RONGOTAI INVESTMENTS LIMITED AND RONGOTAI ESTATES LIMITED v LAND VALUATION TRIBUNAL [2019] NZHC 3040

RONGOTAI INVESTMENTS LIMITED AND RONGOTAI ESTATES LIMITED v LAND VALUATIONTRIBUNAL [2019] NZHC 3040 [20 November 2019]IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALANDWELLINGTON REGISTRYI TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROATE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHECIV-2019-485-662[2019] NZHC 3040IN THE MATTER of the application for judicial review of aLand Valuation Tribunal hearing in respectof objections under the Rating ValuationsAct 1998 and the Land ValuationProceedings Act 1948UNDER THE Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016BETWEEN RONGOTAI INVESTMENTS LIMITEDAND RONGOTAI ESTATES LIMITEDApplicantsAND LAND VALUATION TRIBUNALFirst RespondentAND 2468 LIMITEDSecond RespondentAND BUNNINGS LIMITEDThird RespondentAND LYALL BAY PROPERTIES LIMITEDFourth RespondentAND WELLINGTON INTERNATIONALAIRPORT LTDFifth RespondentAND WELLINGTON CITY COUNCILSixth RespondentAND ATTORNEY-GENERALSeventh RespondentAND NZ CASH FLOW CONTROL LIMITEDEighth RespondentHearing: 19 November 2019Appearances: S Mills QC and M R Wolff for ApplicantsNo appearance for the First RespondentK P Sullivan for the Second, Fifth and Eighth RespondentsS V McKechnie and J R Meager for the Third RespondentNo appearance for the Fourth RespondentNo appearance for the Sixth RespondentD Jones for the Seventh RespondentDate: 20 November 2019JUDGMENT OF COOKE J(Interim relief)[1] By application dated 8 November 2019 the applicants (Rongotai) apply forinterim orders under s 15 of the Judicature Review Procedure Act 2016 preventing theLand Valuation Tribunal (the Tribunal) from proceeding with hearing or determinationof certain rating valuation objection hearings currently scheduled before it, includinga hearing that is due to commence next week, until Rongotai's judicial review claimsare heard and determined.[2] The judicial review proceedings concern the appropriateness of previousprocesses and determinations of the Tribunal, and are set out in an amended statementof claim dated 11 November 2019. Two judicial review claims are pleaded, apparentbias and pre-determination although both seem to advance the same central complaint.[3] Mr Mills QC advanced the argument for Rongotai in support of the application.Mr Jones appeared for the Attorney-General in opposition to the order. Mr Jonesexplained that the Attorney-General appeared in relation to allegations concerningjudicial conduct, and also in connection with the public interest in the inquiryprocesses. Ms McKechnie advanced the submissions in opposition on behalf of thethird respondent, and Mr Sullivan on behalf of the second, fifth and eighthrespondents.Test for interim relief[4] Section 15 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 provides:(1) At any time before the final determination of an application, the courtmay, on the application of a party, make an interim order of the kindspecified in subsection (2) if, in its opinion, it is necessary to do so topreserve the position of the applicant.(2) The interim orders referred to in subsection (1) are interim orders—(a) prohibiting a respondent from taking any further action that is,or would be, consequential on the exercise of the statutorypower:(b) prohibiting or staying any proceedings, civil or criminal, inconnection with any matter to which the application relates:(c) declaring that any licence that has been revoked or suspendedin the exercise of the statutory power, or that will expire by thepassing of time before the final determination of theapplication, continues and, where necessary, that it be deemedto have continued in force.(4) An order under subsection (2) or (3) may—(a) be made subject to such terms and conditions as the court thinksfit; and(b) be expressed to continue in force until the application is finallydetermined or until such other date, or the happening of suchother event, as the court may specify.[5] The general approach to interim relief under the predecessor of this section, s 8of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, was set out by the Supreme Court in Ministerof Fisheries v Antons Trawling Company Ltd,1 by reference to the judgment of CookeJ in Carlton & United Breweries Ltd v Minister of Customs.2 The Supreme Court held:Before a Court can make an interim order under s 8 of the JudicatureAmendment Act 1972 it must be satisfied that the order sought is reasonablynecessary to preserve the position of the applicant. If that condition is satisfiedthe Court has a wide discretion to consider all the circumstances of the case,including the apparent strengths or weaknesses of the applicant's claim forreview and all the repercussions, public and private of granting interim relief.