OF THE COURT(Given by Collins J)Introduction[1] Mr Lincoln appeals a decision of Dunningham J, in which she declined hisapplication to be admitted as a barrister and solicitor on the ground that he could notsatisfy the High Court that he is "a fit and proper person".1 This requirement, whichis prescribed in the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (the Act), must be satisfiedby those who wish to be admitted as a barrister and solicitor of the High Court.2[2] Mr Lincoln completed a law degree at the University of Canterbury in 2017.At the time he was 55 years old. After he completed his professional examinations,he applied to the Canterbury-Westland branch of the New Zealand Law Society(the Law Society) for a certificate of character to enable him to file an application foradmission as a barrister and solicitor.3 The Law Society commenced inquiries, butbefore it could reach a decision on whether or not to issue a certificate of character,Mr Lincoln applied to the High Court for admission as a barrister and solicitor.The Law Society opposed his application.4[3] The Law Society's opposition to Mr Lincoln's application was based upon itsconcern that he has an enduring "frailty" of character that renders him not a fit andproper person to be admitted as a barrister and solicitor.5[4] Dunningham J agreed with the Law Society's assessment. Her conclusionswere based on evidence that:(a) In September 2015, Mr Lincoln was arrested on firearms offences andresisting a police officer in the execution of his duty. Those chargeswere dismissed in July 2017.6 Thereafter, Mr Lincoln commenceda campaign against one of the police officers, which included civil andcriminal proceedings as well as making disparaging and abusivecomments on Facebook about the police officer. Mr Lincoln also sentan intimidating message to the police officer's wife.(b) Mr Lincoln's pattern of behaviour in 2017 was consistent with hisaggressive and unreasonable attitude towards a senior police officer in1 Lincoln v New Zealand Law Society [2018] NZHC 3050 at [76]–[77].2 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, ss 49(2)(b), 51 and 55.3 Lawyers and Conveyancers (Lawyers: Admission) Rules 2008, r 5(1)(b).4 Rule 6(4).5 Lincoln v New Zealand Law Society, above n 1, at [50].6 Police v Lincoln [2017] NZDC 14511, [2017] DCR 795.1993, who had revoked Mr Lincoln's firearms licence over concernsabout his personality.[5] Mr Lincoln's appeal is advanced on two broad grounds:(a) The High Court Judge erred by not considering that Mr Lincoln would,if admitted, be required to practise under supervision for at leastthree years before he could practise on his account.(b) Dunningham J therefore erred when finding that Mr Lincoln hadan enduring frailty of character and not a fit and proper person to beadmitted as a barrister and solicitor.Background[6] It is convenient to start our narrative of the background by referring to eventsthat occurred in 1993. We acknowledge that those matters are ancient and bythemselves would not have provided a basis for preventing Mr Lincoln from beingadmitted as a barrister and solicitor. The events that occurred in 1993 are, however,important in understanding the concerns about Mr Lincoln's defects of character.[7] Mr Lincoln has had a long-term interest in firearms. In 1993 he becameembroiled in a dispute with the police when his firearms licence was revoked becauseof concerns about what the police considered to be his violent and aggressivebehaviour. These concerns arose in the context of Mr Lincoln being charged withvarious offences following the breakup of his relationship with a former girlfriend.Those charges were ultimately dismissed when the former girlfriend decided not toreturn to New Zealand to give evidence against Mr Lincoln.[8] Mr Lincoln challenged the decision to revoke his firearms licence. That led toa hearing in the District Court. Mr Lincoln's former girlfriend did give evidence atthat hearing. The judgment of the District Court sets out in detail the basis ofthe concerns harboured by the police at that time, which included the aggressive wayin which Mr Lincoln endeavoured to get the charges against him dropped.7The judgment also sets out extracts from letters written by Mr Lincoln after the DistrictCommander decided to revoke his firearms licence. The following extracts providean accurate flavour of the correspondence:(a) In a letter of 27 July to the Police Complaints Authority, Mr Lincolnaccused the District Commander of fabricating the grounds forrevoking his licence and that other police officers had persisted in"obnoxious behaviour" and had made threats against him.