MARTEL & ORS v R [2018] NZCA 305

MARTEL & ORS v R [2018] NZCA 305 [10 August 2018]IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALANDI TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROACA453/2017[2018] NZCA 305BETWEEN RODNEY GEORGE MARTELAppellantAND THE QUEENRespondentCA529/2017BETWEEN REGHARDT ROUXAppellantAND THE QUEENRespondentCA579/2017BETWEEN RACHEL ROSE VINCENTAppellantAND THE QUEENRespondentHearing: 27 June 2018Court: French, Venning and Katz JJCounsel: P J Kaye for Appellant Mr MartelM A Corlett QC for Appellant Mr RouxB A Crowley for Appellant Ms VincentZ R Johnston for RespondentJudgment: 10 August 2018 at 11 amJUDGMENT OF THE COURTA The applications to extend time for filing Ms Vincent and Mr Roux's appealsare granted.B The respondent's application for leave to file Mr Burn's affidavit out of timeis declined.C Mr Martel and Mr Roux's appeals against sentence are dismissed.D Ms Vincent's appeal against sentence is allowed in part. The sentence of14 years and eight months' imprisonment is quashed and replaced with asentence of 12 years and 11 months' imprisonment, with a minimum periodof imprisonment of six years and five months.____________________________________________________________________REASONS OF THE COURT(Given by Katz J)[1] Rodney Martel, Rachel Vincent and Reghardt Roux were each convicted of anumber of charges relating to their involvement in the importation of significantquantities of restricted drugs into New Zealand. They were sentenced to lengthy termsof imprisonment.1[2] They each now appeal their sentence on the basis that it is manifestly excessive.In particular, they submit that the sentencing Judge, Palmer J, adopted starting pointsthat were too high and failed to give them sufficient discounts for their guilty pleasand personal mitigating factors. Ms Vincent and Mr Roux also submit that theimposition of minimum periods of imprisonment (MPIs) on them was not warranted.Background[3] Between 9 June 2015 and 20 April 2016, Customs intercepted 37 packagescontaining the restricted drugs methamphetamine, cocaine, GBL or MDMA, sent tomultiple addresses in Auckland, Christchurch and the wider Canterbury region.1 R v Martel [2017] NZHC 1878 [sentencing notes].Mr Martel, Mr Roux and Ms Vincent were each convicted of being involved in theimportation of some or all of the packages. In particular:(a) Mr Martel was involved in the importation of all 37 packages over a10 month period. The packages contained approximately5.683 kilograms of methamphetamine, 7.7 litres of GBL, 31 grams ofcocaine, 1,986 tablets of MDMA and 31 grams of MDMA powder.He pleaded guilty on the morning of trial to representative charges ofimporting methamphetamine, GBL, MDMA and cocaine. He wassentenced to an end sentence of 18 and a half years' imprisonment, withan MPI of 50 per cent (nine years and three months).(b) Ms Vincent was involved in the importation of approximately3.63 kilograms of methamphetamine, 5.8 litres of GBL, 31 grams ofcocaine, 1,986 tablets of MDMA and 31 grams of MDMA powder in24 packages over a three month period.2 She pleaded guilty on the firstday of trial to representative charges of importing methamphetamine,GBL and MDMA, a charge of possession of methamphetamine forsupply and a charge of importing cocaine. She received an end sentenceof 14 years and eight months' imprisonment, with an MPI of 50 per cent(seven years and four months).(c) Mr Roux was involved in the importation of 1.324 kilograms ofmethamphetamine, 1.8 litres of GBL and 31 grams of cocaine infive packages across six weeks. He pleaded guilty on the morning oftrial to a representative charge of importing methamphetamine andimporting cocaine and GBL. He was sentenced to an end sentence of11 years and six months' imprisonment, with an MPI of 50 per cent(five years and nine months).2 The sentencing notes, above n 1, at [5(b)] do not mention the 31 grams of MDMA powder but wetake this to be merely a typographical error.Extension of time for filing appeals[4] Ms Vincent and Mr Roux's appeals were filed out of time. The Crown doesnot, however, object to an extension of time for filing. The delay was short, explained,and caused no prejudice. The application for an extension of time is accordinglygranted.Were the starting points within range?Palmer J's approach[5] Palmer J's approach to setting the starting point was to take the charges ofimporting methamphetamine as the lead charges (subsuming the cocaine offendingwithin that) and then make an uplift to reflect the class B charges.3Mr Martel[6] It was common ground that Mr Martel's offending falls within band four of theguideline decision of R v Fatu.4 Band four provides for a sentencing range of 12 years'to life imprisonment.5 The key issue is where in that band Mr Martel's offending falls.In Fatu, this Court stated:[31] Where an offender fits within any particular band will depend notjust on the quantity and purity of the drugs involved but also the role playedby the offender. Those who are the primary offenders can expect starting pointsentences towards the higher end of the relevant band with the converseapplying to those whose role is less significant.