[6] For the reasons more fully set out in Greer v Department of Corrections, in myview the Court should avoid an overly formalistic approach to the threshold questionof whether the order sought is reasonably necessary to preserve the position of the1 Minister of Fisheries v Antons Trawling Company Ltd [2007] NZSC 101; (2007) 18 PRNZ 754.2 Carlton & United Breweries Ltd v Minister of Customs [1986] 1 NZLR 423 (CA).applicant, with the focus being on a consideration of the facts and circumstances ofthe case in the application of the discretion.3 When doing so the s 15 power should beinterpreted and applied in light of its apparent purposes. These include the desirabilityof preserving the Court's ability to grant effective relief if the judicial review challengeis successful, and relieving the applicant from the adverse effect of a decision until thechallenge is heard and determined in deserving cases.Background circumstances[7] Rongotai is one of several parties participating in proceedings before theTribunal challenging rating value assessments that have been made in relation tocertain land in the area of Rongotai which is adjacent to Wellington Airport. Forreasons that do not need to be elaborated upon at this stage there has been aconsiderable delay in relation to the hearing of objections before the Tribunal. TheTribunal is now addressing objections in relation to the same properties in a series ofhearings in relation to different valuation periods. The relevant valuation periods are2007, 2012, 2015 and 2018.4 Once the rating value is set this has a flow-on effect forthe rent paid by lessees. Rongotai favours a high value as the owner of the freeholdinterest, and the respondents who are lessees favour a lower value.[8] The Tribunal issued a decision in relation to the 2007 valuation period on19 July 2019.5 It then declined an application by Rongotai to stay the hearings inrelation to the further years by decision dated 19 August 2019.6 The Tribunal thenproceeded with a hearing for the 2012 valuation period from 19–29 August. By anoral interim decision of the Tribunal dated 12 September 2009, the Tribunal then heldthat a particular transaction called the Pengelly transaction was relevant to itsdetermination.7 It later issued its substantive decision dated 7 November 2019.8 Thenext hearing commencing next week is to deal with the 2015 valuation period, withthe 2018 valuation period hearing scheduled for next year.3 Greer v Department of Corrections [2018] NZHC 1240, [2018] 3 NZLR 571 at [21]–[26].4 There were initially more years in issue but these are the remaining contested years.5 NZ Cashflow Control Ltd v Wellington City Council [2019] NZLVT 078.6 Rongotai Investments Ltd v Wellington City Council [2019] NZLVT 083.7 Rongotai Investments Ltd v Wellington City Council [2019] NZLVT 093.8 Rongotai Investments Ltd v Wellington City Council [2019] NZLVT 108.[9] There have also been hearings before this Court. Rongotai filed an appeal fromthe 2007 valuation period decision of the Tribunal dated 19 July 2019 (CIV-2019-485-430). Rongotai also commenced judicial review proceedings, including an applicationfor what was essentially interim relief in relation to the Tribunal's decision not to granta stay (CIV-2019-485-495). On 26 August 2019 Justice Doogue dealt with theapplication for interim relief, where Rongotai sought orders staying the orders of the2012 objections until determination of the judicial review. That application wasdeclined. Doogue J held:9[17] I consider there will be both private and public repercussions thatmilitate against the granting of relief. These objections are being heard afterconsiderable delay and the objectors and the public have a right to haveproceedings resolved expeditiously and without further delay.[10] At a hearing on 27 September 2019 Cull J dealt with Rongotai's applicationfor the allocation of a priority fixture to hear a separate question of law in relation tothe appeal, as well as other matters. That application was declined. Cull J held thatthe question of law that had been formulated did not raise a discrete jurisdictionalpoint. She then held:10[21] Even if I am wrong about that issue, there are three reasons I considercount against a separate hearing:(a) it will cause delay, not expedite the hearings;(b) the parties had agreed to the four hearings being heardsequentially, with appeal issues being addressed later;(c) the consequences of not proceeding with the scheduledhearings will cause further complications.