TAYLOR v MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS [2017] NZHC 2302

TAYLOR v MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS [2017] NZHC 2302 [22 September 2017]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDWELLINGTON REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATE WHANGANUI-Ā-TARA ROHECIV-2016-485-000974[2017] NZHC 2302UNDER the Citizenship Act 1977 and theJudicature Amendment Act 1972IN THE MATTER of an application for a declaration under s19(2) of the Citizenship Act 1977BETWEEN ROBERT TAYLORApplicantAND MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRSRespondentHearing: 26 June 2017Appearances: R E Harrison QC for PlaintiffJ K Gorman and L Kean for DefendantJudgment: 22 September 2017JUDGMENT OF COURTNEY JThis judgment was delivered by Justice Courtneyon 22 September 2017 at 3.30 pmpursuant to R 11.5 of the High Court RulesRegistrar / Deputy RegistrarDate.Introduction[1] One way to acquire New Zealand citizenship is by grant under s 8 of the Citizenship Act 1977. Under s 17(2), however, the Minister of Internal Affairs can give notice of his or her intention to deprive a person of the grant on specified grounds, one of which is mistake. This case raises questions about the nature of mistake as a ground for deprivation.[2] The plaintiff, Dr Robert Taylor, was born in India as Max Munish Mehta. As a young man he moved to the United States and obtained citizenship there. In 2005 he moved to New Zealand, where he changed his name and applied for citizenship. When Dr Taylor completed his application form for citizenship he did not disclose that he had been charged with a criminal offence in the United States and that there was a warrant outstanding for his arrest. Dr Taylor maintains, and the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) accepts, that his failure to disclose these matters was not deliberate.[3] The Minister has served Dr Taylor with a notice under s 17(2) of his intention to order that Dr Taylor be deprived of his New Zealand citizenship on the groundthat the grant was procured by Dr Taylor's mistake.1 Dr Taylor has applied under s 19(2) for a declaration that there are insufficient grounds to justify the making of the order. The decision of this Court on the s 19(2) application is final.2 Dr Taylor hasalso sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to issue the notice and thedecision on that application is subject to appeal.[4] The same grounds of challenge were argued in relation to both the s 19(2) application and the judicial review application. They can be summarised as:(a) Mistake by Dr Taylor is not available as a ground of deprivation because:(i) it is limited to mistake by the decision maker, and does not include mistake by the grantee;1 This notice is the second such notice; the first, which I mention later, was set aside by Clark J in a previous judicial review application: Taylor v Minister of Internal Affairs [2016] NZHC 868, [2016] NZAR 1244.2 Citizenship Act 1977, s 19(9).(ii) the Minister was not relying on mistake by Dr Taylor;(iii) neither the innocent failure of the grantee to supply relevant information nor mere ignorance of a state of affairs by the decision-maker constitute mistake for the purposes of s 17(2);(iv) mistake, whether by the decision-maker or grantee cannot be said to procure either a requirement for a grant or a grant itself.(b) The Minister failed to exercise his discretion under s 17(2) by treating the deprivation of citizenship as automatic upon being satisfied that citizenship had been procured by mistake.3Statutory framework[5] Section 8, under which Dr Taylor obtained his grant of citizenship, relevantly provides that:(1) The Minister may authorise the grant of New Zealand citizenship to any person, including a person who may be a New Zealand citizen by descent, who –(a) has attained the age of 16 years; and(b) is of full capacity; and(c) applies for citizenship in the prescribed manner; and(d) satisfies the Minister that he or she meets each of the requirements specified in subsection (2)(2) The requirements referred to in subsection 1(d) are as follows:(a) the applicant is entitled in terms of the Immigration Act 2009 to be in New Zealand indefinitely;(b) that the applicant was present in New Zealand –(i) for a minimum of 1350 days during the five years immediately preceding the date of the application; and(ii) for at least 240 days in each of those five years –being days during which the applicant was entitled3 This ground was not pleaded but was argued without objection by the Crown.in terms of the Immigration Act 2009 to be in New Zealand indefinitely.(c) that the applicant is of good character [6] The Minister may deprive a person who acquires citizenship by grant under s 8 of that citizenship under s 17 which relevantly provides:(2) Subject to s 19, the Minister may, by order, deprive a New Zealand citizen to whom this section applies of his New Zealand citizenship if he is satisfied that the registration, naturalisation, grant, or any grant requirement was procured by fraud, false representation, or wilful concealment of relevant information, or by mistake.