[7] Mr Kaye submitted, on behalf of Mr Martel, that the starting point of 20 years'imprisonment that Palmer J adopted was too high.6 Palmer J fell into error, hesubmitted, by wrongly characterising Mr Martel's role in the offending as being"central" and "pivotal".7 Mr Kaye submitted that there was little difference inculpability between Mr Martel and Ms Vincent, whom Palmer J described as a "senior3 Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [14].4 R v Fatu [2006] 2 NZLR 72 (CA).5 At [36(d)].6 The starting point was then uplifted by six months to take into account Mr Martel's previousconvictions, but no issue is taken with that uplift on appeal.7 At [18].manager involved in organising the operation".8 Hence, Mr Kaye submitted, a startingpoint similar to that of Ms Vincent (17 years) should have been adopted.[8] We do not accept that Palmer J erred in his characterisation of Mr Martel's role,or in assessing his culpability as more serious than that of his co-offenders.In particular, we note:(a) Mr Martel was the only offender involved in all 37 importations over a10 month period (Ms Vincent, by way of comparison, was involved in24 importations over a three month period).(b) Mr Martel was responsible for importing more drugs, by a considerablemargin, than his co-offenders. For example, he was involved in theimportation of 5.683 kilograms of methamphetamine, significantlymore than Ms Vincent's 3.63 kilograms of methamphetamine.Mr Martel was also responsible for the importation of 31 grams ofcocaine, 7.7 litres of GBL, 1,986 MDMA tablets, and 31 grams ofMDMA powder.(c) Mr Martel is the only common link between all of the importations inboth Auckland and Christchurch. He was the only one of the appellantswho was associated with a fourth offender (who has not appealed hissentence) who received the first six packages in Auckland. Mr Martelwas also linked to all of the subsequent importations and offenders.(d) When the police searched Mr Martel's address they located afraudulently obtained passport in the name of Lucien Smith. Eleven ofthe packages were addressed to Lucien or L Smith. Another 12 wereaddressed to other names ending in the surname Smith.[9] It is clear that Mr Martel was involved to a significantly greater degree thanhis co-defendants. This was appropriately reflected in the starting point adopted byPalmer J.8 At [5(b)].[10] We have carefully considered the various cases referred to by the Crown andthe appellants, and also some additional cases.9 With reference to those cases, an18 year starting point for the methamphetamine offending alone would have beenjustified, as would a two year uplift for the other drug offending. The global startingpoint of 20 years' imprisonment adopted by Palmer J appropriately reflects thesignificant volume of drugs imported, the duration of the offending (involving37 packages over a 10 month period), and Mr Martel's senior role within the operation.Ms Vincent[11] Palmer J set a starting point of 15 years' imprisonment for Ms Vincent'smethamphetamine offending, with an uplift of two years for the other drugs.10[12] Mr Crowley submitted, on behalf of Ms Vincent, that Palmer J erred inaccepting the Crown's characterisation of her role as that of a "senior manager".11This resulted, he submitted, in an excessive starting point being adopted.The starting point for the methamphetamine offending, he argued, should have been14 years' imprisonment, rather than 15 years. Mr Crowley took no issue, however,with the two year uplift for the other offending.[13] In our view, Palmer J did not err in his assessment of Ms Vincent's role in theoffending. She was involved in the importation of approximately 3.63 kilograms ofmethamphetamine, 5.8 litres of GBL, 31 grams of cocaine and 1,986 MDMA tabletsin 24 packages over a three month period. The search warrant executed on her homein Christchurch uncovered methamphetamine, pills, scales, 14 cell phones,40 SIM cards, a notebook containing track and trace numbers for 18 courier packagesand the associated addresses (all of which were addresses matching interceptedpackages of drugs).9 R v Atta [2016] NZHC 2478; Hoang v R [2016] NZCA 335; O'Connor v R [2016] NZCA 414;Nguyen v R [2016] NZCA 18; R v Wan [2017] NZHC 2376; R v Cheung [2017] NZHC 914;R v Hung [2017] NZHC 467; R v Kupec [2017] NZDC 22632; Gao v R [2018] NZCA 69; Man v R[2017] NZCA 525; Lam v R [2012] NZCA 280; R v Wong [2009] NZCA 332; Chen v R [2010]NZCA 552 at [17]; R v Pai [2015] NZHC 2345; R v Ip [2016] NZHC 1825; and Choi v R [2011]NZCA 237, (2011) 25 CRNZ 262.10 At [19].11 At [5(b)].