[11] Neither of these judgments dealt with the issue of bias and pre-determination,or the issues that have assumed prominence in connection with the present application.The hearing that gives rise to the allegations of bias and pre-determination occurredbetween 19–29 August, at approximately the same time as the matter was being dealtwith on the papers by Doogue J. When the matter was before Cull J in SeptemberRongotai had not yet formulated its new claims.9 Rongotai Investments Ltd v Land Valuation Tribunal [2019] NZHC 2103. This proceeding hassince been discontinued.10 Rongotai Investments Ltd v Wellington City Council [2019] NZHC 2741.[12] The origins of the allegations of bias and pre-determination arise from thePengelly transaction, which involved a sale of a property. The ultimate question waswhether this particular sale was relevant to assessing the market value of the propertiesin the area. Part of Rongotai's arguments that it was not were based on two inter-related factual allegations. First Rongotai contended that the particular sale waseffectively a forced or distressed sale. Secondly it was said the vendor had not actedprudently in achieving the best price, including because the person behind Rongotai,Mr Aharoni said that he and others had made offers to the vendors in relation to thatsale for much higher amounts.[13] Whilst these factual questions were always relevant to the valuation questions,they appeared to attain a greater prominence in the hearings than might be expected.In part that was due to a challenge to the veracity of the evidence given about thetransaction, particularly from Mr Aharoni. The Tribunal permitted cross-examinationof Mr Aharoni, and the expert witnesses called by Rongotai in reasonably forthrightterms. The Tribunal itself, or more particularly the presiding Judge also joined in thequestioning on this issue. It appears the Judge took a dim view of some of the evidencethat was being given. During the evidence of the first expert witness for Rongotai hetook the step of making an order excluding Rongotai's witnesses, including not onlyMr Aharoni but also the remaining expert witnesses who were going to be called inrelation to the Pengelly transaction.[14] In addition during the course of Rongotai's evidence, and on more than oneoccasion, the Judge raised the question of whether he should be giving the witnesses,particularly Mr Aharoni a warning about committing perjury — in effect giving awarning that he might have to give such a warning. This last feature was slightlyobscured by the Judge not using the word "perjury", and referring to it as a "Pwarning".[15] Finally, shortly after the hearing, and in the oral interim decision of12 September 2019, the Tribunal made adverse findings and observations aboutMr Aharoni and other witnesses. Counsel for the third respondent had advanced thecontention that the offers made by Mr Aharoni through a Mr Blackett were "aconstruct" for Mr Aharoni to generate evidence that could later be used before theTribunal to justify a higher value. The Tribunal held:11[44] Mr McEntegart submitted to us very strongly that the evidence wassufficient to satisfy us that Mr Aharoni entered into this tender process andused Mr Blackett subsequently to try and argue for a higher per square metrevalue for the Rongotai land. His role in having Mr Blackett enquire with thePengellys and his sending of the email after the date on which he knew thenew contract were entered into are certainly highly dubious and could properlylead to that conclusion. It suggests that Mr Aharoni's purpose in doing so wasnot in relation to the purchase of the property but rather for a collateralpurpose.[45] Overall it is more likely than not that these steps were to establish anarguable different per metre rate. Nevertheless, we want to be very clear thatit is not necessary for us to reach that conclusion to conclude that the Pengellytransaction was entirely a market and relevant transaction.Is there a position to preserve?[16] I first deal with the arguments for the respondents that Rongotai does not havea position to preserve under s 15 of the Act.[17] As I have already indicated at [6] above I do not adopt a narrow approach tothis question. I accept that Rongotai does have a position to preserve. In particular itis about to engage in hearings before the same members of the Tribunal, and whichwill involve some time and cost for it that it wishes to avoid. Moreover as Mr Millsemphasised by reference to the decision in the Supreme Court in Saxmere CompanyLtd v Wool Board Disestablishment Company Ltd, the right to a hearing conducted ina fair and impartial way is a fundamental right which warrants emphasis.12 It is notsimply a monetary value that the applicant is seeking to preserve.