(b) In a letter of 29 July to the Police Commissioner (the Commissioner),Mr Lincoln said that the District Commander was a "lunatic" and thatthe Commissioner had a responsibility to control the DistrictCommander.(c) In a letter of 12 August to the Commissioner, Mr Lincoln said "someserious questions must be raised about [the District Commander's]inane ramblings perhaps I should apply for special leave fromthe Minister of Justice to obtain a non-molestation [order] against[him]".(d) On the same day, Mr Lincoln wrote to the District Commander saying:I wish you would settle on some climax of your almost dailyattempts at harassment and intimidation, it is tiring having tocontinually revise upward, and re-draft the claim in respect todamages The first sign of mental unsoundness (having one eye closed)is obviously [a]ffecting you. You are a sick man - you needhelp.[9] The judgment records the basis of the Court's conclusion Mr Lincolnresponded in a "grossly exaggerated" way when he disputed decisions that hedisagreed with. The District Court Judge made findings that Mr Lincoln was not7 As noted in by the High Court in Lincoln v New Zealand Law Society, above n 1, at [48], whilethe Court has been provided with a copy of the decision, a reference number for citation is notavailable.a credible witness and that he was capable of "bizarre interpretations of events".The District Court Judge concluded the District Commander had reached the correctdecision when revoking Mr Lincoln's firearm licence.[10] In due course Mr Lincoln either obtained another firearms licence or had hisoriginal licence reinstated.[11] Mr Lincoln's interest in firearms led him to being involved in establishingthe National Shooters' Association (NSA) in 2009, which is a firearms' advocacyorganisation. Mr Lincoln explains the NSA was modelled in part upon the NationalRifle Association of the United States to be aggressive and uncompromising in itsadvocacy of firearms issues. Mr Lincoln and the NSA had some success in seekingdeclarations over the way the police were classifying some firearms and in otherlitigation concerning firearm issues.8[12] At the time of the events that were the focus of the judgment of Dunningham J,Mr Lincoln's firearms licence had a "E" endorsement, which allowed him to possessmilitary-style semi-automatic weapons.[13] On 17 September 2015, Mr Lincoln was taking a Heckler & Koch SL8 (SL8)semi-automatic rifle from his home in Timaru to a gunsmith in Christchurch.He stopped on the way to purchase petrol and later to use a toilet. On both occasionshe removed the SL8 from his car and took it with him. He did not wish to risk leavingsuch a weapon unattended in his locked car. Two people who saw Mr Lincoln carryingthe SL8 contacted the police.[14] The events that then transpired involved Senior Constable Manning, aided bytwo other officers, performing an "armed stop" of Mr Lincoln's car north ofDunsandel. There was an issue as to whether or not Mr Lincoln obstructedSenior Constable Manning from carrying his out his duties. While this washappening, Sergeant Sutherland entered Mr Lincoln's home in Timaru and conducteda search. Mr Lincoln was arrested at Dunsandel and taken to the Ashburton Police8 Lincoln v Police HC Palmerston North CIV-2009-454-473, 1 March 2010; and Lincoln vCommissioner of Police [2013] NZHC 1813.Station. He was examined by a mental health assessor and then interviewed byConstable O'Reilly. He was granted police bail at about 4.00 pm, with a condition hesurrender any firearms in his possession to the police. He was driven back toDunsandel to collect his car. In the meantime, Timaru Police were asked by AshburtonPolice to enter and conduct a further search of Mr Lincoln's home.[15] Mr Lincoln drove home to Timaru. He arrived there at about 6.30 pm wherehe met Sergeant Manson. Mr Lincoln told Sergeant Manson that he would notsurrender any firearms in his possession. She stated that she considered he wasmentally unfit to have possession of firearms at that time, and that she would searchand seize any firearms at the address. Mr Lincoln then discovered that someone hadbeen into his home that day. He complained he had been the subject of burglary.When asked to do so, he assisted the police to open the gun safe in his house statinghowever, that he believed the police were acting unlawfully. He started filmingthe police officers while they moved about his home. Sergeant Manson instructed himto stop filming and to remain quiet while she discharged her responsibilities.The police seized from Mr Lincoln's property, a Hatsan shotgun and a Panther DPMSrifle.