[14] We have carefully considered the various cases referred to by counsel. Havingregard to Ms Vincent's senior role in the offending, the repeated nature of the offendingover a period of several months, and the significant quantity of drugs imported, thosecases do not support the contention that the starting point adopted by Palmer J wasoutside of the available range.Mr Roux[15] Mr Roux's offending related to five packages in which 1.324 kilograms ofmethamphetamine, 1.8 litres of GBL and 31 grams of cocaine were imported.The offending occurred over a six-week period.[16] Palmer J set a starting point of 13 years' imprisonment for Mr Roux in respectof his methamphetamine offending, and uplifted this by six months to reflect his GBLoffending. Palmer J made the following observations regarding Mr Roux's role:[20] I consider that Mr Roux's role was not high in the operational chainbut in organising addresses he was more than just a catcher. He played a lesserrole [than Ms Vincent] but not a much lesser role and he was involved inimportation of a large quantity of drugs.[17] Mr Corlett QC submitted, on behalf of Mr Roux, that Palmer Jmischaracterised his role in the offending as being more serious than it actually was.He submitted that Mr Roux's role was actually similar to that of Mr Bell (anotherco-offender). The starting point adopted for Mr Bell's sentence was nine years'imprisonment. Duffy J, who sentenced Mr Bell, found that his role in the importationwas that of a "catcher," at the bottom of the chain.12 He provided a safe address forthe receipt of packages containing the methamphetamine and GBL.13 Mr Bellwas sentenced for importing 323 grams of methamphetamine and 1.9 litres of GBL,as well as possession of 102 grams of cannabis.14[18] Mr Corlett submitted that there was an insufficient basis for Palmer J'sconclusion that Mr Roux's role was not much less than that of Ms Vincent, given thatMs Vincent's involvement was in respect of a larger number of packages, over a longer12 R v Bell [2017] NZHC 1818 at [4].13 At [4].14 At [3].time period and involving a significantly greater amount of methamphetamine. Hermore senior role was evidenced, amongst other things, by the items seized from herhome during a search, including her note book. Mr Corlett submitted that Mr Roux'srole should therefore be considered as being more analogous to Mr Bell's thanMs Vincent's.[19] We do not consider that Mr Roux's offending was at Mr Bell's level. It wassignificantly more serious. He was involved in the importation of a much greateramount of methamphetamine, such that his offending was within band four, rather thanband three of Fatu. Further, his role was clearly senior to that of Mr Bell, as evidencedby text message evidence. This included a message between him and a third partywhere Mr Roux asked that person for their address. That address was then providedto Ms Vincent and drugs were delivered to that address. Another text message, sent totwo individuals, warned them to be on standby at their addresses as it was meant to bea busy week. Such evidence clearly supports the Judge's conclusion that althoughMr Roux was "not high in the operational chain he was more than just a catcher".15[20] We have reviewed the cases counsel referred to, and some additional cases.16In our view the starting point set by Palmer J was well within range. Indeed, giventhat the offending fell within band 4 of Fatu, the starting point his Honour adopted isarguably towards the lower end of the available range.17 Nor does a global startingpoint of 13 years and six months' imprisonment for Mr Roux offend the parityprinciple. It appropriately reflects his culpability relative to both Ms Vincent andMr Bell.Were sufficient discounts given for the appellants' personal mitigating factors?Mr Martel[21] Palmer J uplifted Mr Martel's sentence by six months to take account of his2016 convictions for possession for supply and manufacture of methamphetamine.15 At [20].16 Above n 9.17 We note, for example, that R v Ip, above n 9, and Choi v R, above n 9, both involved smalleramounts of methamphetamine and less senior roles, and starting points of 13 years and 12 yearsand six months respectively, were imposed.His Honour noted the previous convictions, before turning to the letter of remorse,commenting that:[23] I have received a letter from Mr Martel expressing his remorsewhich I read in the context of his previous extensive offending. Mr Chamberssays he is dedicated to rehabilitation. I welcome that and encourage him in it.His efforts may count for parole. On the basis of the position as it currentlystands I agree the six months' uplift is justified.