[18] But the extent of the position that the applicant is seeking to preserve alsobecomes relevant to the discretionary phase of the application of s 15. Whilst I acceptthat there is a position to preserve, I have decided that interim relief should not be11 Other adverse comments were made that Mr Aharoni's email relating to an offer was "suspicious"([14]) that Ms Watson (a valuer working for QV) had given an answer on the matter that was"convenient" ([34]) that Mr Aharoni and Mr Young had discussed their evidence about whetherthe Pengelly transaction was distressed and that "there may be further ramifications of all this"([36]) and that Mr Butcher's evidence was "quite surprising" ([43]).12 Saxmere Company Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Company Ltd [2009] NZSC 72, [2010] 1NZLR 35.granted in the facts and circumstances of the present case for the reasons outlinedbelow. These are influenced by the fact that the Court will be able to give an effectiveremedy should the applicants judicial review claims be made out. I explain this inmore detail below.Nature of the challenge[19] It seems to me that a key consideration is the nature and strength of theapplicants' challenge, and what is necessary to properly assess it.[20] The nature of the challenge Rongotai wishes to advance necessitates a carefulconsideration of all the evidence before the Tribunal and the circumstances of the case.That is not something that has been able to be achieved in this interim relief hearingeven though I was able to read some of the more significant parts of the voluminousmaterial filed, and the hearing of the application proceeded for most of the day. Iaccept that there are some features of the hearing that took place before the Tribunalbetween 19 and 29 August 2019, and the steps taken thereafter, that can be describedas unorthodox, and give rise to a possible question relating to the fairness of theapproach that was followed. I say that for the following reasons:(a) Rongotai had put in issue factual questions relating to the Pengellytransaction. This included issues on whether it was a distressed sale,and whether Mr Aharoni's offers were better evidence of the true valueof the property. But the Tribunal's factual inquiries appear to have gonefurther and included an inquiry on whether the evidence led before theTribunal was untrue, and had been orchestrated. It is arguable thatinquiring into whether the evidence had been so orchestrated was notrelevant to what the Tribunal needed to decide. Indeed the Tribunalitself held that such findings were not necessary for it to reach itsdecision, but only after first making them.1313 At [45]. Engaging in an inquiry as to a party's conduct before the Tribunal can be problematic.Indeed this was part of the criticism made by the Court in Re Erebus Royal Commission (No 2)[1981] 1 NZLR 618 (CA), [1983] NZLR 662 (PC) at 686.(b) Orders excluding witnesses can be made by a Court when there will besignificant credibility issues in a case — for example when the caseconcerns an allegation of fraud.14 That is not something that would benormal in proceedings before the Land Valuation Tribunal, even wherethere were factual issues. The orders made by the Tribunal here wereunusual in three further respects. First they occurred some way throughthe hearings, covered only the witnesses for one party, and were notmade on the application of any party. Secondly, they did not exemptthe representative of a party appearing before the Tribunal, and whilstthere remains jurisdiction to exclude a party representative as part ofsuch an order, this is only done in extraordinary circumstances giventhe fundamental rights of a party to be able to participate in their owncase.15 Thirdly it is unusual for such an order to apply to expertwitnesses, which again would only be necessary when there werecompelling reasons.16(c) Occasionally it as appropriate for a Judge to give a warning that awitness runs a risk of committing perjury if he or she gives dishonestevidence. That is usually when there is a fairness concern for thewitness. It is something that needs to be done with some care becauseof the implication that the Judge is pre-judging the credibility of theevidence. There have been cases where the giving such a perjurywarning has been held to be evidence of pre-determination.17 In thepresent case the question whether such a warning should be given wasraised several times by the Judge during cross-examination. It isarguable that this theme gave the impression of pre-determinationand/or unfair treatment of the witnesses.