[16] Mr Lincoln was charged with obstructing Senior Constable Manning inthe execution of his duty, unlawfully possessing and carrying the SL8 and unlawfulpossession of two other semi-automatic guns, the Hatsan shotgun and the DPMS rifle.Judge Maze heard and dismissed the SL8 charges in June 2017 as the police offeredno evidence and dismissed the remainder of the charges in July 2017.9 In a subsequentcosts judgment, Judge Maze criticised aspects of the police conduct.10 She awardedMr Lincoln $11,255.38 in costs.[17] In late 2017, Mr Lincoln commenced civil proceedings againstSenior Constable Manning. He arranged to film the service of those proceedings onthe policeman at his home.9 Police v Lincoln, above n 6, at [7] and [75].10 Lincoln v Police [2017] NZDC 23625.[18] According to Mr Lincoln, his decision to commence civil proceedings againstSenior Constable Manning was a response to what he believed was a campaign ofharassment against him by the police.[19] After serving the proceedings on Senior Constable Manning, Mr Lincolnplaced a post on the NSA Facebook page that said:11The criminal offender, JAMES ANDREW MANNING who works for the NZpolice gets a fraction of his comeuppance.Normally these videos remain undisclosed because they are proof of servicerecords only. But in this case the video is made public because James AndrewManning is a violent and dishonest criminal offender who remains at large.Manning's offending includes assault and battery, kidnapping, perjury,attempting to pervert the course of justice and various offences underthe Criminal Procedure Act.The public need to be aware that this offender is at large in our communityand in spite of his offending, remains a serving member of police.He lives at [ ] and works at Lincoln police station.This is his Facebook page [ ].and this is his wife's Facebook page:[ ]The public are warned that this offender is dangerous, unpredictable andshould not be approached. If engaging with him, make sure you have a camerarecording.(personal details contained in the original post are omitted)[20] The Facebook post we have referred to at [19] contained a link to the video ofMr Lincoln serving the civil proceedings on Senior Constable Manning. At aboutthe time the Facebook post was created, Mr Lincoln sent the following message toSenior Constable Manning's wife through the Facebook Messenger service:When the for sale sign goes up on your home and the receivers come in,remember that your husband is the one to blame. While you're struggling tomake ends meet for your kids, he will probably be serving time in a nice coldprison cell for assault, kidnapping and perjury.How did you ever wind up marrying a lowlife scumbag thug?11 Lincoln v New Zealand Law Society, above n 1, at [19].[21] The civil proceedings Mr Lincoln commenced against Senior ConstableManning and others were settled on a confidential basis in May 2018. The followingmonth, Mr Lincoln sent an apology to Mrs Manning via her husband's lawyer in whichhe acknowledged that he had "used Mrs Manning instrumentally to achieve endsaimed at her husband". He accepted that it was wrong of him to do so and heapologised.[22] In July 2018, Mr Lincoln continued his campaign against Senior ConstableManning by presenting charging documents to the District Court at Christchurch,relating to the events of 17 September 2015. After a defended hearing, Judge Garlanddirected that the charging documents not be accepted for filing.12 In reaching thisdecision, Judge Garland said that Mr Lincoln was attempting to bring the charges inorder to "humiliate, embarrass or otherwise extract revenge on Mr Manning".13Judge Garland noted that the Facebook message sent to Mrs Manning and the postingof the video showing the service of the civil proceedings on Senior Constable Manningdemonstrated that Mr Lincoln had a desire to embarrass or humiliate the police officer.Judge Garland said in his judgment that:14Mr Lincoln's attempt to use the criminal law to extract revenge forthe perceived wrongs he has suffered is misguided. It would tarnishthe integrity of the Court to accept these charging documents for filing.New evidence[23] It is convenient to complete our narrative of the facts by dealing at this stagewith the Law Society's application to adduce new evidence in opposition toMr Lincoln's appeal.[24] There are two categories of new evidence that the Law Society has applied toproduce. The first is correspondence between Mr Lincoln and the Crown Solicitor inTimaru, Mr McRae. That correspondence comprised:12 Lincoln v Manning [2018] NZDC 20025.13 At [70].14 At [80].(a) A letter of 2 May 2017 from Mr Lincoln to Mr McRae, containinga threat to bring a private criminal prosecution against him, and topursue civil proceedings against the Crown if Mr McRae continued toprosecute the criminal charges, which were in due course dismissed byJudge Maze.