[22] The pre-sentence report writer noted that Mr Martel had expressed remorse andhad some insight into his offending. Ultimately, however, Palmer J did not giveMr Martel any discount for remorse.[23] Mr Kaye submitted that Palmer J should have considered remorse as astandalone factor, rather than considering it in the context of Mr Martel's previousoffending. If Palmer J had approached the issue correctly, he submitted, he wouldhave afforded Mr Martel a discount for remorse.[24] There is no requirement that a discount be given simply because an offenderexpresses remorse at the time of sentencing. The court's assessment of remorserequires a "proper and robust evaluation of all the circumstances".18 The court willlook for "hard evidence of genuine regret and remorse".19 Limited weight will beattached to an expression of remorse that is "belated".20 Little weight may be placedon even genuine expressions of remorse in circumstances of recidivist offending.21[25] We do not accept Palmer J erred in considering Mr Martel's claimed remorseagainst the backdrop of his previous convictions for drug related offending. Thoseconvictions were imposed as recently as 2016. This history of recidivist drugoffending was relevant to the Judge's assessment of whether Mr Martel's expressionsof remorse were genuine, as was the fact that Mr Martel's guilty plea was only enteredon the first day of trial. It was open to Palmer J to conclude that a remorse discountwas not warranted in such circumstances.18 Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607 at [64].19 R v Brewster [1998] 1 Cr App R 220 (CA); adopted by the full Court in Senior v Police (2000)18 CRNZ 340 (HC) at [21].20 R v T (CA251/02) (2002) 20 CRNZ 51 (CA) at [14].21 R v Ngamo [2009] NZCA 512 at [9].Ms Vincent[26] Ms Vincent wrote a letter of remorse, and indicated her determination tocontinue the drug free status she had maintained on remand. Palmer J acknowledgedthe significance of her addiction, and wished her well with her rehabilitation.22 Heobserved, however, that offending while serving a sentence requires deterrence, andon that basis uplifted her sentence by three months.23 He did not consider a discountwas justified given the level of offending.24[27] Mr Crowley initially submitted that Ms Vincent's "previous convictions didnot merit an uplift to her sentence of 3 months". Further, he submitted, she shouldhave received a discount for remorse and to reflect the fact that her offending wasdriven by her own addiction.[28] At the appeal hearing, Mr Crowley accepted that he had misunderstoodPalmer J's sentencing comments. In particular, the Judge did not impose athree-month uplift to reflect Ms Vincent's previous convictions. Rather, the upliftreflected that Ms Vincent had been subject to a sentence of community work forpossession of GBL at the time of the offending. That was a relevant sentencing factor,which justified a three month uplift.[29] As for Ms Vincent's addiction issue, in He v R, this Court acknowledged thatdrug addiction can be an underlying factor in drug-related offending, but concludedthat the offender in that case:25[19] was involved in a commercial drug dealing operation which wouldinevitably lead to others becoming addicted. That leaves little or no room totreat [the defendant's] addiction as a mitigating factor.[30] Given the commercial scale of Ms Vincent's offending (within band 4 of Fatu),those observations are equally apt in this case. Ms Vincent was not involved in asmall time operation to fuel her addiction, but a large commercial operation whichoperated over an extended period. Palmer J accordingly did not err in concluding that22 At [24].23 At [24].24 At [24].25 He v R [2017] NZCA 77.Ms Vincent's personal circumstances (including in particular her addiction issues) didnot warrant a sentencing discount.