(3) The Minister may not deprive a person of New Zealand citizenship under subsection (2) if –(a) the citizenship was acquired by mistake; and(b) to deprive the person of that citizenship would leave the person stateless.[7] A person in respect of whom the Minister makes an order under s 17(2) may apply to the Court under s 19(2) for a declaration that there are insufficient grounds for depriving the applicant of citizenship:(2) Every person upon whom a notice is served under subsection (1) may, within 28 days after it is served on him, apply to the High Court for a declaration that there are insufficient grounds to justify the making of an order under s 16 or, as the case may require, s 17 depriving the applicant of New Zealand citizenship; and the court may make or refuse to make such a declaration accordingly.[8] There is some inconsistency in previous decisions regarding the onus of proof on a s 19(2) application. In Wang v Minister of Internal Affairs4 and Hao v Minister of Internal Affairs5 Randerson J and Hugh Williams J both considered that the legal burden of proof lay with the applicant. In Yan v Minister of Internal Affairs, Hammond J took the view that, although the applicant had to endeavour to demonstrate why the Minister was wrong, the ultimate burden must be on the Minister to sustain his or her decision.6 In Joseph v Minister of Internal Affairs, Lang J did not consider it helpful to dwell on the onus of proof, commenting that:74 Wang v Minister of Internal Affairs [1998] 1 NZLR 309.5 Hao v Minister of Internal Affairs HC Auckland CIV-2009-404-005610, 7 September 2009.6 Yan v Minister of Internal Affairs [1997] 3 NZLR 450 at 459–460.7 Joseph v Minister of Internal Affairs [2012] NZHC 49, [2012] NZAR 179 at [28].The Court must reach its own conclusion as to the ultimate issue. It has the task of weighing the competing arguments and determining as an exercise in judgment whether the grounds upon which the Minister relies are insufficient to justify an order depriving the applicant of New Zealand citizenship.[9] For myself, I consider, as did Randerson J in Wang, that the legal burden of satisfying the Court that insufficient grounds exist to justify deprivation lies with the applicant:8To put the matter simply in the context of the present case, it is my judgment that the legal burden of proof remains upon the plaintiff throughout upon the well-established principle that "he who asserts must prove". In other words,it is for the plaintiff to prove his contention that there are insufficient grounds to justify the making of an order. This conclusion follows from the clear wording of s 19(2) which places upon the plaintiff the obligation to apply for the declaration identified in that subsection. During the hearing of the application, the evidential burden may shift from one party to another. In some cases, much will depend upon which party has the evidence in their possession or control.At the end of the day, however, I am satisfied that the ultimate burden (ie the legal burden) must lie with the plaintiff to establish that there are insufficient grounds to justify the making of the order under s 17.BackgroundDr Taylor's application form[10] In early 2005 Dr Taylor arrived in New Zealand to take up a position with a Christchurch company as a staff consultant radiologist. He was granted a work permit and applied for a residence visa under the skilled migrant category which was approved in September 2005. At this stage, he was using his original name, Max Munish Mehta. He changed that name by deed poll in July 2007.[11] In December 2007 Dr Taylor applied for New Zealand citizenship. At that stage he did not meet the five-year residency period required by s 8(2) and therefore advanced his application as one based on special circumstances, namely that his employment required frequent travel to Australia, which was inconvenient because travelling on a US passport required him to obtain a new business visa each time he travelled.8 Wang, above n 4, at 317.[12] Dr Taylor completed the standard application form required by applicants forNew Zealand citizenship. He answered "No" to question 20.4, which asked:Are you, or have you been involved in any other legal action against you, review or investigation in New Zealand or overseas by:Police [13] Question 21 asked:[I]f there is anything else we should know that may affect your application, please explain below and provide supporting documentation.[14] Dr Taylor did not provide any further information.