(d) The Judge engaged in substantial questioning himself, some of whicharguably had the character of cross-examination. On occasion this may14 See generally, Matthew Downs (ed) Cross on Evidence (loose-leaf ed, Lexis Nexis) at EVA, Part3, Subpart 4.1(e), Ordering Witnesses out of Court.15 See Robinson Crothall Ltd v Snap On Inc (2002) 16 PRNZ 430 (HC) at [40].16 See Maruha Corporation v Amaltal Corporation (No 5) (2004) 17 PRNZ 83 (HC).17 Hill v New Zealand Police [2017] NZHC 2112 at [23]–[24].have given the impression that the questions were being pursued jointlywith cross-examining counsel.18 During the cross-examination ofMr Aharoni by Mr McEntegart the Judge asked counsel "do you thinkI've got to the P-word warning or not?" and Mr McEntegart respondsthat he has. The Judge then says that he is reluctant to give such awarning, and directs counsel for Rongotai to have a discussion withMr Aharoni. It is unusual for a Judge to ask opposing counsel whetherthe Judge should give a witness for another party a perjury warning.(e) The release of decisions by the Tribunal also seems a little unusual. Therelease of an oral interim decision on 12 September (after the hearingshad completed on 29 August) was explained by the Tribunal on thebasis that witnesses appearing for the next rounds concerning the 2015and 2018 periods should know that the Tribunal considered thePengelly transaction relevant. But it was also said to be becauseproceedings were then being taken in the High Court, and the partieswere being given the benefit of the Tribunal's views.19 It is in thisdecision that the adverse credibility findings were made. Arguably thepurpose of the decision was to make these adverse views known to theparties and this Court. When these judicial review proceedings werethen issued and served on the Tribunal, including a claim for an orderthat the Tribunal not to release its substantive decision, the Tribunalthen released the substantive decision that afternoon. The firstparagraph of the decision stated that the decision was "unlikely to beissued before the commencement of the next hearing" which suggeststhere had been a change of mind on the timing of release.20 The releaseof the decision on the afternoon of the day the proceedings were servedmay be a coincidence, but it is arguable that the release of both of these18 For example at NOE 362 the Judge takes over cross-examination of Ms Christina Watson, aregistered valuer employed by QV for just over a page and a half of questioning beforecommenting at NOE 364 "well I can only take it so far Mr McEntegart. I have to leave it to yourtender care again."19 Rongotai Investments Ltd v Wellington City Council, above n 7, at [2].20 Rongotai Investments Ltd v Wellington City Council, above n 8, at [2].decisions has been influenced by the Tribunal's adverse views ofRongotai.[21] Other matters have been mentioned in argument but it is unnecessary to addressthem at this stage.21Factors against the grant of relief[22] Notwithstanding these points, there are several features which satisfy me thatthe Court should not grant the interim orders.[23] At this interlocutory stage I only have a preliminary basis for assessing theissues and evidence before the Tribunal. Mr Sullivan emphasised that it was Rongotaithat had opened up the factual contests, and argued that as the evidence emerged it wasclear there was no foundation for its contentions. It may well transpire that theTribunal had good grounds to regard Rongotai's evidence on the distressed nature ofthe Pengelly transaction, and the existence of offers at higher levels, as not credible.There can also be a fine line between finding that evidence is not credible, and afinding of perjury.22 Whilst that might not fully answer all concerns about the mannerin which the hearings were conducted, it may provide fuller context to the criticismsthat are now made by Rongotai.