(b) An email from Mr Lincoln to Mr McRae sent on 15 May 2017 in whichhe again, threatened Mr McRae with a private criminal prosecution for"conspiring to prosecute" Mr Lincoln.(c) An email from Mr Lincoln to Mr McRae sent on 29 July 2019 in whichhe demanded, amongst other matters, an explanation from Mr McRaeas to why he should not be prosecuted for deliberately abusing hispowers as the Crown Solicitor in pursuing the criminal prosecutionsagainst Mr Lincoln. Mr Lincoln told Mr McRae that his reply, or lackof reply, would be referred to this Court, and that Mr McRae might besummonsed to appear before us as a witness.[25] The second source of new evidence is correspondence between Mr Lincoln andMr Mackenzie, who was counsel for the police officers whom Mr Lincolnendeavoured to prosecute. Mr Mackenzie also acted for police officers, includingSenior Constable Manning in the civil proceedings commenced by Mr Lincoln thatwere settled in May 2018. Mr Lincoln accused Mr Mackenzie of various seriousmatters, including deceiving the High Court, lying to Judge Garland and defamingMr Lincoln. In addition to making these allegations Mr Lincoln threatened tocommence disciplinary proceedings against Mr Mackenzie.[26] The Law Society contends that this new evidence is relevant in two respects:(a) In a fourth affidavit he filed in the High Court, Mr Lincoln said that hehad not behaved in any way as he did towards the Mannings inthe previous 25 years. The Law Society says in fact Mr Lincoln was,both before and after he was threatening and abusing the Mannings,making similar threats against Mr McRae and Mr Mackenzie.(b) The letter and emails sent by Mr Lincoln to Mr McRae andMr Mackenzie demonstrates that he continues to respond in anaggressive and unbalanced way when he disputes decisions madeagainst him by persons in authority, including lawyers acting againsthim.[27] The first two sets of correspondence from Mr Lincoln to Mr McRae that wehave referred to at [24] predated the hearing in the High Court and are therefore not"fresh". That correspondence was brought to the Law Society's attention afterDunningham J delivered her judgment and following some publicity and discussionsby lawyers about the judgment. The email sent on 29 July 2019 andthe correspondence sent to Mr Mackenzie were written after the High Court hearingand are therefore "fresh".[28] Mr McKenzie, counsel for Mr Lincoln, opposed the Law Society's applicationto adduce new evidence, on the basis that the earlier communications to Mr McRaecould have been obtained with reasonable diligence before the High Court hearing.It was also suggested that none of the letters or emails sent by Mr Lincoln providesevidence that assists us in determining the appeal. That is to say, it was submitted thatnone of the correspondence has the requisite degree of cogency.[29] The principles that govern the admissibility of further evidence on appeal arewell settled.15 The primary issue is whether the proposed new evidence is credibleand cogent and whether there is a reasonable explanation for its late production.[30] We are satisfied the new evidence is both credible and cogent.Notwithstanding the opposition expressed in Mr Lincoln's affidavit filed in responseto the new evidence, the letters and emails speak for themselves and they do assist indetermining whether the High Court correctly concluded Mr Lincoln has an "enduringfrailty of character" that renders him not a fit and proper person to be admitted as abarrister and solicitor. We accept that the first two communications from Mr Lincolnto Mr McRae might have been discovered earlier, but there is nothing before us to15 Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005, r 45; Erceg v Balenia Ltd [2008] NZCA 535 at [15]; andPatrick v Bank of New Zealand [2018] NZCA 122 at [13].suggest that the Law Society was aware of Mr Lincoln's threats against Mr McRaebefore the hearing in the High Court. In these circumstances, we are satisfied weshould allow the Law Society to produce all of the new evidence.Legal principles[31] Under s 52 of the Act, the High Court must make an order admitting a candidateas a barrister and solicitor if the Court is satisfied that the candidate has obtainedthe qualifications for admission prescribed by the New Zealand Council of LegalEducation and is a "fit and proper person".[32] Section 55 of the Act provides statutory guidance for assessing whether or nota candidate is a fit and proper person to be admitted. Included in the criteria set out ins 55 is whether the candidate is a person "of good character". The Law Society saysMr Lincoln has a serious and enduring defect of character and is therefore nota "fit and proper person" to be admitted as a barrister and solicitor.