[15] In fact, Dr Taylor had been arrested in Texas in May 2004 on a charge of soliciting a minor assault, which related to alleged on-line grooming in which the complainant was a police officer posing as a minor. Dr Taylor was arrested, charged, photographed and fingerprinted. The information available suggests that he was bailed on a $50,000 surety but failed to appear in court on 1 May 2006. A warrant was issued and remained active. Shortly before the hearing of this application Dr Taylor was arrested in Auckland and held in custody pending an extradition application by the US government.The first s 17 notice (not the subject of the application)[16] In 2014 the DIA learned of Dr Taylor's arrest in the US and advised him thathis citizenship was at risk. Initially, the DIA took the view that the misstatement and non-disclosure in Dr Taylor's application was deliberate and viewed it as "fraud, false representation or wilful concealment of relevant information" for the purposesof s 17(2), rather than mistake.[17] Dr Taylor maintained that he thought the charge had been dropped and was therefore not required to disclose the information and that he was unaware of the warrant having been issued. In support of these assertions he said that he had travelled to the US subsequent to the charge and in his original name without difficulty. He provided documents evidencing this fact and a letter from his US lawyer. My own view of these documents is that they do not necessarily support Dr Taylor's assertion; the travel to the US appears to have occurred in April 2006,before the date on which Dr Taylor failed to appear and before the warrant wasissued. Nevertheless, the DIA accepted Dr Taylor's explanation was plausible.[18] The Minister gave notice of his intention to deprive Dr Taylor of citizenship under s 19 citing mistake (the first notice). As a result of defects in the process (theMinister having made his decision before Dr Taylor's solicitors provided further information at the DIA's invitation) Clark J set the notice aside.9The second s 17 notice[19] Immediately after Clark J's decision was delivered Dr Taylor's solicitors, Lane Neave, wrote to the DIA indicating Dr Taylor's intention to make furthersubmissions before any further decision was made regarding his citizenship. The DIA responded that it intended to recommend to the Minister that an order be made under s 17 depriving Dr Taylor of his citizenship on the grounds that he had procuredNew Zealand citizenship by "fraud, false representation, wilful concealment ofrelevant information, or by mistake due to his non-disclosure of relevant informationwhen he applied for a grant of citizenship". Dr Taylor was invited to provide anyfurther information he wished, which he did.[20] In its letter to the DIA, Lane Neave advised that Dr Taylor rejected any basis for depriving him of citizenship on the grounds of fraud, false representation or wilful concealment of relevant information on the ground that to do so on thesegrounds would be unreasonable, given the DIA's previous conclusion that there wasinsufficient information to show that Dr Taylor deliberately withheld information and that no further information had come to light.[21] As to the ground of mistake, Lane Neave asked that the discretion be applied not to recommend deprivation of citizenship on that ground and pointed to Dr Taylor's good character, skills and value he is able to contribute to New Zealandas factors to take into account in considering this ground. Attached to that submission were a number of character references from a number of professional colleagues and examples of his academic writings.9 Taylor v Minister of Internal Affairs, above n 1.[22] The DIA prepared a briefing paper dated 22 August 2016. It considered thatthe arrest and issue of the warrant were relevant to Dr Taylor's ability to meet therequirements for citizenship as it was likely to have affected the assessment of hisability to meet the "good character" requirement. The author of the briefing paper, Jeff Montgomery, considered that Dr Taylor's explanation for his failure to declarethe charge and warrant was plausible but did not negate the fact that relevant information had not been made available to the Minister to exercise his discretion.[23] Mr Montgomery concluded that there were sufficient grounds to justify a recommendation that the Minister make an order to deprive Dr Taylor of his New Zealand citizenship on the ground that it was procured by mistake:Dr Taylor did not declare that he had been charged with an offence in the US and that he had an outstanding warrant for his arrest in the US. This failure appears to have been due to his mistaken belief that the charge had been dropped, which it was not. As this information would likely have affectedthe Department's assessment and recommendation of his ability to meet thegood character requirements for citizenship, Dr Taylor's grant of citizenshipwas procured by mistake.Dr Taylor has requested in his submission that you use your discretion not to make the order on the ground of mistake, on the basis of his good character, skills and value to New Zealand. However, the Department recommends that you make the order on the basis that the information about the charge in the US and the outstanding warrant would likely have affected the formerMinister's decision to grant Dr Taylor citizenship regardless of Dr Taylor'sskills and potential contribution to New Zealand.