[24] Previous cases involving allegations of pre-determination arising from theconduct of hearings illustrate the importance of context. In Re Royal Commission onThomas Case the Court of Appeal was also dealing with a situation where commentsmade by the presiding judicial officer of the Commission of Inquiry were said toevidence pre-determination.23 But given the circumstances of that inquiry the Courtconcluded that the challenge based on pre-determination should not be upheld, whilstnoting that the matter was finely balanced and had caused the Court anxiety.24Similarly in Riverside Casino Ltd v Moxon the High Court had upheld a challenge21 A particular matter concerning a familial association between counsel for Rongotai and a memberof the Tribunal was referred to. I accept that this matter raises issues, but given it has not beenexpressly pleaded I do not think it appropriate to address it at this stage.22 As Lord Diplock observed in Re Erebus Royal Commission, above n 13, at p 686.23 Re Royal Commission on Thomas Case [1982] 1 NZLR 252 (CA).24 At p 284.based on alleged conduct of this kind, principally because there were "too many signspointing in one direction" in relation to the Chair's comments during hearings of theCasino Control Authority.25 But on appeal the Court of Appeal referred to the Chairhaving heard the same arguments and evidence at other hearings, and ultimatelyconcluded that the Chair's "unnecessary robustness at times to us reflected more hispersonality and background than bias".26 A similar approach to such cases was takenin the Australia authorities referred to by Ms McKechnie.27[25] Perhaps most relevant authority is Russell v The Taxation Review Authoritywhere the Court of Appeal addressed an allegation of pre-determination/bias by theTaxation Review Authority in relation to a decision in relation to a J G Russell taxavoidance template, which the same Judge had previously held to be patently anarrangement for tax avoidance.28 The Court held that Mr Russell had a basis forobjecting to that Judge hearing the case. But the Court emphasised that there was anappeal to the High Court by way of a re-hearing, and that that re-hearing cured anyissue of pre-determination.29 In the present case there is similarly an appeal by wayof re-hearing to this Court, and accordingly the same potential for any concerns inrelation to the manner of the first hearing to be addressed in the appeal process.[26] The above authorities illustrate not only the desirability of assessingallegations of pre-determination in the full circumstances of the case, but also that anyorders by way of relief need to be assessed in the full circumstances. Quite robustearlier findings, or comments during hearings have been held not to warrantintervention when the full context is understood. The discretion in relation to relief injudicial review is important. For example, even if the claims were upheld, it may bethat the Court could quash the comments in the oral interim decision of 12 September,or make relevant declarations, but conclude that the substantive determination shouldnot be disturbed.3025 Moxon v Casino Control Authority, HC Hamilton, M324/99, 24 May 2000 at [96].26 Riverside Casino Ltd v Moxon [2001] 2 NZLR 78 at [70].27 Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48, (2000) 201 CLR 488; Zaki v Minister of Immigration andBorder Protection [2019] FCA 1822.28 Russell v The Taxation Review Authority [2011] NZCA 158.29 At [39]–[45].30 See, for example, the declaratory relief given in Peters v Davison [1999] 3 NZLR 744 (HC).[27] The factual contest concerning the Pengelly transaction appears to haveoccupied much hearing time before the Tribunal. But although it was an importantsale, the ultimate issue was whether it should be included in the basket of transactionstaken into account to assess the value of land. The question to be determined by theTribunal, and then by this Court on any appeal, is what the appropriate value of theland is. There is no doubt that the Pengelly transaction occurred, with the only factualissues relating to whether it was at market price. So the ultimate issues of relevanceare confined ones.[28] It is also of particular significance that Rongotai is not irretrievably prejudicedby the hearings continuing. If it is successful with these judicial review proceedings,the Court retains the ability to grant effective relief. Were that point reached, the Courtwould be able to set aside the decisions of the Tribunal for 2012, and if necessary for2015 and 2018 as well. The main prejudice to Rongotai arises from it continuing inthe hearing process before the Tribunal which has already expressed strongly adverseviews of Rongotai and its experts. As Mr Mills emphasised this has more than simplyfinancial implications. But it is equally true that any order requiring the hearings tostop now to enable Rongotai's judicial review proceedings to be heard wouldsignificantly disadvantage the other parties who wish them to continue, and upset thepre-arranged sequential hearing process determined at the outset. It was these factorsthat influenced Justice Doogue in declining the interim relief on a previous occasion,31and it is also a feature that influenced Justice Cull's decision in relation to thepreliminary issue.32[29] It is also relevant that the hearings in relation to 2015 and 2018 will not involveany factual contest of the kind that was involved in the dispute about the Pengellytransaction. Rather it is to be focused on the more routine questions that usually arisebefore the Tribunal as to assessment of the value of land. Whilst Rongotai will becalling the some of the same expert witnesses, I am advised that it now has differentcounsel instructed to appear at the hearings.31 Rongotai Investments Ltd v Land Valuation Tribunal, above n 9.32 Rongotai Investments Ltd v Wellington City Council, above n 10.