[33] An assessment of whether or not a candidate is a fit and proper person must bemade in the context of the fundamental obligations of lawyers set out in s 4 of the Act:4 Fundamental obligations of lawyersEvery lawyer who provides regulated services must, in the course of his or herpractice, comply with the following fundamental obligations:(a) the obligation to uphold the rule of law and to facilitatethe administration of justice in New Zealand:(b) the obligation to be independent in providing regulated services to hisor her clients:(c) the obligation to act in accordance with all fiduciary duties and dutiesof care owed by lawyers to their clients:(d) the obligation to protect, subject to his or her overriding duties as anofficer of the High Court and to his or her duties under any enactment,the interests of his or her clients.[34] In Stanley v New Zealand Law Society, this Court analysed a series of casesconcerning assessments of candidates who wished to be admitted as barristers andsolicitors.16 A similar exercise had previously been undertaken by Wylie J in Brown vNew Zealand Law Society.17 The following principles are particularly pertinent toMr Lincoln's circumstances:(a) The Court should not lightly prevent a candidate being admitted whenthey have achieved the qualifications prescribed by the New ZealandCouncil for Legal Education.18(b) A candidate for admission is not to be punished for past wrongdoing.19(c) An assessment of the candidate's fitness to be admitted as a barristerand solicitor must focus on protecting the public and the profession.(d) The assessment must be prospective. It requires an evaluation ofthe candidate at the time of their application and the risks, if any, theypose in the future to society and the profession's reputation.20(e) The concept of a fit and proper person incorporates standards ofintegrity,21 and "moral rectitude of character".22(f) Where a candidate has been involved in some past indiscretionthe Court must be satisfied that the "frailty or defect of character"indicated by the earlier behaviour can be safely regarded as "spent".2316 Stanley v New Zealand Law Society [2019] NZCA 119, [2019] NZAR 1001.17 Brown v New Zealand Law Society [2018] NZHC 1263, [2018] NZAR 1192.18 Harder v Auckland District Law Society [1983] NZLR 15 (CA) at 17; Brown v New Zealand LawSociety, above n 17, at [39(a)].19 Re Lundon [1926] NZLR 656 (CA) at 658; and Stanley v New Zealand Law Society, above n 16,at [29].20 Stanley v New Zealand Law Society, above n 16, at [29], [33] and [48]–[53]; and Brown v NewZealand Law Society, above n 17, at [39(b)].21 New Zealand Law Society v Mitchell [2010] NZCA 498, [2011] NZAR 81 at [24]–[25]; and Brownv New Zealand Law Society, above n 17, at [39(d)].22 Re Lundon, above n 19, at 658; Stanley v New Zealand Law Society, above n 16, at [29]; andBrown v New Zealand Law Society, above n 17, at [39(c)].23 Re Owen [2005] 2 NZLR 536 (HC) at [35]; and Brown v New Zealand Law Society, above n 17,at [39(e)].(g) The Court is required to make an objective judgement based on allrelevant evidence when assessing the ability of the candidate to complywith the fundamental obligations imposed upon all lawyers.24[35] Mr Lincoln's appeal is a general appeal. We are therefore required to make ourown assessment of the merits of his case.25Analysis[36] We are satisfied Mr Lincoln suffers from a longstanding and enduring defectin his character that causes him to react in an aggressive, threatening and whollyunbalanced way against those whom he perceives have wrongly challenged him.This defect in his character was very evident as long ago as 1993, when Mr Lincolnbecame embroiled in a dispute with his former partner, and then with police officerswho revoked his firearms licence because of well founded concerns about his violentand aggressive behaviour.[37] Unfortunately, these defects in Mr Lincoln's character have not diminishedwith the passage of time. His relentless pursuit of Senior Constable Manning andMrs Manning was very disturbing and closely mirrored the conduct that resulted inthe District Court being very critical of Mr Lincoln in its 1994 judgment.[38] In assessing whether Mr Lincoln's enduring defect of character shouldpreclude him from being admitted as a barrister and solicitor, we have considered howthese defects of character would impact upon his ability to practise as a barrister andsolicitor. We have had particular regard to Mr Lincoln's ability to uphold the rule oflaw and to facilitate the administration of justice, which is the first of the fundamentalobligations imposed upon a lawyer by s 4 of the Act. This requirement imposesa number of duties upon a lawyer, which are amplified in the Conduct and Client CareRules issued by the Law Society. Those rules provide:2624 Stanley v New Zealand Law Society, above n 16, at [31].25 Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2007] NZSC 103, [2008] 2 NZLR 141.26 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008.(a) Rule 2.3:A lawyer must use legal processes only for proper purposes.A lawyer must not use, or knowingly assist in using, the lawor legal processes for the purpose of causing unnecessaryembarrassment, distress, or inconvenience to another person'sreputation, interests, or occupation.(b) Rule 2.7:A lawyer must not threaten, expressly or by implication, tomake any accusation against a person or to disclose somethingabout any person for any improper purpose.(c) Rule 2.10:A lawyer must not use, or threaten to use, the complaints ordisciplinary process for an improper purpose.(d) Rules 10 and 10.1:A lawyer must promote and maintain proper standards ofprofessionalism in the lawyer's dealings.A lawyer must treat other lawyers with respect and courtesy.(e) Rule 12:A lawyer must, when acting in a professional capacity,conduct dealings with others, including self-representedpersons, with integrity, respect, and courtesy.(f) Rule 13:The overriding duty of a lawyer acting in litigation is tothe court concerned. Subject to this, the lawyer has a duty toact in the best interests of his or her client without regard forthe personal interests of the lawyer.(g) Rules 13.2 and 13.2.1:A lawyer must not act in a way that undermines the processesof the court or the dignity of the judiciary.A lawyer must treat others involved in court processes withrespect.[39] Mr Lincoln's threats against Senior Constable Manning, Mrs Manning,Mr McRae and Mr Mackenzie involved multiple breaches of the duties we have setout at [38]. A lawyer who conducted him or herself in the way that Mr Lincoln didwould inevitably face serious disciplinary consequences.[40] We have borne in mind that if Mr Lincoln were admitted as a barrister andsolicitor he would be required to practise under supervision for at least three yearsbefore he could practise on his own account.27 We understand from the evidence thatMr Lincoln proposes to practise in chambers under the supervision of a Mr Starling.[41] We accept that in some instances, the requirement that a newly admitted lawyerpractise under supervision may ameliorate any lingering concerns about his or herfitness to be admitted as a barrister and solicitor. There are, however, two reasons whythis consideration does not persuade us that Mr Lincoln's appeal should be allowed:(a) All candidates for admission must satisfy the "fit and proper person"criterion. In our assessment, Mr Lincoln currently falls well short ofmeeting that standard. Supervision may assuage concerns in a finelybalanced assessment of the suitability of a candidate for admission.The evidence before us demonstrates, however, Mr Lincoln is wellbelow the cusp of being a fit and proper person.(b) Mr Lincoln's defect of character is so profound and enduring, we wouldrequire convincing evidence before we could be satisfied thatsupervision would provide sufficient protection for the community andthe profession if he were admitted as a barrister and solicitor. We wouldexpect that evidence to include assessments from suitably qualifiedhealth professionals who could provide assurances that Mr Lincoln'saggressive and unbalanced attitude can be managed throughsupervision. There is no evidence of that nature before us.Conclusion[42] We are satisfied that Dunningham J correctly concluded that Mr Lincoln is nota fit and proper person to be admitted as a barrister and solicitor. His defect ofcharacter is profound and very disconcerting.27 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act, s 30; and Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: PracticeRules) Regulations 2008, regs 3(1) and 12(3).[43] Mr Lincoln may be able to persuade the Law Society, with appropriateadditional evidence, that he is able to address the concerns that we have set out in thisjudgment. At this stage, however, the evidence clearly establishes that he does notsatisfy the requirements to be admitted as a barrister and solicitor.Result[44] The respondent's application to adduce further evidence is granted.[45] The appeal is dismissed.[46] The Law Society is entitled to costs on a standard band A basis, plusdisbursements.Solicitors:SB Law, Christchurch for AppellantNew Zealand Law Society, Wellington for Respondent