[31] In terms of remorse, Mr Crowley referred to Ms Vincent's letter of remorse, anaffidavit sworn by her sister in which she deposed that Ms Vincent had expressed herremorse to her in a phone call and Ms Vincent's pre-sentence report. Having readthose documents, we accept that Ms Vincent appears to have at least some insight intoher offending, and the harm that drugs cause to society. We are not satisfied, however,that it was an error on the part of Palmer J to conclude that, in all of the circumstancesof the case, Ms Vincent's remorse was not at a level that warranted a sentencingdiscount. This is particularly so given that the offending occurred when Ms Vincentwas serving a sentence for previous drug related offending.Guilty plea discount[32] The Supreme Court in Hessell v R established that the maximum discount fora guilty plea is 25 per cent.26 Further, before a discount is given after a trial hascommenced, there must be "some real justification".27[33] Each of the defendants pleaded guilty on the first day of trial. Mr Martel wasgiven a 10 per cent guilty plea discount and Ms Vincent and Mr Roux were both given15 per cent guilty plea discounts. Each of the appellants say that they should havebeen afforded a greater guilty plea discount. Mr Martel alleges disparate treatmentwith Ms Vincent. Ms Vincent and Mr Roux both submitted that they should have beengiven the maximum guilty plea discount of 25 per cent.Ms Vincent[34] At the outset of trial, 30 charges against Ms Vincent were withdrawn. As aconsequence, the amount of methamphetamine Ms Vincent was charged withimporting almost halved. Ms Vincent entered guilty pleas to the remaining chargesagainst her.26 At [75].27 Hessell v R, above n 18, at [76].[35] Although the Crown had supported a guilty plea discount of up to 20 per cent,Palmer J did not consider that a discount at that level could be justified for guilty pleasentered at such a late stage, and instead allowed a 15 per cent discount.28[36] Ms Vincent submits that she ought to have been given a full 25 per centdiscount for her guilty plea, on the basis that she pleaded guilty at the first reasonableopportunity. In the affidavit that she swore in support of this ground of appeal,Ms Vincent states that she wanted to enter guilty pleas much earlier but was unable todo so. This was due, she says, to the fact that she did not meet with her trial counsel(Lincoln Burns) to discuss the case against her and review the police disclosure, untilone working day before trial.[37] Ms Vincent was arrested in March 2016. Her trial commenced on10 July 2017. Ms Vincent's evidence is that she met Mr Burns at court at the time ofher initial appearance and on a subsequent occasion when she unsuccessfully appliedfor bail. Subsequently she also met with Mr Burns on one occasion in late June 2016(shortly after she had been transferred to Auckland Region Women's CorrectionsFacility) when he gave her a statement made by one of her co-offenders and about10 pages of text messages. On that occasion Ms Vincent was also able to get detailsof what the charges against her were, but did not see a summary of facts "which wouldhave explained what the case was about".[38] Ms Vincent says that she was aware that if she pleaded guilty she would get areduced sentence. She therefore wanted to see the evidence and the summary of facts,so she could understand the case against her and enter pleas to those charges in respectof which she accepted she was guilty. Ms Vincent had difficulty, however, in makingcontact with Mr Burns. She says that she left him multiple voice messages and alsosent him handwritten letters that she would ask the prison staff to send him. WhenMr Burns answered his phone, Ms Vincent would ask him to bring her thepolice disclosure, or send it to her. She told him that she was anxious to discuss thecharges with him.28 Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [24].[39] Ms Vincent has provided copies of prison phone logs to support her claimthat she made numerous attempts to contact Mr Burns. They record that shemade 31 phone calls to him from Christchurch Women's Prison during the period23 March 2016 to 27 June 2016. She made a further 50 phone calls to him from theAuckland Region Women's Corrections Facility, during the period 18 August 2016 to19 December 2017 (the last five of which post-dated the trial).[40] Ms Vincent says that Mr Burns told her that he could not discuss the case withher over the phone, but would instead come and see her in person. However, followinghis visit to her in late June 2016, Ms Vincent did not see Mr Burns again until Friday7 July 2017, over a year later. This was one working day before the trial, which wasscheduled to commence the following Monday, 10 July 2017.[41] Ms Vincent's evidence is that when she met with Mr Burns on 7 July 2017 heexplained the various charges to her and took her through the evidence relating tothem. She then instructed Mr Burns that she accepted liability in respect of a numberof the charges and wished to enter guilty pleas to them. Ms Vincent says that shewould have been willing to plead guilty to the charges that she did plead guilty tomuch earlier but was unable to do so because she could not access her lawyer, despiteher best attempts to do so. As a result, until the eve of trial, she had not seen thepolice summary of facts, had not seen or reviewed the police disclosure, and had notreceived legal advice regarding the charges. Once she understood the case against hershe promptly indicated her willingness to plead guilty to a number of charges. All ofthe remaining charges were withdrawn.