[24] The same day the Minister signed a notice of intention to deprive a person of New Zealand citizenship (the second notice), this being the notice now under challenge. It said:At the time you were granted New Zealand citizenship, the Department of Internal Affairs and the then Minister of Internal Affairs were not aware thatyou were charged with an offence of "criminal solicitation of a minor to commit sexual assault of a child" in the United States of America, and were also not aware that you had an outstanding warrant for your arrest in the United States of America. You did not disclose this information to the Department and you explained that this was due to your belief that the charge had been dropped.Had this information been known to the Minister at the time, it is likely that your application would have been declined as you would not have clearlymet the requirements for "good character". Due to this, I intend to make anorder depriving you of your New Zealand citizenship on the ground that the grant was procured by mistake.Mistake as a ground of deprivation[25] Mistake as a ground of deprivation of citizenship was first introduced in the Citizenship Act 1977. The predecessor provision, s 23(2) of the British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act 1948, permitted deprivation of citizenship wherethe registration or certificate of naturalization had been "obtained by means of fraud, false representation, or the concealment of any material fact". As Hammond J observed in Yan v Minister of Internal Affairs, the addition of mistake as a ground made the New Zealand Act more draconian than its United Kingdom counterpart.10There appears to be no explicit record of the reason for this addition but it leads one to the view that the Legislature intended to widen the grounds upon which a grant of citizenship might be withdrawn.Does s 17(2) apply only to mistakes by the decision-maker?[26] Mr Harrison submitted that any alleged mistake on Dr Taylor's part cannotprovide grounds for a s 19 notice because "mistake" for the purposes of s 17(2)relates only to a mistake by the Department or Minister as the decision-maker. Mr Harrison's argument rested mainly on the grammatical structure of s 17(2). He argued that the phrase "or by mistake" was disjunctive and therefore to be treated differently from the preceding words "fraud, false representation, or wilful concealment of relevant information". He submitted that the latter plainly related toconduct by the applicant so that the words "or by mistake" must be directed solelytowards ministerial or departmental conduct.[27] In support of his argument Mr Harrison drew a comparison with provisions of the Immigration Act 2009 and its predecessor the Immigration Act 1987. Mr Harrison equated mistake in s 17(2) with the concept of "administration error"that appears in the Immigration Act 2009 and its predecessor, both of which differentiate between steps such as deportation and revocation of refugee or protected person status on the ground of deliberate and dishonest conduct (fraud, forgery, etc) and administrative error. Mr Harrison submitted that because citizenship is a more fundamental right and status than immigration status, the fact that immigration legislation does not provide for change of status for innocent10 Yan v Minister of Internal Affairs, above n 6, at 460.applicant error but only for "administrative error" strongly supported an argument that "mistake" in the Act should be similarly interpreted. On this approach asuccessful applicant and recipient of a grant of New Zealand citizenship would only be at risk of being deprived of it by virtue of his or her own deliberately dishonest acts or omissions.[28] Whilst statutes dealing with analogous subject matter or forming part of a comprehensive legislative scheme may be of assistance in interpretation, I am cautious about accepting that the words used in the Immigration Act, introduced well after the implementation of the Citizenship Act, can legitimately be viewed as of assistance in the interpretation of the latter. That is particularly so given thedistinctly different wording; "administrative error" is very specific whereas "mistake" is naturally broad.[29] I do not accept Mr Harrison's interpretation of s 17(2). First, it is commonground that the words "fraud, false representation or wilful concealment of relevantinformation" relate to conduct by the grantee. The fact that the phrase "or by mistake" appear in the same sentence as those words indicates that the latter also relates to the grantee. The phrase "or by mistake" is more naturally read as disjunctive in the sense only of differentiating between different kinds of conduct. It can reasonably be expected that if the phrase was not intended to include the grantee more specific words would have been used.[30] Secondly, the verb "procured" relates to both forms of conduct and in Rajan v Minister of Internal Affairs was held to apply equally to mistake by a grantee and the Minister.11 In Rajan the applicant had obtained a New Zealand residence permit on the basis of her Australian residence permit, the latter granted by virtue of her marriage because her husband already had an Australian residence permit. But thehusband's Australian permit had been obtained by fraud, which led to the Minister revoking the applicant's New Zealand residence permit. The applicant was unaware of that fact when she applied for citizenship less than a fortnight later and did not disclose her changed residence status. Her application was granted because Ministry officials mistakenly took into account the period of Australian residence when11 Rajan v Minister of Internal Affairs HC Auckland M1040/95, 5 November 1996, Anderson J.calculating the period for which the applicant had been ordinarily resident in New Zealand.[31] Anderson J held that the grant of citizenship had been procured by mistake for the purposes of s 17(2), namely mistake by the Minister:12It is an inevitable inference on the information available that the Minister and his advisers made a mistake, namely that they mistakenly assumed that the applicant was lawfully entitled to be considered for a grant of citizenship on grounds including fulfilment of minimum residency requirement. It is plain that by virtue of such mistake the Minister approved grant of citizenship. There are therefore grounds for finding affirmatively that the grant was procured by a mistake and that a substantial reason for the grant of citizenship was the mistaken assumption of fulfilment of minimum residency requirements.[32] Apart from Rajan almost all the cases decided under s 19 have proceeded on the basis of a mistake by the grantees, or by someone acting for them. In Heng v Minister of Internal Affairs the plaintiff innocently obtained citizenship on the basis of false documents provided to her by an acquaintance.13 Salmon J followed the approach taken in immigration cases14 in finding that a person may be deprived of citizenship where the grant had been procured on the basis of fraudulent documents even though the applicant was innocent of fraud and then went on to observe that:15Assuming that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the fraud she was nevertheless mistaken in her belief that the documents upon which she relied for her citizenship application were forgeries. She thus obtained citizenship on the basis of that mistaken belief.If citizenship were able to be obtained by an innocent person on the basis of documents that were fraudulent the policy of the Immigration Act and the Citizenship Act which is to ensure that both immigration and citizenship are carefully regulated would be defeated. The same considerations apply even if citizenship were to be obtained as a result of a mistake.[33] In Wang v Minister of Internal Affairs, in which citizenship was found to have been procured by use of a fraudulent document (a divorce decree from China), Randerson J said:1612 At page 10.13 Heng v Minister of Internal Affairs HC Auckland M616/95, 24 April 1995, Salmon J.14 Rajan v Ministry of Immigration HC Auckland M115/94, 31 July 1995, Tompkins J.15 Page 13.16 Wang v Minister of Internal Affairs, above n 4, at 314–315.It is well established that the fraud, false representation, wilful concealment or mistake need not be that of the plaintiff. It is sufficient if those grounds are made out, even if the plaintiff had no knowledge of them and was an innocent party.[34] Randerson J was relying for that statement on both Heng and also a case decided under s 20 of the Immigration Act 1987.17[35] Likewise, in Joseph v Minister of Internal Affairs, Lang J observed that, in the context of s 17, the impugned conduct does not have to be that of the applicant for citizenship but may be the conduct of somebody acting on that person's behalf inrelation to the application.18[36] The last case I mention on this aspect is Yan v Minister of Internal Affairs.19The applicant had made a statutory declaration in support of his citizenship application that he intended to continue to reside in New Zealand if granted citizenship. He had been employed in New Zealand on a temporary basis following submission of his PhD thesis. That employment was for two months. In the middle of that period he received his grant of citizenship and then, having been advised that no permanent position was available, accepted a position in Australia. The Minister issued a notice under s 17(2), and at trial relied on false representation by the applicant (which Hammond J rejected on the facts) or on a mistake by the Minister himself. Hammond J rejected the possibility that the Minister could rely on his own mistake in issuing the s 17(2) notice:20 [T]here is authority for the proposition that the mistake need not be on thepart of the applicant (Heng v Minister of Internal Affairs, Rajan v Minister of Internal Affairs (HC Auckland M1040/95, 5 November 1996 Anderson J). But I do not think that principle extends to this case – the Minister can hardly rely on his own mistake.[37] Mr Harrison submitted that if Yan is read as a general proposition that mistake by the Minister cannot form the basis for a notice under s 17(2) then it was wrongly decided. I do not think it does stand for a general proposition; HammondJ's reliance on Rajan, in which mistake by the Minister was the permitted ground for deprivation, is inconsistent with an intention to state a general proposition to the17 Rajan v Minister of Immigration, above n 11.18 Joseph v Minister of Internal Affairs, above n 7.19 Yan v Minister of Internal Affairs, above n 6.20 At 461.contrary. In my view Hammond J was referring to the circumstances of that particular case. Regardless, the comment was obiter as Hammond J did not identify any mistake.[38] Looking at the approach taken in previous cases decided under s 19(2) it is clear that mistake as a ground for deprivation under s 17(2) applies to conduct by or on behalf of either the grantee or the decision maker. Only that interpretation is consistent with the grammatical structure of the provision and its purpose.[39] Finally, I note Mr Harrison's reliance on a November 2003 report of theForeign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee to the House of Representatives,"International Treaty Examination of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness".21 The report contains the following statement:We are advised that for the purposes of s 17 of the Citizenship Act,"mistake" means an administrative error on the part of the citizenship office[40] This report was tendered in the previous case before Clark J, who found it not to be of assistance. Mr Harrison invited me to find that it articulates a tenable view of the policy behind the statutory provision for deprivation of citizenship on the grounds of mistake as against other, fraud-related grounds. I do not accept this submission. There is no principled basis for the view expressed. Moreover, immediately after the statement relied on, the report made a broad but wholly inaccurate summary of the state of the law as it then stood:We are told that to date, no-one has been deprived of New Zealand citizenship on the grounds of a mistake. Moreover, it would not be possible for an applicant to create a situation where he or she received a grant by mistake because creating such a situation would necessarily involve the provision of false and misleading information. In such a case deprivation proceedings would be taken on the grounds of the provision of false or misleading information.[41] At the date of the report the decisions in Rajan, Heng and Wang had already made it clear that s 17 permitted deprivation of citizenship on the grounds of applicant mistake.21 The purpose of the report was to consider the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and is no doubt one of the steps that preceded the introduction of s 17(3) by way of the Citizenship Amendment Act 2005.Is the Minister relying on mistake by Dr Taylor?[42] Mr Harrison argued that the wording of the notice shows that the mistake being relied on is that of the Minister. I am satisfied from the wording of the notice that the mistake being relied on for the purposes of s 17(2) is that of Dr Taylor. The first paragraph of the notice certainly opens with the statement that the DIA and thenMinister were unaware of the charge and outstanding warrant. But the Minister'signorance of the charge and warrant is not to be viewed in isolation, but rather in light of the reason for that ignorance. The Minister was ignorant of these facts because Dr Taylor had made a statement to the effect that no such facts existed. Thefinal sentence of that paragraph, referring to Dr Taylor's failure to disclose theinformation and his explanation for that failure, makes it clear that what is actuallybeing relied on is Dr Taylor's misstatement that he had not been involved in anypolice investigation or legal action. If it were otherwise there would be no need to even mention his explanation for not having disclosed it.Does the conduct relied on constitute a mistake?[43] Mr Harrison characterised Dr Taylor's conduct as the mere innocent failure todisclose information or the innocent provision of incorrect information and submitted that it could not amount to mistake for the purposes of s 17(2). He arguedthat the inclusion in s 17(2) of "wilful concealment", which involves the deliberatewithholding of relevant information, must mean that the innocent failure to provide such information is necessarily excluded. Mr Harrison relied on Lang J's decision inJoseph for that proposition.