[30] There is also a background factor that the two valuer members of the Tribunalwill only remain members of the Tribunal through to the first half of next year.Accordingly delaying the hearings process may mean that the Tribunal membershipmight need to change. That is a further factor in favour of the hearings continuing andbeing completed by the currently composed panel of the Tribunal.[31] I also accept that there is some relevance to delay as Ms McKechnie and othercounsel emphasised. The interim decision was released on 12 September, but theseproceedings not filed until 6 November. I accept Mr Mills point that some time wouldhave been required to assemble the potential case in relation to pre-determination, andthen take advice from senior counsel as to whether it was appropriate to advance it.But it has still taken some time for the challenge to be brought, and as Ms McKechniepoints out steps have been taken in the meantime, including the caucusing of the expertvaluers for the next round of hearings beginning next week. There is some force inthe submission she makes that in these circumstances the approach adopted by DobsonJ in Bradfield v Attorney-General is appropriate, and that such proceedings should betaken at the "first reasonable opportunity".33[32] Mr Sullivan also emphasised the parties that are affected by the ongoinghearing processes are changing, with the impacts on each party varying in terms of thesignificance that a particular year's determination has for the level of their rent. Byitself that is a factor against the grant of an interim order.[33] If Rongotai's proceedings ultimately succeed, it will potentially adverselyaffect all parties who may be required to go through a new hearing process. But it issignificant that all the parties who have appeared on this application oppose the orderssought by Rongotai as they wish to proceed. Their hearing rights are also important.[34] It seems to me that before the Court would make interim orders of the kind thatRongotai seeks it would have to have been convinced that the judicial reviewproceedings were highly likely to succeed, such that the further hearings shouldaccordingly be curtailed. But I am well short of that point. As Mr Jones submittedthe matters that have been raised do not prevent the hearing going ahead. The potential33 Bradfield v Attorney-General [2019] NZHC 1570 at [45].concerns that I have identified in [20] above should not be overstated. The authoritiesrecognise a degree of latitude in terms of the manner of hearings taking place beforetribunals of this kind, and ultimately the Court could conclude that the criticisms ofRongotai had a solid evidential foundation, and that any residual concerns about themanner in which the hearings proceeded are not such that warrant the intervention ofthe Court.Outcome[35] For these reasons the application for interim orders is dismissed.[36] I reserve the question of costs. Any parties seeking costs may file memoranda,with any response to be filed and served 15 working days thereafter. My preliminaryview is this should be categorised as a 2B matter, that the Attorney-General should notbe awarded costs, but that the second, fifth and eighth respondents represented byMr Sullivan, and the third respondent represented by Ms McKechnie are entitled tocosts. Whether that should be two costs awards, or a single costs award to be sharedbetween the two opposing respondent groups is a matter which should be covered inmemoranda if such applications are pursued.[37] I further direct that the appeal proceedings in CIV-2019-485-430 and thisproceeding, together with any other proceeding that are filed in relation to the hearingsbefore the Tribunal in relation to 2015 and 2018, be subject to joint case management.Cooke JSolicitors:Morrison Kent, Wellington for ApplicantsPort Nicholson Chambers, Wellington for Second, Fifth and Eighth RespondentsSimpson Grierson, Wellington for Third RespondentCrown Law, Wellington for Seventh Respondent