[42] Mr Burns very belatedly sought to file an affidavit responding to Ms Vincent'sevidence. We declined the Crown's application for an extension of time to file hisaffidavit, given the following procedural history:(a) On 21 November 2017, Winkelmann J issued a Minute recording thatMr Crowley (counsel for Ms Vincent on appeal) had raised a concernthat his inability to contact Mr Burns and uplift his file was prejudicingpreparation of Ms Vincent's appeal. Winkelmann J directed Mr Burnsto co-operate with Mr Crowley forthwith and stated that:[3] If Mr Crowley continues to experience difficultyin this regard, this is a matter he may raise with the Court.This Court is concerned if a failure on the part of trial counselto provide information delays the progress of an appeal.(b) On 13 February 2018, Brown J had to adjourn the original appealhearing (for all three appellants) because:[2] Regrettably there has been a delay in the provision by[Ms] Vincent's former counsel [Mr Burns] of that counsel'sfile to Mr Crowley. As a consequence Mr Crowley seeks anadjournment of [Ms] Vincent's appeal.(c) A new appeal hearing date of 27 June 2018 was scheduled.(d) Ms Vincent's affidavit, in which she was critical of Mr Burns, wasfiled on 19 April 2018. The Crown was directed to file evidence inresponse by 25 May 2018. It did not do so. The Crown advised(in its memorandum of 26 June 2018) that:Despite repeated requests, Mr Burns did not provide aresponse by that date. Mr Burns was given a furtheropportunity to respond prior to the Crown filing submissionson 18 June 2018. He did not do so.(e) Mr Burns eventually provided the Crown with an affidavit in responseto Ms Vincent's affidavit on 26 June 2018, the day before the appealhearing. The Crown sought leave to file that affidavit out of time butacknowledged that, in that event, a further adjournment of the appealmay well be necessary.(f) At the commencement of the hearing on 27 June 2018, Mr Crowleyrequested that, if Mr Burns' affidavit was admitted, the appealhearing be adjourned to enable him to take instructions and to preparecross-examination of Mr Burns. (In our view that was a reasonablerequest).[43] Given this context, we had no hesitation in concluding that it would not be inthe interests of justice to further extend the time for filing Mr Burns' affidavit.Mr Burns provided no adequate explanation for the lengthy delay in provision of hisevidence. A second adjournment would have impacted not only Ms Vincent, but alsoMr Roux and Mr Martel, whose appeals were being heard at the same time.We therefore declined the extension request and proceeded to hear the appeal.[44] This aspect of the appeal therefore proceeds on the basis of Ms Vincent'sunchallenged evidence, which we accept. It is of note that the significant difficultiesMr Crowley and Ms Johnston reported in obtaining information from Mr Burnsmirrors the difficulties described by Ms Vincent in her evidence.[45] In light of Ms Vincent's undisputed evidence, we accept that the first realisticopportunity she had to plead guilty was on Monday, 10 July 2017. In suchcircumstances (which we note are highly unusual), a full 25 per cent guilty pleadiscount was warranted. The Judge accordingly erred in only affording Ms Vincent a15 per cent discount. We make no criticism of Palmer J, however. He would not havebeen aware of much of the background we have outlined. Ms Vincent's difficultieswith Mr Burns only came to light on appeal, after she had engaged new counsel to actfor her.Mr Martel[46] Mr Martel was granted a discount of 10 per cent for pleading guilty on the firstday of trial. Mr Kaye submitted that he should have been given the same discount asMs Vincent, because the time and money saved by Mr Martel pleading guilty was thesame as that saved by Ms Vincent's guilty pleas.[47] Mr Martel's position is not, however, analogous to that of Ms Vincent.Ms Vincent's guilty plea was made at the first reasonable opportunity, for the reasonswe have outlined above. Mr Martel, however, could have pleaded guilty much sooner.There was no significant change to the charges against him from the commencementof the proceedings to the date of his guilty pleas. Although some charges werewithdrawn, this simply reflected that the 37 separate charges against him werereplaced by representative charges. The prosecution case appears to have been astrong one. There is no suggestion that Mr Martel experienced the same difficultieswith access to counsel that Ms Vincent did.