[44] I consider that Dr Taylor's conduct is properly characterised as the innocentor mistaken provision of incorrect information, not the mere innocent failure to disclose information. As discussed earlier, the real nature of the mistake asserted by the Minister is the (innocent) misstatement by Dr Taylor of the position regarding the police investigation and charge against him, which certainly constitutes mistake for the purposes of s 17(2). It is perfectly clear that the relevance of the charge and warrant arises from question 20.4 in the application form which asked whether Dr Taylor had been involved in any other legal action, review or investigation by thepolice. Dr Taylor's negative answer misstated the position. Question 20.4 was theonly place in the application form for disclosure of such information; a later generalquestion under "disclosure" that asked for "anything else we should know" would obviously exclude information captured by question 20.4. The correct, and onlypossible, characterisation of Dr Taylor's conduct is misstatement and the words in the notice "you did not disclose this information" can only be read as a reference tothat.[45] Nor do I accept Mr Harrison's submission that the presence of s 17(3)supports an approach that treats mistake as a different category to the first three grounds under s 17(2). Section 17(3) is an exception carved out of the general scheme of s 17(2) to bring it into line with international law relating to the reduction in statelessness. It provides relief from the potentially unduly harsh effect of s 17(2). But there is no basis on which to conclude that mistake is intended to be treated differently in other circumstances.[46] Mr Harrison's alternative argument was that if the mistake relied on is that ofthe Minister, its true character is mere ignorance of the criminal charge and warrant, which could not constitute a mistake. Whilst I accept Mr Harrison's submission that, for the purposes of s 17(2), a mistake requires some positive misunderstanding or error as opposed to ignorance or lack of awareness,22 I do not accept thecharacterisation of the Minister's conduct as mere lack of awareness of the criminal charge and warrant. In assessing an application for citizenship the Minister takes into account information relevant to the s 8 requirements. A misstatement as to those requirements leads, self-evidently, to the Minister proceeding on a wrong understanding of the relevant facts. That is more than mere ignorance of relevant facts but a positive error in believing that Dr Taylor had never been involved in a police investigation.Can mistake satisfy the requirement for procurement?[47] The Minister may only deprive a person of citizenship under s 17(2) if the mistake or other relevant conduct procured the grant or any grant requirement. Themeaning of "procure" in this context is settled; it requires only that the conduct be a22 Caldow v Wall [1964] NZLR 65, 68; Thomas v Houston Corbett & Co [1969] NZLR 151, 161, 166, 171 – 2 citing Kelly v Solari [1835-42] All ER Rep 320.substantial cause of the grant or satisfaction of a grant requirement. It need not be the principal or overwhelming cause.23[48] Mr Harrison argued that the relevant grant requirement, being the requirement under s 8(2)(c) that the applicant be of good character, is not capable of being procured. It must therefore be the grant of citizenship, rather than the grant of requirement that was procured by mistake in this case. I do not accept this argument.[49] Section 8(1)(d) requires that the applicant satisfies the Minister that he or she meets each of the requirements in s 8(2), one of which is good character. Readliterally, Dr Taylor's mistake could not procure good character. But when s 8(2)(c) isread in conjunction with s 8(1)(d) it is clear that procuration in that context means procuration of the Minister's satisfaction that the applicant had met the grant requirements. If it were otherwise the words "any grant requirement" in s 17(2)would be otiose.[50] Dr Taylor's misstatement was undoubtedly a substantial cause leading to the Minister's conclusion that Dr Taylor was of good character. It is a proper inference on all of the facts in this case that a positive belief that Dr Taylor had not beeninvestigated by the police would have a substantial causative effect in the Minister'sconclusion that Dr Taylor was of good character. But, in any event, as Clarke Jfound, Dr Taylor's mistake can also be viewed as having procured the grant ofcitizenship itself on the basis that information about a charge for criminal solicitation of a minor to commit sexual assault of a child would be directly relevant to and an effective factor in the decision to grant citizenship.Minister's exercise of the discretion as part of the s 19(2) inquiry[51] Mr Harrison submitted that s 17(2) conferred on the Minister a discretion whether to make an order for deprivation of citizenship even if satisfied that the statutory grounds for doing so were made out. He argued that the Minister had wrongly treated deprivation of citizenship as inevitably following once he was satisfied that the grant had been procured by mistake.23 Wang v Minister of Internal Affairs, above n 4, at 8; Joseph v Minister of Internal Affairs, above n 7, at [36].[52] What was required of both the Minister under s 17(2) and the Court under s 19(2), according to Mr Harrison, was consideration of the merits of deprivation as the time the discretion fell to be exercised, which involved a balancing exercise in which the circumstances and relative seriousness of the ground relied on and factors weighing in favour of the grantee retaining citizenship are evaluated against each other. In this case that would have required consideration of "good character" information as well as "bad character" information. Mr Harrison invited me to consider the meaning of the requirement in s 8(2)(c) that the applicant be "of good character" and to consider the evidence of Dr Taylor's general good character and standing to conclude that the conduct relied on by the Minister could not now be said to be sufficient to justify deprivation of citizenship.[53] Katz J considered the virtual identical submission in Joseph v Minister of Internal Affairs (No 3).24 In Joseph the Court had already determined under s 19(2) that there were sufficient grounds under s 19 to make an order under s 17 before theapplication for judicial review was brought. But I respectfully agree with Katz J'sreasoning and consider that it applies equally to the present situation:25Section 19 requires the court to make a determination on whether there "are"sufficient grounds to deprive (s 19(2)). A de novo assessment of the evidence is required at the time the declaration is determined. The court's task on a s 19(2) application is not, therefore, to simply review the Minister'spreliminary decision to deprive a person of citizenship, but to undertake an inquiry afresh. The Court is not limited to considering whether the Minister is right or wrong. This position was recognised in Yang v Minister of Internal Affairs where the Court stated:26The decision of the Court on any such application is final. Section 19(9). It is also well-established that the Court is entitled to consider all the evidence placed before it and is not limited to evidence relied on by the Minister prior to making the decision to issue notice under s 19(1).[54] The Act envisages, however, that if the statutory grounds are made out the Minister may proceed to make a deprivation order. She is not required to do so. Indeed there may be cases where she decides, in her absolute discretion, not to make such an order. But once the Court has ruled that there are sufficient grounds under s 17, the Minister is entitled to proceed to make a deprivation order.24 Joseph v Minister of Internal Affairs (No 3) [2014] NZAR 578 [2014] NZHC 415.25 At [36], [37] and [42].26 Yang v Minister of Internal Affairs [1998] 1 NZLR 309 (HC) at 316.[55] For the reasons outlined I have concluded that there was no obligation on the Minister to consider matters other than those set out in s 17 when making her deprivation order.[56] In my view, the Minister had no obligation to consider facts beyond the statutory grounds in s 17. Nor do I accept that the Court itself has any obligation to embark on a merits-based review of the deprivation of citizenship; its inquiry is limited to the sufficiency of the statutory grounds. There is no basis on which toread the words "insufficient grounds" as inviting any wider inquiry and, in particular,no basis on which to find that the Court should, itself, embark on a consideration offactors that might go to the exercise of the Minister's discretion.[57] Lastly, I refer to Wang in which Randerson J held that:The jurisdiction of [the High] Court under s 19(2) is limited to making a declaration that there are insufficient grounds to justify the making of an order under s 19 or refusing to make such a declaration.[58] There is no scope for the Court to inquire into the wider circumstances of the case. It is a simple matter of whether sufficient grounds for the order under s 17(2) exist or not.[59] It follows that the Minister's decision cannot be impugned on the basis he failed to have regard to and weigh the wider circumstances of the case. Mr Harrison's arguments in this respect must fail.Result[60] I have concluded that:(a) mistake by the grantee is available as a ground of deprivation under s 17(2);(b) the Minister was relying on mistake by Dr Taylor in giving notice under s 17(2);(c) Dr Taylor's conduct constituted mistake for the purposes of s 17(2);(d) Dr Taylor's mistake procured either a grant requirement or the grantitself;(e) the Minister had no obligation to consider matters beyond the statutory grounds for deprivation and therefore did not fail to exercise his discretion under s 17(2).[61] It follows that both the s 19(2) application and the judicial review application are dismissed.[62] I was not addressed on the issue of costs. Counsel may file memoranda.____________________P Courtney J