[48] We are satisfied that Palmer J did not err by refusing to grant Mr Martel thesame discount as Ms Vincent. A discount of 10 per cent for Mr Martel was appropriate.Mr Roux[49] Mr Roux, who also pleaded guilty on the first day of trial, was granted a15 per cent discount. The Crown had accepted that a discount of 20 per cent could bejustified, but Palmer J's view was that a discount of 15 per cent was more appropriatefor such a late plea.29[50] Mr Roux seems to have initially appeared on the charges in July or August2016, and the Court record indicates that by September 2016 at the latest, Mr Hall QCwas acting for him. Mr Corlett subsequently accepted assignment as legal aid counselin March 2017.[51] Mr Corlett advised that he travelled to Christchurch to meet with Mr Roux forthe first time in early May 2017. He was unable to meet with him prior to that due totrial commitments. At the May meeting Mr Roux is said to have squarelyacknowledged responsibility for some of the offending, but denied responsibility forother charges. Following the meeting Mr Corlett provided Mr Roux with formalwritten advice. Mr Roux then gave Mr Corlett instructions regarding resolution of thecharges. Mr Corlett wrote to the Crown proposing a resolution on Sunday 9 July (theday before the trial commenced). The Crown accepted the proposed resolution thefollowing morning and Mr Roux then entered guilty pleas.[52] We are not persuaded that Palmer J erred in affording Mr Roux a 15 per centguilty plea discount in such circumstances. Although a slightly higher discount couldhave been justified, 15 per cent was within the appropriate range. It was open toMr Roux, following his meeting with Mr Corlett in early May, to plead guilty to thosecharges in respect of which he accepted responsibility. He elected, instead, to delay29 At [25].entering pleas until a resolution of all of the charges could be negotiated. There isnothing improper, or unusual, in such a course. As a result, however, Mr Roux cannotclaim to have entered his guilty pleas at the earliest available opportunity.Were the MPIs appropriate?[53] Both Ms Vincent and Mr Roux seek to have their MPIs removed or reduced to40 per cent.Ms Vincent[54] In relation to Ms Vincent, Mr Crowley submitted that an MPI is not requiredfor the purposes set out in s 86 of the Sentencing Act 2002 (accountability,denunciation, deterrence and protection of the community).30[55] In serious drug offending, the criteria for imposing an MPI will almostinvariably be made out.31 The Court of Appeal in R v Zhou stated:32[19] the pervasive and pernicious influence of methamphetamine inNew Zealand society is such that the usual MPI of one-third applicable underthe Parole Act 2002 will most often be insufficient to meet the statutorypurposes identified in s 86(2) in cases of large scale offending.[56] Deterrence and denunciation carry significant weight in this case, givenMs Vincent's relatively senior role in the offending, and the overall scale andseriousness of it. In our view Palmer J did not err by setting a 50 per cent MPI.Mr Roux[57] As for Mr Roux, Mr Corlett submitted that his role was at the lower end of thescale, such that the purposes set out in s 86 do not require the imposition of an MPI.[58] We have previously considered, and rejected, Mr Corlett's submission thatMr Roux's role was broadly analogous to that of Mr Bell. Mr Roux's offending wasmore serious than that. He was convicted for his involvement in the importation of30 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86(2).31 See R v Aram [2007] NZCA 328 at [78].32 R v Zhou [2009] NZCA 365.five packages in which 1.324 kilograms of methamphetamine, 1.8 litres of GBL and31 grams of cocaine were imported. The offending occurred over a six week period.Mr Roux played a role in organising and overseeing others, as evidenced by thetext messages we have referred to at [19] above. Palmer J did not err in imposing a50 per cent MPI in such circumstances.Result[59] The applications for extensions of time for the filing of Ms Vincent andMr Roux's appeals are granted.[60] The application for an extension of time to file Mr Burns' affidavit is declined.[61] Mr Martel and Mr Roux's appeals are dismissed.[62] Ms Vincent's appeal is allowed in part. Her end sentence of 14 years and eightmonths' imprisonment is quashed and replaced with a sentence of 12 years and11 months' imprisonment, with a minimum period of imprisonment of six years andfive months. This reflects our view that, in the unusual circumstances of her case, aguilty plea discount of 25 per cent is warranted, rather than the 15 per cent affordedby the Judge.Solicitors:Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent